

## Advaitasiddhi

The logicity of knowability (dRishyatvam) as the reason for  
mithyAtvam

(The proposition put forward by the advaitin is that the world is mithyA because it is knowable (dRishyam), like nacre-silver).

prapancam mithyA, dRishyatvAt, shuktirUpyavat.

Here the hetu or reason is drishyatvam. The sAdhya or what is to be established, is mithyAtvam. The example is shuktirUpyam.

mithyA means ‘what does not exist in all the three periods of time in the locus in which it appears’—e.g., nacre-silver, rope-snake, etc.

asat or tuccha is what never appears in any locus, like the horn of a rabbit.

(Notes—

In VyAptipancaka, Gangesopadhyaya has defined vyApti as the non-existence of the hetu in the locus of the absence of the sAdhya—साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्.

Advaitasiddhi- Skt Commentary, Balabodhini, Page 169--  
dRishyatvam means being an object of knowledge, and not only of perceptual (pratyakSha) knowledge-

P. 170-- In Patanjali’s darshana, vikalpa, which means concept of non-existent things like the horn of a rabbit, is considered as jnAna. In advaita, though vikalpa is accepted as a chittavRitti, it is not accepted as jnAna.

p.171—The vRitti named jnAna is of two kinds, that in the form of the modification of the mind and that in the form of modification of avidyA.

p. 171—In advaita, in the erroneous cognition of the form of nacre-silver, etc., a vRitti of the mind in the form of ‘this’ (idam) and a vRitti of avidyA in the form of silver, etc are accepted. The silver is not cognized by a vRitti of the mind, because a vRitti of the mind can occur only when there is

contact of one of the five external senses with the object. The eye cannot be in contact with the nacre-silver for the simple reason that it is not there. But still it is dRishyam, an object of knowledge.

p.171—vRitti-vyApyatvam means being the object of a vRitti.

p.172—Where the vRitti is for the removal of the veil of ignorance, the consciousness limited by such removal is the phala, (see pp. 65-67 of Siddhantabindu translation),

p.173—The connection of the object with its knowledge is AdhyAsika—due to superimposition only.

p.173- Only in perception through the external senses there can be phalavyApyatvam. In parokSha knowledge, such as that of dharma, and pratibhAsika objects like nacre-silver, in happiness, sorrow, and other mental states which are known only by the witness-consciousness, there can be no phala.

p. 173—In the view that the vRitti is for connecting the knower-consciousness with the object, the consciousness reflected in the vRitti in the form of the object which is generated by a pramANa (sense-organ) is the phala.

p.174—There is sAkShAt citviShayatvam only for those which are known by the witness-consciousness, such as happiness, etc., and not for pot, etc., which become objects of cit only through a vRitti. By the use of the words ‘at some time’ and ‘in some way’ past knowledge and sAkShAt viShayatvam as well as knowledge through vRitti are covered. Even unknown objects are the viShaya of witness-consciousness and so they are also covered.

p. 178—Dharma and adharma which are not knowable by the senses (nitya atIndriya), all prAtibhAsika objects such as nacre-silver, happiness, etc., and avidyA, which are revealed by the witness, are not revealed by a phala. So, if phalavyApyatva is taken as the hetu, these items will not come under dRishyam and so there will be the defect of bhAgAsiddhi- the hetu not being present in a part of the pakSha. In the example, nacre-silver, there is the defect of sAdhanavaikalyam, the hetu not being present in the example.

vyabhicAra means the defect of the hetu appearing where the sAdhya is not present, e.g., dRishyatvam appearing in

Brahman which has no mithyAtvam, because of a faulty definition of dRishyatvam.

१. ननु—मिथ्यात्वं साध्ये हेतूकृतं यद्दृश्यत्वं तदप्युपपादनीयम् । तथा हि—किमिदं दृश्यत्वम्?

वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वं वा? फलव्याप्यत्वं वा? साधारणम् वा? कदाचित् कथंचित् चिद्विषयत्वं वा? स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिर्वा? अस्वप्रकाशं वा?

1. Objection by the dvaitin – The reason given for the mithyAtvam (of the world), namely, knowability, should be explained. What is this knowability? Does it mean ‘being revealed by a vRitti’? Or being revealed by phala (the reflection of consciousness in the vRitti)? Or both? Or being an object of consciousness at some time in some way? Or being invariably dependent on a consciousness different from itself for its own manifestation? Or not being self-luminous (asvaprakAshatvam)?

Note- p.177—The last option is based on the advaitin’s definition of svaprakAshatvam. The definition of svaprakAshatvam is:--

अवेद्यत्वे सति अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम् ।

avedyatvam has been defined as ‘not revealed by a phala’. Nacre-silver is not revealed by a phala since it is revealed by the witness. So it is avedyam. But its cognition by the witness is pratyakSha, which is the same as aparokSha. So it becomes svaprakAsham by the above definition. That means that the hetu, asvaprakAshatvam, is not present in the example, nacre-silver. This is sAdhanavaikalyam. This objection will be refuted later.

Now the dvaitin goes on rejecting each of the above meanings.

२. नाद्यः; आत्मनो वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेन तत्र व्यभिचारात्, अत एव न तृतीयोऽपि ।  
नापि द्वितीयः; नित्यातीन्द्रिये शुक्तिरूप्यादौ च तदभावेन भागासिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ययोः  
प्रसङ्गात् । नापि चतुर्थः; ब्रह्म पूर्वं न ज्ञातमिदानीं वेदान्तेन ज्ञातमित्यनुभवेन आत्मनि  
व्यभिचारात् । नापि पञ्चमः ब्रह्मण्यप्यद्वितीयत्वादिविशिष्टव्यवहारे  
संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिदर्शनेन व्यभिचारात् । नापि षष्ठः; स हि अवेद्यत्वे

सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावरूपः । तथा च शुक्तिरूप्यादेरपि अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वेन साधनवैकल्यात्—इति चेत् ।

2. Obj (contd)--Not the first (alternative), since the AtmA is revealed by a vRitti brought about by vedAnta, and so there would be the defect of vyabhicAra- the hetu appearing in what is not the pakSha. (since that would make the AtmA a dRishya). Not the third alternative either, for the same reason. Nor is the second alternative. Since in objects which are always beyond the senses (like heaviness, dharma and adharma) and such things as nacre-silver, as well as past and future events, are not revealed by a phala, there will be the defects of bhAgAsiddhi (not covering the entire pakSha) and sAdhanaivaikalya (the example nacre-silver is not phalavyApyam and has therefore no dRishyatvam by this definition.)

Not even the fourth, since by the experience that brahman was not known before, but now it is known through vedAnta there is vyabhicAra because brahman becomes an object of knowledge. That means there is dRishyatvam in Brahman.

Not the fifth, because for describing Brahman as non-dual, etc., another consciousness has to be depended on.

Not the sixth, because according to the definition of svaprakAśatvam nacre-silver would also have svaprakAśatvam, as explained below.

Note- The definition of svaprakAśatvam is:--

अवेद्यत्वे सति अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम् ।

Avedyatvam means 'not revealed by a phala'. Nacre-silver is not revealed by a phala since it is revealed by the witness. So it is avedyam. But its cognition by the witness is pratyakSha, which is the same as aparokSha. So it becomes svaprakAśam by the above definition. That means that the hetu, asvaprakAśatvam, is not present in the example, nacre-silver and so there is the defect of sAdhanaivaikalyam.

३. मैवम्, फलव्याप्यत्वव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यापि पक्षस्य क्षोदक्षमत्वात् । न च— वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वपक्षे ब्रह्मणि व्यभिचारः; अन्यथा ब्रह्मपराणां वेदान्तानां वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति वाच्यम्; शुद्धं हि ब्रह्म न दृश्यम्; “यत्तदद्रेश्यमि”ति श्रुतेः, किन्तूपहितमेव, तच्च मिथ्यैव;

न हि वृत्तिदशायामनुपहितं तद्भवति । न च— ‘सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्येऽस्मिन् ब्रह्मरूपे व्यवस्थिते’  
इति स्ववचनविरोध इति—वाच्यम्; तस्याप्युपहितपरत्वात् ।  
न च— एवं सति शुद्धसिद्धिर्न स्यादिति—वाच्यम्; स्वत एव तस्य प्रकाशत्वेन सिद्धत्वात्

3 Answer—Not so, because all the alternatives other than phalavyApyatvam can stand scrutiny. In the matter of vRittivyApyatvam, it is not correct to say that there is the defect of vyabhicara with regard to Brahman or that the vedAnta which deals with Brahman will become futile (if, in order to avoid the defect of vyabhicara, the advaitin says that they do not reveal Brahman). It is only the pure Brahman that is not dRishyam, because of the shruti ‘That which is adreshyam, etc.,’ but it is only Brahman with the vRitti as upAdhi that is dRishyam. That is indeed mithyA. Pure Brahman is not what is revealed by the vRitti.

MaNDana misra has said in brahmasiddhi:--In this brahman which is known by all cognitions. That also refers only to Brahman with the world as upAdhi. (When a pot is known, it is Brahman with pot as upAddhi that is known).

It cannot also be said that, in that case, the pure Brahman cannot be attained at all, because it is known by itself because of being self-luminous.

४. ननु अज्ञाते धर्मिणि कस्यचित् धर्मस्य विधातुं निषेद्धुं वा अशक्यत्वेन शुद्धे दृश्यत्वं निषेधता शुद्धस्य ज्ञेयत्वमवश्यं स्वीकरणीयम् ।

न च— स्वप्रकाशत्वेन स्वतःसिद्धे शुद्धे श्रुत्या दृश्यत्वनिषेध इति—वाच्यम्, शुद्धं स्वप्रकाशमिति शब्दजन्यविशिष्टवृत्तौ शुद्धाप्रकाशे तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वासिद्धेः—इति चेत्.

4. Obj: Since it is not possible to attribute or deny any quality to a subject that is not known, one who denies dRishyatvam in pure (Brahman) has necessarily to accept the knowability of pure Brahman.

Nor can it be said that dRishyatvam has been denied by the shruti in pure Brahman which is self-established because of being self-luminous. In the vRitti generated by the words ‘pure self-luminous’ the pure Brahman is not revealed and so its

self-luminosity is not established. (If pure Brahman is revealed by this vRitti, then pure Brahman would become dRishyam).

५. न, वृत्तिकाले वृत्तिरूपेण धर्मेण शुद्धत्वासम्भवात् शुद्धस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वं न सम्भवति । अतः “शुद्धं स्वप्रकाशमि”ति वाक्यस्य लक्षणया अशुद्धत्वमस्वप्रकाशत्वव्यापकमित्यर्थः ।

5. Answer: The pure Brahman cannot become the object of the vRitti because when there is the vRitti purity cannot co-exist along with the vRitti. Therefore, the meaning of the expression ‘pure self-luminous’ is ‘the quality of being non-pure pervades non-self-luminosity’. (i.e., wherever there is non-self-luminosity, there is non-purity.)

६. तथा च अशुद्धत्वव्यावृत्त्या शुद्धे स्वप्रकाशता पर्यवस्यति, यथा भेदनिषेधेन अभिन्नत्वम् ।  
6. Thus, by the denial of non-purity, it follows that there is self-luminosity in pure brahman, just as non-difference results from the denial of difference.

Note- In the previous para it was said that Brahman with upAdhi and non-self-luminosity go together. From this it follows, by implication, that Brahman without upAddhi, or pure Brahman, is self-luminous.

७. न च शुद्धपदेन अभिधया लक्षणया वा शुद्धाप्रकाशे तत्प्रयोगवैयर्थ्यमिति—वाच्यम्; पर्यवसितार्थमादाय सार्थकत्वोपपत्तेः ।

एवं च “शुद्धं न दृश्यं न मिथ्येत्यस्याप्यशुद्धत्वं दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोः व्यापकमित्येतत्परत्वेन शुद्धे दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्व्यतिरेकः पर्यवस्यति ।

7. Nor can it be said that the use of the word ‘pure’ is futile because purity is not signified by that usage either primarily or by implication; its meaningfulness is understandable if the sense that ultimately results is taken.

Thus, since the statement that the pure (Brahman) is neither dRishyam nor mithya means that non-purity pervades knowability and illusoriness (mithyAtvam), it follows that pure Brahman is different from dRishyam and mithyA.

८. एतेन—स्फुरणमात्रमेव मिथ्यात्वे तन्नम्; लाघवात् ।

अतः “स्वतःस्फुरदपि ब्रह्म मिथ्यैवे”ति – शून्यवादिमतमपास्तम्; स्वतःस्फुरणरूपतायाः शक्तिरूप्यादावभावात्, स्फुरणविषयत्वस्य ब्रह्मण्यसिद्धेः ।

8. The view of the shUnyavAdins that manifestation alone is the criterion for mithyAtvam and that Brahman is mithyA even though it is self-manifest is refuted by the fact that self-manifestation is absent in nacre-silver and Brahman is not the object of manifestation (by any other entity).

९. ननु—विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेष्यस्यापि भाने श्रुत्या विशिष्टस्य दृश्यत्वेनैव विशेष्यस्यापि दृश्यत्वाद्व्यभिचारः, न च “विष्णवे शिपिविष्टाये”त्यादौ विशिष्टस्य देवतात्ववत् विशिष्टस्य विषयत्वम्, अग्नीषोमयोर्मिलितयोर्देवतात्ववद्वा मिलितस्य विषयत्वम्, अतो न विशेष्ये विषयत्वमिति—वाच्यम्; तद्वदेव विशेषणस्याप्यविषयत्वे भागासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्,— इति चेत्—

9. Obj: Since in a cognition that includes a qualifier the qualified is also cognized, by the mere fact that according to the shruti the object with the qualification has knowability, the object that is qualified also becomes knowable and so there is the defect of vyabhicAra. It cannot be said that in such statements as “To viShNu who is shipiviShTa”, the offering is to viShNu as qualified by the term shipiviShTa and that in the statement “To agni and soma” the offering is to both agni and soma together, and so there is no knowability in the qualified, because by the same reasoning there would be no knowability for the qualifier also and there will be the defect of the hetu not applying to a part of the pakSha.

Note- When an object is cognized as ‘black pot’ the pot as such is also cognized. Similarly, it is argued by the opponent, when Brahman with upAdhi is known, pure Brahman should also be considered as known. That makes Brahman a knowable object. This is the objection. He says that if it is contended by the advaitin that in such a cognition Brahman by itself is not known, then it can also be said, by the same reasoning, that the upAdhi, which is another part of the cognition, is also not known. That would mean there is no dRishyatvam for the upAdhi which is also in the pakSha. So the hetu, dRishyatvam, does not cover the entire pakSha.

१०. न, विशेष्यतापन्नस्य विषयत्वेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्, तस्य मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात्; अत एव— उपहितविषयत्वेऽप्युपधेयविषयत्वमक्षतमेव इति—अपास्तम् । उपहितात्मना तस्यापि मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात् । ज्ञानान्तरविषयत्वेन विशेषणे भागासिद्ध्यभावात् ।

10. Answer—No. There is no harm even if what has become the qualified is knowable, because it has been accepted as mithyA. Thus, since when Brahman with upAdhi is an object the objectness of Brahman which is limited by the upAdhi is also unaffected, the objection is refuted. As limited by upAdhi that is also admitted to be mithyA. Since the qualifier (or upAdhi) is an object of another knowledge, there is no defect of bhAgAsiddhi.

११. ननु—वेदान्तजन्याखण्डवृत्तेरुपहितविषयत्वे तदानीमुपाध्यन्तराभावेन तस्या एवोपधायकत्वात् स्वविषयत्वापत्तिः, न चेष्टापत्तिः, शाब्दबोधे शब्दानुपस्थिताभाननियमेन वृत्तेः शब्दानुपस्थिताया भानानुपपत्तेः ।

यथा कथञ्चिदुपपत्तौ वा न ततोऽज्ञानतत्कार्ययोर्निवृत्तिः स्यात्, अज्ञानतत्कार्याविषयकज्ञानस्यैव तदुभयनिवर्तकत्वात्, अन्यथा अहमज्ञः अयं घटः इत्यादिज्ञानानामप्युपहितविषयकत्वेन अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् ।

11. Obj: If the akhaNDAkAravritti generated by Vedanta has Brahman with upAdhi as its object, then, since there is no other upAdhi, that vRitti itself being the upAdhi, it will result that it has itself as its object (or it illumines itself), which is not an acceptable conclusion, since there is the rule that things which are not specifically covered by the words cannot be illumined by a cognition resulting from words. (The information conveyed by words is confined to what the words specifically state. In contrast, the knowledge gained by perception may cover aspects which the cognizer did not specifically look for. For example, if a person says that there are ten pens in a particular box, the listener cannot know anything more about the pens, such as their make, etc. But if he actually sees the pens he can say what make they are, what colour they are, etc.)



If it is said that it is somehow possible, then there will not be the removal of nescience and its effects, because those two can be removed only by knowledge which does not itself have as its object nescience or its effects; otherwise there will be the contingency of even knowledge of the form 'I am ignorant' or 'This is a pot', which have as object what is limited by upAdhi, becoming capable of removing nescience.

१२. न; वृत्तेः शाब्दवृत्तावनवभासमानाया एवोपधायकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तदुक्तं कल्पतरुकृद्भिः—शुद्धं ब्रह्मेति विषयीकुर्वाणा वृत्तिः स्वस्वेतरोपाधिनिवृत्तिहेतुरुदयते स्वस्या अप्युपाधित्वाविशेषात् ।

12. Answer-- No; Since only the vRitti which is not illumined by the mahAvAkya is admitted to be the upAdhi. It has been said by the author of Kalpataru—The vRitti which reveals the pure Brahman arises as the cause of the destruction of itself and the upAdhis different from it, since there is no difference in the nature of its being an upAdhi (it being an upAdhi just like other upAdhis).

१३. एवञ्च नानुपहितस्य विषयता; वृत्त्युपरागोऽत्र सत्तयोपयुज्यते, न तु भास्यतया विषयकोटिप्रवेशेनेति । अयमभिप्रायः—यथा अज्ञानोपहितस्य साक्षित्वेऽपि नाज्ञानं साक्षिकोटौ प्रविशति, जडत्वात्, किन्तु साक्ष्यकोटावेव, एवं वृत्त्युपहितस्य विषयत्वेऽपि न वृत्तिर्विषयकोटौ प्रविशति । स्वस्याः स्वविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः, किन्तु स्वयमविषयोऽपि चैतन्यस्य विषयतां सम्पादयतीति न काप्यनुपपत्तिः ।

13. Answer (contd)—Thus therefore, Brahman not limited by upAdhi is not an object of knowledge; the connection of the vRitti becomes useful by its mere existence, and not by its being illumined by becoming part of the object of knowledge. This is the idea—Just as, even though Brahman limited by nescience is the witness, nescience is not part of the witness, being inert, but it is only among the things witnessed, similarly though Brahman limited by vRitti is the object, the vRitti does not become an object, since it cannot be its own object; but, though it is itself not an object, it makes consciousness an object and thus there is no inconsistency.

१४. एतेन—ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरेकविषयत्वं व्याख्यातम्; अज्ञानमपि हि स्वोपधानदशायामेव ब्रह्म विषयीकरोति; स्वानुपधानदशायां स्वस्यैवाभावात्। तथा च ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरुभयोरप्युपाध्यविषयकत्वे सत्युपहितविषयकत्वात् समानविषयत्वमस्त्येव ।

14. By this it has been explained that jnAna and ajnAna have the same object (or content). Nescience has Brahman as its object only when it is an upAdhi (of Brahman), it being itself non-existent when it is not an upAdhi. Thus, both knowledge and nescience, while not having the upAdhi as object, have Brahman with upAdhi as object and so they have certainly the same object

१५. एतेन उपाधिविषयज्ञानानां अज्ञानानिवर्तकत्वं - व्याख्यातम् । अज्ञानस्य उपाध्यविषयत्वेन समानविषयत्वाभावात्; समानविषयत्वेनैव तयोर्निवर्त्यनिवर्तकभावात् । वस्तुतस्तु—शब्दाजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वमेव दृश्यत्वम्; अन्यथा शशविषाणं तुच्छमित्यादिशब्द-जन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वे तुच्छे व्यभिचारस्य दुरुद्धरत्वात् । एवं च सति शुद्धस्य वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वेऽपि न तत्र व्यभिचारः; तुच्छशुद्धयोः शब्दाजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वानभ्युपगमात् ।

15. By this it has been explained that the knowledge which has upAdhi as its object cannot remove nescience, because nescience does not have the upAdhi as its object and so the two (nescience and knowledge) do not have the same object. Removal is possible only when both have the same object. (The ignorance about a particular object can be removed only by knowledge about the same object). Actually, knowability is only being the object of a vRitti which is not generated by words. Otherwise, it will be difficult to avoid non-existent things like rabbit's horn which is the object of a vRitti resulting from words becoming a knowable. Thus, even though pure Brahman is the object of a vritti generated by words (the mahAvAkya) there is no vyabhicAra, both pure Brahman and non-existent things not being accepted as objects of vRittis not generated by words.

१६. यद्वा सप्रकारकवृत्तिविषयत्वमेव दृश्यत्वम्, प्रकारश्च सोपाख्यः कश्चिद्धर्मः; तेन निष्प्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते शुद्धे निरुपाख्यधर्मप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते तुच्छे च न व्यभिचारः। अभावत्वस्यापि सोपाख्यत्वादभावत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते अभावे न भागासिद्धिः । उपाख्या चास्तीति धीविषयत्वदीत्यन्यत् ।

16. Or, knowability is nothing but being the object of a vRitti with attributes; attributes are some quality that can be described in words. By this definition there is no vyabhicAra in pure Brahman which is the object of a knowledge without attributes, and in non-existent things which are the object of knowledge with no qualities that can be described. Since abhAva, absence, is also describable (as ghaTAbhAva, paTAbhAva, etc.), abhAva is the object of knowledge which has the quality of 'being absent' (abhAvatva), there is no defect of bhAgAsiddhi (the hetu, dRishyatva, not covering a part of the pakSha, abhAva). (abhAva is also dRishyam and so mithyA, unlike tuccha which is not mithyA). Moreover, description means that there is the knowledge that it exists (only an existing thing can be described).

Note- According to the MAdhvAs, even tuccha is the object of a knowledge of the form 'It is'.

१७. एतेन वृत्तिव्याप्यफलव्याप्ययोः साधारणं व्यवहारप्रयोजकविषयस्वरूपं दृश्यत्वमपि हेतुः ; ब्रह्मणि तुच्छे च व्यभिचारपरिहारोपायस्योक्तत्वात् ।

17. Thus knowability as the hetu may also be defined as being an object which gives rise to worldly activity which is common to those revealed by vRitti as well as to those revealed by phala. It has already been explained how this does not result in Brahman or non-existent things becoming knowable.

१८. यद्वा दृश्यत्वं चिद्विषयत्वं, तच्च यथाकथंचित् चित्सम्बन्धित्वरूपं हेतुः; तच्च न चैतन्ये; अभेदे भेदनान्तरीयकस्य सम्बन्धस्याभावात्, अतो न व्यभिचारः । तुच्छे च व्यभिचारः परिहरणीयः ।

18. Or, knowability is being the object of consciousness. And that means, connection in some way with consciousness is the

reason (hetu). That cannot be present in consciousness (itself) since connection, which depends on difference, is not possible where there is identity. (Consciousness cannot have connection with itself). There is therefore no vyabhicAra. In respect of non-existent things, vyabhicAra has to be removed (by pointing out that it is not the object of any transaction as existing).

Note- All things of the past are connected with consciousness by mediate (parokSha) vRitti. Things which are always inaccessible to the senses, like weight, dharma, adharma, etc., are connected by inference. Those which are revealed by the witness itself (sAkShi-bhAsya) are directly the object of consciousness (sAkShAt cidviShayam).

१९. यद्वा स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदपेक्षानियतिरूपं दृश्यत्वं हेतुः; संविच्छब्देन विषयाभिव्यक्तं वा वृत्त्यभिव्यक्तं वा (शुद्धं वा) चैतन्यमात्रमभिप्रेतं, तथा न घटादौ नित्यातीन्द्रिये साक्षिभास्ये च सर्वोऽपि व्यवहारः स्वातिरिक्तसंवित्सापेक्ष इति नासिद्धिः ।

19. Or, the hetu, knowability, is, being invariably dependent on a consciousness different from itself for its manifestation and all transactions with regard to it. By the word 'consciousness' is meant pure consciousness alone, whether it is the consciousness that reveals the object, or that which illumines the vRitti (or pure consciousness). In pot, etc., as well as in things which are beyond the senses, and in things directly illumined by the witness all transactions are dependent on a consciousness different from itself and so there is nothing that is not covered by this definition.

Note- The consciousness that reveals the object is the consciousness on which the object is superimposed and it gives direct (pratyakSha) cognition. The consciousness that illumines the vRitti is what gives indirect or parokSha cognition.

२०. व्यवहारश्च स्फुरणाभिवदनादिसाधारणः तत्र ब्रह्मणः स्फुरणरूपे व्यवहारे नित्यसिद्धे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदपेक्षा नास्तीति नियतिपदेन व्यभिचारवारणम् । स्वगोचरयावद्व्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदपेक्षायां पर्यवसानात् ।

20. 'vyavahAra' means manifestation, being described in words, etc. The manifestation of Brahman which is eternal does not depend on a consciousness other than itself. By the word 'invariably' the applicability of the hetu, knowability, to Brahman is avoided, because the hetu covers all those things which depend on a consciousness different from themselves for their manifestation and for all transactions relating to themselves.

Note- vyavahAra is defined by PancapAdikAvivaraNam as abhijnA (manifestation), abhivadanam (being spoken about), upAdAnam (being accepted) and arthakriya (serving a purpose).

२१. अत एवास्वप्रकाशत्वरूपं दृश्यत्वमपि हेतुः; स्वप्रकाशत्वं हि स्वापरोक्षत्वे स्वातिरिक्तानपेक्षत्वं, “यत्साक्षात् अपरोक्षात् ब्रह्म” इति श्रुतेः ।

21. Thus knowability defined as non-luminosity is also a proper hetu (for mithyAtvam). Luminosity is-- not being dependent on something different from itself for direct manifestation, and other transactions with regard to itself, because of the shruti, “That which is directly manifest (by itself)”.

Note- Directly manifest by itself means that it is self-luminous.

२२. तथा चान्यानधीनापरोक्षत्वं पर्यवस्यति, तन्निरूपितभेदवत्त्वं हेतुः । तत्र नित्यपरोक्षे अन्याधीनापरोक्षे च घटादावस्तीति नासिद्धिः । न च—ब्रह्मणोऽपि ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिककाल्पनिकभेदवत्त्वात्तत्र व्यभिचारः; अकल्पितभेदस्य क्वाप्यसिद्धत्वादिति—वाच्यम् ।

22. Thus self-luminosity means being directly cognizable without dependence on anything else. Being different from that (self-luminosity) is the hetu. This is found in things which are beyond the senses (like dharma, adharma, etc.), and in pot, etc and so there is no defect of asiddhi (the hetu not covering part of the pakSha). It cannot be said that this hetu applies to Brahman also, as there is an assumed difference between the Brahman that is cognized and the Brahman that

cognizes (and so Brahman is cognized by a consciousness different from itself), because there is no difference that is not assumed. (The difference of all objects from Brahman is also assumed (kAlpanika) because in reality there is no difference at all.)

Note- The objection is that since the jIva knows Brahman through a vRitti, Brahman becomes an object of consciousness and therefore dRishyam. The answer is that the difference is only kAlpanika and not real.

२३. तद्भेदस्यान्यानधीनापरोक्षत्वरूपधर्मानिरूपितत्वात्, जीवत्वेश्वरत्वादिरूपस्यान्यधर्मस्य तन्निरूपकत्वात् ।

24. That difference (between Brahman on the one hand and jIva and Ishvara on the other) is not based on self-luminosity, but on other dharmas (jIvatva and Ishvaratva).

Note- jIvatva and Ishvaratva are kalpita and so the difference based on them is also kalpita (assumed and not real).

२४. एवञ्चावेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावरूपं दृश्यत्वमपि हेतुः; न च— फलव्याप्यत्वाभावविशिष्टं यदपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं तस्य ब्रह्मणीवाविद्यान्तःकरणादौ शक्तिरूप्यादौ च सत्त्वेनासिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ये इति—वाच्यम्; अज्ञाननिवर्तकवृत्तिविषयत्वयोग्यत्वस्यापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वपदेन विवक्षितत्वात्, तस्य चाविद्यादौ शक्तिरूप्यादौ चासत्त्वात् नासिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ये । यथा च घटादेः फलव्याप्यत्वं, तथाऽग्रे वक्ष्यामः । अविद्यानिवृत्तेः पञ्चमप्रकारत्वपक्षे तत्र व्यभिचारवारणायाज्ञानकालवृत्तित्वं हेतुविशेषणं देयम् ।

24. In the same way, knowability defined as absence of the possibility of being considered as directly cognizable, while not being knowable, is also a hetu (for mithyAtva). (Here 'not being knowable' means 'not being revealed by a phala' as already stated). It cannot be said that this description applies also to avidyA, mental states like joy, sorrow, etc., and prAatibhAsika items like nacre-silver as much as to Brahman (on the ground that these are are sAkShipratyakSha, which means that they are also directly cognized) and that therefore there are the defects of asiddhi and sAdhanavikalya. This is because what is meant by the term 'being considered as directly cognizable' is

‘capable of being the object of a vRitti that removes ajnAna’. This is not there in avidya, mental states and prAtibhAsika items because they are not covered by ajnAna before being known. (This is because these come into existence only when they are known and so they have no ajnAtasattA.) We shall explain later how pot, etc., are revealed by phala. If avidyAnivRitti is considered as falling in the fifth category, the hetu should be qualified by the words ‘existing during the period of ajnAna’ in order to avoid the defect of vyabhicAra.

Note- vyAvahArika objects exist even before they are known through a pramANa. It is therefore said that they have अज्ञातसत्ता. prAtibhAsika objects exist only when they are perceived and so they have no ajnAtasattA.

२५. तेनैव तुच्छेऽपि न व्यभिचारः । एवमेव सर्वेषु हेतुषु व्यभिचारपरिहाराय यतनीयम् । सद्विविक्तत्वमात्रे तु साध्ये तुच्छे पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्तौ च न व्यभिचारगन्धोऽपीति सर्वमवदातम् ।

25. For the same reason there is no vyabhicAra with regard to non-existent things also. In this way effort should be made to avoid vyabhicAra in all reasons.

In the definition of the sAdhya (mithyAtva) as merely different from the real, there is not even a trace of vyabhicAra with regard to non-existent things and avidyAnivRitti considered as falling in the fifth category.

ईति अद्वैतसिद्धौ दृश्यत्वहेतूपपत्तिः ।