

being afflicted with hunger, remembers his repeated feedings in the past, and (accordingly) desires the milk from the breast. Hence it cannot be true that there is a different soul to each of these bodies , it must be the same Soul that continues to exist, even after the perishing of its former body.

Sūtra 22

[*Objection*]—“ **The action of the child is only like the moving of the iron to the magnet** ”

BHĀSYĀ

“ In the case of the Iron it is found that it moves towards the Magnet, even without any repeated experience in the past ; and similarly the desire (and consequent activity) of the child for the mother’s milk may come about without any repeated experience in the past [So that the activity of the new-born child does not necessarily prove past experience]. ”

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYĀ

[In answer to the Opponent’s argument in the preceding *Sūtra*, the *Siddhāntin* asks]—Is this ‘moving up of the Iron’ (that you have put forward) without any cause ? Or is it due to a definite cause ? *Without a cause*—

Sūtra 23

it cannot be, because there is no such action in any other thing (except Iron, and that too in the proximity of no other thing except Magnets).

BHĀSYĀ

If, in the case cited, the moving up of the Iron were without any cause (entirely fortuitous), then it would be possible for stone and other things also to move up to the Magnet, and there would be no ground for any such restriction (as that Iron alone, and no other substance, moves up to the Magnet).

If, on the other hand, the moving of the Iron be held to be due to a definite cause, then we ask—Who ever perceives any such cause ? [All that is perceived is that the Iron moves up to the Magnet]. As a matter of fact, the sole indicative of the cause of an action is the action itself, and (consequently) any limitations in the Action indicates similar limitations in the cause. It is this that accounts for the absence of moving in the

case of other substances (than Iron).* [Hence from the limitation in the Effect,—that the moving appears only in Iron, and not in other substances,—we infer that this restriction must be due to some corresponding limitation in the cause of the Motion]. Now in the case of the child also the action (of moving the mouth &c) is found to be restricted (in the sense that such actions appear in the child only, and that also only when near its mother, and so forth); [all parties being agreed as to this action of the child being due to the desire for mother's milk], the only cause that can be indicated by the child's desire for the mother's milk consists in the 'continuity of remembrance due to repeated feeding in the past',—and the instance cited by the Opponent (that of the moving of the Iron to the Magnet) cannot point to any other cause.† And no effect can appear unless its cause is present. Further, the instance§ cited by the Opponent cannot set aside what is actually perceived (by all sentient beings) to be the cause of the said desire [e g., everyone perceives in his own case that when he sees sugar, his desire for it is due to his remembering its sweetness tasted by him in the past.] From all this it is clear that the citing of the instance of the Iron moving to the Magnet is entirely futile.

[Another explanation of the expression *anyatra pravrittayahā-vāt*, in the Sūtra is suggested]—*The moving of the Iron also is found to appear in the proximity of no other thing*; that is, the Iron is never found to move up to Stone [nor does it move up to a magnet far removed from it];—now, to what is this restriction due? If it is due to the limitations of its cause, and

* What is the cause of the moving up of the Iron to the Magnet placed near it is its contact with the imperceptible rays of light emanating from the Magnet. If this were due to something in the nature of the Iron itself, then every bit of Iron in the world would be constantly moving towards the Magnet that lies buried under the Sea.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The Vīz. text with its wrong punctuation, is unintelligible. The passage should read thus—न च स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गमन्यदाहाराभ्यासकृतात्स्मरणानुबन्धान्निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेनोपपाद्यते; which is to be construed as follows—आहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्मरणानुबन्धात् अन्यत् स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गं (स्तन्याभिलाषो लिङ्गं यस्य तत्) निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेन (अयसो दृष्टान्तेन) न उपपाद्यते (उपपादयितुं शक्यते)।

§ The case of the opening and closing of the Lotus cited under Sū. 20—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

such limitations in the cause are indicated by the limitations in the action (due to that cause),—then, in the case of the Child also, the desire, appearing in regard to a restricted object (like the mother's milk, for instance), can be due only to some restrictions in connection with its cause; and whether this cause consists in 'the remembering of repeated experiences of the past', or in something else, is settled by our actual experience. In our actual experience we have found that in the case of living beings the desire for food proceeds from the remembrance of past experience

INTRODUCTORY BHĀŚYA

For the following reason also the Soul should be regarded as eternal. "Why?"

Sūtra 24

Because persons free from longings are never found to be born.*

BHĀŚYA

What is implied by the Sūtra is that *only persons beset with longings are born.*† As a matter of fact, when a person is born, he is born as beset with longings, this 'longing' could be due only to the recalling to mind of things previously experienced, and this 'previous experience' of things in a preceding life could not be possible without a body; hence what happens is that the Soul, remembering the things experienced (and found pleasant) by him in his previous body, comes to 'long' for them, this is what forms the connecting link between his two lives; there

* Viśvanātha, suspecting this Sūtra to be a mere repetition of what has been said in Sū. 22, in connection with the child's desire for milk, offers the following explanation.—In the former 'ūtra the child's desire was put forward as brought about by the remembering of the milk having been found, in the previous life, to be the means of a desired end, while what is put forward in the present Sūtra is the fact of the said desire being due to 'attachment', a condition that is applicable, not only to human beings, but to all kinds of animals.

† The *Bhāśyacandra* rightly remarks that this implication is due to the two negatives in the Sūtra—Persons *without attachments* are *not born*, which means that persons that *are born* are only those in whom attachment *is present*. But it becomes over-refined when it goes on to explain the simple expression '*arthāt āpadyate*' to mean '*arthāpattiyā anumīyate*'

are similar links between his previous life and his life preceding that, and between that and a life preceding that, and so on and on (to infinity);—which shows that the connection of the Soul with bodies has been without beginning; and without beginning has also been his connection with longings; and from this (beginningless series of attachments and consequent bodies) it follows that the Soul is eternal

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[The Opponent asks]—“How do you know that the Longing of the new-born child arises from the recalling of previously experienced things, and not

Sūtra 25

“that it is produced in the same manner as substances and their qualities ?”

BHĀSYA

“In the case of ordinary substances that are capable of being produced, their qualities are found to be produced by certain causes (in the shape of fire-contact and the like),—in the same manner, in the case of the Soul, *which is capable of being produced*, its quality in the form of *Longing* may be produced by certain causes (in the shape of Time and Place &c.).”*

The assertion put forward (in the present Sūtra) is only a repetition of what has already been said before †

Sūtra 26

[Answer]—It is not so; because Longing (and Aversion) are due to anticipation.

BHĀSYA

The Soul's longing cannot be said to be produced in the same manner as Substances and their Qualities.—“Why ?”—

* Viśvanātha explains this Sūtra somewhat differently ‘Just as an ordinary substance, like the Jar, is produced along with certain qualities; so is the Soul also born, as along with the quality of attachment’.

† The argument here urged is the same as that urged in Sūtra 22; there the argument was based upon the instance of the Iron and Magnet; and in the present Sūtra, it is based upon the example of such ordinary things as the Jar and the like.

What the Bhāsyā means by this remark is that the answer to this argument is also the same as that offered to Sū. 22’ —*Tātparya*

Because Attachment and Aversion are due to anticipation. As a matter of fact, in the case of living beings experiencing pleasures and pains from objects, Longing is found to arise from anticipation or conviction [that such and such an object is the source of pleasure, or of pain];—this ‘ anticipation ’ arises from the recalling to Mind of previously experienced objects ;—and from this fact it is inferred that in the case of the new-born child also, the Longing must arise from the recalling to Mind of the previously experienced object * On the other hand, for †persons who hold the view that the Soul is produced (or brought into existence anew, at each birth), the appearance of Longing must be explained as proceeding from a cause other than the said ‘ anticipation ’ [as no such anticipation from past experience is possible under this theory];—just as the coming into existence of substances and their qualities [which is due to causes other than ‘ anticipation ’]. As a matter of fact, however, it is not yet proved that the Soul is actually *produced*, § nor do we find any other cause for ‘ Longing,’ than the said ‘ anticipation’. From all this it follows that it is not right to say that—‘ the coming into existence of the Soul and its Longing is like the coming into existence of Substances and their Qualities.’”

Some people explain the appearance of ‘ Longing ’ as being due to a cause entirely different from ‘ anticipation’,—such cause, according to them, being in the form of the ‘ Unseen Force ’ consisting of ‘ Merit—Demerit’. But even so (under this theory also) the Soul’s connection with a previous body cannot be denied. For the said ‘ Unseen Force ’ (of ‘ Merit—Demerit ’) could have accrued to the Soul only during its connection with a previous body, not during its present life ‡ As a matter of fact, however,||

* The child recalls to mind the fact that the mother’s milk was a source of pleasure ; and hence his longing for it.

† In place of अत्मोत्पादाधिकरणान्तु, read आत्मोत्पादाधिकरणानान्तु, which is the reading of the two Puri Mss., and also of the *Bhāsyacandra*, which explains the word as अत्मोत्पादः अधिकरणं पक्षः येषाम् तेषां वादिनान्तु मते.

§ The Viz. text wrongly puts a stop after आत्मोत्पादः

‡ As in the present life the new-born person has done no acts that could bring to him *Dharma* or *Adharma*.

|| The author cites here a popular saying.—*Bhāsyacandra*.

it is well known that *Longing proceeds from complete absorption in the thing*; and this 'absorption' is no other than the *repeated experiencing of the object*, which leads to the conviction or anticipation (that such and such a thing is the source of pleasure). What particular kind of Longings will appear in a new-born Soul will depend upon the peculiarities of the particular kind of body into which it is born; * what determines the special kind of body in which the Soul is born is his past 'Karma' (good or bad acts of the past); and the personality comes to be known by the particular name (of an animal) by reason of the peculiar body with which it is equipped at the time †

From all this it is clear that it is not possible for the said 'Longing' to be due to any other cause except 'anticipation'

SECTION (6)

The Exact Nature of the Body

Sūtras 27-29§

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

It has been explained that the connection of the intelligent Soul with the Body is without beginning; this Body has its

* This has been added in view of the following objection — "If the Longings in the new-born child are the result of the remembrance of past experience, then this would mean that, even in a case where a Soul, that occupied a human body in its past life, happens to be born in an elephant's body, the desires of this elephant cub would be for such things as are sought after by human beings" The answer to this is that the character of the child's longings depends upon that of the body occupied by him at the time; and the longings in the elephant cub would be those in accordance with the experiences gone through by that Soul in some remote previous life in an elephant's body.—*Tātparya*.

† The new-born personality is known as 'man' or 'elephant', not because the Soul is *man* or *elephant*, but because the Soul happens to be equipped with a *human* or an *elephantine* body. This meaning, in the case of learned men, is *figurative*, while in the case of ignorant people, it is a misconception—*Bhāsyacandra*.

The Vārtika reads तादर्थ्यात् ताच्छब्दं लभते which means that the Body comes to be known as the 'person' because it serves the purposes of the Soul.

§ The *Parīśuddhi* mentions Shri-vatsa as raising the question why this section does not form part of the foregoing section,—inasmuch as this also explains the difference of the Soul from the Body. The answer given by the *Parīśuddhi* is that it is necessary to have the 'detailed examination'

source in the acts done by the Personality, and becomes the receptacle* of pleasure and pain. In regard to this Body, we proceed to examine whether, like the Olfactory and other organs, it is composed of a single substance, or of several substances. "Why should there be any doubt on this point?" The doubt arises from difference of opinion † People have held the Earth and other material substances to be the components of the Body, in varying numbers;§ and the question naturally arises—What is the real truth? [The answer is supplied by the next *Sūtra*]

Sūtra 27

**The Body must be regarded as composed of the Earth ;
because we find in it the distinctive quality (of Earth) ‡**

of everything that has been 'mentioned;' and since the distinction of the Soul from the Body has been already explained in the previous section, it now behoves us to examine in detail the exact nature of the Body. The real motive for this procedure has been explained by the *Tātparya*, which points out that when one knows the exact nature of the Body and its appurtenances, he loses all regard for it, and hence acquires the necessary degree of dispassion, which is necessary for Release.

* The Body is the 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain only in the sense that they serve the purpose of qualifying and differentiating it, it is the Soul that is the actual 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain, as a 'receptacle' of a thing, in the proper sense of the term, must be such as forms its substratum, that in which the thing subsists by inherence, (and not merely the container.)—*Bhāsyacandra*.

† Both Purī manuscripts have a 'ca' here, and the *Bhāsyacandra* remarks that this 'ca', 'also', is meant to include the 'presence of diverse properties', which is one of the principal sources of doubt (*vide—Sū. 1. 1. 23*)

§ Some philosophers regard the Body as composed of a single material substance, others of two, others again, of three, others of four, and others of five substances.—*Bhāsyacandra*.

‡ The *Parīśuddhi* reads '*tadiyaviśesagunopalabdheh*', which, not being found in any manuscript, we take as the paraphrase of the phrase '*gunāntaropalabdheh*.' This 'peculiar quality' of the earth is 'Odour'—says the *Bhāsyacandra*, which is in keeping with the *Parīśuddhi*, it is only Odour that forms the 'peculiar quality' of Earth. But *Viśvanātha* would include all such qualities as *dark colour, solidity* and so forth.

The *Parīśuddhi* raises the question—In reality the Body is the receptacle of the activities of the Soul; and it is on the basis of this character that its examination should proceed; what bearing has the composition of the Body got on its examination? What does it matter whether the Body is composed

BHĀṢYA

The human body must be regarded as composed of Earth ; —Why?—*because we find in it the distinctive quality of Earth.* The Earth is endowed with Odour, and so is also the Body,—and inasmuch as Water and the other material substances are *odourless*, if the Body were composed of them it would be without odour. But as a matter of fact, the Body could not form the receptacle of the Soul's activities, if it were built up of the Earth only, without being mixed with Water, etc.; hence the Body should be regarded as being built up by the mixture of all the five material substances ; the Sūtra does not deny the mutual contact or mixture (in the Body) of the five substances.*

Bodies composed of Water, Fire and Air are found in other regions ;† and in these also the presence (by contact) of the several material substances is in accordance with the character of the experiences to be undergone by the personality ensouling a particular body. In the case of all such ordinary things as the Dish and the like, it is found without the least doubt, that they

of Earth or of Water ? The answer given is that when it becomes ascertained that the Body is composed entirely of material substances, it becomes comparatively easy to prove that intelligence cannot belong to it ; from which it would follow that—(a) it is the receptacle of the activities of which the contact of the existing Soul is the non-constituent cause,—(b) that it is the substratum of the Sense-organs, the developments whereof are due to the developments of the Body under the influence of food and drink,—and (c) that it forms the receptacle of the experiences of the Soul related to the Body.

* The Siddhānta says that the Body is composed of, constituted by, the Earth only, the Earth alone forms its component cause ; though the presence, by contact, of the other four substances also is necessary in its formation ; but this does not make these four the *constituent cause* of the Body. The Jar has for its constituent cause, only the Clay ; and yet the presence of water is necessary. The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes the term '*bhūtasam-yoga*' as a '*karmadhāraya*' compound, meaning 'well-recognised presence', the meaning being—'the mere presence by contact of the other four, which (contact) is *duly recognised* (*bhuta*), cannot be denied'—the *Bhāṣyacandra* explaining '*nisiddah*' as '*niseddhum śakyaḥ*'.

† The *aqueous* body is found in the regions of Varuna ; the *fiery* body in the regions of the Sun, and the *aerial* body in the regions of Vāyu. *Ākāśa* does not form the component of any body ; hence there is no *Ākāśa* or ethereal body,—according to the Nyāya.

are not built up without the contact of Water and other substances *

Sūtra 28

“The Body is made up of Earth, Water and Fire Because we find in it the distinctive qualities of these, [i e, Odour, Viscidity and Heat] ” A

Sūtra 29

“It is made up of four substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air), because we find in it in-breathing and out-breathing (in addition to the aforesaid qualities of Earth, etc). ” B

Sūtra 30

“It is made up of five substances, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāś'a, because we find in it odour (of Earth), humidity (of Water), heat (of Fire), breathing (or circulation of the juices) (of Air) and cavities (of Ākāś'a). ” † C

BHĀŚYA

The reasons put forward in these Sūtras being inconclusive, the author of the Sūtra has taken no notice of them [i e, he has not taken the trouble to refute them]

Question .—“In what way are they inconclusive ?”

Answer —As a matter of fact, the presence of the qualities of material substances in any object may be due, either to the fact of those substances forming the constituents of that object, or to the fact that the mere presence by contact of these substances in any object is possible—(a) when those substances form the

* The *Bhāṣyacandra*, along with nearly all manuscripts, reads *nḥsamśayah* but *nḥsamśayā*, appears to be the right reading. The only way of construing the form ‘*nḥsamśayā*’ is to take it, as the *Bhāṣyacandra* does, along with ‘*bhūtasamyogaḥ*’ of the preceding sentence, otherwise (if we do not read *nḥsamśayā*, and take it as qualifying ‘*mṣpattiḥ*’), the only form that could be admitted would be *nḥsamśayam*

† All these three are *Sūtras*. They are found in the *Nyāyasūchī*-*bandha*, and also in the *Purī Sūtra* manuscript. *Viśvanātha* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* both explain them as propounding the different opinions in regard to the composition of the human body. The editor of the *Viz.* text has been misled by the fact that these opinions have not been refuted by the Sūtra. But this omission has been satisfactorily explained by the *Bhāṣya*, which says that the Author of the Sūtra has taken no notice of these views, because the reasons put forward by them are of doubtful validity.

constituents of that object, and also (b) when they do not form the constituents, and are only present in it by contact; which presence is not denied (by any party);—for example in the case of the Dish we find that Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa are all present by contact [even though the dish is composed of Earth only, and not of these four]. [Thus it being found that the mere fact of the qualities of a certain material substance being found in the Body does not necessarily prove that the Body is actually composed of that substance,—the reasons put forward in the three Sūtras must be regarded as *inconclusive*]

If the human body were composed of several substances, then, by reason of the peculiar character of its (multiple) constitution, it would be without odour, without taste, without colour and without touch.* As a matter of fact, however, the Body is not so (Without Odour etc.). Hence the conclusion is that *it should be regarded as composed of Earth, because we find in it the distinctive quality of Earth.*

Sūtra 31

Also because of the authority of the Revealed Scripture.

BHĀSYA

In the *mantra*†—‘May thy Eye go to the Sun etc.’ (*R̥gveda*, 10-16-3), we find the words—‘May thy Body go to the Earth’; and what is referred to here is the absorption of the product (the Body) into its constituent element. Again, we find another *mantra* (recited in the course of the rites of consecration performed in connection with child-conception) beginning with the words—‘I create thy Eye out of the Sun’—and going on to say—‘I create thy Body out of the Earth’ (*S’atapatha-Brah̥mana*, 11-8-4-6); and what is referred to is only the production of the product (Body) out of its constituent element. In the case of the Dish and such other things, we find that one product is produced out of one kind of constituents; and from this we infer that it is not possible for any single product to be produced out of several heterogeneous constituents.

* This has been explained in detail by the *V̥artika*.

† This *mantra* is recited over the dead body, in course of its consecration by fire.

SECTION (7)

Sūtras 32--50

The Sense-organs and their Material Character

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In accordance with the order in which the 'Objects of Cognition' have been *mentioned*, it is now the turn of the *Sense-organs* to be *examined*; and in regard to the Sense-organs we are going to consider whether they are the modifications of Primordial Matter (as held by the Sāṅkhyas), or they are made up of elemental substances (Earth &c.)*

"Whence does this doubt arise?"

[We have the answer in the following Sūtra]—

Sūtra 32

This doubt arises from the fact that there is perception (with the Eye) when the Pupil is there, and there is perception also when there is no contact with the Pupil.

On one hand, it is found that there is perception of colour only when the Pupil, which is a physical organ made up of elemental substances, remains intact, and there is no perception when the Pupil is destroyed [which would indicate that the Visual-organ consists of the Pupil only, which is made up of elemental substances], while on the other hand, it is also found that when an object is before the observer, there is perception of it without its coming into direct contact with the Pupil, and it is not necessary for it to come into any such contact with the Pupil; and certainly Sense-organs cannot operate effectively without getting at, coming into direct contact with, the object perceived; and in

* It is interesting to note that while the *Bhāṣya* confines the discussion between the Sāṅkhya and the Naiyāyika, the *Tātparyā* brings in here the controversy between the Naiyāyika and the *Bauddha* who holds that the organ is nothing apart from the outer physical body; i.e., the Visual-organ consists only of the Pupil, and not of a Luminous Substance underlying the Pupil, as the Naiyāyika holds. The *Tātparyā* also adds that according to the Sāṅkhya also, the Sense-organ is not exactly a 'modification of Primordial Matter' itself; but it is the direct product of '*Ahankāra*', 'Egoism', which is the product of *Buddhi*, which is the direct product of Primordial Matter. Even so, inasmuch as Primordial Matter is the root-cause of all manifested things, it is quite right to say that according to the Sāṅkhya, the Sense-organs are 'modifications of Primordial Matter'.

reality this latter fact (of an object being seen without coming into contact with the Pupil) can be explained only on the basis of the theory that the Organ is not made up of elemental substances and is all-pervading in its character [and it does not consist of the Pupil] * So that both characters being found to belong to the Organ, the aforesaid doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[In refutation of the above-mentioned Bauddha-theory that the Visual Organ consists in the Pupil only, the *Sāṅkhya*] asserts as follows —

“The Sense-organs are not made up of Elemental Substances, —Why?—

Sūtra 33

“Because there is perception of large and small things.”

BHĀṢYA

“The term ‘large’ includes also the *larger* and the *largest*; and what is meant is that as a matter of fact, all things of various degrees of magnitude are perceived; e.g., the (*large*) Banyan tree, as also the (*larger*) mountain, and so forth;—similarly the term ‘small’ includes also the *smaller* and the *smallest*; and the meaning is that as a matter of fact things of various degrees of smallness are perceived; such as the Banyan-seed and so forth. This fact of both kinds of things being perceived sets aside the possibility of the Sense-organs being made up of Elemental Substances; as a matter of fact, that which is made up of Elemental Substances can pervade over (and operate upon) only such things as are of the same magnitude as itself; while

* The organ can be all-pervading in character only if it be the product of *Ahankāra* which being all-pervading in its character, its products are also such, and hence unimpeded by anything, can come into contact with anything and everything; so that even though the object is not in physical contact with the physical Eye-pupil, it would not matter; as the Visual-organ, being all-pervading in its character, would be in contact with it all the same; and hence render it perceptible. If, on the other hand, the Visual-organ were made up of Elemental Substances, it could not get at things behind any physical obstruction whatsoever, even in the shape of transparent things.—*Tātparya*.

that which is not so made up is all-pervading, and as such can operate upon all things (of all magnitudes) ”*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[The *Bhāsyā* answers the *Sāṅkhya* argument of Sū. 33 as follows]—From the mere fact of there being apprehension of large and small things it cannot be inferred that the Sense-organs are *not made up of elemental substances*, or that they are *all-pervading*

Sūtra 34

The said apprehension (of large and small things) is due to the peculiarity of the contact between the light-rays (emanating from the Visual Organ) and the object (perceived).

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, the ‘apprehension of large and small things’ is brought about by the peculiarity of contact between the light-rays emanating from the Visual Organ and the object perceived, † just as there is by contact between the light-rays from the lamp and the object

That there is such contact between the light-rays (from the Visual Organ) and the Object perceived is proved by the phenomenon of obstruction, that is, when the rays of light emanating from the Eye are obstructed by such things as the wall and the like intervening between the Eye and the Object,

 * The *Sāṅkhya* argument is thus stated by Viśvanātha —The Physical Eye-ball cannot be the organ of vision, for if it were, then it would mean that the organ is operative without getting at the Object; which is open to objection. Then, it might be held that if the Eye-ball is not the organ, it is something else made up of Elemental Substances which is the organ,—but this also would not be right, as the organ of vision apprehends things of large as well as small magnitudes, which would not be possible, if it were made up of Elemental Substances.

† The light-rays emanating from the Visual Organ which are devoid of any manifested colour, form the constituent parts of the organ, which according to the *Naiyāyika*, is made up of the Elemental substance of Light; the organ, consisting of the light-rays, issuing forth, comes into direct contact with the object, and whether it is a large or a small object perceived depends upon the exact nature and extent and force of the light-rays emanating from the organ. The example cited is that of the Lamp, because the light from the lamp also, like that from the Visual Organ, is devoid of manifested colour.—*Bhāṣyācandra*.

they do not illumine (and render perceptible) that object ; this being exactly what happens in the case of light emanating from a Lamp. [And this goes to prove that for the perception of objects, the direct contact of light from the Eye with the object is essential ; for if this were not so, and if the organ were an all-pervading one, the perception would not be obstructed by an intervening object].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Siddhāntin having put forward the view that the fact of the Visual Organ consisting of light-rays can be inferred from the phenomenon of obstruction,—the Opponent urges the following objection :—

Sūtra 35

“Inasmuch as no such thing (as Visual light-rays) is ever perceived, what has been put forward cannot prove anything.”

BHĀṢYA

“Inasmuch as by its very nature Light is endowed with colour and touch, the Light of the Visual Organ, if it existed, should be perceived,—just in the same manner as the Light of the Lamp is perceived,—according to the principle that ‘the perception of a thing is due to its being possessed of large magnitude, being composed of several component particles, and being endowed with colour’.* [And since the Light from the Eye is never perceived, it follows that no such Light exists.]

Sūtra 36

[Answer to the objection]—Mere non-Perception of that which can be deduced by inference is no proof of its non-existence.

* This principle is enunciated in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras, though the form of the Sūtra (4. 1. 6) is somewhat different from what is quoted here. The Sūtra is worded as महत्त्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् रूपवत्त्वाच्च उपलब्धिः.

The *Tātparya* explains the sense of the Opponent’s objection thus — “When a thing, which is capable of perception, is not perceived, the only right conclusion is that it does not exist, and it would not be right to assert its existence on the ground of merely inferential reasons. If this were permitted, then it might be permissible to assert the existence of even such things as the horns of a man.”

BHĀṢYA

The existence of the light-rays (of the Visual Organ) being deduced by Inference from the phenomenon of 'obstruction', which shuts off (makes impossible) the contact (of the object with the Visual organ,)—mere non-apprehension of them by Perception does not prove non-existence, just as in the case of the upper surface of the lunar disc and the lower strata of the Earth (both of which are deduced by Inference and not apprehended by Perception, and yet not regarded as non-existent).

Sūtra 37

There being no uniformity regarding the character (of perceptibility or imperceptibility) as belonging to Substances and Qualities, there can be no certainty in regard to any particular thing being actually perceived.*

BHĀṢYA

The said character (of Perceptibility or Imperceptibility) is diverse, inasmuch as it belongs (sometimes) to the Substance and (sometimes) to the Quality, for instance, while the *Substance*, in the shape of the molecule of Water (hanging in the atmosphere) with its constituent particles actually in contact (with our organs of perception), is not perceived (though the Visual organ),—its *quality of coolness* is perceived; and it is from the continuous presence (in the atmosphere) of such aqueous molecules that the two (Winter) seasons of *Hēmanta* and *S'is'ira* derive their character,—similarly while the Substance in the shape of the molecule of light (hanging in the atmosphere), with its colour unmanifested, fails to be seen, along with its colour,—its warmth is actually perceived; and it is from the presence of this substance that the two seasons of Spring and Summer derive their character. [All this goes to prove that the mere non-perception of a thing is not a proof of its non-existence]

* The Viz -edition reads उगलद्विनियमः so also the *Nyāyasūchimbādhā*. But we find the reading उपलब्धनियमः in the *Bhāṣyacandra*, in the Puri Sū Ms, in Sūtra Ms D, as also in the Puri Bhāṣya Mss. A and B The translation adopts this latter reading.

Sūtra 38

Where it does come about,—

Perception of Colour (and coloured Substance) is the result of the subsistence of several component substances, and of the presence of a particular character of Colour.*

BHĀṢYA

That is to say, it is so whenever Colour and the Substance in which it subsists are apprehended by Perception. The 'particular character of Colour'—by reason of whose presence colour (and coloured Substances) are perceived, and on account of whose absence, a Substance (as endowed with colour) is *not* perceived,—consists in what has been called its 'manifested character'.† It is for this reason (of perceptibility depending upon the *manifestation of colour*) that the Light-ray from the Eye, having its colour *unmanifested*, is not perceived with the Eye, [and certainly this non-perception does not prove that the ray is non-existent] In connection with Light, we find that it possesses a diversity of character *viz* (a) sometimes it has both Colour and Touch manifested, as in the Sun's rays (which are perceived by the Visual and Tactile organs); (b) in some cases it has its Colour manifested but Touch unmanifested, as in the rays of light from the Lamp (which are perceived with the Visual organ); (c) in some cases it has its touch manifested and colour unmanifested, as light in contact with (heated) Water and such other things (which are perceived by the Tactile Organ only), and (d) in some cases it has both Colour and Touch unmanifested and is, as such, *not perceptible*, (either by the Visual or by the Tactile Organ)—*e. g.*, the light-rays emanating from the Eye

Sūtra 39

The formation of the Sense-organs, being due to Merit and Demerit, is subservient to §the purposes of man.

* This *Sūtra* is not found in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, nor in the *Nyāya-sūtravivarana*, nor in *Sūtra Ms. D*, nor in *Purī Sūtra Ms.* But the *Vārtika*, the *Nyāyasūcībandha* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* treat it as *Sūtra*.

† That is, Colour and Coloured object are perceived only when the colour is manifested.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः, as 'brought about by man's purpose'. But from the *Bhāṣya* it is clear that it means 'subservient to man's purpose'.

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact the Sense-organs are formed in accordance with the purposes of the sentient being served by them,—such 'purpose' consisting of the *perception of things* and the *experiencing of pleasure and pain*; so that the generation of the light-ray in the Eye is for the purpose of getting at (and operating upon) the object perceived; and the fact that the Colour and Touch (of this Light in the Visual Organ) are not manifested is deduced from (and assumed on the basis of) certain well-known usages [such, e.g., as the dictum that 'the Sense-organs are themselves beyond the senses', and so forth]† Similarly it is from usage (and experience) that we deduce the fact that, in regard to certain objects, there is hindrance to the operation of the Visual organ, which indicates the presence of obstruction. In fact, as the Sense-organs, so also the manifold and diverse formation of all things, is 'due to Merit and Demerit (of Men being born into the World)', and is 'subservient to the purposes of Man'.

The term '*Karma*' (in the Sūtra) stands for 'Merit and Demerit', which serves to bring about the experiences of the sentient Person.

The said 'Obstruction' can belong only to a material substance, because there is unfailing concomitance § That is to

* From the general principles enumerated in the Sūtra, it follows that, because objects are perceived with the Eye, and the Eye-socket or Pupil is unable to get at the object,—and Sense-organs cannot apprehend things without getting at them,—we conclude that the formation of the Eye must be such that it is able to get at the object, and hence we come to the conclusion that the Eye is composed of Light, and it is the ray of light, that issuing from the Eye, falls upon the object that is seen with it.

† The *Bhāṣyacandī* explains '*Vyavahāra*' as *Vyavahāraśeṣaḥ, Vicitrajñānāśabdāprayogarūpādih, Atīndriyamindriyamityādih*. There are certain well-known notions in connection with the Sense-organs, one of these being that the Sense-organs themselves cannot be perceived by the Senses, and in the case of the Eye, this would be true only if the Eye consisted of such Light as has its colour and touch unmanifested, if it consisted of the Pupil only, the Eye could not be *imperceptible*.

§ This sentence has been printed in the Viz -dition as a Sūtra. But neither Sū. Ms. D., nor the *Nyāyasūcīmbandha*, nor the Purī Sū. Ms., nor Viśvanātha, nor the *Nyāyinsūtraśaraṇa*, nor the *Bhāṣyacandī* read any such Sūtra. We do not, therefore, treat it as a Sū.

say, the obstruction that we find as hindering the operation of the Sense-organ upon certain substances must be regarded as belonging to a material substance, for the simple reason that it never fails in its concomitance with material substances; for we have never found any *immaterial* substance (as *Ākāś'a* and the like) appearing as an 'obstruction'. [It is true that *non-obstruction* is found in the case of certain *material* substances also, e.g., glass, rock-crystal and the like, which do not hinder the operation of the Visual organ; but] as for *non-obstruction*, this is not *unfailing in its concomitance*, either with *material* or with *immaterial* substances,—being found, as it is, along with both. [Hence non-obstruction cannot prove either the *material* or the *non-material* character of the Sense-organs.]

Some people argue as follows:—"It comes to this that, because there is *obstruction*, the Sense-organs must be *material*, and because there is *non-obstruction*, they must be *non-material*; 'non-obstruction' (of the Sense-organ) also we find when things, hidden behind the glass, or mass of white clouds, or rock-crystal, are clearly perceived" But this is not right, because there is *non-obstruction* also in the case of *material substances*; e.g. (a) there is illumination, by lamp-light, of things hidden behind glass, clouds and rock-crystal; which shows that there is *no obstruction* of *Lamp-light* (which is admittedly *material*); and (b) there is *no obstruction* of the heat of the cooking fire operating upon things placed in the vessel (placed upon the oven) [and the cooking fire is also admittedly *material*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀŚYA

As regards the non-perception (of the Light-rays from the Eye), this may be due to special reasons [For example]—

Sūtra 40

Its non-perception is similar to the non-perception of the light of the stars at midday.

BHĀŚYA

The general principle is that there is perception of a thing when there is 'inherence of several component substances' and also 'a particular colour'; and yet in the case of the light of the stars, we find that even though the said conditions of perception are present, it still fails to be perceived at midday, because it

is suppressed by the (stronger) light of the Sun ;—exactly in the same manner, in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ, even though the conditions of perception—in the shape of the presence of ‘several component substances’ and of ‘a particular colour’—are present, it fails to be perceived, for certain special reasons. What this special reason is has been explained above (in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 38,), where it has been pointed out that there is no perceptual apprehension of the substance *which does not have its Colour and Touch manifested*. It is only when there is absolute non-perception, [*i e* when the thing is not perceived at all, and its non-perception is not due to any special causes], that it can be rightly regarded as proving the non-existence of the thing [and inasmuch as such is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ, its merely accidental non-perception cannot justify the conclusion that it does not exist].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some one might here argue that—“On the same analogy we may say that there is Light in the piece of stone also, and it is not perceived at midday because it is suppressed by the Light of the Sun ” And in answer to this we have the following Sūtra—

Sūtra 41

The said assertion cannot be accepted ; because there is non-perception (of the Light of Stones) also at night ;—

BHĀṢYA

and also because there is no cognition of it by Inference either (which there *is* in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ) Thus then, there being absolute non-cognition (at all times, and by all means of Cognition) of the Light of the Stone-pieces, we conclude that no such light exists Such however is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ [which *is* apprehended by means of *Inference*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The view propounded by us is supported by reason also

Sūtra 42

The perception of things being brought about by the aid of external light, the non-perception (of the Visual Light) must be due to non-manifestation (of colour)

BHĀSYA

It is only when the Visual Organ is aided by some external light that it becomes capable of apprehending things ; and in the absence of such light, there is no apprehension with the Visual Organ [So that it is on account of the absence of an external light falling upon it that the Visual Light is not perceived] As a matter of fact, even when the aid of (external) light is present, and there is perception also of Cool Touch, the object in which that touch subsists, (*i, e*, the particles of Water hanging in the atmosphere) fails to be perceived with the Eye, for the simple reason that its Colour is not manifested, this shows that there is non-perception of an object endowed with Colour by reason of its Colour being not manifested.* For these reasons we conclude that what the *Pūrvapakṣin* has said in Sū. 35—that “ inasmuch as no such things (as the Visual Light-ray) is ever perceived, what has been put forward cannot prove any thing ”—is not right

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Question—“ But why is *suppression* not put forward as the reason for the non-perception of the Visual Light ?† [The answer is given in the following Sūtra].

Sūtra 43

Because there can be suppression (of Colour) only when it is manifest also .

* In the case of the Water-particle hanging in the atmosphere, what happens is that its Colour not being manifested, it is not perceived with the Eye, and that this is so we infer from the fact that in the perception of Water we require the aid of external light, similarly, the Visual Light also requiring, for its perception, the aid of external light, it follows that the non-perception of this also must be due to the non-manifestation of its Colour. It is a generally recognised principle that a thing, which requires for its perception the aid of external light, fails to be perceived only when its Colour is not manifested ; so that the non-perception of such a thing must be attributed to the *non-manifestation of its colour*, and not to its *suppression by stronger light*, as is found to be the case with the light of stars, which, not requiring the aid of any external light in its perception, has its non-perception at midday due to suppression by the light of the Sun.—*Vārtika and Tātparya*.

† This question emanates from those Logicians who hold that Visual Light has its Colour manifested, like any ordinary Light, and it is not perceived because it is suppressed by the stronger light of the atmosphere

BHĀSYA

—and also when it is not dependent for its perception upon external light ; this is the implication of the particle ' cha ', ' also '. As a matter of fact, there is suppression of only such Light as is manifested—i. e. duly evolved— and does not depend upon the aid of external light [as we find in the case of Stars] ; when, on the other hand, such conditions are absent, (e g , in the case of the Light in such things as the Visual Organ), there can be no suppression, which leads us to conclude that when a certain Light, which is not perceived (with the Eye) by reason of its Colour being not manifested, becomes perceived when some external light falls upon it,—such Light cannot be said to be 'suppressed'.

From the above it follows that the Visual Light does exist (and is endowed with a particular form and character).

Sūtra 44

Also because we actually perceive the Light in the eyes of night-walkers.

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, we actually see rays of light in the eyes of ' night-walkers '—i e the cat and other animals (of the feline species) ; and from this we infer the existence of light in the eyes of other living beings.

“ But just as the genus (of the Cat) is different (from that of Man), so would their sense-organs also be of different characters [so that the mere fact of the Cat's Eye possessing rays of light cannot justify the inference of the existence of Light in the Eyes of Man]. ”

There is no justification for the assumption that there is such difference of character (between the Eye of the Cat and the Eye of the Man), specially in view of the fact that both are equally found to have their approach (upon visible objects) hindered by obstructions such as the wall and other things. [Which fact is what forms the main ground for the assumption that the Visual Organ consists of Light]*

* The mere fact that while we see light-rays emanating from the Cat's Eye, and not those emanating from the Man's Eye, cannot justify the assumption that the two are not of the same kind of 'sense-organ'; in the case of the Sun and the Moon, though the former is felt to be hot and the latter cool, both are regarded as 'luminous', hence mere difference in some detail of character does not prove diversity of 'genus'.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—“ It is not right to regard *the Content of the Sense-organ with the Object* as an instrument of Cognition. Why ?

Sūtra 45

“ Because (as a matter of fact) there is perception without (the Organ) getting at (the Object) ; as (we find that) there is perception of things behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal ”

BHĀṢYA

“ As a matter of fact, we find that when a flying piece of straw strikes against glass or vapour, it is actually seen with the Eye ; and yet one thing can come into contact with another only when no third thing comes between them,—and whenever a third thing does come between two things, their contact is obstructed. Such being the case, if the contact of Light-rays (from the Eye) and the Object (the straw behind the glass) were the cause of its perception, then,—no contact being possible by reason of the obstruction (of the intervening glass),—there should be no perception at all. And yet we do perceive things hidden behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal ;—all which goes to prove that the Sense-organs are operative without actually getting at (and coming into contact with) the object. From this it follows that they are non-material in their character ; because all material things (such as the Arrow, the Axe and the like) have the character of being operative only by getting at their objects.”

Sūtra 46

[Answer to the above]—The above reasoning has no force against our doctrine, because there is no perception of things behind a wall.*

BHĀṢYA

If the Sense-organs were operative without getting at their objects, then there would be nothing to prevent the perception of things hidden behind a wall.

* In the *Viz.* text and in Puri A, the *Bhāṣya* has a ‘na’ preceding the *Sūtra*. It is not in Puri B; nor is it supported by the *Bhāṣyacandra*. And as the denial is already contained in the *Sūtra* itself, in the term ‘*apratishedhaḥ*’, an additional ‘na’ would be superfluous.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[The Opponent retorts]—" But if the Sense-organs were operative only by getting at the objects, then there would be no perception of things behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal. "

[The answer to this is as follows]—

Sūtra 47

Inasmuch as there is no real obstruction (by such things as the Glass etc), Contact does take place* (in the cases cited).

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, neither Glass nor Vapour obstructs the passage of Light rays from the Eye ; and not being obstructed, the rays do actually come into contact with the object.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

One who holds the view that "there can be no non-obstruction of what is purely material"†—is not right;—

Sūtra 48

Because (as a matter of fact) there is no obstruction of the Sun's rays,—in connection with the object behind a piece of rock-crystal,—and in connection with the object to be burnt,§

BHĀSYA

The view that has been held cannot be accepted as right,—(a) because there is no obstruction of the Sun's rays,—(b) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object behind a piece of rock-crystal,—and (c) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object to be burnt;—the sentence in the Sūtra is to be split up into three clauses by construing the term 'because there is no obstruction', ' *aviḡhātāt*', with each of the other three terms ;

* The *Bhāsyacandra* and Viśvanātha read उत्पत्तिः for उपपत्तिः

† Puri Mss. A and B and the *Bhāsyacandra* read यश्च न मन्यते &c which may be construed to give the same sense thus.—'If one does not admit all this, and insists upon the view that there could be no absence of obstruction, if the Sense-organs were material in character'.

§ Such is the translation of the Sūtra as interpreted by the Bhāsyā, which (see below) analyses the Sūtra into three factors. The simple meaning of the Sūtra appears to be that 'there is no obstruction of the Sun's-rays even when the object burnt by it is behind a piece of rock-crystal'.

and the meaning assigned to the Sūtra is in accordance with this construction

(a) The rays of the Sun are not hindered by the Jar and such things,—‘as there is no obstruction’ in this case, and the Water in the Jar becomes heated; such imbibing of the quality of warmth of one thing (Light) by another (*i. e.*, Water) is possible only when there is actual contact (between the two things); and the original coolness (of the Water) becomes suppressed by the warmth thus imbibed.

(b) When the object to be illumined is hidden behind rock-crystal, there is no obstruction to the lamp-rays falling upon it; and ‘because there is no obstruction’, the object is got at by the light, and becomes perceived.

(c) When the thing is placed in a frying pan over the fire it becomes burnt by the light of the fire, and here also ‘because there is no obstruction’ to the light-rays, the thing is got at by them, and because it is thus got at, it becomes burnt, and the heat (of the Light) is operative only by contact.

The term ‘*aviḡhātāt*’, ‘because there is no obstruction’, may also be taken by itself (as propounding a fourth argument); “What would be the meaning of ‘*aviḡhāta*’, ‘non-obstruction’ (in this case)?” It would mean that there is no hindrance on any side to the progress of the substance (Light) by any such intervening substance as has its component particles not ruptured and transformed (by the Light passing through them); * *i. e.*, there is no hindrance to its operation; *i. e.*, there is no obstacle to its contact (with the object). For instance, we find that water placed in an earthen jar imbibes the coolness of the outer atmosphere [in which case the hot light-rays go out of the Water through the intervening jar, without dismembering and transform-

* The term ‘*vyūhyamāna*’ is used here in a peculiar sense; it has been explained by the *Tātparyā* as meaning ‘dismemberment’; the sense being that when the thing in the frying pan is burnt by the heat of the fire in the oven, the heat passing through the pan does not tend to the dismemberment of the pan’s component particles; *i. e.*, it does not so happen that the pan is broken up and another pan appears in its place. And this permeating of the rays of light and heat—without dismembering and transforming the intervening substance,—is what is meant by ‘non-obstruction’.

ing the latter].* And there can be no perception of the *touch* (warmth or coolness) of a thing unless it is got at by the Sense-organ ; and we also see (in the case of the Water in the Jar) that there is percolation, as also flowing out,† [which also shows that substances can pass through an intervening substance without dismembering or transforming it].

Thus then, it becomes established that in the case of things hidden behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal, perception duly comes about, 'because there is no obstruction' to the rays of Visual Light by the said glass, etc , and they get at the object by passing through the intervening glass, etc.

Sūtra 49

[*Objection*].—"The view put forward is not right ; because there is possibility of either of the two characters belonging to either of the two substances."

BHĀṢYA

"(a) Whether there is *non-obstruction* (of the Visual Light) by the Wall and such other things, just as there is by glass and vapour, etc., or (b) there is *obstruction* by glass and vapour, etc., just as there is by the wall,—inasmuch as both these alternative views are equally possible, it behoves you to show cause which, and why, is the right view."§

Sūtra 50

[*Answer*].—Just as there is perception of Colour in the Mirror and in Water,—by reason of these two being, by their nature, bright and white,—similarly there is perception of Colour (also in the case of such intervening substances as Glass etc., which are, by their nature, transparent).

* This parenthetical explanation is according to the *Vārtika* and *Tāt-parya*.

† The *Vārtika* reads '*parispanda*' for '*praspanda*', and explains it as *lateral motion*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads '*praspanda*', and explains it as *percolating through the pores* ; '*parisrava*' standing for *actual flowing out*.

§ The Puri Mss. read *Niyamena* for *Niyame* ; the *Bhāṣyacandra* also notices this reading and explains it to mean that "it is absolutely necessary to state your reasons".

BHĀṢYA

The MIRROR and Water are possessed of 'prasāda'—i. e., a particular colour (bright-white); which belongs to them by their very nature; as is shown by the fact of their always possessing it; and of this 'bright-white colour' also, it is the very nature that it reflects (and renders visible) the Colour (of things placed before it); and in the case of the Mirror, we find that when a man puts his face before it, the light-rays emanating from his eyes strike the Mirror and are turned back (reflected), and thereby they come into contact with the man's own face, whose colour and form thus become perceived; this perception being called 'the perception of the reflected image'; and it is brought about by the peculiar colour of the Mirror's surface; that it is so is proved by the fact that any such reflection fails to appear whenever there is a deterioration in the brightness of the Mirror's surface. [Though such is the case with the Mirror, yet] There is no such 'perception of the reflected image' in the case of the Wall and such other things [and the only explanation possible is that these latter things are not endowed with that particular property which would enable them to reflect the light-rays from the Eye]. In the same manner, even though there is *non-obstruction* of the Visual Light by such things as the Glass and Vapour, etc., yet there is *obstruction* by such things as the Wall and the like; and this is due to the very nature of the things concerned [which must be accepted as they are].

Sūtra 51

It is not right to question or deny things that are (rightly) perceived and inferred.*

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, every Instrument of Right Cognition apprehends things as they really exist; so that when certain things are cognised by means of Perception or Inference, it is not right for you, in course of your inquiry, to *question* the reality of these things;—nor is it right for you to *deny* their reality. It would, for instance, not be right to argue that 'Just

* Puri Sū. Ms. reads 'paryanuyoga' for 'pratiśedha'; and Puri-Bhā. Ms. B. reads 'pratiyoga'; it is clear from the *Bhāṣya* that *pratisedha* is the right reading.

as Colour is visible by the Eye, so should Odour also be visible', or that 'like Odour, Colour also should *not* be visible by the Eye'; or that 'like the cognition of Fire, the cognition of Water also should arise from that of Smoke'; or that 'like the cognition of Water, that of Fire also should *not* arise from that of Smoke'. And what is the reason for this? Simply this, that things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition just as they really exist, exactly as endowed with their real nature, and as possessed of their own real properties; so that Instruments of Right Cognition always apprehend things as they really exist. You have put forward the following *question* and *denial*:—(a) 'there *should be non-obstruction* (of Visual Light) by the Wall, etc.; just as there is by Glass and such things'; and (b) 'there should not be non-obstruction by Glass, etc., just as there is none by the Wall, etc.' But it is not right to do so; because the things that we have described (in connection with the obstruction or non-obstruction of Visual Light by certain objects) are such as are actually cognised by means of Perception and Inference; whether there is *obstruction* or *non-obstruction* (of a certain thing by another thing) can be determined only by our perception or non-perception, (*i. e.* it depends upon our perceiving or not perceiving such obstruction); so that in the case (in question) from the fact that there is no perception of things behind the Wall and such things, it is *inferred* that there is obstruction by these things; and from the fact that there is perception of things behind glass and vapour, etc., it is inferred that there is non-obstruction by these latter.

SECTION (8)

Sūtra 52-61

(*The Sense-organs one or many?*)

BHĀṢYA

[Now the question arises]—Is there only one Sense-organ? or several Sense-organs? * “ Why should this doubt arise ? ”
[The Sūtra answers]—

* The sequence of this section is thus explained by the *Parisuddhi*—
‘ In the foregoing section, it having been established that the Sense-organs are made up of material substances, and that they are operative by contact, —it has next to be proved that there are several Sense-organs; and the

Sūtra 52

The doubt arises—because by reason of Subsistence in several places, there should be multiplicity ; and yet a single composite actually subsists in several places.*

determination of this point is necessary as preliminary to what has gone before. For, if the Sense-organs are one only—and not many—then they cannot be made up of material substances ; and if they are not material in their character, they cannot be operative by contact. Because if there is only one Sense-organ, there would be no force in such reasonings as—‘the Visual organ must consist of Light, because from among Colour and other things it renders perceptible only Colour’, and so forth ; and under the circumstances it could not be proved that the Organ operates by contact ; as it is only when the organ is proved to be material in its character that it can be held to be operative by contact. The real purpose served by the present discussion is that when it has been proved that there are several Sense-organs, then alone can there be any force in such reasons for the existence of the Soul as—‘one and the same object is apprehended by the organs of Vision and Touch’ and like.

* The Sūtra presents a difficulty. The words as they stand mean—‘We find several things occupying several places and also a single thing occupying several places’.—But the *Vārtika* and *Tātparya* are dissatisfied with this. The grounds for dissatisfaction are explained by the *Vārtika*, and amplified by the *Tātparya*—If we take the words of the *Sūtra* as they stand, it would mean—‘we have seen that when there is diversity of place there is multiplicity, as when several Jars occupy diverse places ; and we also find a single thing occupying several places, as when a single composite resides in several of its components’. But such statement would be open to the following objections—in clause (a) ‘diversity of place’ स्थानान्यत्वं denotes the quality of ‘diversity’ as subsisting in the *Place* ; and in clause (b) the term नानास्थानत्वं, ‘the character of occupying several places’, denotes a quality subsisting in something else, other than *Place*. But Doubt can never arise from *two qualities* subsisting in two distinct things. For these reasons, the reasoning of the Sūtra could be resolved into one or other (not both) of the following, and neither would be right. For if the reasoning is put in the form—(a) ‘Doubt arises because we have seen multiplicity and unity when there is *diversity of place*’—then inasmuch as this quality of diversity would belong to the *place*, it would not belong to any *one* thing ; and hence it would not be common to both (*one* and *many*) ; specially as what the Sūtra has pointed out (in clause b) is only the fact of the *one thing* having the quality of occupying several places ; and it does not put forward the *diversity as belonging to the Place* ;—this latter has been put forward (in clause a) only in connection with *multiplicity*. If, on the other hand, the reasoning is put in the form—(b)—‘Doubt arises because we have found Unity and Multiplicity when things occupy several places’—

As a matter of fact, we find that when different places are occupied, there are several substances ; and yet the Composite

then the difficulty is that, as a matter of fact, there is no substance which occupies several places, each substance occupying only one place ; so that in this also the character would not be a common one ; specially as what the Sūtra declares in clause (b) is the fact that *the character of occupying several places* indicates *unity* of the thing. As for the contingency when several Jars occupy several places this has been spoken of, in clause (a) as indicating *diversity of place*, and not *the character of occupying several places*.

[For these reasons], the *Bhāṣya*, ignoring the literal meaning of the words of the Sūtra, which would be apparently irrelevant, has explained the Sūtra according to its sense—says the *Parīśuddhi*. And this sense is as rendered in the translation. The whole point of the difference is that the ‘occupying of several places’ should be taken as belonging to the *Sense-organs* specifically, and not to things in general,—and that of *occupying of several places* indicating *multiplicity* as well as *singleness*.

The *Bhāṣyacandra* offers the following explanation —

स्थानानि अन्यानि यस्य तस्य तत्तथा तस्य भावः ‘स्थानान्यत्वम्’ अनेकस्थान-स्थितैकत्वम् तेन नानात्वात् तज्ज्ञापितनानात्वात् [This explanation of the compound avoids the difficulty raised in the *Vārtika*]—‘Because *multiplicity* of Sense-organs is indicated by the fact that it is found in several places’—and अवयविनः एकस्य नानास्थानत्वात् नानावयवाधारकत्वञ्च एकत्वम् ; and yet inasmuch as a single composite resides in several of its components, it would seem that the Sense-organ is one only.’

The difficulty raised appears to be more verbal than real. What the Sūtra means is simply this—‘we find that when things occupy several places, they are many, [e g., when the Jar and the Cloth occupy different places] ; and we also find a single thing occupying several places ; e g., the Composite is single and yet it resides in several components ; so that when we find the Sense-organs occupying different places, there arises a Doubt as to whether they are several (like the Jar and the Cloth), or one (like the composite)’.—as Viśvanātha puts it. And all that the *Vārtika* insists upon is the fact that the Sūtra should be construed as simply putting forward *the character of occupying several places—as belonging to the Sense-organs—as the property common to ‘one’ and ‘several’, and hence giving rise to doubt as to the Sense-organs being one or many. And even when we take the Sūtra as referring to things in general, the implication is exactly this.*

Vardhamāna, in the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, puts the difficulty in a somewhat different manner —‘As the words of the Sūtra stand, the first clause mentions *multiplicity due to diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *singleness* (the second factor of the Doubt) ; similarly, the second clause mentions *singleness during diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *multiplicity*, so that in either case, the Doubt remains unaccounted for.’

substance, though subsisting in several places, is one only. Hence *in regard to the sense-organs, which are found to occupy different places*, the said doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[*Purvapakṣa*]—"The Sense-organ is one,—

Sūtra 53

"the Cutaneous (Tactile) only, because of non-absence."

BHĀṢYA

"The Cutaneous Organ is the only *one* organ",—says the Opponent. Why? "*Because of non-absence* ; that is, there is no *substratum of sense-organ* which is not pervaded by the *Skin* (in which the skin is not present) ; so that in the absence of *Skin* there can be no perception of anything. Hence it follows that there is a single Sense-organ—the Cutaneous (Tactile) Organ—by which all sense-substrata are pervaded, and in whose presence alone the perception of things is possible."

[**Siddhānta*]—The above is not right ; because there is no perception (by the Tactile Organ) of the objects of other Sense-organs.† The distinctive feature of the Cutaneous or Tactile Organ is that it is the instrument of the perception of Touch ; and when by means of this Tactile Organ, the Touch (of a certain thing) is perceived, there is no perception of the objects of other Sense-organs, such for instance, as Colour etc.—by such persons as are blind (devoid of the Visual Organ, even though endowed with an efficient Tactile Organ). [According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*] there is no other Organ except that which apprehends Touch ; so that (according to that theory) the blind man should perceive *Colour* etc , exactly as he perceives Touch ;—as a matter of fact, however, Colour etc. are not perceived by the blind ;—from which it follows that the Cutaneous Organ is not the only *one* Organ.

[The view that the Cutaneous Organ is the only sense-organ having been shown to be untenable, the *Pūrvapakṣin* next

* This is the *Siddhānta* put forward by the *Bhāṣya* ; the *Sūtrakāra* proounds it in the next *Sūtra*.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* calls this '*Sūtra*' ; The *Tātparya* regards it as *Sūtra*. It is interesting to note that the *Parīśuddhi* states and criticises the view that this is a *Sūtra*.

advances the view that the various Sense-organs are only parts of the one Cutaneous Organ]—"The perception of those things would be of the same kind as the perception of Smoke ; that is, as a matter of fact, the touch of Smoke is perceived (felt) by means of that particular part of the Cutaneous Organ (skin) which is located in the Eye,—and not by means of any other part of skin ; and similarly Colour, etc., also are perceived by particular parts of the skin ; and it is on account of the destruction of such parts that the blind fail to perceive Colour, the deaf fail to perceive Sound, and so forth."*

Answer—What has been urged cannot be right; as it involves a self-contradiction. Having asserted that—"inasmuch as the Cutaneous Organ is not absent anywhere, there is only one Sense-organ,"—you now allege that "the perception of Colour etc., is obtained by means of particular parts of skin, just like the perception of Smoke ;" if this latter allegation is true, then the instruments apprehending the several objects of perception (Colour, Touch etc) must be regarded as *several* ; for the simple reason that each of them apprehends a particular object of its own ; as is proved by the fact that one particular object, (*e. g.* Colour) is perceived only when one particular instrument (the *Eye* or the *Skin in the Eye*) is present, and it is not perceived when the latter is destroyed. Thus your former assertion (that there is a single Sense-organ apprehending all things) becomes contradicted by the latter.

The 'non-absence' that you have put forward (in Sū 53), as the reason (for the conclusion that there is only one 'Sense-organ') is also open to doubt. As a matter of fact, the substrata of the Sense-organs are pervaded by (*i. e.* composed of) the Earth and such other substances also, for in the absence of these substances there is no perception of things. From this it follows that there is no single Sense-organ—the Cutaneous or any other—which can bring about the perception of all things.

* When the blind fail to perceive Colour, it is only because that particular part of skin which was in the Eye, and which was the means of colour-perception, has been destroyed.

Sūtra 54

[*Siddhānta*]—It is not true [that there is only one Sense-organ]; because (several) things are not perceived simultaneously.

BHĀṢYA

[According to the view that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all things, what would happen would be that] the Soul would come into contact with the Mind, the Mind with the single Sense-organ, and the single sense-organ with all objects (Colour, Odour, Touch, Taste and Sound); so that (in every act of Perception), the contact of the Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the several objects being present, there would be perception, at one and the same time, of all these objects. As a matter of fact, however, Colour and such other objects are never perceived at one and the same time. Hence it follows that it is not true that there is a single sense-organ operating on all objects of perception.

Further, by reason of the non-concomitance of the perceptions of things, it cannot be accepted that there is a single sense-organ apprehending all things; if there were concomitance of perceptions of several things, then no blindness etc., would be possible.*

Sūtra 55

The Cutaneous Organ cannot be the only sense-organ; as this would involve inner contradictions.†

* The difference between 'non-simultaneity of perceptions' urged before and the 'non-concomitance of perceptions', urged now is not quite clear. The distinction, according to the *Vārtika* and the *Parīśuddhi*, is that 'non-simultaneity' is more general, referring principally to simultaneity of Perceptions; the sense being that several perceptions cannot appear at the same time; while 'non-concomitance' refers mainly to the objects perceived; the sense being that the several perceptions do not always appear together; *i. e.*, it is not necessary that the perception of Odour must always be accompanied by the perception of Colour; if that were so, then at the time that the blind man perceives Odour, he could have the perception of Colour also; and he would not be blind at all.

The *Parīśuddhi* remarks that what the *Sūtra* really means to urge here is, not exactly the 'non-simultaneity of cognitions', but only the impossibility of several things being perceived at one and the same time.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains the term '*vipratishedha*' as '*vidhāya pratishedha*', 'denying after affirming'.—*i. e.*, contradicting oneself.

This *Sūtra* is not found in *Viśvanātha*; the *Bhāṣyacandra* appears to treat it as *Bhāṣya*, it is not found in *Sūtra Ms. D*, nor in the *Purī Sūtra Ms.* It is found in the *Nyāyasūcībandha*, and the *Vārtika* also treats it as *Sūtra*.

BHĀṢYA

The Cutaneous Organ cannot be regarded as the only Sense-organ ; as such a view involves inner contradictions: That is, it would mean that by that Organ, Colour etc , are perceived without being in contact with it ;—and if the organ is operative without contact (as it is *ex-hypothesi*, in the perception of Colour etc.), then it should be so in the perception of Touch also ; or if Touch etc , are apprehended by the organ by contact only, then Colour etc., also should be apprehended by contact only.* It might be urged that—“ the Cutaneous Organ operates half and half. ” But, in that case, since no obstruction would be possible, any and every object would be equally perceived That is to say, if you mean that—“ Touch etc., are apprehended by the Cutaneous Organ only when they are in contact with it, while Colours are apprehended by it without being in contact with it, ”—then (our answer is that), under such a theory (where apprehension is possible *without contact*) there would be no obstruction (to the operation of the Organ) ; and there being no obstruction, there would be perception of all colours, the hidden as well as the unhidden ; nor would there be any ground for the well-known phenomenon that there is perception of Colour near at hand, and no perception of Colour at a distance ; that is to say, if the Cutaneous Organ apprehends Colour without being in contact with it, then there would be no reason for the phenomenon that, while Colour is not perceived from a distance, it is perceived when near at hand.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The plurality (of sense-organs) having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of *singleness*, the *Sūtra* proceeds to propound direct positive arguments in support of the same.†]

* The right reading प्राप्ताना ग्रहणम् is supplied by the Purī Mss. A. and B.

† This sentence has been construed in two ways, by the *Vārtika* — (1) *Ēkatvapratishedhāt anantaram*,—‘ after having negatived singleness ’—*nānātvāsiddhāu sthāpanāhetuh upādīyate*—‘ the *Sūtra* propounds arguments in support of plurality ’ ;—or (2) ‘ *Ēkatvapratishedhāt nānātvāsiddhau* ’—‘ the plurality of sense-organs having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of singleness, the *Sūtra* proceeds to propound direct arguments in support of the same. ’

Sūtra 56

Because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold.

BHĀṢYA

The term ' *artha* ' stands for *prayojana*, ' object ' or ' purpose ' ; and as a matter of fact, this ' object ' of the sense-organs is five-fold ; that is, when Touch is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, that same organ does not apprehend Colour ; hence we infer the existence of another, the Visual organ, which serves the ' purpose ' of apprehending Colour ; similarly when Colour and Touch are apprehended (by the Tactile and the Visual organs respectively), these two organs do not apprehend Odour ; which leads us to infer a third, the Olfactory Organ, which serves the ' purpose ' of apprehending Odour ;—in the same manner, when the three (Touch, Colour and Odour) are apprehended (by the Tactile, the Visual and Olfactory organs respectively), these same organs do not apprehend Taste ; hence we infer the existence of the fourth, the Gestatory Organ, which serves the ' purpose ' of apprehending Taste ;—lastly, when the four (Touch, Colour, Odour and Taste) are apprehended (by the Tactile, the Visual, the Olfactory, and the Gestatory organs respectively) those same organs do not apprehend Sound ; hence we infer the fifth, Auditory Organ, which serves the ' purpose ' of apprehending Sound. Thus, from the fact that the purpose of one sense-organ is not served by another, it follows that there are *five* Sense-organs.

Sūtra 57

[*Objection*]—“ **What is asserted cannot be accepted ; because the ' objects ' are many (and not ' five ')** ”.

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—“ That there are ' *five* ' sense-organs cannot be regarded as rightly proved by the fact that *the objects of the sense-organs are fivefold* ; Why ?—*Because the said objects are many*. The ' objects ' of the Sense-organs are several ; *e. g.* , there are three kinds of Touch—the *cool*, the *hot* and the *neither-cool-nor-hot* ; there are endless colours—in the shape of white, green and the rest ; there are three odours—agreeable, disagreeable and indifferent , there are several tastes—the bitter and the rest ; Sound is diverse ; appearing in the form of letters as also in that of mere indistinct sound. In view of these facts,

the man who would hold the sense-organs to be *five* on the ground of the objects of the Sense-organs being five-fold, should also have to admit that there are many (more than five) Sense-organs, because the objects of the sense-organs are many.”

Sūtra 58

[*Answer*]—Inasmuch as (the several kinds of Odour are) nothing more than ‘odour,’ there can be no denial of Odour or the rest (as constituting the ‘five Sense-organs’).

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, Odour (Colour, Test, Touch and Sound) have their exact extension precisely determined through their respective Universals.—so that the perceptions of these can be rightly regarded as indicating the existence of distinct apprehending instruments, only when it is found that they (the perceptions) are such as are *not* brought about by the same (or similar) instruments.* Further, the argument that has been put forward (in Sū. 56) has for its subject the ‘perceptible things’ as grouped under well-defined heads, and not individual things, severally, while your denial (in Sū 57) of the number ‘five’ as applied to ‘perceptible things’ refers to individual things regarded severally. Consequently the denial cannot be regarded as right and proper.†

“But how do you know that Odour and the rest have their extension precisely determined through their respective Universals?”

Well as a matter of fact, the three kinds of Touch—the cool, the warm and the neither-warm-nor-cool—are all grouped

* The reading न प्रयोजयन्ति is wrong, the right reading is प्रयोजयन्ति as found in the two Purī Mss. and in the *Bhāsyacandra*, and also supported by the *Bhāsyā* below.

† All Odours are apprehended by the same organ; hence they are grouped under one head, and regarded as ‘one’, similarly with Colour, Taste, Touch and Sound. Hence these five groups justify the assumption of five ‘Sense-organs’. The Opponent takes each Odour as a distinct unit, and for each such unit he would have one organ; and hence he does not agree to restrict the number of organs to five only. But when all Odours are actually found to be apprehended by the same organ, there is nothing to justify the assumption of several organs for the apprehending of Odour.

(and unified) under the single *Universal* of 'Touch'; so that when we perceive the *cool* Touch (by the Tactile Organ), the perception of the other two kinds of Touch—the *warm* and the *neither-warm-nor-cool*—cannot indicate, or justify the assumption of, other instruments (distinct from the said Tactile Organ); for the simple reason that all the several kinds of Touch are as a matter of fact perceptible by the same instrument; that is the other two kinds of Touch also are actually perceived by means of the same organ as the *cool* Touch. Similarly, all kinds of Odour are included under the single group 'Odour', all kinds of Colour under 'Colour', all kinds of Taste under 'Taste' and all kinds of Sound under 'Sound'. As for the perceptions of Odour (Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound), on the other hand, each of these is found to be obtained by means of a different kind of instrument; and as such they indicate so many different organs. From all this it becomes established that 'because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold, there are five Sense-organs.'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—"If things can be grouped under a *Universal*, then it follows that all the Sense-organs—

Sūtra 59

"should be regarded as 'one', their (several) objects being no more than 'object'.

BHĀṢYA

"That is to say, all objects being included under the single *Universal* of 'object' [the 'objects of the Sense-organs' are *one*, from which it follows that there is only one Sense-organ]."

Sūtra 60

[*Answer*]—Not so; because of the fivefoldness—(a) of the signs (or indicatives) in the shape of Perceptions, (b) of the location, (c) of the process (operation), (d) of the shape (magnitude) and (e) of the constituents.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, objects are never found to have their extension determined through the *Universal* of 'Object'; and hence they cannot all be inferred as perceptible by any single organ, independently of other organs; in the case of Odour etc.,

on the other hand, we find that they do have their extension determined by their respective UNIVERSALS 'Odour' and the rest; and as such they are inferred as perceptible—each by a distinct Sense-organ. Hence what is urged (in Su. 59) is entirely irrelevant.

This is what is described in detail in the Sutra :—

(A) *Because of the fivefoldness of the signs in the shape of Perceptions*; what indicate the existence of Sense-organs are our own perceptions, since the presence of Sense-organs is proved only by the perception that we have of certain things,—this has been already explained in the Bhāṣya on Sū 56, which speaks of the 'fivefoldness of the objects of the Sense-organs';—thus then, inasmuch as the 'indicatives of Sense-organs', in the shape of perceptions, are fivefold, the Sense-organs must be five.

(B) The *location* also of the Sense-organs is *fivefold*: (1) The Tactile Organ, which is indicated by the perception of Touch, has its *location* throughout the body; (2) the Visual Organ, which, as issuing out of the body, is indicated by the perception of Colour, has its *location* in the pupil of the Eye; (3) the Olfactory organ has its *location* in the Nose; (4) the Gestatory organ has its *location* in the Tongue; (5) the Auditory Organ has its *location* in the cavity of the Ear,*—all this being proved by the fact that the five organs have their existence indicated by the perceptions of Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound.

(C) On account of the fivefoldness of the *processes* also there is diversity in the Sense-organs: *e. g.*, (in visual perception) the Visual Organ encased in the pupil issues outside and then gets at the objects possessed of Colour; the Organs of Touch (Taste and Odour) on the other hand are themselves got at by the objects, which latter reach the Organs by the movements of the

* The *Bhāṣyacaṇḍra* remarks that, inasmuch as the Auditory organ consists of *Ākāśa* it is not right to locate it in the Ear-cavity. To avoid this difficulty, it offers other explanations of the compound '*karnachidrā-dhīsthānam*' (1) '*chīdram*', 'cavity', stands for a particular form of contact; and '*karna*' stands for an object made up of earth-particles and '*adhīsthāna*' stands for auxiliary; hence the whole compound means 'that which has for its auxiliary an object made up of earth-particles'—or (2) 'that which is the *adhīsthāna*,—substratum,—of the contact of the Ear'.—Both these interpretations would apply to the *Ākāśa*.

body in which the Organs exist; while the contact of the Auditory Organ with the Sound (heard) is obtained by reason of this latter proceeding in a series.

(D) ' *Ākṛti*, shape, ' stands for the exact limit or extent of magnitude, and this is found to be fivefold. The Olfactory, the Gestatory and the Tactile Organs have their shape or magnitude restricted to their respective substrata (in the body; the shape of the Olfactory organ is the same as that of the Nose, and so forth),—and are inferred (as distinct from the perception of their objects);—while the Visual organ, though located in the pupil, moves out of the socket and pervades over the object;—while, lastly, the Auditory Organ is nothing other than *Ākāśa* itself, and like *Ākāśa*, is all-pervading,—being inferred only from the perception of Sound; and yet this Organ manifests or renders audible only certain particular sounds,—being restricted in its scope by the substratum (body) in which it subsists, by reason of the force of the peculiar faculties (of Merit and Demerit) belonging to the person concerned.*

(E) By *Jāti*, 'Constituent', is meant 'source'; the 'sources' or 'constituents' of the Sense-organs are five, in the shape of the rudimentary substances, Earth (Air, Water, Light and *Ākāśa*). It follows therefore that, because the 'constituents' are five, the Sense-organs also must be five.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(The *Sāṅkhya* asks)—" How do you know that the Sense-organs have their source in the *rudimentary substances*, and not in *Unmanifested Primordial Matter* ? "

[The answer is given in the following Sūtra].

Sūtra 61

The Sense-organs are regarded as being of the same nature as the Rudimentary Substances, because there is perception (by their means) of the specific qualities of these substances.

* Though the Auditory organ is nothing more than the all-pervading *Ākāśa*, yet it cannot apprehend all Sounds in the world, because its scope is restricted by the disabilities of the body in which it subsists,—this connection of a particular organ with a particular object being determined by the merit and demerit of the man to whom it belongs.

BHĀṢYA

In the case of Air and the other rudimentary substances we find that there is a restriction as to the perception of particular qualities ; e. g. Air serves to manifest Touch ; Water serves to manifest Taste ; Light serves to manifest Colour ; as for Earth, one earthy thing (oil, *f. i.*,) serves to manifest the odour of another earthy thing (the *kunkuma*, *f. i.*,) ;—this restriction as to the perception of the specific qualities of rudimentary substances is found in the case of the Sense-organs also [*e. g.* the Olfactory Organ manifests *Odour* only, the Tactile Organ *Touch* only, and so forth] ; hence from the fact that there is restriction as to the perception of the specific qualities of Rudimentary Substances, we conclude that the Sense-organs have their source in (are constituted by) those Substances, and not in Unmanifested Primordial Matter.*

SECTION (9)

(Sūtra 62-73)

Examinations of the 'Objects' of Sense-organs.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been mentioned† above (in Sū 1-1-14) that Odour etc., are the qualities of Earth, and inasmuch as this assertion would be true if Earth etc., had each only one quality, as well as

* The *Tātparya* makes the following observation.—By the declaration that there are only five Sense-organs, it is implied, that the other five—Hands, Feet etc.—which also have been regarded as 'Sense-organs'—are not 'Sense-organs'; and the reason for this lies in the fact that they do not fulfill the conditions of the 'Sense-organ'; these conditions are—(1) that they should be connected with the Body, (2) they should be distinct from the defects of *samskāras* and (3) they should be the direct instruments of cognition; and these (specially the last) are not present in Hands, Feet, etc.

† What this refers to is not the mere 'mention', '*uddeśa*' of the Objects; it apparently refers to their 'definition', '*lakṣana*'. The *Tātparya* says—'With a view to *examine* the nature of *objects*, the *Bhāṣyakāra* recalls the definition provided under Sū. 1-1-14'; the mere 'mention' of 'objects' has been made under 1-1-1. The *Parīśuddhi* adds that the purpose underlying the examination of the 'objects' is the proving of the main thesis that there are several sense-organs, as also the discarding of the objections against the definition of Earth etc.

if they had several qualities,* the author of the Sūtra adds the following Sūtras —

Sūtras 62 and 63

From among Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound,—those ending with Touch belong to Earth (Sū. 62) ; and [from among those ending with Touch] excluding from the beginning, one by one, they belong respectively to Water, Light and Water ; and to Ākāśa belongs the latter. (Sū 63).†

BHĀṢYA

‘From among those ending with Touch’—this term, with its (former Nominative) case-ending changed (into the Genitive)—has to be construed along with Sū. 63.‡

To Ākāśa belongs the latter—i. e. Sound,—so called in reference to those ending with Touch.‡ “Why then is the comparative suffix ‘tarap’ used [when the reference is to the four qualities of Odour etc., while ‘tarap’ is used when one thing is referred to one other thing]?” The word is an independent positive adjective (and not a comparative term ending with ‘tarap’) and all that it signifies is ‘that which comes after’; and in Sū. 1-1-14,—where all five are mentioned—‘Sound’ comes after

* Here the author propounds the doubt that forms the basis of the present enquiry : As regards the assertion in Sū. 1-1-14, it may mean, either—(1) that each one of Odour, Colour etc., belongs to each one of Earth, Light etc.; or (2) that among Earth and the rest, some have one quality, some two ; or (3) that all belong to all.—*Vārtika*. On this the *Parīśuddhi* remarks—The question is—Is the assertion in Sū 1-1-14 meant to be *restrictive* (of one quality to one substance) ? or *alternative* (one possessing one quality, one several and so forth) ? or *cumulative* (all possessing all) ? Or the doubt may be in regard to Odour, Colour, etc.;—some qualities are common to all substances, some belong to only a few;—to which of these categories do Odour &c belong ?

† These are two Sūtras—according to the *Vārtika* and also according to the *Bhāṣyatandra*.

‡ This term is necessary in Sū. 63 and it can be brought only from the foregoing Sūtra ; there however it has the Nominative ending ; hence when construed with Sū. 63, its case-ending has to be changed. The meaning is that Earth has Odour, Taste, Colour and Touch ; Water has Taste, Colour and Touch ; Light has Colour and Touch ; Air has only Touch.

‡ The term ‘*spārsaparyanth*’ of the previous Sūtra, with the case-ending changed into the form ‘*Sparahaparyantēbhyoḥ*’, being brought in from the preceding Sūtra.

' those ending with the Touch '. Or the word may be taken as a relative term,—the reference being to ' Touch ' only; the meaning being ' among those ending with Touch, that which is last, i. e. Touch,—in reference to this, Sound is ' latter '.

Sūtra 64

[*The Pūrvapakṣin objects*]—" **The view expressed cannot be accepted; because all the qualities (attributed to the Substances) are not apprehended (by the Sense-organs constituted by them).**"

BHĀṢYA

[*The Pūrvapakṣin*, holding the view that each one of the substances, is possessed of only one quality, objects to the view put forward in the preceding *Sūtra*]—" The said distribution of qualities is not right.—Why?—Because as a matter of fact, all the qualities that have been attributed to the various substances (under the preceding *Sūtra*) are not apprehended by the Sense-organs composed by those substances. For example, by the Olfactory Organ, which is composed of Earth, all the four qualities ending with *Touch* are not apprehended; it is *Odour* alone that is apprehended by it. Similarly with the others also."

In what manner then are the Qualities to be distributed?—asks the *Siddhāntin*.

[*The Pūrvapakṣin* answers this question and propounds his theory in the next *Sūtra*.]

Sūtra 65

[*The Pūrvapakṣin says*]—" **Inasmuch as each of the qualities subsists, one by one, in each of the Substances, one after the other,—there is no apprehension of the others.**"*

BHĀṢYA

" As a matter of fact, from among Odour (Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound), each subsists, one by one, respectively in Earth, (Water, Light, Air, and Ākāśa). Hence ' there is no apprehension of the others '—i. e. (*a*) ' of the other three qualities, ' (*b*) ' of the other two qualities ' and (*c*) ' of the other quality ', that is to say, (*a*) there is no apprehension, by the

* The right reading is एकैकश्रेण as found in Sū. Ms. D, in Puri Sūtra. Mss. A and B; in *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, and also in the *Vārtika*.

Olfactory Organ of Taste, Colour and Touch,—(b) there is no apprehension, by the Gestatory Organ, of Colour and Touch,—(c) there is no apprehension, by the Visual Organ, of Touch.”

Question—If such is the case, then, how is it that the Rudimentary Substances (Earth and the rest) are actually perceived as possessing *several* qualities?

Answer—“The perception of several qualities is due to admixture;* that is, that Taste and the other qualities are perceived in Earth is due to the Mixture (*i. e.*, presence therein) of particles of Water and the other substances. Similarly with the others.”

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *Siddāntin* asks]—If such be the case, then there should be no restriction; inasmuch as there is no restriction in the association of the substances, there should be no such restriction as that ‘Earth has *four* qualities’, ‘Water has *three* qualities’, ‘Light has *two* qualities’ and ‘Air has *one* quality.’

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers]—“Certainly restriction is possible.”—How?

Sūtra 66

“**Because the preceding is permeated by the succeeding.**”

BHĀṢYA

“As a matter of fact, among Earth (Water, Light, Air and Ākāśa), that which precedes is permeated by what succeeds it; and on account of this (restricted) mixture or association, there is restriction (in regard to the qualities).†

“All this is to be learnt from the account (contained in the *Purāṇas*) of the creation of things; and it cannot be

† This is printed as *Sūtra* in the *Viz.* edition; but no such *Sūtra* is found anywhere; and from the *Bhāṣya* below (*e.g.*) it is clear that the *Pūrvapakṣa* consists of only three *Sūtras*.

* Earth is permeated by all the other four substances; hence all those qualities are found in it; Water is permeated by all but Earth, hence it is found to possess all qualities except *Odour*; and so with the rest.

This is the explanation of the *Tātparyā*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains the *Sūtra* as—‘Earth is permeated by Water etc., and Water by Earth etc.’ But this is not in keeping with the *Bhāṣya*.

directly known now (by us ; since the matter is beyond the reach of our mind).”*

Sūtra 67

(*Siddhānta*)—**Not so ; because the Earthy and the Aqueous Substances are both actually perceived [with distinct qualities of their own.]†**

BHĀSYA

‘*Not so*’—denies all that has been stated in the preceding three *Sūtras*. And the reason for this denial is given in the next phrase—*because the Earthy Substance (Earth) and Aqueous Substance (Water) are both actually perceived*. [If the *Pūrvapakṣa* theory were true, and each of the Substances had only one quality, then] according to the principle that ‘Perception is due to large magnitude, to composition by several components and to Colour,’ the *Luminous Substance* (Light) alone would be perceptible, and not either Earth or Water ; since the two latter are devoid of Colour (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, and the presence of Colour is a necessary condition of perceptibility).§ As a matter of fact, however, Earth and Water are as perceptible as Light. Nor will it be right to attribute the presence of several

* Such is the explanation given by the *Tātparyā*. The *Bhāsyacandra* explains that all this peculiar creation in which the substances are associated together in this peculiar fashion is the result of God’s peculiar powers ; and hence it cannot be questioned, it must be accepted as true, as described in the Scriptures.

† The *Bhāṣya* has provided four explanations of the *Sūtra*, embodying the following four statements—(a) Earth and Water are actually perceived, (b) they are perceived with distinct tastes, colours and touches ; (c) they are perceived with distinct qualities of their own, and (d) each of the Substances, Earth, Water etc. is perceived as mixed up with the rest. We have adopted (c) alone in the translations, as it is the widest, and as such practically includes the others.

§ Even according to the Opponent, Earth, Water and Light are held to be perceptible by the Eye ; but according to the view that each substance has only one quality, Earth would have Odour only, and Water would have Taste only ; so that both of these being devoid of Colour, would be invisible ; and Light would be the only visible substance. Nor will it be right to assert that the visibility of Earth and Water is due to their association with Light. For such association, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, is present in Air and Ākāśa also ; so that these two also should be perceptible by the Eye.—*Tātparyā*.

qualities in a substance to its association with other substances ; because if one holds that the perceptibility of Earth and Water is due to the presence therein of such Colour as belongs to another substance (Light) which is mixed with it,—then, for him, Air also should be equally perceptible ; or you should find some explanation for the restriction (that while Earth and Water are perceptible, Air is not perceptible) [the condition of perceptibility, in the shape of mixture with Light, being equally present in all the three].

(b) Or, the clause '*because the Earthy and the Aqueous are perceived*' may mean 'because distinct tastes of Earth and Water are perceived ; *i.e.*, as a matter of fact, the taste of Earth is of six kinds, while that of Water is only *sweet*, and this could not be, if the two were actually mixed up. Or, *because distinct Colours of Earth and Water are perceived* ; while if the Colour of Earth and Water were due only to the Colour of the Light mixed up with them, then such Colour would serve only to illumine (render perceptible) other things, and it would itself not be illumined (and perceived) ;'* as a matter of fact however the Colours of Earth and Water are *actually perceived*, as being of several kinds and of only one kind respectively ; *e.g.*, the Colour of Earthy things is of several kinds, green, red, yellow and so forth ; while the Colour of Water is only white, and that also illuminative in its character :—such a phenomenon is never found in the case of Substances consisting only of the mixture of several substances, each endowed with only one quality.

The Sutra has mentioned 'Earth' and 'Water' only by way of illustration. The same is true of other things also which we proceed to show in detail.

The reason for our denying the Pūrvapakṣa is—*because of Earth and Light, distinct touches are perceived* ; *i.e.*, the touch of Earth is *neither-hot-nor-cold*, while that of Light is actually perceived as *hot* ; and no such phenomenon would be possible

* For the *Colour of Light* is only *White-light*, which, while itself not perceptible, renders other things perceptible. Hence if the Colour in Earth and Water were only the Colour of Light, it would not be itself perceived ; while the Colour of Earth and Water are actually perceived ; these Colours must belong to something other than Light.

if both (Earth and Fire) were mixed up with Air, which is *neither-hot-nor-cold*.

(c) Or, the phrase, 'because the Earthy and Aqueous substances are perceived,' may mean that *both these substances, Earth and Water, are actually perceived with distinct qualities of their own*; e. g. Earthy things are perceived with four qualities, and Aqueous things are perceived with only three; and from this we conclude that the *constituent Earth* (of the Earthy substance) is also endowed with those same (four) qualities; because the finished product is indicative of the nature of its cause, which, by reason of its being the cause, is regarded as modifiable (into that product). Similarly, inasmuch as the Earthy and Luminous Substances are perceived as possessed of distinct qualities, we conclude that the constituents of these also must be possessed of these same distinct qualities.

(d) Or, [The *Sūtra* may be explained to mean that] a difference is actually perceived between Earthy and Aqueous substances, both of which are distinctly perceived; that is to say, it is actually perceived that Earthy Substances are mixed up with Water (Light and Air),—that Aqueous Substances are mixed up with other two substances (Light and Air),—and Luminous Substances are mixed up with Air; and not a single substance is ever found to be possessed of only one quality.

As for the reasoning propounded in Sū. 66—"because the preceding is permeated by the succeeding [restriction of qualities becomes possible]"—it is no reasoning at all; because we do not find in it any reason leading up to the conclusion,—on the strength whereof we could accept the Proposition. As for the assertion (made by the Opponent, in the *Bhāṣya*, on Sū. 66)—"that the preceding is permeated by the succeeding is to be learnt from the account, contained in the Purāṇas, of the creation of the things, and it cannot be directly known now"—is not right: because there would be no ground for the restriction [that Odour only should subsist in Earth, that it subsists in Earth only, and so forth].* Further,

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains the passage as translated. The *Tātparyā* offers a somewhat different explanation —"There is no evidence according to you, in support of the view that Odour subsists in Earth only; for the

it is actually seen even now that 'the preceding substance is permeated by the succeeding;' e. g., Light (Fire) is permeated by Air [so that the assertion referred to is not true, being contrary to a fact of perception]. Then again, 'permeation' is only a kind of *contact*, and this is equal to both; so that there can be no explanation for the fact that, while Light becomes endowed with Touch by reason of its being permeated by Air, Air does not become endowed with Colour, though it is permeated by Light. Further, it is actually seen that the Touch of Air (which is neither-hot-nor-cold) is suppressed by the Touch of Light (which is hot), and becomes imperceptible (by reason of that suppression), and certainly a thing cannot be suppressed by itself [and this is what the said phenomenon would mean if the touch of Light were due to its permeation by Air; as in that case the said suppression would mean that the *Touch of Air* is suppressed by the *Touch of Air*]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Having thus repudiated a theory opposed to all reason the *Sūtra* next turns to answer the argument (put forward under Sū. 64)—that "the view cannot be accepted, because all the qualities (attributed to Substances) are not apprehended by the Sense-organs constituted by them":—

Sūtra 68

Inasmuch as from among the qualities [of the organs of Olfaction, Gestation, Vision, Touch and Audition] there is an excess (in each Organ) of each of the qualities [Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound], one by one, in the order in which they are mentioned,—each Organ is regarded as preponderating in that quality.*

only arguments that you propound are against such a conception; hence the account of the creation of things, referred to you, must be taken as figurative, not literally true."

* We have translated the *Sūtra* according to the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. The *Vārtika* does not accept this view, on the ground that—"if the predominance of an Organ consisted of its apprehending a certain object, then all Organs would be equally predominant; for every Organ apprehends its object." But the *Vārtika* apparently misunderstands the expression *tattatpradhānam* of the *Bhāṣya*: it does not mean that each of the *Organs* respectively is predominant, as the *Vārtika* seems to take it—but that each

BHĀṢYA

Hence [because of the fact mentioned in the Sūtra] there can be no apprehension (by any sense-organ) of all qualities. Among the qualities of the Olfactory and other Organs—i. e., among Odour and the rest—there being an excess (in each Organ) of the preceding quality (over the succeeding qualities)—each organ is regarded as preponderating in that quality.

“What does this *predominance* mean?”

It means that the Organ is capable of apprehending that object.

“What is meant by the ‘*excess*’ of a quality in an Organ?”

It means that that Organ has the capacity of manifesting (rendering cognisable) that quality.

[The meaning of the Sūtra thus is as follows]—Just as the external substances of Earth, Water and Light,—which are endowed respectively with four, three, and two qualities—are capable of manifesting, not all these qualities, but only Odour, Taste and Colour, respectively;—and this is on account of the fact that in these substances there is an excess of the qualities of Odour, Taste and Colour, respectively,—in the same manner the Organs of Olfaction, Gestation and Vision,—which are endowed respectively with four, three and two qualities,—are capable of apprehending, not all qualities, but only Odour, Taste and Colour respectively,—and this on account of the fact that

of the Organs has that for its predominant quality, and this predominance is indicated by the Sense-organ manifesting that only; and this is not open to the objection urged in the *Vārtika*. Further, the *Vārtika* explanation has no point, if the Olfactory Organ is predominant, as endowed with the largest number of qualities (four),—what can that have to do with its apprehending *Odour only*, which is the point at issue? In fact, that it is endowed with four qualities should make it capable of apprehending all those qualities. The *Tātparya* has attempted to justify the *Vārtika*'s interpretation.

The *Bhāṣyacandra* follows the *Vārtika*, but Viśvanātha accepts the *Bhāṣya*. *Vardhamāna* also in the *Nyāyabandhaprakāśa*, offers the following explanation of the Sūtra—“Inasmuch as among the qualities of the Olfactory and other Sense-organs, there is an excess of the preceding over the succeeding qualities, each of the Organs is predominant through that quality, hence it cannot apprehend *all* qualities; it can apprehend only that quality (in its manifested form) whose presence imparts to it the said predominance.”

in each of the Organs there is an excess of those qualities, Odour, Taste and Colour respectively.—Hence [inasmuch as the Organs are not possessed of the capacity of apprehending all qualities] there can be no apprehension, by the Olfactory and other Organs, of all qualities.

[On the other hand] If one holds that—“the Olfactory Organ apprehends Odour, *because it is endowed with Odour*, and so on with the Gestatory and other Organs”—then, it should be possible for each of the other Organs, of Olfaction and the rest, to apprehend all the qualities that it is endowed with* [which would not meet the Opponent’s objection]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The question now arises—“To what is this restriction due—that only one organ is composed of the *Earth*; and not all?—that only a few are composed of Water and Light particles, and not all?”† *Answer*—

Sūtra 69

The restriction (as to one organ being composed of Earth, and so forth) is due to preponderance (*i.e.* singularity).§

* Under the theory noticed—according to which the fact that the Olfactory Organ apprehends Odour, *because it is possessed of Odour*, and not because there is an excess of Odour in it—the Organ should apprehend all the four qualities of Odour, Taste, Colour, and Touch, with which it is held to be endowed. So that the contingency of one Organ apprehending all qualities would remain possible.

† The question simply means that one organ (Olfactory) is held to be composed of Earth, the Gestatory Organ of Water, the Visual Organ of Light, and so forth; now to what is all this restriction due? Agreeably to this, the *Tātparya* puts the question as—“Whence do you get at the restriction that it is the Olfactory Organ alone that apprehends Odour?” The *Vārtika* and Vishvanātha put the question differently—“Why is not every substance composed of Earth regarded as the ‘Olfactory Organ’? The *Bhāṣyacandra* and the *Nyāyasūtravivarana* put the question in the simplest form—“What are the reasons for regarding the Olfactory Organ alone as composed of Earth, the Gestatory Organ alone as composed of Water and so forth?” With the exception of the *Vārtika* and *Viśvanātha*, all are in agreement with the *Bhāṣya*.

§ The *Bhāṣya* has explained the expression ‘*bhūyastvāt*’ of the Sūtra to mean *prakṛstatvāt*, due to superiority or singularity. Would it not be simpler to take it as meaning simply *preponderance*?—the argument being that ‘the Olfactory Organ is regarded as of Earth, because Earth forms the

BHĀṢYA

[In the formation of a thing] there is a coming together (amalgamation) of such distinct substances as are capable of bringing about the requisite thing—this amalgamation being regulated by the destiny (merit-demerit) of men (to whom the thing is to belong); it is *this amalgamation of distinct substances* that constitutes the 'preponderance' [which means 'singularity']—of the thing; the word 'preponderance' is found to be used in the sense of 'singularity' or 'excellence'; e.g., an *excellent* thing is called 'preponderating'. For instance, such things as Poison, Medicinal Plant, Gem and so forth, which are produced under the influence of the destiny of Men, are capable of accomplishing distinct purposes; and all things do not accomplish all purposes. In the same manner, when the Olfactory and other organs are produced, they are capable of apprehending only certain distinct things,—and not all things.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question.—"Why is it that the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities?"*

[The answer is given by the following *Sūtra*]—

Sūtra 70

Because it is only as endowed with qualities that the Sense-organs are what they are.

BHĀṢYA

The Olfactory and other organs do not, as a matter of fact, apprehend their own qualities, Odour and the rest. If you ask—"Why is this so?"—our answer is that it is only as endowed with their respective qualities that the Olfactory and other Organs are regarded as 'Sense-organs'. That is to say, the

preponderating element in its constitution. In view of this we have translated the said expression as 'preponderance', which is its natural signification, and placed the *Bhāṣya* rendering as a parenthetical explanation.

* "If, for instance, the Olfactory Organ is, as the *Siddhāntin* holds, endowed with Odour, how is it that the Organ does not perceive this Odour present in itself?"

Viśvanātha introduces the *Sūtra* somewhat differently—"The *Sūtra* proceeds to prove that the Sense-organs are actually endowed with the qualities of Odour, etc.'

Olfactory Organ apprehends outside Odour, only when it is itself accompanied by Odour which serves the same purpose (of making perceptible the Odour, of other things) as the organ itself; so that it cannot apprehend its own Odour, for the simple reason that in this the necessary auxiliary (in the shape of its own Odour) would be wanting. Similarly with the other sense-organs.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

If it be held that—"The Odour of the Olfactory Organ would itself be the requisite auxiliary also",—then our answer is—

Sūtra 71

Because a thing cannot be apprehended by itself.

BHĀṢYA

There can be no apprehension, by the Sense-organs, of their own qualities. In fact, the assertion made is exactly like the statement—"Just as an external substance is apprehended by the Eye, so, by the Eye, that same Eye itself should be apprehended;" for in both cases (the apprehension of the Eye by itself, and of the organ's quality by itself), the causes of requisite apprehension are wanting. [*i.e.*, The quality, forming an integral part of the Sense-organ, cannot be apprehended by the same organ; nothing can operate upon itself.]

Sūtra 72

[*Objection*]—"What is asserted cannot be accepted; because the quality of Sound is actually perceived."

BHĀṢYA

"It is not true that the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities; because Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, and yet it is its own quality [Sound being the quality of *Ākāśa*, and the Auditory Organ being nothing other than *Ākāśa*]."

Sūtra 73

Answer—The said apprehension is due to the fact of the quality (Sound) and the substance (*Ākāśa*) being unlike other qualities and substances.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, it is not as endowed with a particular Sound that *Ākāśa* becomes the (Auditory) Sense-organ possessed

of a quality ;* and Sound is not the manifester of Sound [so that the Auditory organ consisting of Ākāśa differs from the other organs consisting of Earth etc., because it is only as possessed of Odour that Earth constitutes the Olfactory organ, and so forth; while Ākāśa forms the Auditory organ by its very nature ;—and Sound also differs from Odour].

Further, that the Olfactory and other organs apprehend their own qualities is known neither by Perception, nor by Inference ; while as regards the Ākāśa of the Auditory organ, we do know, by Inference, that Sound is apprehended by it , and Sound is the quality of Ākāśa . The Inference that leads to this Cognition is that which operates by elimination . [among the Substances that could be regarded as the Auditory organ, to which alone Sound could belong as a quality] the Soul is the *hearer*, and not the *instrument* (of hearing) [Hence the Soul can not be the Auditory organ] ;—if the Mind were the Auditory organ, then (Mind being imperishable) there would be no possibility of deafness ;—as regards Earth (Water, Light and Air), though they have the capacity of becoming (composing) the organs of Olfaction and the rest, they do not have the capacity of forming the Auditory organ;—*Ākāśa* thus is the only substance left ;—hence it is concluded that it is *Ākāśa* that forms the Auditory Organ.

* That is, it is *not* by reason of its having Sound for its quality that the Auditory organ is an organ of perception ; by its very nature is the Auditory organ Ākāśa. The quality of Sound that belongs to Ākāśa of the Auditory organ could not be the same that is apprehended by it.

DISCOURSE III
DAILY LESSON II
SECTION 1

Transient Character of Buddhi—Cognition.

Sūtras 1-9

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The *Sense-organs* and *Objects* have been fully examined ; now it is the turn of the Examination of *Buddhi*, Cognition.* And the first question that arises is—Is Cognition eternal or non-eternal ?

“Why should there be this doubt ?”

Sūtra 1

The Doubt arises by reason of the similarity (of Cognition) to Action and Ākāśa.

BHĀṢYA

(a) The ‘similarity’ of Cognition to Action and Ākāśa consists in *intangibility* ; (b) and further, in Apprehension we do not perceive any such definite character as either *liability to production and destruction*—which would mark it as *non-eternal*—or the contrary [*i.e., non-liability to production and destruction*] which would mark it as *eternal*, hence [all necessary conditions of

* The Agent (Soul), the Instrument (the Sense-organs) and the Objects of Apprehension or Cognition having been duly examined, it is now the turn of the examination of the nature of Cognition or Apprehension itself —*Bhāṣyacandra*.

The things outside the Body having been examined, the Author next proceeds to examine those within the Body,—says the *Parisuddhi*. On this Vardhamāna makes the following observations —

When it is said that the things now going to be examined exist *in the Body*, it cannot mean that they subsist or inhere in it, as in this sense Cognition and Mind cannot be said to exist in the body, nor can it mean that they are in physical contact with it ; as this would not be true of Cognition, and also because many external things also are in contact with the Body. What is meant is that the coming Lesson deals with such objects of Cognition as are distinguished by the character of being the cause of experiences in connection with the Body. Such examination is conducive to that Disgust for things which is a necessary step towards Final Release.

Doubt, described under Sū. 1-1-23, being present] the said Doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[An objection is raised against the above question]—“The doubt put forward is groundless ; it is a fact known to every living being that Cognition is transient, being just like Pleasure and such experiences ; every man has such notions as—‘I shall know’, ‘I know’ and ‘I have known’; and the connection with the three points of time (involved in these conceptions) would not be possible if Cognition were *not liable to production and destruction* [So that it is not true that we do not find in Cognition the *liability to production and destruction*] ;* hence, inasmuch as Cognition is related to all three points of time (being, as it is, liable to production, existence and destruction), it follows as an established conclusion that it is *non-eternal* Further, in the *Nyāya-sūtra* itself it has been asserted as a well-substantiated fact—(a) that ‘Cognition is *produced* by the contact of the Sense-organs, and the Object’ (Sū. 1-1-16), and (b) that ‘the non-simultaneous *production* of Cognitions indicates the existence of Mind’ (Sū. 1.1.16) [wherein it is taken for granted that Cognitions are *produced*, from which it follows that Cognition is *not-eternal*] , so that no further doubt and discussion should be called for.”

* The three notions mentioned imply that there is *production* of Cognition (as involved in the notion ‘I shall know’, which means that the Cognition shall be produced), there is *Continuity* of Cognition (as expressed by ‘I know’ which means that Cognition is *present*), and there is *destruction* of Cognition (as expressed by ‘I have known’, which means that the Cognition has come to an end).—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

The *Tātparya* puts the question somewhat differently —“If by ‘Buddhi’ in the present context, you mean the individual cognition of things, then the whole discussion becomes pointless, as no one holds such cognitions to be other than momentary. If, on the other hand, you mean by *Buddhi*, the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya*, then, before discussing the character of such a thing, it behoves you to discuss its very existence; as the *Naiyāyika* does not admit of any such universal Cosmic Principle as the ‘*Mahat*’ of the *Sāṅkhya*.

Vardhamāna has some observations to make in regard to the exact words in which the subject-matter of the discussion should be stated. In the sentence—‘Is *Buddhi* eternal or non-eternal,’ the term ‘*buddhi*’ like every other term, denotes the *Universal ‘buddhitva’*; and as this latter is eternal, according to all parties, there is no occasion for doubt on this matter.

Our answer (in justification of the present enquiry) is that the present enquiry is for the purpose of refuting the unreasonable assertions based upon false speculation; the Sāṅkhyas, speculating, in the realms of philosophy, assert that—"Buddhi, the Internal Organ of Man, is eternal"; and they also put forward arguments in support of this assertion, as in the following *Sūtra*.*

Sūtra 2

‘Because there is re-cognition of things.’

BHĀṢYA

“What is this ‘re-cognition’? ‘Re-cognition’ is the name of that re-collective cognition which is involved in the conception that we have in regard to one and the same thing, in the form—“I now cognise the same thing that I had cognised before’. Such

Nor can the question be stated in the form—‘Is the *word buddhi* one whose *denotation* is eternal, or is it one whose *denotation* is not eternal?’ Because it is possible to give the name to a person, whereby the physical body of that person would form the denotation of the word ‘buddhi’; and certainly there could be no question of this denotation being eternal. Some people have stated the question in the form—“Is the denotation of the term *buddhi*, which is the substratum of the *Universal ‘buddhitva’*, eternal or non-eternal?” The Author himself would favour the question in the form—‘Is *cognition* co-substrate with *I-ness* or not?’ According to the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Buddhi-tattva* is the substratum of Cognition, which is something different from the *Ātman*, and as such *not* co-substrate with *I-notion*.

* Whether *Buddhi* is eternal or non-eternal is not the main subject of our present enquiry, this has been introduced only as a preliminary issue, which serves to establish the conclusion that there is no such thing as the Cosmic Thinking Principle, the Mahat, which the Sāṅkhya posits as something distinct from the ephemeral Cognitions of things. The fact of the matter is that if *Buddhi* were something eternal, then it would certainly be something different from the momentarily appearing and disappearing cognitions,—if on the other hand, the grounds put forward in proof of the eternity of *Buddhi*, are found to be incapable of establishing it, then there would be no justification for postulating any Universal Thinking Principle apart from the Cognitions; and it becomes established that ‘Buddhi’ and ‘Cognition’ are synonymous terms, as declared by the *Naiyāyika* in *Sū.* 1-1-15. It is in this manner also that the present enquiry becomes connected with the definition of *Buddhi* set forth in the *Sūtra* (1-1-15). There would be no such relevancy in the enquiry if it pertained merely to the eternity or non-eternity of *Buddhi*.—*Tātparya*.

re-collective cognition can be possible only when Cognition is eternal ; for if there were several divergent Cognitions, capable of being produced and destroyed, no 're-cognition' would be possible for a thing *cognised* by one cannot be *re-cognised* by another".*

Sūtra 3

[*The Sidhāntin's answer to the Sāṅkhya argument*].

Inasmuch as what has been put forward is itself still to be proved, it cannot be accepted as a valid reason.

BHĀṢYA

Just as the 'eternality' of *Buddhi* is 'still to be proved,' so is also the fact that 're-cognition belongs to *Buddhi*' 'still to be proved', *i.e.*, not proved [it cannot be admitted];—why so?—because what belongs to an intelligent being cannot be attributed to an instrument ; as a matter of fact, *Buddhi*,—which is spoken of as *jñāna* (Cognition), '*darshana*' (Perception), '*upalabdhi*' (Apprehension), '*bodha*' (Understanding), '*pratyaya*' (Cognizance), and '*adhyavasāya*' (Ascertainment),—is a quality of, and belongs to, the conscious Person ; and it is only the conscious Person that *re-cognises* what he has *cognised* before ; so that it is to this conscious Person only that 'eternality' can be attributed, on the ground of 'recognition' † If it be held that 'Consciousness' (or 'Intelligence') belongs to the instrument [and not to the Soul ; so that Recognition also would belong to the Instrument],—then it becomes necessary to explain the exact nature of the *conscious* (intelligent) being ; for unless you define the exact nature of the 'Conscious Being', you cannot posit a totally different § Soul (a Personality or conscious Being totally different from

* And according to the Sāṅkhya, *Buddhi* is eternal, and yet capable of under-going modifications ; by virtue of which it becomes connected with the several cognitions involved in Re-cognition. This would not be possible of the Soul, which is eternal, unmodifiable.—*Tātparya*.

† It is the Person that *recognises*, 'recognition' belongs to him, hence if 'recognition' proves *eternality*, this eternality can belong only to the Conscious Person, and not to *Buddhi*, which, as the Internal Organ, is a mere *instrument* ; for this simple reason this *Buddhi* does not appear in the *Recognition* at all.—*Tātparya*.

§ The *Naiyāyika* posits one kind of Conscious Being in the shape of the Soul ; the Opponent now posits the 'Conscious Being' in the shape of the Instrument, the Internal Organ. Before this can be accepted, the Opponent should explain what he exactly means by the 'Conscious Being'.

what is generally regarded as the Conscious Being). That is to say, if it be held that Cognition (Consciousness) belongs to the Internal Organ in the shape of the Mind, we ask you—of this ‘conscious being’ of yours, what is the exact form, what the character, and what the exact nature? And what does this ‘Conscious Being’ do with the cognition subsisting in the *Buddhi*?

If it be held that—“it cognises, *cētatātē*,”—our answer is that this expression would in no way differ from ‘*jñāna*’, ‘cognition’; that is to say, the two expressions—‘the man *cognises*’ and ‘*Buddhi* knows’—would both connote *cognition*, and nothing else;* as the words *cētatātē* (‘cognises’) ‘*jñātē*’, (knows) ‘*budhyate*’ (understands), ‘*paśyati*’ (perceives), ‘*upalabhate*’ (apprehends),—all mean one and the same thing. “But *Buddhi* is what *makes things known*.” That is just so; the *Person* knows and the *Buddhi* makes known things; but (under this theory) it thus becomes established that Cognition belongs to the Person (as held by the Siddhāntin), and *not* to the Internal Organ, ‘*Buddhi*’ (as held by the Pūrvapakṣin) †

[It having been proved that Cognition belongs to the person and not to *Buddhi*, the Author proceeds to refute the view that the actions denoted by the terms ‘cognition’, ‘apprehension’, ‘understanding’, are different from one another, and as such should belong to different entities]—If it be held that each of the actions denoted by the terms (above-mentioned) belong to distinct individual persons,—then it behoves you to show cause for your denial (of the view that they belong to the one and the same person). That is to say, if the Opponent holds the view that—“one person does the *cognising*, another the *understanding*, a third the *apprehending*, and a fourth the *perceiving*,”—then it comes to this that all these persons,—the *cogniser*, the *under-*

* ‘What is spoken of as *cognising*, i.e., the Person, is nothing different from what is spoken of as *knowing*, i.e., *Buddhi*; so that ‘*Buddhi*’ and ‘Person’ become ‘synonymous terms’. This is the explanation of the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† One is said to ‘know’, when he brings about cognition in himself while one is said to ‘make known’ things when it brings about cognition in others; so that these two being totally different, *cognition* cannot belong to *Buddhi*, which, *ex-hypothesi*, only makes things known.’—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

stander, the *apprehender* and the *perceiver*—are so many distinct persons, and *the corresponding qualities (of Cognition and the rest) do not belong to one and the same person*. Such being your view, (we ask you)—what is your reason for this denial? If you put forward “the non-difference of denotation” as your reason,—then the same may be said for us also. That is, if what you mean is that—“inasmuch as the words *cognises*, *apprehends* etc. denote the same thing, it cannot be right to attribute (and restrict) them all to one and the same Person [and there would be no sense in predicating so many synonymous terms in reference to the same Agent]”,—then the same fact (of sameness of denotation) may be equally urged against you also: For in the two expressions, ‘the person *cognises*, *cetayate*’, and ‘the Buddhi *knows*, *jānāti*’, there is no difference in the denotation of the terms ‘*cognises*’ and ‘*knows*’; so that both (Person and Buddhi) being equally Cognitive or Conscious Beings, [there being no reason for predicating one of the Person, and the other of the Buddhi] one of the two must be rejected [and Cognition should be attributed to one only].*

* This passage is somewhat obscure; the obscurity being enhanced by the reading of the text. Several manuscripts, as also the *Vārtika*, read ‘*arthasyābheda iti samānam, abhinnārthā* etc. etc.’ The only meaning that can be deduced from this text is as translated above; we have adopted this in the body of the text, in deference to the *Vārtika*. Several other manuscripts, however, among them the two Purī Mss, and also the *Bhāṣyacandra*, read ‘*arthasya bheda iti* etc. etc.’ Apparently this is the better reading; because the proposition that the ‘several qualities do not belong to the same individual’ can be supported by the fact that the qualities expressed by the terms are different; if it were the same single quality denoted by them all, then there would be nothing wrong in predicating all the terms of the same individual. The difficulty in this reading, however, is that, the repeated reference to the argument of the preceding clause is found, in all manuscripts, in the form ‘*abhinnārthah* etc.’, which shows that the preceding clause must be *arthasyābhedah*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* has made an attempt to construe this passage according to its own reading, by which the translation should stand thus.—“There is a difference in the denotation of the terms *cognises* etc., which are not synonymous;—if this is what you mean, then we may make a similar assertion: the words in question *are* synonymous [this assertion being as reasonable as yours, that they are *not* synonymous]; and hence it is not possible to make any distinction (either as to the qualities denoted by the words, or to the entities to whom the qualities belong). If you admit this (well-established fact),

If (with a view to escape from the above difficulties) it be held that—"the name 'buddhi' stands for the Mind, being explained as '*budhyate anayā*', that by means of which things are cognised [i. e. it is the *Instrument*, not the *Agent* of cognition]; and the Mind is certainly eternal",—then our answer is that that may be so* (the Mind may be eternal); but the eternity of the Mind is not proved by *the recognition of things* (which has been urged by the Opponent as the reason for the eternity of *Buddhi*);—specially because as a matter of fact, we find *Recognition* appearing even when there is a diversity of *Instruments*, only if the Cognitive Agent happens to be the same [so that Recognition cannot imply or prove the sameness and continuity of the *Instrument*]; —for as asserted in Su. 3-1-7,—'there is *recognition*, with the right eye, of what has been seen with the left'—an assertion made in regard to the Eye, but equally true of the Lamp also; there being recognition, of a thing previously seen with the help of one lamp, with the help of another. From all this it follows that what has been put forward by the Opponent (i. e. 'the recognition of things') is a reason for the eternity of the *Cognitive Agent* (Soul); and not for that of the *Instrument*, *Buddhi*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The view has been held (by the *Sāṅkhya*) that—"From out of the *eternal 'Buddhi'*, there go forth, in reference to the single object cognised, emanations, which constitute the 'Cognitions' of those objects,—and that the 'Emanation' is nothing different from the Source from which it proceeds".—This, however—

then the same may be said (in connection with what we are going to point out): That is, in the two expressions, 'the Person cognises' and 'the *Buddhi* knows', there is no difference in the denotation of the two terms 'cognises' and 'knows'; so that both *Buddhi* and Person being cognitive entities, one or the other must be rejected (not regarded as really cognitive) [there being no room for two cognitive entities in the same body]."

It will be found that both these explanations involve a certain amount of forced construction. In that which has been adopted in the body of the text, the explanation of the phrase '*vyavasthānupapattih*' is not entirely satisfactory; while the *Bhāṣyacandra* in several places has been forced to give up the construction of the passage, which appears to be the most natural, and most in keeping with the style of the *Bhāṣya*.

* The Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read '*astyetadevam*'; which means 'Mind is eternal, we admit that'.

Sūtra 4

is not right ; because there is no simultaneous cognition of things.

BHĀṢYA

If the 'Emanation' and its source were non-different,—then, inasmuch as the Source (Buddhi) is, *ex hypothesi*, eternal, the Emanations also should be always present (eternal); which would mean that all the cognitions of things that we have are eternal ; and if this is so, then, the cognitions of things should be simultaneous [which is an absurdity].

Sūtra 5

[Otherwise] the cessation of the cognition* would mean the destruction (cessation of the existence) [of the Internal Organ, Buddhi].

BHĀṢYA

[If Cognitions were not eternal, even though the same as *Buddhi*, then], whenever the Cognition (Emanation from Buddhi) ceases to exist (as it must, being transient), the 'Source of Emanation' also should cease to exist and this would mean that the Internal Organ (Buddhi, which is the source from which the Emanations in the shape of Cognitions, proceed) is destroyed. On the contrary [i.e. if even on the cessation of the *Emanation*, its *source* continues to exist], the two should have to be regarded as different from each other.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Mind, which is of limited magnitude (not all-pervading), comes into contact with the several sense-organs,† one by one (and at distinct points of time) ; so that—

Sūtra 6

inasmuch as the process is gradual, the apprehension is not simultaneous,—

BHĀṢYA

that is, of the objects of sense-perception. Hence it follows that the 'Emanation' and its 'Source' are distinct from each

* Here, as in Sū. 7, 'pratyabhijñāna' stands for *cognition in general*.

† i. e. with the Soul, and the Sense-organs—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

other ; for if they were one and the same, there would be no appearance and disappearance of them (which would be incompatible with the afore-mentioned *gradual* process).*

Sūtra 7

The non-apprehension of one thing is due to (the Mind) being occupied with other things.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*apratyabhijñāna*' here stands for 'non-apprehension' (and not for *non-recognition*). The 'non-apprehension' of a certain object is explained on the assumption that (at that time) the Mind is occupied with some other object ; and this (explanation) is possible only on the presumption that the Emanation is something different from its Source ; for if the two were one and the same, there would be no force in any previous 'occupation with other objects'.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

†If the Mind were all-pervading, its gradual contact with the Sense-organs, one by one,

Sūtra 8

would not be possible ; because there is no movement—

* The clear meaning of the *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* is as translated ; the term '*indriyārthānām*' being syntactically construed with the '*grahanam*' of the *Sūtra*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* however offers a different construction : According to it, the words of the *Bhāṣya* have no syntactical connection with those of the *Sūtra*, and the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is to be construed as—*indriyārthānām nānātvaṃ* (there is diversity in the Sense-organs and in the objects of perception), *vrttvrttīmatōśca nānātvaṃ* (there is diversity between the substratum of the emanation and the emanations themselves— i.e. the contact and the resultant cognition).

† This anticipates the argument that the mere fact of the Mind's contact with the Sense-organs being gradual does not necessarily imply that the Mind is not all-pervading, and yet it would be possible to have contact with the Sense-organs, one by one. The sense of the refutation is that this is not possible.—the term '*Sāmyogaḥ*' of the *Bhāṣya* being syntactically connected with the '*na*' of the *Sūtra*. The gradual contact of a thing with another thing pre-supposes *movement*—moving from one place to the other—on the part of the former ; no such movement is possible for a thing which is all-pervading, i.e., occupying all points in space, it cannot, and need not, move from one place to another. Hence if Mind were all-pervading, it could not have movement ; and hence it could not have gradual contact with the Sense-organs.

BHĀṢYA

The Sense-organs (before becoming operative) have to be got at by the Internal Organ; and the *moving*, necessary for this *getting at* something, cannot be present (in the Mind, if it is all-pervading); so that gradual operation being impossible, there can be no explanation for the (well-known) fact of apprehension being *non-simultaneous* (as urged in Sū. 6) For the non-simultaneity of apprehensions having been found impossible, by reason of the absence of *movement* in the *all-pervading* Mind, there is no other reason from which it could be inferred (by which it could be accounted for). *In the case of the Organ of Vision, though the fact of near and remote things (e. g. Hand and Moon respectively) being seen at the same time leads one to conclude that the Organ has no movement, yet the fact that it *has* movement is inferred from the reason in the shape of the phenomenon of obstruction of vision by the interposition of something else, between the Eye and the Hand (which is near), and between the Eye and the Moon (which is remote). [There is however no such reason or ground available for the inferring of movement in the Mind, in which movement is found to be apparently impossible by reason of its all-pervading character, according to the Opponent].

All this dispute does not arise in regard to the *existence* of the Internal Organ (Mind); nor in regard to its *eternity*; for that there *is* such an Internal Organ as the Mind, and that it is eternal, are well-established facts † “In regard to what, then, does the dispute arise?” it arises in regard to its all-pervading character; and this character is denied (by the *Siddhāntin*) on the ground that *there is no proof for it* [lit., it is not found to be cognised by any instrument of right cognition].

[The *Bhāṣya* proceeds to show a further reason for rejecting the view that the Emanations, Cognitions, and their Source, *Buddhi*, are identical]—The internal Organ is *one*, while the Emanations, in the shape of Cognitions, are *many*; e. g., *visual* cognition, *olfactory* cognition, cognition of *Colour*, cognition of

* The Author cites an example *per contra*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The Naiyāyika also admits the Mind to be atomic and hence eternal. It is only *Buddhi*, *Cognition*, that he holds to be transient.

Odour ; all this would be impossible if the Emanations and their source were identical.

From all this we conclude that it is the (Conscious) Person that cognises, and not the Internal Organ.*

By this fact (that it is the Person that knows, and not the Internal Organ)† what has been said by the Sāṅkhya in regard to the Mind being ‘occupied with other things’ becomes refuted; because ‘being occupied with other things’ can only mean ‘apprehending other things’; and this belongs to the Person, not to the Internal Organ;‡ though we do admit of the Mind also being ‘occupied’, in the sense that in one case it is in contact with a Sense-organ, while in another it is not in such contact. [But this does not justify the view that the apprehending is done by Buddhi, and not by the Person]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent, the *Sāṅkhya*, says)—“Even when the ‘Emanation’ is identical with its Source, it cannot be (reasonably) asserted that ‘the Internal Organ is one, and its Emanations many’. Because]

Sūtra 9

“the notion of its being different (diverse) is analogous to the notion of difference (diversity) in regard to the rock-crystal.”

BHĀṢYA

“In regard to the Emanation (which, as identical with the Internal Organ, is, in reality, one only), there is a notion of its

* For the *Siddhāntin*, who regards the Emanations as different from their source, it is quite possible and reasonable that things are cognised by the Soul, by the instrumentality of such instruments as the Internal Organ and the several Sense-organs—*Tātparya*.

† Or the fact that the Internal Organ is not all-pervading—according to the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

‡ He alone can be ‘pre-occupied’ who apprehends things; and inasmuch as it is the Person, and not the Internal Organ, that apprehends, it is only the person that can be said to be ‘occupied by other things’. This however does not mean that no kind of ‘occupation’ is possible for the Internal Organ; ‘occupation’ in the sense of being in contact with the Sense-organs, is quite possible for the Internal Organ; it is only ‘occupation’ in the sense of ‘apprehending things’ that cannot belong to it.

being many (diverse), by reason of its being associated, or in contact, with diverse objects ;—just in the same manner as, in regard to the rock-crystal, which is in contact with other (coloured) substances, there is the notion of its being different (from the pure *white* rock-crystal),—when the crystal is spoken of as being ‘blue’ or ‘red’ (as distinguished from the *white* crystal).”*

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the above view of the *Sāṅkhya*—*We cannot accept the above, as there is no reason in support of it.*† What the Opponent means is that—“ the notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions is only figurative, unreal, being like the notion of diversity in regard to the rock-crystal ; and it is not *real*, as is the notion of diversity in regard to Odour, Taste, etc.” ;—but in support of this theory there is no reason adduced [what is stated in Sū. 9 being only an Example] ; and in the absence of valid reasons, it cannot be accepted as right. “ But the absence of reasons is equal.”§ Certainly not ; for as a matter of fact, *in the case of Cognitions it is actually found that they appear and dis-*

* The phrase ‘*viśayāntaropadhānā**’ at the end of the paragraph is to be construed with ‘*nānāvābhimānaḥ*’ of the second line ; the construction being —तस्यां वृत्तौ नानात्वभिमानो विषयान्तरोपधानात्, यथाद्रव्यान्तरोपहित..... नीलो लोहित इति ।

The sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is thus explained by the *Tātparya*.—“It is true that Emanations *appear* as *many* ; but this appearance is a mistaken one ; for it is not possible for the Emanations, which are not different from the Internal Organ, to be *many* in reality. The fact of the matter is that, just as in the case of the Rock-crystal, which is one and of one uniform colour, notions of diversity appear by reason of its contact with several coloured things, and this notion of diversity is purely adventitious,—in the same manner when the pure white Internal Organ becomes associated, through the Sense-organs, with diverse things, it takes the form of the Cognitions or ‘Emanations,’ and hence *appears* as diverse and many.”

† This is found as *Sūtra* in Puri Sū. Ms., in *Sūtra* Ms. D, also in *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* ; the *Bhāṣyacandra* and *Viśvanātha* also treat it as *Sūtra*. But it is not found in the *Nyāyasūcimbandha*, and both the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* take it as part of the *Bhāṣya*. *Vardhamāna* says that some people call it ‘*Siddhānta-Sūtra*’, and adds that the *Tātparya* calls it ‘*Bhāṣyam*’, because the ‘*bhāṣya*’ is nothing more than an explanation and expansion of the ‘*Sūtra*’.

§ “ Just as we make the simple assertion,—that the notion of diversity is figurative—without adducing any reasons,—so do you also merely make the assertion that the notion of diversity is real, without adducing any reasons. So that both of us are open to the same charge.”

appear one after the other [and not all together ;—and this is a clear reason in support of the proposition that they are really *many, not one*] That is, it is found as a matter of fact that in connection with the Object of Perception, Cognitions appear and disappear, one after the other (at different points of time); and from this it follows that the notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions is real, just as it is in regard to Odour, etc.

SECTION (2)

(Sūtras 10-17)

Examination of the Theory that Things of the World are in Perpetual flux undergoing destruction every moment.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Under Sū 9, the *Sāṅkhya* has asserted that—“The notion of diversity in regard to the Emanation is analogous to the notion of diversity in regard to the rock-crystal”,—being unable to admit this, the Nihilist [who holds that things of the world are in a perpetual flux, undergoing destruction every moment] argues as follows: *—

* Having thus refuted the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine from the standpoint of the *Nyāya*, the Author, with a view to point out the defects in that doctrine pointed out by the *Bauddha* philosophers, proceeds first, to expound the doctrine of the *Bauddhas*.—*Tātparyā*.

Though the main subject-matter of this section—the demolition of the Nihilistic philosophy,—is of use in all philosophical systems, yet in the present context, it has been introduced with a view to the proving of the Soul's existence; it is only when the continued existence of things has been established that there can be any force in the arguments, based upon Recognition, that have been put forward under Sū. 3. 1. 1, *et seq*; and it is only when the difference between qualities and things possessed of qualities has been established that we can prove the existence of the Soul, as the necessary substratum of such well-known qualities as Desire and the rest—*Pariśuddhi*.

Some people have held that this is only a part, and continuation, of the foregoing section; and should not be treated as a separate section; specially because the *Bhāṣya* at the end of the present section concludes with the words—“Thus it is proved that *Buddhi* is not-eternal”, from which it is clear that the *Bhāṣya* takes the whole as one section dealing with the *non-eternality of Buddhi*. But the fact of the matter is that the subject-matter of the present section is totally different; the *Bhāṣya* conclusion is due to the fact that the subject of the present section has been introduced in connection with the *non-eternality of Buddhi*.—*Vardhamāna*.

Sūtra 10

[*The Nihilist says*]—"In the Rock-crystal also, there are produced fresh rock-crystals one after the other; since all individual things are momentary; hence what has been stated (in Sū. 9) is without reason."

BHĀSYA

"The proposition (stated in Sū. 9) that—'In the case of the Rock-crystal, the notion of diversity is due to the diversity of its associates, the Rock-crystal remaining one and the same during the whole time'—is *without any reason* in its support;—'Why?'—*because in the Rock-crystal also there are produced fresh rock-crystals one after the other*, that is to say, in what is regarded as the Rock-crystal, several rock-crystals appear and several disappear (during the time);—'How is that?'—*Since all individual things are momentary*; the 'moment' is an extremely small point of time, and things whose existence lasts only for that time are called 'momentary'. 'How do you know that individual things are momentary?' We infer this from the fact that in the case of the Body and such things we find a continuous series of growth and decay; in the Body the essence of food taken, brought about by the process of digestion, *grows* into blood and the other constituents of the body; and this growth and consequent decay goes on continuously; and by 'growth' there is production or birth of the individual things, and by 'decay' there is destruction.* It is in this fashion that, by a process of modification of its constituent elements, there comes about, in the Body, in due course of time, a growth or development. And what is found in the case of one individual thing, (in the shape of the Body) should be understood to apply to every individual thing."†

* We have adopted and translated the reading as in the *Viz* text In place of पक्तिनिवृत्तस्या etc. however, the two *Purī* Mss and the *Bhāsyacandra* read पक्तिवृत्तस्या etc. By this reading the passage should be translated thus 'In the case of the Body we find that there is *pakti*, ripening, which is a form of destruction; and there is continuous growth and decay of the food-essence, which becomes destroyed and then turns into blood etc.'

† The Nihilistic position is thus summed up in the *Tātparyā*—"All that exists must be momentary,—as the Body;—and the Rock-crystal also, being something that exists, must be momentary. In the case of the Body we find

Sūtra 11

[*The Naiyāyika's answer to the above Bauddha argument*]—

Inasmuch as there is no reason in support of the universal proposition,—we can admit of it only in accordance with our experience.

BHĀṢYA

It is not universally true that 'in all individual things there is a continuous series of growth and decay, just as there is in the Body';—why? *because there is no reason or proof in support of such a universal proposition*; that is, such a universal proposition is not supported either by Perception or by Inference. Hence *we can admit of it only in accordance with our experience*; that is, in cases where we actually perceive such continuous series of growth and decay, there, by reason of our actually seeing the appearance and disappearance of several individual entities, one after the other, we admit of such a series of growth and decay; e.g., in the case of the Body and such other things; where, on the other hand, we do not perceive any such series, there we deny it; e.g., in the case of such things as the stone and the like. In the case of the Rock-crystal, we do not perceive any such series of growth and decay. Hence it is not right to assert that "in the Rock-crystal, there are produced fresh rock-crystals, one after the other" (Sū. 10); for such an assertion (attributing growth and decay to all things on the ground of the Body being subject to growth and decay) would be similar to the attributing of the bitter taste to *all things* on the ground of the *Arka* (a poisonous plant) being bitter!

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some people hold that—"Every object consists of a series of entities, each entity being entirely destroyed and succeeded

that it undergoes growth and decay, in course of time becoming fat and lean; from which we infer that it is undergoing minute changes every moment; and these changes constitute so many 'destructions'. Even though such growth and decay are not apparent in the case of the Rock-crystal and such things, yet we are justified in assuming that there must be such in these also, because they are *entities*, like the Body." So that the notion of diversity in the case of the Rock-crystal is not mistaken; there are really diverse crystals, appearing one after the other; though the crystal apparently remains the same.

by an entirely different entity, without any trace of the former, —and each of these entities has but a momentary existence ;” — but this view

Sūtra 12

can not be accepted ; because the cause of production and of destruction (when present) are perceived.

BHĀSYA

The augmentation of component particles is perceived to be the ‘cause of production’, in the case, for instance, of the *Ant-hill* and such other things ; and the *disruption of component particles* is perceived to be the ‘cause of destruction’, in the case, for instance, of the *Jar* and such other things. But when a philosopher holds that a thing is *destroyed*, without losing any of its component particles, or that a thing is *produced*, without having its component particles augmented,—there can *not* be perceived any cause, either of the ‘total destruction’ or of the ‘production’ of an entirely new thing.*

Sūtra 13

[The *Nihilist* says—]

“ **Just as in the case of the destruction of milk, and the production of curd, the cause is not perceived [and is yet admitted],—so would it be in the case of the substances in question.**”

BHĀSYA

“ [When milk is turned into curd] though we do not perceive the cause either of the destruction of the milk, or of the production of the curd, yet the existence of such cause is admitted ;—similarly in the case of the *Rock-crystal*, the existence of the cause of destruction, as also of the production, of several individual entities should be admitted.”

Sūtra 14

[The *Siddhāntin* answers—]

Inasmuch as there is actual apprehension through indicatives, there is no non-perception (in the case of milk and curd).

* The *Vārtika* explains the argument somewhat differently.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the cause of the destruction of Milk is actually apprehended,—being indicated by the destruction of the Milk ; similarly the cause of the production of Curd is also apprehended,—being indicated by the production of the Curd ; so that it is not true that there is “non-perception” (of the said causes).* Contrary to this is the case of such substances as the Rock-crystal and the like ; for in the case of these, there is nothing to indicate the production of several individual entities (in the same object), which leads us to conclude that there is no such production (of several entities in a piece of Rock-crystal).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

To what the Bauddha Nihilist has urged in Sū 13, some one (the *Sāṅkhya*) has offered the following answer.—

Sūtra 15

“Of the milk there is no destruction (when it turns into curd) ; for what happens is either transformation or manifestation of new qualities.”†

BHĀṢYA

“Of the milk there is *transformation*, not *destruction*,”—says one (the *Sāṅkhya*)—“and there is *transformation* when the substance remaining constant, its former character (e.g. that of

* That there is destruction of the Milk is inferred from the appearance of Curd in the milk particles ; the inference being—‘In the milk-particles there has been *destruction of Milk*, because there have appeared in them particles of a substance other than, not compatible with, Milk, and the *destruction of Milk* being thus cognised, inasmuch as the said *destruction* is an effect, it must have a *cause* ; so that the *cause of destruction* is indicated by, has for its indicative, the *destruction*. The indicative of the *production of Curd* consists in the actual *perception of the Curd* ; and when the *production* is thus cognised, inasmuch as it is an effect, it must have a *cause* ; so that the ‘cause of the production of Curd’ is indicated by its *production*. And it is not true that “the cause of the destruction of Milk and that of production of Curd are not perceived” (as urged by the Opponent in Sū 13).—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The translation of the *Sūtra* is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*. According to Viśvanātha it should run thus—‘*What happens is only transformation, which consists in the manifestation of new qualities.*’

'milk') is destroyed and a new character (e.g. that of 'curd') is produced."

Another philosopher (the Neo-Sāṅkhya) says that "there is manifestation of new qualities ; i.e. the substance remaining constant, its former qualities disappear and new ones appear."*

Both these views appear as if they were one and the same.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to both the views (put forward in Sū. 15) is as follows :—

Sūtra 16

[Siddhānta]—When we perceive a new Substance being produced through a fresh reconstitution, we infer from this the cessation (destruction) of the previous substance.

BHĀṢYA

When we see that a new Substance, in the shape of *Curd*, is produced through a fresh re-constitution or re-organisation of the component particles,—this 're-constitution' being in the form of *coagulation*,†—we infer from this that the previous substance, Milk, has been 'destroyed' through the disruption of its component particles ; just as when we see the new substance—Saucer—being produced out of a fresh re-arrangement of the component particles of the Clay-lump, it is inferred that the Clay-lump has been 'destroyed' through the disruption of its component particles. And the constitutional contiguity between Milk and Curd is similar to that between Clay and things made of Clay ; [that is, the component particles of the Milk continue to subsist in the Curd, just as those of Clay do in the thing made of Clay] ; if there were a complete destruction of the Milk (along with its component particles,—if it were completely burnt to ashes, for instance),—the production of the new substance (Curd) would

* The new qualities also are not *produced*, in the sense that they come into existence for the first time ; for according to the Sāṅkhya, the qualities were there all along ; but only in a latent form ; and they only become *manifested* ; and when they are regarded as having been destroyed, they only disappear from view, they are not lost.

† When the former constitution or arrangement of the component particles of the former substance—Milk—is upset, and a fresh arrangement—conducive to the new substance—is set in, we have what is called '*sammūrchanam*'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

never be possible,—there being no connection possible (between this production and any existing substance).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Even admitting (for the sake of argument) that there is destruction of Milk and production of Curd without any cause, we point out the following objections against the theory (of the Nihilist) :—

Sūtra 17

Inasmuch as in some cases the cause of destruction is perceived, while in some it is not perceived,—what is stated (as the premiss) is not universally true.*

BHĀṢYA

It is not universally true that—“there is destruction and production of individual rock-crystals, just as there is of Milk and Curd” ;—“Why ? ”—Because there is no reason (in support of such a universal proposition) ; that is, there is no ground for asserting that “the case of the individual entities in the Rock-crystal is analogous to that of Milk and Curd, where destruction and production are without cause,—and it is *not* analogous to that of the Jar, where there is destruction when the cause of destruction is present, so that there is no destruction and production of individual entities in the Rock-crystal simply because the causes of such destruction and production are not present.”†

Further, the statement of the Example is baseless : If ‘destruction and production’ were ever actually perceived in the case of such things as the Rock-crystal and the like, then alone could there be any basis for the statement of the Example—“Just as in the case of the destruction of Milk and the production of Curd, the cause is not perceived” (Sū. 13) ;—as a matter of fact however ‘destruction and production’ are not

* Viśvanātha reads the Sūtra simply as क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः. But everywhere else—in the *Nyāyasūtravivarana*, *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, the Sūtra—Ms. D. and in Puri Sū. Ms.—we find it as printed in the *Viz.* Text.

† The reading of the last part of this passage is confused ; by a comparison of the readings in several manuscripts, the right reading appears to be—कुम्भस्य विनाश उत्पत्तिकारणभावाच्चोत्पत्तिः एवंपटिकादिव्यक्तीना विनाशोत्पत्तिकारणभावाद्विनाशोत्पत्त्यभाव इति ।

perceived (in things like the Rock-crystal);—hence the statement of the Example is entirely baseless.*

Then again, when you admit the ‘destruction and production’ of the Rock-crystal, you tacitly admit also the cause of these [since, being effects, they must have a cause]; so that your denial (of the cause) is not right. That is to say, you cannot but admit the force of the Example (of the Jar) in the assertion—‘the destruction and production of the Rock-crystal, etc., like those of the Jar, cannot be without cause’; for the simple reason that its force cannot be denied. On the other hand, the force of the Example cited by you—in the assertion “the destruction and production of the Rock-crystal, like those of Milk and Curd, are without cause”—can be easily denied; for the simple reason that (in all cases) ‘destruction and production’ are actually found to proceed from causes; so that when we see destruction and production’ in the case of Milk and Curd, we infer the presence of a cause; as the Effect is a sure indicative of the Cause.

From all that has gone before (in this section and the last) it follows that *Buddhi* or Apprehension is *not eternal*.

SECTION 3

Sūtras 18—41

Buddhi is a quality of the Soul.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

We now proceed to consider the question—From among the Soul, the Sense-organs, and the Objects of Cognition, of which one is *Buddhi* the quality?† Though this fact is well

* A correct example is that which is found to be similar to the thing in question; in the present instance ‘destruction and production of several entities in the Rock-crystal’ is the thing in question, under dispute, so that the Example, to be correct, should be one that resembles the said ‘destruction and production’; this resemblance could be known to us only if we had ever perceived such ‘destruction and production in the Rock-crystal’. [Until we have perceived a thing, we cannot recognise its resemblance to anything.] As a matter of fact, however, no such ‘production and destruction in the Rock-crystal’ is ever perceived. Hence the example cannot be a correct one.—*Tātparyā*.

† It is only after the eternity of *Buddhi* has been refuted that there is any likelihood of its being a quality of the Soul. Hence it is the latter

known, yet it is introduced with a view to carry on further investigations on the subject. The doubt as regards Apprehension (being the quality of the Soul or of some other Substance) arises from the fact that it is found to arise from the contact (of several things, Soul, Mind, Sense-organ and Object), and people fail to detect any peculiarity in any one of these (by virtue of which the quality of Apprehension could be attributed to that one exclusively)

Sūtra 18

Apprehension (Buddhi's) cannot subsist in the Sense-organ, or in the Object,—since it continues to exist also when these two have been destroyed.

BHĀṢYA

Apprehension or Cognition cannot be a quality of either the Sense-organ or the Object, because even when these have ceased to exist, Apprehension continues to exist. For instance, even after the object (seen) and the Sense-organ (the Eye) have been destroyed we have the Cognition in the form 'I have seen'. On the other hand, after the Cogniser (the Soul) has been destroyed, there can be no Cognition at all. As a matter of fact,

subject that is introduced now. The purpose of this enquiry also consists in the proving of the Soul as an entity apart from the Body etc. Under Sū. 3. 1-1 *et. seq.* we have proved the existence of the Soul, on the strength of Apprehension through Recognition; and now we are going to establish it on the strength of Apprehension, as its quality.—*Pariśuddhi.*

Vardhamāna adds the following —The connection of the present Section with the immediately preceding section on the momentary character of things lies in this that if all things are momentary, there can be no such thing as the 'constituent' cause of things; so that there would be no possibility of Apprehension subsisting, as a quality, in the Soul. Hence before taking up this latter question, we have had to dispose of the former theory Even though the fact of Apprehension being a quality of the Soul has already been put forward under Sū. 3-1-14, yet there is this difference that under that *Sūtra* we have proved the existence of the Soul, as the substratum of Apprehension as a quality; while now we are going to prove the existence of Apprehension itself as a quality of the Soul. Some people think that the present section serves the purpose of adding fresh reasonings in support of the doctrine already established before, and thus strengthening the pupil's convictions. The *Tātparya*, for instance, remarks that the present section carries on further investigation into a matter already discussed before.

there are two kinds of Cognition : there is one kind of Cognition which proceeds from the contact of the Sense-organ and the Object (e.g. the ordinary perceptual cognitions), and which ceases upon the destruction of the Sense-organ and the Object ; and there is the other kind of Cognition which proceeds from the Contact of the Mind and the Soul ; and it is only natural that these latter should persist (even upon the destruction of the Sense-organ and the Object). To this latter class belongs the recollection in the form 'I have seen', which pertains to things seen before , and when the Cogniser has been destroyed, it is not possible for any previous perception to be recollected ; for a thing that has been perceived by one cannot be recollected by another Even if the existence of Soul be not admitted, and the Mind be regarded as the *Cogniser*,—it would not be possible to prove that either the Sense-organ or the Object is the *Cogniser*.

“Well then, Cognition may be a quality of the Mind.”

[The answer to this is given in the next *Sūtra*.]

Sūtra 19

Apprehension cannot be the quality of the Mind, (a) whose existence is inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous—[or (b), because the apprehension of things is not simultaneous]—[(c) and also because the simultaneous cognition of things actually appearing in Mystics would be inexplicable if Cognition belonged to the Mind]*

BHĀṢYA

(A) The fact that the Apprehension of things is not simultaneous is indicative of the existence of the Internal Organ (Mind) [as explained in Sū. 1-1-16] ; and the Internal Organ (or Mind), having its existence inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous,—Apprehension or Cognition cannot be a quality of that Mind.

“Of what then is it a quality ?”

* Two explanations of the term युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेः are possible; both of which have been incorporated in the translation as (a) and (b). The *Bhāṣya* construes the च in the *Sūtra* as implying a further reason, which we put in as (c). The *Bhāṣya* notices only (a) and (b).

It is a quality of the Cognitive Agent, as it is he who is the controller.*

As a matter of fact, *controller* is the *cogniser*, and that which is controlled is the *instrument*. So that if the MIND has Apprehension for its quality, it would cease to be an *instrument*. And from the fact that the apprehension of Odour etc., belongs to that Cognitive Agent who is equipped with such instruments as the Olfactory Organ and the like, we infer the apprehension of pleasure etc., as also Re-collection, which belongs to that Cognitive Agent who is equipped with the instrument in the shape of the Internal Organ (MIND) Under the circumstances, if it be held that that of which Apprehension is a quality is the *Mind*,—to which we give the name 'Soul'—while that which is instrumental in bringing about pleasure etc., is the *Internal Organ*—to which we give the name 'Mind'; then there is a mere difference of nomenclature (between us); and the fact remains the same [that there are two distinct entities—one of which Apprehension is a quality and the other which is instrumental in bringing about pleasure etc.] according to both of us.

(B) The particle 'ca' in the *Sūtra* may be interpreted as implying the further reasoning that the Yogi's *simultaneous Cognition of things would be impossible*; that is to say, when the Yogi has attained the culminating point of his practices he becomes endowed with exceptional faculties of perception, and having created for himself several bodies endowed with distinct sets of organs, he apprehends several cognitions simultaneously in those bodies;—such a phenomenon could be possible if there were a single Cognising Agent permeating all those bodies; it could not be possible if the cognitions belonged to the MIND, for the simple reason that MIND is atomic (and as such could not be present in several bodies at one and the same time). If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) MIND be held to be

* Though the sentence ज्ञस्य वशित्वात् is generally regarded as *Sūtra*, it should be treated as *Bhāṣya*.—*Pariśuddhi*.

One who is independent, and operates by himself, is the *Cogniser*; while that which is operated upon, controlled by another, is the *instrument*; the intelligence necessary for the carrying on of activities and of operating the several instruments bearing upon it, belongs to the Agent.—*Tātparāya*.

all-pervading (not *atomic*), even so this could not be accepted as a valid argument against Apprehension being a quality of the Soul. For if Mind were all-pervading, then, since it is the internal Organ (of Cognition), (and is all-pervading), it could be in contact with all the sense-organs at one and the same time, and thus bring about several Cognitions at one and the same time (even in the case of ordinary persons) (which is an impossibility).

Sūtra 20

[*Objection*].—“What has been urged applies equally to the case of Apprehension being a Quality of the Soul.”

BHĀṢYA

“The Soul, being all-pervading, would be in contact with all the Sense-organs at one and the same time ; so that there would be a possibility of several Cognitions appearing simultaneously.”

Sūtra 21

[*Answer*].—The said (simultaneous) appearance of Cognitions is not possible ; because the contact of the Mind with (all) the Sense-organs is not possible.

BHĀṢYA

In the cognition of Odour, etc., the contact of the Sense-organs with the Mind is as much a necessary cause as the contact of the Sense-organs with the objects ; and inasmuch as the Mind is atomic, it is not possible for its contact with all the Sense-organs to appear at one and the same time. And by reason of the non-simultaneity of this contact (of the Mind), it is not possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously, even though they are the qualities of the (all-pervading) Soul.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

If it be held that—“The Cognition of Odour etc., proceeds from the contact among Soul, Sense-organ and Object only, and the contact of Mind is not essential ; [so that even though the contact of the Mind and the Sense-organ may be absent, that will not stand in the way of Cognitions appearing simultaneously; hence there is no force in the answer given in Sū. 21.]”—then our answer is—

Sūtra 22

This can not be right ; for no proof is adduced in support of such origin (of Cognitions, without contact of Mind).*

BHĀṢYA

When you make the assertion that—"The Cognition of Odour etc., proceeds from contact among Soul, Sense-organ and Object only",—you do not adduce any proof in support of such origin,—on the strength whereof we could accept it.†

Sūtra 23

[Objection]—“Further, if Apprehension subsists (in the Soul), then it should have to be regarded as eternal ; since we do not perceive any cause for its destruction.”

BHĀṢYA

“What is urged in this Sūtra is meant to be taken along with what has been said under Sū. 20. [This is the sense of the particle *ca.*]

“There are two kinds of causes whereby qualities are destroyed : (1) the destruction of the substance in which the quality subsists, and (2) the appearance of a contrary quality. Inasmuch as the Soul (which is the substance in which Apprehension subsists) is eternal, the former cause of destruction is not possible (in the destruction of Apprehension). Then, as for a quality contrary to Apprehension (whose appearance would put an end to the Apprehension), we do not find any such quality (appearing in the Soul). So that, if Apprehension is the quality of Soul, it must have to be regarded as eternal.”

Sūtra 24

[Answer]—Inasmuch as Apprehension is (universally) recognised as non-eternal, its destruction proceeds from another apprehension ; just like Sound.

* ‘Kāraṇa’ stands for ‘pramāṇa’, proofs, says the *Bhāṣyacandra*, What the Opponent says in Sū. 21 is a mere assertion and since no proofs have been adduced in support thereof it cannot be accepted.

† Viśvanātha takes this Sūtra also as coming from the *Pūrvapakṣin* and meaning as follows.—“Inasmuch as the Siddhāntin cannot point out the cause of Cognition, Cognition cannot belong to the Soul. He cannot point to *Mind-Soul-Contact* as the cause ; for if this were so, then Cognition should never cease ; the contact of the all-pervading Soul being always present.”

BHĀṢYA

That Apprehension is transient is recognised by all living beings in their own experience ;—and as a matter of fact, (in the case of every Apprehension) we perceive a series of cognitions ; and we infer from these facts that (in this series) one Apprehension is ‘contrary’ to the other ;—just as in every Sound there is a series of Sounds, where one Sound is contrary to the other [and hence the cause of its destruction].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—“If Apprehension is a quality of the Soul, several Recollections should appear at one and the same time ; for innumerable impressions produced by cognitions—which are the causes of Recollections, subsist in the Soul simultaneously,—and the contact of the Mind with the Soul, which is a cause common to all Recollections, is also present ; so that there is no *non-simultaneity* in the causes of Recollections. [Hence it should be possible to have several Recollections at one and the same time.]”

In view of this objection, some Logicians (*Ēkadeśins*), with a view to show that the contact (necessary for Recollections) is *not* simultaneous, offer the following explanation :—

Sūtra 25

“As a matter of fact, Recollection proceeds from the contact of the Mind with that part of the Soul which is permeated by (the impression of) the (corresponding) Cognition ; so that several Recollections cannot appear simultaneously”.

BHĀṢYA

“The term ‘*Jñāna*’ in the *Sūtra* stands for *impression brought about by cognition*. What happens (in cases of Recollection) is that the Mind comes into contact only gradually, one after the other, with such parts of the Soul as are impressed (affected) by Cognition ; hence the Recollections also, that proceed from the said contact of the Mind with the Soul, appear only gradually, one after the other (and *not* simultaneously).”

Sūtra 26

This explanation is not right ; because the Mind lies within the Body.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, when the Mind of man comes into contact with the Soul born in a body,—and this contact appears along with such Karmic residue as has begun to bear fruit,—this is what is called the person's 'living'; so that until the person dies (and the Soul escapes from the limitations of the Body), it is not possible for the Mind,—which lies and functions within the Body,—to come into contact with such parts of the Soul as lie outside of the Body, and to be impressed by (previous) cognitions. [And as for those parts of the Soul that lie within the Body, with these the Mind is in contact at one and the same time, whereby the possibility of Cognition and Recollections appearing simultaneously remains.]

Sūtra 27

[*The Ēkadeśin objects to Sū. 26*—“The reason put forward is not valid, because it is still to be proved.”

BHĀṢYA

“As a matter of fact, *living* consists in *fructifying Karmic residue* only; so that it is still to be proved that *the Mind lies within the Body*.”

Sūtra 28

[*Answer*—The above objection is not right; because (in support of our contention) there is this proof that the recollecting person retains a body.

BHĀṢYA

When a person is desirous of recollecting something, he concentrates his mind, and then, after some time, succeeds in recollecting that thing; and while he is recollecting it, he is found to be equipped with the Body [which shows that in the phenomenon of Recollecting, the Mind operates in the Body; otherwise, if the Mind operated outside the Body, there would be no contact of the Mind outside with the Soul as equipped with the Body; and in the absence of this contact, no Effort would be possible; and without such Effort the *retaining of the Body* would be impossible]. The Effort due to the contact of the Mind with the Soul is of two kinds—*retaining* and *impelling*; and when the Mind goes out of the Body, no *retaining* Effort (within the

Body) would be possible ; so that (in the absence of the *retaining* or sustaining Effort), the Body of the recollecting person would, through its inherent gravity, fall down.

Sūtra 29

[*Another Objection*—“ **What has been urged is not possible; as the Mind is quick in its movement.**”

BHĀSYA

“As a matter of fact, the Mind is quick in moving ; so that it is quite possible for it to go out of the Body and come into contact with such parts of the Soul as are outside the Body, and are impressed by Cognition ; and then it quickly returns within the Body, and gives rise to the Effort-(necessary for the retaining of the Body). Thus it is quite possible for the Mind to carry on both the processes of *Contact* and of *Effort*). Or (inversely), it may be that the Mind goes out of the Body after having produced the Effort required for the retaining of the Body ; and thus it is quite possible that the Body should continue to be retained (until the Mind returns to it, which it does very quickly).

Sūtra 30

[*Answer*—**What has been asserted is not possible; because there is no restriction as to the time of Recollection.**

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, while one thing is remembered quickly, in another the process of recollection is delayed ; and when the process of recollection is delayed, the Mind is held concentrated, with a desire to remember the thing, and there appears a continuous series of ideas, and when among these there appears the idea of some such thing as happens to be the distinguishing feature of the thing to be remembered, it becomes the direct cause of the desired recollection. All this phenomenon could not be possible, (under the theory of the Opponent) ; as it would mean the going out of the Mind for a considerable length of time.

Then again, the contact of the Mind with the Soul cannot bring about Recollection, except when it is in contact with the Body ; because it is the Body that forms the receptacle of all experience. As a matter of fact, it is the Body of the Cognitive Person which forms the receptacle of experience ; so that when

the Mind goes out of the Body, its mere contact with the Soul cannot bring about either Cognition, or Pleasure etc. ; if it did (i.e. if Cognition, Pleasure etc. were brought about independently of the Body) then there would be no use of the Body at all.

Sūtra 31

[A second *Ekadeśin* Logician offers the following remarks against the view of the former *Ekadeśin* propounded in *Sū. 25.*]—
“The particular kind of contact (of the Mind, with things outside the Body) is not possible ; (a) either by the impelling of the Soul, or (b) by chance, or (c) by reason of intelligence.”

BHĀṢYA

The contact of the Mind outside the body could be due—
 (a) either to the impelling of the Soul, or (b) to chance, or (c) to the intelligence of the Mind ;—but as a matter of fact, none of these is possible. “Why?” (a) Because the thing has still got to be recollected, and because Recollection and Cognition are not possible through mere desire. That is to say, if the said contact were due to the impelling or urging by the Soul, then it would mean that the Soul impells the Mind after having cogitated thus—‘the Impression which is the cause of the Recollection of this particular thing subsists in this part of the Soul, let therefore the Mind come into contact with this part’;—and this form of cogitation (where the idea of the thing is already present) on the part of the Soul would mean that the thing is *already recollected*, and is not one *that has got to be recollected*; and further, ‘a part of the Soul’ or the ‘Impression’ cannot be perceptible to the Soul; so that any apprehension of these by the cognition of the Soul itself is absolutely impossible [and yet both of these appear in the said cogitation]. (b) As a matter of fact, the person recollects a thing only after fixing his mind upon it for some time; and it (i. e., the contact necessary for Recollection) cannot be due to mere *Chance*. (c) Lastly, *intelligence* (to which the said contact might be due) does not belong to the Mind at all; as we have already shown that Consciousness does not belong to it.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The said particular kind of contact (which has been objected to under *Sū. 31*)—

Sūtra 32

is similar to that particular kind of contact which causes pain in the foot of the person whose Mind is preoccupied.

BHĀSYA

When a person, having his Mind preoccupied with some attractive scene,* is hurt in the foot by a pebble or thorn, a *particular kind of contact* of the Mind with the Soul must be admitted; for we perceive that there is actual pain and feeling of pain in such cases; and what has been urged (in Sū 31, against the particular kind of contact postulated by the previous *Ekadeśin* in the case of Recollection) would apply with equal force to the case cited [And yet it cannot be denied that there is such contact actually present in the case.] Then as regards what the second *Ekadeśin* has said in regard to *contact* being due to 'chance' (in Sū 31),—it is open to this additional objection that as a matter of fact, no action and no contact can ever be due to mere 'chance'. [So that this part of the argument is entirely baseless.]

“But in the case of the pain caused by the thorn, what causes the action (in the Mind) is the Unseen Karma (force of Destiny) which brings about all experience.”

This also will be equally applicable to both cases. What you mean is that—“the Unseen Destiny, subsisting in the Person, which serves to bring about all his experiences, is what leads to the action of the Mind (and brings it into contact with the Soul), whereby there comes about pain and also the feeling of pain”;—but exactly the same may be the case also with the particular kind of contact that brings about Recollection.

Thus then, what has been said by the second *Ekadeśin*, to the effect that “the particular kind of contact is not possible, either by the impelling of the Soul, or by chance, or by intelligence” (Sū. 32)—is no criticism at all (of what the first *Ekadeśin* has put forward under Sū. 25); the real criticism of that position is what has been said by us above to the effect

* Several Mss. read देशे, which should be construed with what follows, meaning—‘having his foot hurt by a pebble or thorn in some place’. But दश्ये gives better sense, as translated.

that 'this explanation is not right, because the Mind lies within the Body'. Sū. (26).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—"What now is the reason that Recollections are not simultaneous, even though their causes are present at one and the same time?"

Sūtra 33

[*Answer*]—**Recollections are not simultaneous, because such causes as Attention, Perception of the Sign and the rest are not all present at one and the same time.**

BHĀṢYA

Just as the *Contact of the Soul with the Mind and Impressions* are the 'cause of Recollection', so also are Attention and Perception of the Sign and such other things [detailed in Sū. 41]; and inasmuch as these latter do not appear at one and the same time, it is to this that the non-simultaneity of Recollections is due.*

[The Opponent argues]—"Just as in the case of Intuitional Perception, so also in the case of such Recollection as is independent of Attention and the other causes, there should be simultaneity. That is, there are at times certain Recollections which, being independent of Attention and the other causes, resemble Intuitional Perception; and in such Recollections there should be simultaneity, as there is no reason (why there should be no simultaneity)."[†]

[*Answer*]—As a matter of fact, in the case cited also, the several causes are present; and it is because these causes fail to be perceived that people have the idea that the Recollection resembles Intuitional Perception. What actually happens is that, when there appear in the Mind a number of ideas pertaining

* Mind-Soul Contact and Impressions are not the sole cause of Recollection. So that even though these two are present, yet, inasmuch as the other causes of Recollection—Attention, etc.—are not present, several Recollections do not appear simultaneously.

† When, for instance, without any rhyme or reason, a recollection rushes in upon the Mind, all on a sudden. *Prātibhavat, etc.*, is printed in some editions as Sūtra. But no such Sūtra appears either in the *Nyāya-sūchībhandha*, or in any of the Sūtra Mss. or in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*.

to several things, it is only some one of these several things that brings about Recollection in some man (and not in others); and this is so because he recollects that particular thing because he ponders more specially over that thing; and yet the Recollector is not cognisant of all the causes that go to bring about the Recollection; he does not review his entire memory-process by thinking that 'in this fashion has my Recollection come about'; and because he is not cognisant of the causes, he thinks that his Recollection resembles Intuitional Perception, and also that Recollection is not dependent upon *Attention* and such other causes.

Question.—"How is it in the case of Intuitional Perception?"*

Answer.—The restriction or limitation is due to the peculiarities of the person's *Karma* (past deeds); just as there is in the case of experience. What the question means is—"Why does not Intuitional Perception appear simultaneously?"—and the meaning of the answer is that—just as the Man's past *Karma*, which brings about his experiences, does not bring about all his experiences at one and the same time,—similarly the peculiarity of man's past *Karma*, which is the cause of his Intuitional Perception, does not bring about several such perceptions at one and the same time.†

"What is said can not be right, because there is no reason."

This objection is not right, because an Instrument has power to bring about cognitions only one by one. That is to say, if, by your objection, you mean that—"When you say that the limitation is similar to that in the case of experiences, what you put forward is only an example,—you do not put forward any reason",—then our answer is that this objection has no force; because as a matter of fact, an Instrument can, by its very nature, bring about cognitions only one by one; and several cognitions are never produced, at one and the same time, either with regard to one or with regard to several objects;—and from this perceived fact of cognitions appearing one by one,

* This question has been propounded by the Author by way of introduction to the principal argument in support of his theory.—*Tātparya*.

† The *Tātparya* calls this answer '*ābīlam*,' *unsatisfactory*. The real answer comes in the next passage.

we infer that the capacity of *Instruments* is such (that they can bring about cognitions only one by one): though there is no such restriction in regard to the *Agent*; because in the case of a person possessed of supernormal organs and powers, it is found that when (through his occult powers) he creates several bodies for himself, he does have several cognitions at one and the same time (in his several bodies).

The following is another objection that has been urged [against the view of the *Ekadeśin* that "Recollection cannot appear simultaneously, because it proceeds from the contact of the Mind with that part of the Soul which is permeated by the cognition" (Sū. 25)]:—"Even in the case of the person who has a single body (and who is not a *Yogī* capable of taking several bodies), it would be possible for several cognitions to subsist in a single part of the Soul at diverse times, and [since the impressions left by all these Cognitions would inhere in the same part of the Soul] it should be possible to have the recollection of several things at one and the same time. As a matter of fact, it often happens that when the Agent has his body located in a certain place, several cognitions do appear in one and the same part of the Soul, through the contact of the several Sense-organs with their respective objects;—so that when the Mind comes into contact with such a part of the Soul (bearing the impressions of several cognitions), it is only natural that there should appear, at one and the same time, the recollections of all the several things cognised before; specially because there can be no graduation or non-simultaneity in the case of the Mind's contact with a part of the Soul. Then again, the several 'parts of the Soul' not being so many distinct substances, the condition of 'subsisting in the same substance' would be fulfilled by all cognitions belonging to the several parts of any single Soul; and thus (simultaneity of cognitions being quite possible) the said *Ekadeśin's* explanation of the non-simultaneity of Recollections (propounded in Sū. 25) is not satisfactory."

[Our answer to the above objection is as follows.]—In the case of Sound-series it is found that only that individual Sound is heard which happens to be in contact with the receptacle

or substratum of the Auditory Organ (and not all the Sounds ; even though they all inhere in the same substratum, *Ākāśa* ; in the same manner Recollection is produced by the contact of the Mind with *each individual impression* (left by the corresponding Cognition ; and not all the impressions left on the Soul) ; so that there can be no possibility of the several Recollections appearing at one and the same time.* Hence we conclude that the right answer to the Ekadeśin position (in Sū. 25) is what has been put forward before (in Sū. 26) ; and it is not true (as has been argued above) that “since several cognitions subsist in a single part of the Soul, it should be possible to have several Recollections at one and the same time”.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSĪYA

Some people hold the theory that—“*Jñāna*, Cognition, is a property of the Soul, but Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, and Pain are properties of the Internal Organ ;”†—this theory is impugned in the next Sūtra.

* Even though it is true that the impressions left by the several cognitions are present in the same part of the Soul,—yet, inasmuch as no Impression pervades over an entire part of the Soul, it is not possible for the Mind to be in contact with all the impressions at one and the same time ; and hence no simultaneity of Recollections is possible ; the Mind, in fact, can come into contact with only one impression at a time.

† We now proceed to consider the question whether or not Cognition belongs to the same substratum as Desire and the rest. This doubt arises by reason of different views being held by the *Sāṅkhya* and the Nihilist.—*Tātparyā*.

That Cognition belongs to the same substratum as Desire etc. is a fact known by ordinary experience, and is also established by reasons. Hence so long as it is not proved that Desire etc. belong to the Soul, it cannot be regarded as established that Cognition belongs to it. Such is the connection of the present question with the main subject-matter of the section.—*Pariśuddh.*

Viśvanātha puts it somewhat differently —“Desire belongs to the Mind ; Desire again is produced by Cognition, hence the two should reside in the same substratum, therefore Cognition also should belong to the Mind, not to the Soul.”

The ‘theory’ quoted in the Bhāṣya is thus explained by the *Tātparyā*—‘The intelligence of the Soul is one and immutable ; in this are reflected the Internal Organ modified into the forms of the several objects of cognition ; and it is by virtue of these reflections that the *one* Intelligence appears to be liable to production and destruction. Desire, Aversion etc. on the

Sūtra 34

Inasmuch as activity and cessation from activity are caused by Desire and Aversion of a Cognisant Being [Desire and Aversion must belong to this Cognisant Being].*

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, what happens is that the person *cognises* the fact of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another thing being a source of pain to him,—then he *desires* to obtain that which gives him pleasure and *desires* to get rid of what causes him pain,—and when he is imbued with the *desire to obtain* and puts forth an Effort to obtain what gives him pleasure, this *Effort* is what is called ‘*activity*’; and when imbued with the desire to get rid of a thing, he avoids what gives him pain, this is what constitutes ‘*cessation from activity*’;—thus we find that *Cognising, Desiring, Effort, Aversion, Pleasure, and Pain*, all these belong to (subsist in) one and the same substratum; that is, *Cognising, Desiring* and *Acting* have one and the same Agent, and subsist in the same substratum. From all this it follows that Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, and Pain are properties of the cognisant, intelligent thing (the Soul),—and not of a non-intelligent thing (the Internal Organ). Such ‘activity’ and ‘cessation from activity’ as have been described we actually perceive in the case of our own Souls,—and from this we infer the same in regard to other Souls.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The philosopher who holds Intelligence to belong to Material Substances (*i.e.*, the Materialist) says—

Sūtra 35

“ Inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot

other hand, are by their very nature, diverse and liable to be produced and destroyed. Hence while the Cognition belongs to the Soul, Desire etc. belong to the Internal Organ.

* Viṣvanātha has supplied two constructions of the Sūtra.—(1) ‘Activity and Cessation from Activity are due to Desire and Aversion, hence these latter are *ज्ञेय*, must belong to a Cognisant Being’; and (2) ‘Inasmuch as Activity and Cessation from Activity are caused by Desire and Aversion of a Cognisant Being, (these latter must belong to that cognisant being).’

be denied in regard to the Bodies composed of Earth and other material substances. ”

BHĀṢYA

“ The presence of Desire and Aversion is indicated by Activity and Absence of Activity ; hence it follows that Desire and Aversion must belong to that to which Activity and Cessation from Activity belong, and to that same should belong Cognition also ;—so that, inasmuch as Activity and Absence of Activity are found in Bodies composed of Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—it is these Bodies that are endowed with Desire, Aversion, and Cognition ; which shows that Intelligence belongs to these material bodies.”

Sūtra 36

Since we find Activity and Absence of Activity in such things as the Axe and the like,—

BHĀṢYA

it follows that Intelligence need not belong to the material Body. That is, if the finding of Activity and Absence of Activity in a certain thing justifies the attributing of Desire, Aversion and Cognition to it,—then, inasmuch as such Activity and Absence of Activity are found also in such *Instruments* as the Axe and the like, Intelligence should be attributed to these also. Desire etc., are attributed to the Body,—and yet we find, in the case of the Axe etc., that Activity and Cessation from Activity are not concomitant with Desire etc. ;—so that it cannot be right reasoning to argue that—“*because Activity and Absence of Activity are found in Bodies of Earth, Water, Fire and Air,*—therefore, Desire, Aversion and Cognition must belong to these.”

[Says the *Materialist*—“Well, in that case, we shall put another meaning to the words—‘*talligatvāt* etc., etc.,’ (Sū. 35) : The ‘activity’ of the material substances, Earth etc., in bodies,—transitory* (of insects) and durable (of animals and men),—consists of a particular kind of action, whose presence is indicated by the aggregation or re-arrangement of the component parti-

* We adopt the reading त्रसत्सु for तावत्. It is found in several Mss. and is supported by the *Tātparya* which says—‘त्रसत्सु’ अस्थिरेषु कृमिप्रभृतीनां शरीरेषु, ‘स्थावरेषु’ स्थिरेषु देवमनुष्यादीनां शरीरेषु.

cles of those bodies (by virtue of which the shape of the bodies undergoes changes, becoming fatter or leaner etc.]; 'Absence of Activity'—i.e., Inactivity—is found in such things as stone etc.; in which there is no such indication of activity ;—and again, the presence of Desire and Aversion is indicated by 'Activity' and 'Absence of Activity' ;—so that, inasmuch as we find Activity and Absence of Activity in the Atoms of Earth etc., (as shown above), and as Desire and Aversion are concomitant with these (Activity and Absence of Activity), it follows that Cognition also belongs to those same Atoms ;—and thus it becomes established that Intelligence belongs to material substances (and not to the Soul)."

[Our *answer* to the above is as follows]—What has been put forward is not a valid reason, as it is not perceived in such things as the Jar and the like.* In the case of the Earth-molecules composing the Jar and such things also, we find 'activity' in the form of a particular action which is indicated by *aggregation* or *re-arrangement* (of parts) ;—and we find 'absence of activity' in such things as the Sound (in which case there is no aggregation) in which every form of action is absent ;—and yet even though 'Activity and Absence of Activity' are found in the Earth-molecules and Sound, we do not find in them 'Desire and Aversion' ;—from this it is clear that mere presence of 'Activity and Absence of Activity' in anything cannot be a valid ground for attributing to it Desire and Aversion.

Sūtra 37

What differentiates the said Desire and Aversion (from the qualities of Material Substances, and marks them out as belonging to something other than Material Substances) is Universality and Absence of Universality.

BHĀṢYA

What distinguishes the qualities of *Desire* and *Aversion* and marks them out as belonging to something other than Material Substances is '*niyama*', '*restriction*', '*Universality*', and '*Aniyama*', *Absence of Restriction*', i.e. *Absence of Universality*.

* This is sometimes printed as Sūtra. But no such Sūtra is found either in the *Nyāyasūcimbādhā* or in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, or in any manuscript of the Sūtra.

The 'activity and absence of activity', due to the 'Desire and Aversion of the cognisant being', are such as subsist, not in that Being, but in that on which he operates; so that the Activity and Absence of Activity should belong to only such Material Substances, Earth and the rest, as happen to be manipulated or operated upon by that Being,—and not to all Substances; so that there is in this case '*anyama*', 'absence of universality'.

For one, on the other hand, who regards the Material Substances themselves as *cognisant* (and as such, endowed with Desire and Aversion), the 'activity and absence of activity' due to Desire and Aversion would subsist in those substances themselves; and hence there should be '*niyama*', 'universality'. For in the case of the other well-known qualities of material substances, it is found that the action due to a quality, as also absence of action due to the cessation or obstruction of that quality, occurs in all substances, so that, in the same manner, the action and absence of action due to Desire and Aversion (belonging to the Material Substances) should also occur in all Material Substances;—this however is never found to be the case:—from which it follows that while Activity and Absence of Activity subsist in the things operated upon or manipulated, Desire, Aversion and Effort belong to the *manipulator*.*

* The qualities that are recognised by both parties as belonging to Material Substances are found in all Material Substances, and continue to exist as long as those substances exist. For instance, the Odour of Earth is found in all that is of Earth, and lasts as long as the Earth lasts. The action of *falling* due to the quality of gravity will occur in all Material Substances, and it will cease to occur only when the quality is obstructed or counteracted. This is what is meant by '*niyama*, Universality, restriction'. If Desire etc. belonged to material substances, these also would have been co-existent and coeval with those substances; *i.e.*, they should have been found in all such substances; as a matter of fact, however, Desire and Aversion and Effort are not found to be so; *e.g.*, Desire etc. are never found in the Jar. This is what is meant by 'Absence of Universality', *Aniyama*. From this we conclude that Desire etc. cannot belong to Material Substances.

There is some confusion here in regard to the terms '*Niyama*' and '*Aniyam*'—The *Bhāṣya* has taken them in the sense of 'Universality' and 'Absence of Universality' respectively; the former belonging to the qualities of Material Substances, and the latter to the qualities of the cognisant Being. The *Vārtika* has taken the terms to mean 'restriction' and 'want of restriction', the former applying to the qualities of the Cogni-

Further, there can be no reason in support of the view that in each single body there are several cognisers; and yet according to the person who attributes Consciousness to Material Substances, inasmuch there are, in each single body, several Material Substances (Particles of Earth, Water etc), every one of which is endowed with the qualities of Desire, Aversion and Efforts,—this would mean that in a single body there are several Cognisers * If the Opponent says—“Yes, be it so”,—we point out that there is no proof for such an assertion. In the case of several different bodies we infer the presence of so many different *Cognisers* from the fact that each of them is found to be possessed of distinct qualities of Cognition (Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure and Pain); in the same manner, if, in each single body, every particle of Material Substance were possessed of its own Cognition and other qualities, then alone could it follow as a necessary conclusion that these are so many distinct cognisers (in that single body). [But there is no such ground for Inference.]

Further, as a matter of fact, we find that in Material Substances there appear several such actions as are due to the quality of something else,—and this provides the ground for inferring the same thing in other cases also. That is, in the case of such substances as are used as Instruments,—*e.g.* the axe and the like—and also in the case of such as form the con-

sant Being, and the latter to those of Material Substances. This is the difference of opinion upon which Vardhamāna asserts that the term ‘*niyama*’ may mean either *universality* or *partiality*, according to the meaning that we attach to the term, and ‘*anyama*’ is its contrary. The sense of the argument remains the same.

* In answer to what has been said in para 1, in regard to the possibility of Desire etc. being found in all Earthly substances, the Opponent might put forward the case of wine, grains of barley as a rule are not endowed with the power of intoxicating men, but those grains that enter into the composition of wine do become endowed with that power,—similarly only those particles of Earth are endowed with Consciousness which enter into the composition of the body of man. It is in answer to this that the *Bhāṣya* points out that even so every particle of the material substances composing the body should be imbued with Consciousness; and as such form so many distinct cognisant beings in each body; just as each particle of wine is endowed with the power of intoxication.

stituent cause of objects—*e.g.* clay and the like,—we find that there appear actions that are due to the quality of others;—and this provides the ground for inferring the same thing in other cases also;—*i.e.* in the case of such things as the transitory and durable bodies (of Insects and Men respectively); so that we infer that the action of material substances composing these bodies,—which is indicated by the aggregation and modification of their component particles [which has been put forward by the Opponent in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 36],—is due to the quality of something different (from the material substances).* This quality (to which the said action is due) subsists in the same substratum as *Effort*, and appears in the form of '*Samskāra*', 'Faculty', and is called 'Merit-Demerit'; like the quality of *Effort*, it bears upon all things (related to the Man), and urges to activity all Material Substances, for the fulfilment of that man's purpose.

The theory that Consciousness belongs to Material Substances may also be regarded as set aside by all those arguments that have been shown to prove the existence of the Soul, as well as by those put forward in proof of the Eternality of the Soul; and what has been said (in Sū. 3-2-18)—in regard to 'Cognition not belonging to either the Sense-organs or objects or perception, because Cognition persists also when these are destroyed'—applies with equal force to the denying of Consciousness in the material substances of the Body.†

Further, what the Opponent has urged (in Sū. 35)—to the effect that—"inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion,, these cannot be denied in regard to the bodies composed of Earth

" It is not only the activity of the Body as a whole, but also the action of all its component particles that go on undergoing re-arrangement during life, that are all due to the quality (*Dharma etc*) of the Soul ensouling the Body.

† Because even when the Objects and the Sense-organs are destroyed, Cognition remains,—it is inferred that Cognition cannot belong to them; similarly Consciousness cannot belong to the material substances in the body, because while these substances undergo changes and destruction during the life of the individual, the quality of Consciousness continues to persist all along.—*Tātparyā*.

and other substances"—is on the understanding that the terms 'ārambha', Activity, and 'nivṛitti', 'Absence of Activity' (used by us in Sū 34) stand for mere *action* and *cessation of action*; as a matter of fact, these two terms—'Activity' and 'Absence of Activity'—stand (in Sū. 34) for action of a totally different kind;* and Action of this kind is never found in Earth and other substances. Hence what has been urged (in Sū 35) to the effect that—"inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot be denied in regard to the bodies composed of Earth and other substances"—is not right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, our denial of Consciousness applies equally to Material Substances, Sense-organs and Mind; but (in the following Sūtra) we speak of *Mind* only, singling it out by way of illustration [and our reason for selecting this lies in the fact that Mind is more like the Soul than Substances or Sense-organs].

Sūtra 38

(A) On account of reasons explained before,—(B) on account of these being under the control of something else,—and (C) on account of the contingency, that [if Consciousness belonged to the Mind, etc.] it would mean that the results accruing (to Man) are those of acts done by others (than himself).†

BHĀṢYA

(A) The first phrase ('on account of reasons explained above') includes all that has been said, beginning from the Sūtra

* What is meant by 'Activity and Absence of Activity' in Sū. 34, is not mere *Action* and *Cessation of Action*, but that particular form of action which is undertaken for the obtaining of the desirable and the getting rid of the undesirable thing; and certainly no such intelligent action is ever found in material substances. Without understanding this, you have put forward your argument in Sū. 35.—*Tātparya*.

† In place of (c) अकृताभ्यागमात् Viśvanātha reads स्वकृताभ्यागमात्, meaning—'on account of the fact that what accrues to man must be the results of his own acts.' The same reading is found in the Puri Sūtra Ms., and also in Sūtra Ms. D. The *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* read as in the Viz., text.

1-1-10, 'Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the indicatives of the Soul';—all this goes to show that Consciousness cannot belong to Material Substances, or Sense-organs, or Mind.

(B) *On account of their being under the control of something else*;—Material Substances, Sense-organs and Mind are 'under the control of something else', in the sense that it is only under the impulse of Effort (of the Soul) that they proceed to the actions of sustaining, propelling and aggregating;* while if these were themselves conscious or intelligent, they would be independent [and this would be incompatible with the arguments that have been propounded in support of the conclusion that the Body is under the control of something else].

(C) *On account of the contingency that, if Consciousness belonged to the Mind etc, it would mean that the results accruing to Man are those of acts not done by himself* † Under Sū 1-1-17 it has been pointed out that 'Activity consists in the operating of Mind, of Speech and of Body'—[and in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū 1-1-2, it is shown that *Activity*, conductive to Merit-Demerit, leads to Rebirth],—now if Consciousness belonged to the Mind, or the Sense-organs, or the Material Substances, [since the Conscious beings must be independent agents, it would be those that would

* The *Tātparyā* explains that these three actions refer only to the Body and the Sense-organs; the arguments being formulated thus—(a) 'The Body and the Sense-organs are under the control of something else, in the actions of sustaining, propelling and aggregating, severally,—because they are material,—like the Jar, and (b) 'The Mind is under the control of something else, because it is an instrument,—like the Axe.' So that it is clear that all three act only under the influence of something else

The actions mentioned,—those of sustaining, etc,—appear to be such as belong to the Body only, it is the Body only that sustains or upholds things, that propells things, with the hand, f. i., and that goes on changing through the diverse aggregations of its component particles. The last however is applicable to the Sense-organs also. That is how the *Tātparyā* has spoken of the three actions as referring *severally* to the Body and the Sense-organs.

† This argument is aimed against those persons who accept the authority of the Veda, and thereby regard the Man as one to whom the results of acts accrue, but still attribute Consciousness, not to Man, but to the Body, etc.

have to be regarded as the Agents of all Activity, as the *doers* of all acts,—and yet all these are destroyed at death, and the only thing that remains after death is the Soul, which, being *ex hypothesi, non-intelligent*, has not been the *doer* of any deed;—so that the results occurring in future births, from these acts, would fall upon the Soul, and not upon the Body, etc.; and] it would mean that what is experienced by the Soul (on rebirth) is the result of acts done by others (the Body, etc.) On the other hand, if the Mind, etc. are held to be *non-intelligent* [and a being other than these, i.e., the Soul, be held to be the intelligent or Conscious entity, this latter, being independent, would be the Agent, the *doer* of all deeds], then all these would be the instruments under the control of the Conscious Agent, and hence it would be only right that the Person, the intelligent Agent, acting through those instruments (of the Mind etc.), should undergo (on Re-birth) the results of acts done by himself

Sūtra 39

(A) By reason of 'Elimination' and also (B) because the reasons adduced before are firmly established.

[or (B) because of reasons adduced before and (C) by reason of Reappearance.*]—

BHĀṢYA

The proposition under consideration is that 'Intelligence or Consciousness is the quality of the Soul'

(A) *Pariśeṣa*, 'Elimination'.—When in regard to a quality, some likely substrata being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of other substrata, we have the cognition of that likely substratum which remains undenied,—we have what is called 'Cognition by Elimination'.† In the present connection, for instance, we have the denial of 'Material Substances, Sense-organs and the Mind' (as likely substratum of Consciousness),—there is no other likely substance which might be suspected to be that substratum,—and 'the only substance that remains is the Soul,—so that the conclusion is that 'Consciousness is a quality of the Soul'.

* This is the second interpretation of the clause *Yathoktahetūpāpattēca*, by the *Bhāṣya* (see below).

† This passage also occurs in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1-1-5.

(B) *Also because the reasons adduced before are firmly established*;—i.e. because all the reasons that have been adduced as leading to the Conception of the Soul—beginning with Sū. 3-1-1 onwards—have not been answered by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. The reference to *the previously adduced reasons being established* is meant to indicate (and lend support to) the aforesaid ‘reasoning by Elimination’ [*i.e.* it is on account of those reasons that we are led to the notion that the Soul is the only substance to which Consciousness can belong]; and it also serves to redirect attention to the direct proofs in support of the proposition under consideration.

Or, we may take the phrase ‘*upapatteśca*’ as putting forward an additional reason; [the meaning being as follows]:—‘The Soul, which is eternal, having performed meritorious acts in one body, *reappears*, on the death of that body, in Heaven among divine beings; while having performed sinful acts, it reappears, on death of the body, in the Hells; this reappearance, which consists in the Soul taking to other bodies, can be possible only if the Soul is a lasting entity; on the other hand, if all that existed was a mere ‘series of sensations’, and there were no persisting entity in the shape of the Soul, there being no substratum for the said ‘reappearance’, it would not be possible. Then again ‘Samsāra’, ‘series of births’, which consists of the connection of a single entity with several bodies, *is possible*,—and ‘Deliverance’ or ‘Final Release’, also, which consists of freedom from the series of bodies, *is possible*—[only if there is a persisting entity in the shape of the Soul]; and if there be nothing apart from the ‘series of sensations’, since there would be nothing that could traverse the long path (of Births and Rebirths), there would be nothing that could be freed from the series of bodies; so that in that case both ‘Metempsychosis’ and ‘Final Release’ would be impossible. Further, if there were nothing but a ‘series of sensations’, then each individual living being would consist of several diverse entities; so that the entire phenomenon of his life would be disjointed (the act begun today and finished tomorrow being done by two distinct entities, it would *not be recognised* as the same on both days), undistinguishable [*i.e.*, not properly distinguished from what belongs to another

person : the entity finishing the act to-day being as different from that which began it on the previous day as any strange person] and confused [as no discrimination of personalities would be possible, the entire business of the world would be mixed up] * And another inevitable result of this would be that there could be no Recollection ; for what has been seen by one personality (which was present yesterday) cannot be recollected by another (that has taken its place today); for *Recollection* is only the recognition by the same cogniser of the previously-perceived thing,—it appearing in the form ‘I have known this object before’; and it is clear that in this the same cogniser re-cognises what he had cognised before ; and this *re-cognition* is what is called ‘Recollection’; and no such phenomenon could be possible if there were no other persistent entity save a ‘series of Sensations’.

Sūtra 40

Recollection (must belong) to the Soul ; for it is the Soul that is endowed with the character of the ‘Cogniser’

BHĀṢYA

The term ‘*Upapadyate*’ ‘must belong’ is to be supplied in the Sūtra ; the sense being that *Recollection must belong to the Soul*, and not to a mere Series of Sensations,—the particle ‘*tu*’ expressing *certitude* (‘must’). “Why so?” *Because it is the Soul that is endowed with the character of the cogniser ; i.e. ‘being cogniser’ is the character, the peculiar characteristic, of the Soul. It is the Soul that is spoken of as ‘shall know’, ‘knows’ and ‘has known’, which shows that the Soul is related to cognitions appearing at all the three points of time ; and that the Soul has these cognitions pertaining to the three points of time is realised by each person in his own experience,—every person having such notions as ‘I shall know’, ‘I know’ and ‘I have known’.* Hence it follows that he who is endowed with the said peculiar

* The *Tātparya* explains the ‘confusion’ as being due to the fact that every entity, according to the Bauddha sensationist, being a mere ‘negation of contraries’, all persons would be the same, and no distinction as between the ‘Brāhmana’ and the ‘Ksatriya’ and so forth would be possible ; so that there would be no discrimination of their duties such as the ‘Brāhmana alone shall perform the Soma sacrifice’, ‘the Ksatriya alone shall perform the *Rājasya*’ and so forth.

feature, to him belongs Recollection, and not to a mere Series of Sensations, apart from the Soul.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been explained (under Sū. 33) that 'Recollections do not appear simultaneously, because the causes of Recollections do not appear at one and the same time',—and now the question arises—"From what causes does Recollection arise?"

The answer is that—Recollection arises—

Sūtra 41

from such causes as—(a) attention, (b) association, (c) retentiveness, (d) indicative, (e) distinguishing feature, (f) likeness, (g) ownership, (h) supporter, (i) supported, (j) relationship, (k) sequence, (l) separation, (m) co-profession, (n) enmity, (o) superiority, (p) acquisition, (q) cover, (r) pleasure and pain, (s) desire and aversion, (t) fear, (u) need, (v) profession, (w) affection, (x) merit and (y) demerit.

BHĀṢYA

(a) *Attention*—the fixing of the Mind, with the desire to recollect something, and the pondering of the peculiarities of the thing desired to be recalled—is a cause of Recollection — (b) *Association*—is either (1) the arranging of several things in a connected chain, things so connected bringing about the recollection of one another, either, in the order in which they have been arranged, or in some other order; or (2) the fixing of things (in the plexuses of the Body) to be remembered with those already known,—such connecting being done with the help of the Science of Concentration (Yoga) — (c) *Retentiveness*—the Faculty produced by the repeated cognitions of like things; and this quality of Faculty, belonging to the Soul, is called 'Retentiveness', this also, like others, is a cause of Recollection — (d) *Indicative*—this is of four kinds—(1) conjunct, (2) inherent, (3) co-inherent in one substratum; and (4) contradictory; (1) e.g. smoke is the *conjunct* 'indicative' of Fire, (2) the horn is the *inherent* 'indicative' of the Bull; (3) the hand is the co-inherent 'indicative' of the feet, and so also is Colour of Touch; and (4) the non-material substance is the *contradictory* 'indicative' of the material substance.— (e) *Distinguishing feature*—as found in a living being—reminds us of the race or family to which that

being belongs,—in such forms as ‘this belongs to the race of the Vidas’, ‘this belongs to the family of the Gargas’, and so forth.—*(f) Likeness*—the likeness of *Dēvadatta* in the picture reminds us of *Dēvadatta*.—*(g) Ownership*—the master reminds us of the servant and the servant of the master.—*(h) Supporter*—one is reminded by the landlord of his tenants.—*(i) Supported*—the tenant reminds one of the landlord.—*(j) Relationship**—the pupil reminds one of the Teacher, and the Priest of the person at whose sacrificial performance he officiates.—*(k) Sequence*—as in the case of a number of acts to be done one after the other (the preceding reminds us of the succeeding).—*(l) Separation*—when one is separated from a person and feels the separation, he remembers him frequently,—*(m) Co-profession*—one cutter reminds us of another cutter.—*(n) Enmity*—of two rivals the sight of one reminds us of the other.—*(o) Superiority*—reminds us of that which has produced the superiority —*(p) Aquisition*—when one has either acquired a thing, or wishes to acquire it he is frequently reminded of it —*(q) Cover*—when the sword is remembered by its scabbard.—*(r) Pleasure and Pain*—remind us of what causes them.—*(s) Desire and Aversion*—remind one of what is liked and what is disliked.—*(t) Fear*—reminds one of the cause of fear—*(u) Need*—reminds one of what he needs, in the shape of food or clothing.—*(v) Profession*—the chariot-maker is recalled by the chariot.—*(w) Affection*—one frequently remembers the woman whom he loves.—*(x) Merit*—reminds one of his previous births ; and Merit also enables one to retain what he reads and hears.—*(y) Demerit*—reminds one of the causes of pain suffered in the past.

These several causes of Recollection are never cognised at the same time ; hence no simultaneous Recollections are possible.

The Sūtra is merely suggestive of what causes Recollection ; it is by no means exhaustive.†

End of Section 3

* Some sort of ‘Relationship’ is involved in all that is enumerated here. Hence ‘Relationship’ here stands for those other than the ones specially enumerated.—*Tātparya*.

† There are other causes also ; e.g., Insanity tends to revive old memories—*Tātparya*.

SECTION (4)

Sūtras 42-45

Apprehension vanishes soon after appearance

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Buddhi, Apprehension, having been proved to be *non-eternal*, it would follow that it vanishes soon after appearance; and yet there are several *non-eternal* things* (e g the Jar) which continue to exist for a time more or less remote (from the time at which they are produced);—hence there arises the doubt—Is Apprehension entirely evanescent (disappearing soon after appearance), like Sound?—or is it durable for some time longer, like the Jar?

We accept the view that it is totally evanescent.

“Why so?”

Sūtra 42

Because there is Apprehension of Movement, which is fleeting.

BHĀṢYA

Because there is apprehension of Movement which is fleeting (not durable)—In the case of the arrow shot from the bow we perceive a series of movements till the arrow drops down; and since every cognition is restricted to a single object, it follows that, just as there is a series of (fleeting) movements (in the arrow), so must there be also a series of corresponding cognitions. In the case of the apprehension of (comparatively) durable things also, inasmuch as we find that the perception ceases when the thing is hidden from view, [it follows that in this case

* The *Viz.* text as well as the Purī Mss. read ‘*nityānām*’; but the sense requires ‘*anityānām*’; the *Vārtika* has neither *nityānām* nor *anityānām*. The fact of *nitya*, eternal things, being such as continue to exist longer, can have no bearing upon *Buddhi*, after this has been proved to be *non-eternal*. The meaning clearly is—‘it having been proved that *Buddhi* is *non-eternal*, this would naturally imply that it is fleeting, evanescent, disappearing soon after appearance; and several *non-eternal* things are found to have longer duration; hence the Doubt in regard to *Buddhi*, as to whether it is entirely evanescent or it has some duration’.

With the reading ‘*nityānām*’ the only sense that can be deduced from the passage is as follows:—‘If *Buddhi* is *non-eternal*, it should be entirely evanescent, and if it is eternal, it should continue to exist, hence the doubt.’

also there is a series of several evanescent cognitions]; that is, when the Jar, which is durable, is perceived, we have a series of cognitions, until something comes between (the Jar and the Perceiver); it is for this reason that as soon as something happens to intervene, the perception of the Jar ceases. If Cognition were durable (not evanescent), then the perceptual cognition of the Jar should continue even when the Jar has been hidden from view [which however is not found to be the case, and hence it follows that there is a series of several evanescent cognitions].

The phenomenon of Recollection also does not* prove the durability of Cognitions; for what brings about Recollection is the *Impression* produced by the Cognition (and *not* the *Cognition* itself). Some people have argued that—"Cognition must be regarded as durable, because we find Recollection of things apprehended by the Cognition,—and no such Recollection would be possible if its cause, in the shape of the corresponding Cognition, were non-eternal" But the fact put forward is no proof (of the proposition set forth). "Why?" Because what brings about the Recollection is, not the Cognition, but, the *Impression* produced by the Cognition; and this *Impression* is a quality entirely different from the Cognition.

"What is said cannot be accepted; because no reason has been adduced in its support "

[The *reason* is this]—If Cognition were something durable, then the perception itself would continue for a long time, and there would be no room for *Recollection* at all. That is, so long as the original Perception would continue to exist, the object cognised would remain 'perceptible', and while the Perception itself is there, no 'Recollection' is possible.

* The Puri Mss. read *smṛtiśca lingam*, 'Re-collection does prove', in that case *buddhyavasthāne* should read as '*buddhyavyavasthāne*'. But the reading of the *Viz.* text gives better sense. Things seen now are remembered after several days, this might be regarded as indicating that the cognition of the thing has continued to exist during all these days. But the fact is that the cognition is *not* the immediate cause of Re-collection, which is directly produced by the *Impression* left by the Cognition.

Sūtra 43

[*Objection*] —“If Cognition were evanescent, the perception of things would be always indistinct ; just like the indistinct perception of Colour during lightning-flash”.

BHĀṢYA

“If Cognition is evanescent, then the perception of all cognisable things should be indistinct, just as during lightning-flash, the light of the flash being evanescent, the perception of colour is indistinct. As a matter of fact, however, the perception of things is quite distinct. Hence the view (that ‘Cognitions are evanescent’) cannot be right.”

Sūtra 44

[*Answer*]—The very reason put forward implies the admission of what is sought to be denied.

BHĀṢYA

What is sought to be denied (by the Opponent) is that ‘Cognition is evanescent’, and this is exactly what is admitted when he asserts (in Sū 43) that “the cognition should be indistinct like the indistinct cognition of Colour during lightning-flash ” For if cognition is *indistinct*, it follows that it is also *evanescent*.

As a matter of fact, the diversity in the character (distinct or indistinct) of Cognitions is due to the diverse nature of their causes, and not to any diversity in the cognitions themselves.* That is, the fact that Cognition is at one time distinct and at another indistinct, is due to the diverse nature of the causes of Cognitions ; so that where the cause of the Cognition is evanescent, the Cognition is *indistinct*, while where the cause is lasting, the Cognition is *distinct* ; and the said distinctness or indistinctness is not due to the non-evanescence and evanescence respectively of Cognitions. “Why ? Because ‘Cognition’ is the apprehension of a thing ; be it distinct or indistinct, it is what is called ‘Cognition’. What happens is that, when the special features of a thing are not perceived,—and only its general features are perceived,—then the Cognition is *distinct*, [so far as the cognition

* This has been generally printed as Sūtra. But neither the *Nyāyasūci-mbandha*, nor Viśvanātha, nor any Sūtra-Ms. reads any such Sūtra

of these general features is concerned], † and if a further Cognition of something else (in the shape of the special features) does not appear, this is due to the absence of the necessary causes ; when again the thing is perceived, as along with its general features, and also as along with its special features,—then the Cognition is clearly distinct [so far as both features are concerned];—and where the special features being unperceived, the general features alone are perceived, the cognition is clearly *indistinct*—[but only so far as the special features are concerned] In the present context, *the presence of special features* is clearly ‘something else’ (*viśayāntara*) in comparison with *the presence of general features* ; and if there is no cognition of the ‘something else’, [and there is consequent *indistinctness*], this is due to the absence of the causes of that cognition,—and not to the evanescent character of the Cognition (as the Opponent seems to think)

In fact a cognition that is quite in keeping with the character of its *object* is always *distinct* , so that each Cognition pertaining to its own particular object, even the cognition of generalities, should be regarded as *distinct*, so far as its own particular *object* is concerned ; and similarly the cognition of peculiarities should be regarded as *distinct*, so far as its own object is concerned ; for the simple reason that each cognition pertains to its own particular object. So that when the Opponent brings forward (against us) the contingency of cognitions being *indistinct*,—what is that object of which the cognition would have to be *indistinct*, on account of the *evanescence of cognitions* ?

As a matter of fact, there being several features in the object perceived, there arises a diversity in the cognitions (of that object) ; and it is to the presence or absence of such diversity that distinctness or indistinctness is due That is, every object has two kinds of features, general and special, and in regard to each of these there are diverse cognitions ; if both these kinds

† It appears better to read this passage as सामान्यग्रहणमात्रमव्यक्तग्रहणम्—the meaning being that ‘when general features are perceived and not the special features, the cognition is ‘*indistinct*’. But in deference to the *Vārtika*—and in view of the reading in all Mss., and in view of that follows below—we have admitted the reading of the *Viz.* text, and translated it in accordance with the explanation of the *Vārtika*.

of features are present (and perceived) in an object, then the Cognition is *distinct*, so far as that object is concerned ; if however only the general features are perceived, the Cognition is *indistinct*. It is in this manner that we can explain the appearance of *distinct and indistinct* cognitions.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact also, mere *evanescence*, either of the *cognition* or of the *cognised object*, does not necessarily make the Apprehension indistinct [as the Pūrvapakṣin asserts in Sū. 43].* What has been urged is ;—

Sūtra 45

not true , the said perception would be like the distinct perception of the continuous series of lamp-flames.

BHĀṢYA

Even if Cognition is evanescent, the perception of things must be regarded as *distinct*—why ?—because it is *like the perception of the continuous series of lamp-flames* ; i.e., when the flames of a lamp appear in a continuous series, every one of the perceptions thereof is evanescent , as also is every one of the individual flames perceived ; and inasmuch as every perception pertains to its own individual object, there exist as many *perceptions* as there are *flames* , and yet in this case we find that the perception of each of these flames is quite distinct.

End of Section (4)

SECTION (5)

Sūtras 46-55

Consciousness is not a quality of the Body

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Consciousness or Sentience would appear to be a quality of the Body, as it is found to be present when the Body is present, and absent when the Body is absent ; but—

* In Sū. 44, the author has met the Pūrvapakṣa by a sort of silencer, pointing out to him that his own statement admits what he seeks to demolish. Now, in the following Sūtra, he states his real argument against the Opponent's contention.

Sūtra 46

as a matter of fact, in Substances we perceive their own qualities as also the qualities of others ; so that the matter is open to doubt.

BHĀSYA

The mere fact of Consciousness being present when the Body is present leaves the matter doubtful ; for in water we perceive Fluidity, which is its own quality, as also *warmth*, which is the quality of another substance (Fire). Hence when we perceive Consciousness in the Body, there arises a doubt as to whether the Consciousness perceived is the quality of the Body itself, or it is the quality of some other substance.

Sūtra 47[*Siddhānta*]

Consciousness is not a quality of the Body. "Why?"

Because Colour and other qualities continue to exist as long as the Body exists.

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, the Body is never found to be without colour and such other qualities ; without *Consciousness*, on the other hand, it is actually found (when it is dead, for instance) ; in the same manner as Water is found without warmth. Hence the conclusion is that Consciousness is not a quality of the Body [just as warmth is not a quality of water].*

"It may be like Embellishment (or Momentum)."

That cannot be ; as there is no cessation of any cause (of Consciousness). In the case of Embellishment, it is found that when it ceases to exist in an object, (the Body, e.g.) this object is not quite the same as what it was when the Embellishment was present ; for as a matter of fact, Embellishment ceases to appear in an object only when the object has become deprived of those

* The reason is formulated in the form of a Hypothetical Reasoning, by Viśvanātha.—'If Consciousness were a quality of the Body, it would, like Colour etc., exist as long as the Body exists.' The *Parīśuddhi* formulates it in the form of a regular Inference : 'Consciousness, etc., are not the quality of the Body,—because, like Sound, they do not exist as long as their substratum.' Colour, in this case, being treated as an Instance *per contra*.

factors (such as Propulsion and the like) that were conducive to the appearance of the Embellishment ;—in the case in question on the other hand, when Consciousness ceases to appear in the Body, the Body is exactly what it was when Consciousness appeared in it [and there is no deprivation of any factors, the only cause of Consciousness, according to the Opponent, consisting in the Body itself, which is still intact] Hence (the case of Consciousness not being analogous to that of Embellishment) it is not right to urge, in answer to our argument, that “the absence of Consciousness in the Body is like the absence of Embellishment”.

If (in order to escape from the said difficulty) it be held that the cause of Consciousness in the Body is something else (and not the Body itself), then this cause could subsist either in the Body itself, or in some other Substance, or in both (the Body as well as another Substance). And none of these views can be maintained ; because there would be no reason for any restriction (such as the following) (a) The cause of Consciousness subsisting in the Body itself, there would be no reason for any such restriction as that Consciousness should appear therein at certain times, and not at others,—(b) the cause of Consciousness being in some other substance, there can be no reason for the restriction that while Consciousness appears in the Body, it does not appear in pieces of stone and such other things ;*—(c) if the cause of Consciousness subsists in both (Body and the other substance), there can be no reason for the restriction that Consciousness appears in the Body, and not in other substances that belong to the same category as that Body

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Some people might argue thus.—“In the case of the object possessed of the quality of dark colour (e g the unbaked Jar), we find that there is cessation of that Colour (while the object continues to exist); and in the same manner there may be cessation of the quality of Consciousness (while the Body, of which it is a quality, continues to exist)”

Sūtra 48

This however is not right, because (in the case of the object cited) there is appearance of another Colour due to baking

* Puri Ms B rightly reads a *na* after ‘*lostādīśvītyatī a.*’

BHĀSYA

In the case of the object cited (*i e.* the jar) there is not a total disappearance of all Colour, all that happens is that the *dark* Colour having disappeared, another Colour, *red*, is produced by baking,—in the case of the Body, on the other hand, there is, at death, a total disappearance of Consciousness (and nothing appears in its place).*

Sūtra 49

Further,

Inasmuch as qualities produced by heat are found to be due to the presence of counter-active forces, the criticism based upon the analogy of these cannot be right.

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, qualities are found to be produced by heat in only such substances in which there are present forces counter-active (destructive) of the previous quality, that this is so is shown by the fact that the qualities produced by heat are incompatible with the previous qualities. In the Body, on the other hand, we do not find present any force counteractive of the quality of Consciousness,—by reason of the presence whereof there could appear any new quality incompatible with the (previous) quality of *Consciousness*; and it is only from the appearance of such new quality that the counter-action (destruction) of Consciousness (and hence the impossibility of its continuing as long as the Body lasts) could be inferred. Thus there being nothing to counteract the quality of Consciousness, it should continue in the Body as long as the Body lasts (if it is a quality of the Body) As a matter of fact, however, it does not so continue to exist. Hence the conclusion is that Consciousness is not a quality of the Body.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

For the following reason also Consciousness cannot be a quality of the Body :—

* Viśvanātha takes this *Sūtra* as coming from the Opponent; the meaning being—“The Siddhānta view is not right; as we find new colours produced (and old ones destroyed) by heat, while yet the substance remains the same.”

*Sūtra 50***Because it pervades over the entire Body.***

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, like the Body, all its component parts also are pervaded by the appearance of Consciousness ; and there is not a single part of the Body where Consciousness does not appear ; under the circumstances, if Consciousness belonged to the Body, this would mean that, like the Body, all its component parts are Conscious, and hence in each single person there would be several conscious entities ! So that, just as the restriction in regard to Pleasure, Pain and Cognition [that the Pleasure appearing in Devadatta's body is felt by him alone, and not by Yajñadaṭṭa and so forth] is indicative of the fact that there are several conscious beings—one to each individual body,—so would it also be in regard to the single body [every component part of which being endowed with Consciousness, it would follow that there is restriction as to the Pleasure, etc., of each such part ; so that the Pleasure appearing in one part of the Body would be felt by that part alone, and not by any other part of that same Body]. As a matter of fact, however, no such thing actually happens. Hence we conclude that Consciousness is not a quality of the Body.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[*Objection*] “It has been said that ‘there is no part of the body where Consciousness does not appear’ ; but—

Sūtra 51

“ This is not right ;† as it is not found in such parts of the body as hairs and nails.

* According to the *Paṛiśuddhi*, this Sūtra contains the following argument —‘Consciousness cannot be a specific quality of the Body—because it is a quality that pervades over the whole of its substratum,—like Sound.’ It goes on to remark,—‘This meaning of the Sūtra was so clear and patent that the *Bhāṣyakāra* did not think it necessary to mention it, and he put down only that interpretation of it whereby it became connected with, and introductory to, the following Sūtras.’

† The *na*, appearing in the *Viṣ.* text as part of the *Bhāṣya*, should form part of the Sūtra ; such being the reading of all Sūtra-texts.

BHĀṢYA

“ In hairs and in nails we do not feel any Consciousness appearing ; so that it is not right to say that *it pervades over the entire body.*”

Sūtra 52

[Answer]—Inasmuch as the Body extends only so far as the skin, there is no possibility of Consciousness appearing in such things as Hairs and Nails.

BHĀṢYA

‘Body’ has been defined as ‘the substratum of Sense-organs’ ; so that the Body, which is the receptacle of life, mind, pleasure, pain and cognition, can be regarded as extending only up to the skin ; hence it is natural that no Consciousness would appear in the Hairs and Nails. The presence of such things as Nails and Hairs in the Body is due to the action of certain things [and they do not form constituent parts of the Body].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also Consciousness cannot be a quality of the Body :—

Sūtra 53

Because it differs in character from the qualities of the Body.

BHĀṢYA

Qualities belonging to the Body are of two kinds—(1) Imperceptible, *e.g.*, Gravity, and (2) Perceptible by the senses, *e.g.*, Colour, *etc.* Consciousness is a quality of a totally different kind from the said qualities : It cannot be regarded as *imperceptible*, because it is capable of being sensed (perceived) by itself ; nor can it be regarded as *perceptible by the senses*, because it is cognisable by the Mind.* From this it follows that Consciousness is the quality of a substance totally different from the Body.

* The correct order appears in the *Vārtika*. The right reading would appear to be नाप्रत्यक्षा मनोविषयत्वात् नेन्द्रियग्राह्या स्वसंवेद्यत्वात् and the right translation should be—‘It cannot be regarded as *imperceptible*, as it is *perceived* by the Mind (which is an organ) ; nor can it be regarded as *perceptible* (i. e. perceived through an organ), as it is *cognised* by itself.’

Sūtra 54

[*Objection*—“ **What is urged is not right ; as there is difference in character among Colour and other qualities (belonging to the Body)**”.

BHĀṢYA

“ Just as, even though differing in character from one another, Colour and the other qualities do not cease to be qualities of the Body, in the same manner, Consciousness also, though differing in character from Colour and the other qualities, need not cease to be a quality of the Body.”

Sūtra 55

[*Answer*—**Inasmuch as Colour and the other qualities (of the Body) are perceptible by the Senses, there is no incongruity in these (belonging to the Body)**

BHĀṢYA

‘ *Also because they are not perceptible* ’—(this should be added to the *Sūtra*), [the meaning of the *Sūtra* being] Colour etc., though differing among themselves, yet do not go beyond the limits of the two kinds (mentioned under Sū. 53); and Consciousness also, differing from Colour etc., should fall within the limits of these two kinds, if it were really a quality of the Body;—as a matter of fact, however, Consciousness is found (as shown under Sū. 53) to lie beyond the limits of the said two kinds—hence it follows that Consciousness cannot be a quality of the Body

Though the fact of Consciousness not belonging to the Body has already been established by what has been said above (in Section 3) in regard to Cognition not belonging to Material Substances, or Sense-organs, or Mind,—yet it has been dealt with over again (in the present Section), for the purpose of stating additional arguments (such as pertain to the Body specifically); specially because the more is truth investigated the more fully established it becomes.

End of Section 5

SECTION (6)

[Sūtras 56–59].

Treating of the Mind.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The character of Apprehension having been examined, it is now the turn of Mind to be examined ; and the question arising—Is there only one Mind in each body, or several ? *—[the answer is—

Sūtra 56

The Mind must be one only : since there is non-simultaneity of Cognitions.

There are two kinds of ‘non-simultaneity of cognitions’—(1) the non-simultaneity of several cognitions produced through the same Sense-organ, and (2) the non-simultaneity of cognitions of several things produced through several Sense-organs. Of these two the former is not what is spoken of as indicating the singleness of the Mind,—this ‘non-simultaneity’ being due to the fact that one Instrument (such as Sense-organs are) can, by its very nature, accomplish only one thing at a time :—it is the latter ‘non-simultaneity’ of the cognitions of several things through several Sense-organs that is regarded as indicating the singleness of Mind. “How does that non-simultaneity indicate the singleness of Mind ?” If there were several Minds, it would be possible for several Sense-organs to be in contact with several Minds simultaneously ; whereby there should be several cognitions appearing (through these contacts) at one and the same time ;—but this never happens ;—hence the conclusion is that, inasmuch as cognitions of things appear only one after another—and never simultaneously—there is a single Mind (in one body).

* It has been explained in Sū. 1-1-16 that ‘the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is the indicative of Mind ;’ this would not be true, if there were several Minds in a body, or if the Mind were of large dimension. The present enquiry is undertaken for the purpose of finding out some means of concentrating the Mind ; attempts at concentration could be fruitful only if there were only one Mind ; if there were several Minds, there need be no attempt at concentration ; and no abstraction of the Mind or Meditation would be possible.

Sūtra 57

[*Objection*]—“What has been asserted is not right ; for as a matter of fact, we do perceive several actions (cognitions) actually appearing simultaneously.”

BHĀṢYA

“ [When the pupil perceives his Teacher going in the forest] he has the following notions,—“This Teacher reads—walks—holds the water-pot—looks at the path—hears the sounds proceeding from the forest—becomes frightened—keeps on the lookout for signs of serpents or tigers—remembers the place of destination*”;—he does not notice any order of sequence among these cognitions , so that all these may be regarded as appearing simultaneously ,—and hence it follows that there are several Minds.”

Sūtra 58

[*Answer*]—The said perception is like the perception of the fire-circle ; and is due to the rapidity of motion.

BHĀṢYA

In the case of the whirling fire-brand, even though there is sequence [among the several perceptions of the fire, yet it is not perceived, by reason of the extreme rapidity of motion ; and the sequence not being perceived, there arises the idea of the continuity (of fire in revolution), which gives rise to the notion that there is a single *circle of fire* ;—similarly in the case of cognitions also, Sequence, even though present, fails to be perceived by reason of the rapidity of the cognitions or actions ; and the Sequence failing to be perceived, there arises the notion that the actions (or cognitions) appear simultaneously.

“But is the notion of the simultaneity of cognitions due to the non-perception of sequence in them? Or, is the perception of simultaneity due to the actual existence of simultaneity? —You do not show any cause for accepting the one or the other view in preference to the other; [so that the matter must be open to doubt].”

* The *Tātparya* adopts the reading संस्त्यायनम् and explains it as स्थापनम्. The right reading appears to be that found in the Purī Ms. B. स्थानीयम्.

We have already explained that cognitions of several things, due to the action of the sense-organs, appear one after the other; and this cannot be denied, being directly perceptible by each man for himself. Further, whenever we think of a number of things seen or heard before, our ideas of them always appear one after the other, and never simultaneously; and from this also we can infer (that the cognitions in the case cited in Sū 57 are not simultaneous).

In the case of the cognitions of syllables, words and sentences, and those of their meanings, sequence fails to be perceived by reason of rapidity. "How so?" [As a matter of fact the phenomenon involves the following process]—When the several syllables composing a sentence are pronounced, there appears one auditory perception in connection with each one of those syllables,—then the hearer recognises one or several syllables as forming a *word*,—having recognised the word, he ponders over it,—by this pondering he recalls the meaning of that word,—ponders over a number of words as constituting one *sentence*,—having cognised the meanings of the words as syntactically connected, he recognises the meaning of the sentence.—Even though there are so many cognitions involved (in the process of our comprehension of the meaning of a sentence), yet by reason of the rapidity with which they appear, their sequence fails to be perceived. This example explains the ordinary notion of *simultaneity* that people have in regard to Cognitions.

[While the above facts cannot be gainsaid by either party],—in support of the contrary view—that Cognitions do actually appear simultaneously, there is no instance which is free from doubt (and admitted by both parties), on the strength of which it could be inferred that there are several Minds in a body.

Sūtra 59

For reasons already mentioned, the Mind must be atomic

BHĀṢYA

That Mind is *atomic*, and that it is *one*—both these properties of the Mind follow from the *non-simultaneity of Cognitions*. If

the Mind were something *large*, then it would be possible for it to be in contact with several sense-organs at one and the same time ; and this should give rise to several Cognitions *simultaneously*.

End of Section 6

SECTION (7)
Sūtras 60-72

The Body is formed under the Influence of the Unseen Force (of Destiny)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

*The Mind, along with the Sense-organs, is found to operate only within the Body, never outside the Body ; of the cognising person also, all experiencing of objects, consisting of apprehension etc , is found to occur only in the Body ; so also his acquiring of the desired and abandoning of the undesired thing,—and all other operations carried on by man With regard to the Body, there is a diversity of opinion, which gives rise to the

^a Since the Mind operates only in the Body, it is only right that the exact nature of the Body should be examined after the character of the Mind has been discussed,—says the *Vārtika*. An examination of the Mind requires an examination of its receptacle, Body, also—the *Tātparya* adds.

The use of the present enquiry consists in the determining of the relation of a particular Soul with a particular Body, and the birth and Final Release of that Soul, as also what is called 'Death'. If we can prove that the connection of the Soul with the Body is due to the past deeds of that Soul, all these phenomena become explained, thus alone is use found for the laws relating to the duties of the several castes and conditions of man. Thus it is that all that has gone before in the *Nyāyasūtra* becomes justified—*Pārisuddhi*

Man's experiences occur in the Body, the Mind, like all Sense-organs, functions in the Body, and these facts can be explained only on the basis of Man's body being due to his past deeds Hence the necessity of the present enquiry. It would seem that the proper occasion for this investigation was the Section that dealt with the Body itself. But it comes in more naturally in connection with the Mind, which is the principal instrument of all man's pleasure, pain etc Some people think that the Body of the child is due to the *Karman*, not of the child itself, but of the Father. But this is not right ; because the Body of man must be the product of the acts of that person who regards that Body as himself, and acts for the experiences obtained through and in that Body.—*Vardhamāna*.

following doubt :—Is the formation of the man's Body due to his 'Karman', or, is it the product of the material substances, independently of any 'Karman'? We hear several opinions expressed on this point. The truth on this point is as follows : -

Sūtra 60

The formation of the Body is due to the persistence of the effect of previous acts.

BHĀṢYA

The term 'pūrvakṛtam', 'previous', stands for those deeds, or actions in the shape of the 'Activity of Speech, Thought and Bodily activity', that were done (by the person) in his previous body ;—the 'effect' of the said 'acts' consists of *Merit and Demerit* produced by them ;—the 'anubandha', 'persistence', of that 'effect', means the continuing of it as subsisting in the Soul ;—and the formation of the Body is out of the material substances *as operated upon by the said 'persistence of Merit and Demerit'*, and not out of the material substances by themselves. That particular Body belongs to a Soul subsisting in which the Soul regards it as 'I', attached to which and desiring experiences in which that Soul obtains the various kinds of objects and acquires (brings about) Merit and Demerit ; and when this Body falls off (on death), another is brought into existence by the force of the 'Faculty' in the shape of the said 'Merit and Demerit' along with (and operating upon) the material substances ; when this second body has come into existence, there go on again actions for the fulfilment of the man's purposes, just as in the previous body ; and the man's activities go on as in the previous body. All this phenomenon is possible only on the basis of the assumption that the production of the Body is out of the material substances as operated upon by the Soul's acts. In the case of such objects as the chariot and the like, we find that being intended for the accomplishment of man's purpose, they are brought into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by man's quality in the shape of *Effort* ; and on the analogy of this we can infer that the Body, being meant to accomplish the man's purposes, comes into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by some qualities belonging to the man (such for instance as his Merit and Demerit).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

On this point the Atheist argues as follows :—

Sūtra 61

“ The formation of the Body out of material substances is exactly like the production of material bodies out of material substances.”

BHĀṢYA

“ From out of material substances themselves—independently of ‘Karman’—are produced material bodies, in the shape of Sands, Pebbles, Stones, Orpiment and Soot ; and they are taken up (by men) on account of their being capable of accomplishing the purposes of man. In the same manner the Body, being produced, out of material substances independently of man’s ‘Karman’, would be taken up by him, on account of its being conducive to his purposes.”

Sūtra 62

This cannot be accepted : because what is urged is still to be proved.

BHĀṢYA

Just as it is *still to be proved* that ‘the formation of the Body is independent of Karman’, so is it *still to be proved* that ‘the production of Sands, Pebbles, Stones, Orpiment, Soot and such things is independent of Karman’, so that being itself still to be proved, the said premiss cannot serve as a valid reason.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

What has been urged (in Sū. 61) in regard to the ‘production of material bodies out of material substances’,—any analogy between this and the case in question—

Sūtra 63

there is none ; because Parents are the cause of formation (of the Body).

BHĀṢYA

What has been urged by the Atheist bears no analogy to the case in question. “Why ?” Because the ‘material bodies’ mentioned (Sands etc.) are produced without seeds ; while the Body is always produced from seeds. The term ‘parents’ stands for *the ovule and semen*, which constitute the ‘seeds’ (of the Body) ;

and what bring about the birth of the Body out of the material substances in the mother's womb are—(1) that 'Karman' of the personality himself, which is conducive to the experiences to be gone through by him in the mother's womb, and (2) the 'Karman' of the Parents which is conducive to the experiences resulting from the birth of the child. Thus it is established that there is connection with 'seeds' (in the shape of Semen and Ovule).

Sūtra 64

And so also is the food.

BHĀṢYA

'*The cause of the formation of the Body*'—this has to be added, being the principal clause (of the sentence of which Sūtras 63 and 64 are component parts).

'Food' is what is eaten and drunk ; and the juices, brought about by the digestion of the food, entering into the seed embedded in the mother's womb, undergo development along with that seed : and in that seed there is as much development as suffices for the accretion of the necessary aggregate;—the accretion thus formed goes on to develop into such aggregates as (1) the cell, (2) the mass, (3) the fœtus, (4) the embryo,* (5) the arteries, (6) and head, and (7) the feet etc.,—and ultimately into what comes to be the substratum of the sense-organs,—when the fœtus has been formed, the juices of the food are absorbed by it through the umbilical cord, and it continues to grow till it becomes fit for being born. No such development is found to occur in the case of food lying in the dish (and not eaten by a person) : From all this it follows that the development of the Body of the child is dependent upon the *karman* (Destiny of the Parents).

Sūtra 65

Specially because, even when physical connection is present, there is no certainty (in the appearance of the result).

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, every connection of the Parents does not bring about conception ; and the only explanation of this is

* From (1) to (4) are the names of the several shapes of the developing fœtus—says the *Tātparyā*.

that there is no conception when the necessary influence of *Karman* (Destiny) is absent ; and when this influence is present conception does take place. This is the only explanation possible of the said uncertainty of conception. If the material substances were independent (of any such influence as Destiny), there should be certainty of conception ; for under that hypothesis, there would be no element wanting in the causes necessary for the formation of the Body.

Further,

Sūtra 66

Just as *Karman* (Destiny) is the cause of the formation of the Body, so is it also of the connection of the Body (with a particular Soul).*

BHĀSYA

It is, as a matter of fact, impossible for the Body to be formed out of the Earth and other material substances, independently of Destiny,—as the Body consists of an aggregation, brought about by means of an arrangement or disposition, most difficult to encompass, of such (heterogeneous) components as—(1) the arteries through which the bodily humours and life-breath flow, (2) the humours of the body culminating in the semen, (3) the Tendon, Skin, Bones, Veins, Muscle, Embryo and Fœtus, (4) head, arms and belly, (5) the thighs, (6) the wind, Bile and Phlegm permeating the Body, and (7) the mouth, throat, chest, stomach, intestines and bowels ;—consequently we conclude that its formation is due to Destiny. In the same manner if among the causes (bringing about the body) there is nothing that is related to any particular Soul, the Earth and other material substances that would constitute the body would be

* This *Sūtra* anticipates the objection that, when a body is born, it comes into contact with all Souls—since all are equally omnipresent,—so that a body should belong to all Souls equally. The answer is that, though in a general way all Souls are in contact with the Body, yet the special connection of the body with one individual Soul is due to the Destiny of that Soul, which Destiny determines the exact body fit for the experiences in store for that Soul.

Would it not be simpler to take the *Sūtra* to mean that 'the connection of Parents also is due to the Destiny of the Soul to be born of these parents' ? This would be more in keeping with the context.

equally related to all the Souls—among whom there would be nothing to distinguish one from the other,—and there being nothing in the Earth etc., themselves that would connect them with any one Soul, and not with the rest, the Body formed out of these would be the common substratum for the pleasure, pain and cognition of all the Souls ;—as a matter of fact, however, each Body is found to be connected with only one particular Soul ; and the only explanation of this restriction is that *Karman* (Destiny) is a cause that brings about the formation of the Body ; so that the Karmic residuum of each Soul being restricted to itself, it produces a Body fit for being the substratum of the experiences of that particular Soul in which the residuum subsists, and connects that body with that Soul. Thus it is found that just as *Destiny is the cause of the formation of the Body, so is it also of the connection of that Body with a particular Soul.* What we mean by ‘connection’ is the relation that each Body bears to an individual Soul.

Sūtra 67

By what has been said in the preceding Sūtra the absence of universality has been explained [*i.e.*, shown to be impossible, inexplicable under the Pūrva-prakṣa].*

BHĀṢYA

What is called ‘*anīyama*’, ‘absence of universality’, has been explained—by what has been said in the preceding Sūtra,—‘just as Destiny is the cause of the formation of the Body so is it also of the connection of that Body with a particular Soul’,—as impossible and inexplicable under the theory that the formation of the Body is *not* due to Destiny.†

* All the commentaries explain this Sūtra as aimed against the following Sāṅkhya-doctrine —“The formation of the Body is not due to Destiny ; it is due to the functioning of Primordial Matter ; this Primordial Matter, through its own inherent activity, independently of Merit, Demerit etc., evolves the several products.”

The Sūtra has been rendered according to the explanation provided by the Commentators. Would it not be simpler to render it as follows—‘What has been said disposes of the objection that there could be no restriction as to which Soul should have which Body.’

† The *Tātparya* has adopted the reading योऽयमकर्मनिमित्तसर्गे मते अनियम.....कर्मैत्यनेन प्रत्युक्तः which has been construed as.—योऽयमनियम

Q. "What does *Niyama*, 'Universality', mean here?"

A. What is called 'Universality' here is the idea that *the body of one Soul is the same as that of all Souls*; so that what is meant by '*aniyama*', 'absence of Universality', is *diversity, distinction, peculiarity,—i.e.*, the idea that *the body of one Soul is different from that of another.**

As a matter of fact, we actually find such diversity or distinction in the birth of bodies as (a) one is born in a high family, another in a low family, (b) one is praiseworthy and another blameworthy, (c) one is full of diseases while another is free from diseases, (d) one is full-bodied while another is maimed, (e) one is full of suffering while another is full of happiness, (f) one is endowed with excellent characteristics of man while another is quite the contrary, (g) one is endowed with good properties while another possesses bad properties, (h) one has efficient and another weak sense-organs. [These are the cruder differences ordinarily perceptible] There are several subtler differences, which are innumerable. All this diversity in the birth of Bodies can be due only to the Destiny attaching to each individual Soul (which determines the character of the Body into which that Soul is going to be born). On the other hand, if there were no such diverse Destinies attaching to individual Souls, (as influencing the birth of the Body), then—there being no difference among the Souls themselves, and the Earth and other material substances (as constituting Primordial Matter) being the same in all cases, and there being nothing in these substances to lead to any restriction,—it would come to this that all bodies belong to all Souls. As a matter of fact, however, the life of Souls is not found to be so (that is, such as all bodies belong to all Souls).

इत्युच्यते अयं अकर्मनिमित्तसर्गे मते.....प्रत्युक्तः The *Tātparya* explains the purport as follows—'the absence of Universality—*i.e.*, the fact that no single Body can be common to all Souls—that has been described in the preceding *Sūtra*—has been explained—*i.e.*, shown to be impossible under the theory that the formation of the Body is brought about by material substances independently of any such influence as that of Destiny.'

* '*Niyama*' stands for *Universality*, the idea of all Souls having a common body; '*Aniyama*' means *non-universality*, the idea that one Soul has one body and another a totally different one—*Tātparya*

Hence the conclusion is that the formation of the Body cannot but be due to the influence of Destiny.

Further, the separation (freedom) of the Soul from the Body is also rendered possible by the possibility of the exhaustion of *Karman* (Destiny).* That is to say, when the formation of the Body is due to Destiny, it becomes possible for the Soul to become separated (freed) from that body—"How?"—*Through the possibility of the exhaustion of Destiny* It is possible for Destiny to be exhausted in the following manner.—Right Knowledge having destroyed Illusion, the person becomes free from all attachment,—he commits no further deeds, by body, speech, or mind, which could lead to his re-birth, so that there is no further accumulation of Destiny; and all past accumulation becomes exhausted by his passing through the experiences resulting therefrom; thus (in the absence of Destiny) there being nothing to bring about a further Body, when the present Body falls off, no further Body is formed, and hence there is no further bondage (for that Soul) If the formation of the Body were *not* due to Destiny,—as of the material substance (Primordial Matter) itself there can be no destruction,—there would be no possibility of the Soul ever becoming freed from the Body

Sūtra 68

† If it be asserted that—"the formation of the Body is due to 'adṛṣṭa' [(a) 'non-perception', or (b) unseen quality]"

* This appears as *Sūtra* in the *Viś* text. But no such *Sūtra* is found in the *Nyāyasūcī-nibandha*, nor in *Sūtra* Mss. C and D, nor in *Viśvanātha's* *Vṛtti*.

† The *Viś* text, as also the *Nyāyasūcīmbandha*, includes this clause also under the *Sūtra*. But neither *Viśvanātha* nor any *Sūtra* Ms reads the *Sūtra* so, according to these the form of the *Sūtra* is simply '*punastatprasango' pavarge*'. But from the *Bhāṣya* below it is clear that the text of the *Sūtra* is as translated

The *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* explain this objection as proceeding from the *Sāṅkhya* (A). The *Bhāṣya* latter on, P. 191, L. 10, offers another explanation, whereby the objection is represented as coming from the *Jaina* (B)

The *Tātparya* has explained the term 'Adṛṣṭa' of the *Sūtra*,—which the *Bhāṣya* says, is synonymous here with '*adarśana*', non-perception,—to mean the non-perception of such objects of enjoyment as Sound and the like, as also the non-perception of the distinction between Soul and Matter.

—then [our answer is that] in that case, even after final release there would be likelihood of a Body being produced.

BHĀṢYA

[A] “It is *adars'ana*, ‘non-perception’, that is spoken of as *adr̥ṣta*, (in the *Sūtra*). As a matter of fact, the formation of the Body is brought about by ‘non-perception’. That is, as long as the Body has not been formed, the perceiver, being without a receptacle (abode), cannot perceive things; the things to be perceived by him being of two kinds—(a) the *object* (Sound, Taste, Odour etc.) and the *diversity* or *difference* between the *Unmanifested* (Primordial Matter) and the *Soul*;—and it is (in view of this ‘non-perception’, and) for this purpose (of accomplishing the *perception* of these two kinds of things) that the Body is brought into existence. Hence when the said *perception* (of both kinds of things) has been accomplished, the material substances have done all they had to do (in connection with that perceiving Soul) and consequently do not produce any other Body for him; and in this manner the ‘separation from Body’ becomes possible.”

If you hold the above view, then our answer is that—in that case, even after *Final Release*, there would be likelihood of a further Body being born. That is, there would be likelihood of another Body being produced for that Soul. According to you, there is one ‘non-perception’—i.e., impossibility of perception—while the Body has not been formed; and there is ‘impossibility of perception’ after the Body has ceased to exist,—which also is another ‘non-perception’;—and between these two ‘non-perceptions’ there is no difference; so that, even after *Final Release*, inasmuch as ‘non-perception’ [which, according to you, is the sole cause of the production of the Body] would be there, there would be every likelihood of another Body being produced.

“But the fact of the *purpose of the Body-production having been accomplished* forms the point of difference (between the two ‘non-perceptions’).”*

This cannot be right; because, as a matter of fact, we find production or accomplishment as well as non-accomplishment.

* This is sometimes printed as *Sūtra*. But no such *Sūtra* is found anywhere.

That is, if what you mean to urge is that—"When perception (of ordinary things, and of the difference between Soul and Matter) has been accomplished, the material substances have their purpose fulfilled, and as such, do not go to form another Body; and this forms the point of difference [wherein one kind of 'non-perception', that due to the cessation of the Body upon Final Release, differs from the other kind of 'non-perception', that due to the non-existence of the Body, before it has been produced],"—then, our answer is that this cannot be right; because we find production on accomplishment as well as on non-accomplishment; that is, as a matter of fact, we find that Bodies are produced again and again (for the non-released Soul), even though the material substances have their purpose fulfilled by the Soul's *perception* of the things of the world; and inasmuch as the Bodies produced again and again do not (always) bring about the *perception* of difference between Soul and Matter (which is the only purpose left to be accomplished for the Soul by these subsequent bodies), the production of all these bodies must be regarded as purposeless.

From all this it is clear that, under the theory that the creation of things is not due to Destiny, the formation of the Body *cannot* be regarded as being for the purposes of 'Perception'; while under the theory that the said creation is due to Destiny, the formation of the Body can be rightly regarded as being for the purposes of 'Perception', as (under this latter theory) 'Perception' consists in *experience*, which is the result of deeds done (i.e. Destiny).

[B] The clause '*tadadr̥ṣṭakāritam*' may be taken as representing the theory of other philosophers:—" *Adr̥ṣṭa* is the name of a particular quality of Atoms, which brings about action or movement (vibration); it is when urged by this quality that the Atoms combine and bring about the Body; whereupon this Body is entered by the Mind, which also is urged to it by its own quality of '*Adr̥ṣṭa*'; and when the Body has become entered by the Mind then the Perceiver begins to have his perceptions."

The answer to this theory also is that—"there is *likelihood of another Body being produced*"—since the Mind is not destroyed; that is, even after Final Release, there would be likelihood of a further Body being produced, as '*Adr̥ṣṭa*', the quality of Atoms, is indestructible (and hence persists even after Release).

Sūtra 69

There should be no severance of connection,—this being due to the action of Mind.*

BHĀṢYA

[Another objection against the Jaina view, referred to in the latter part of the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 68]

If the Mind enters (into the Body) by virtue of 'adrṣṭa', the Unseen Quality of the Mind, there should be no severance of connection (between the Mind and the Body). For under this view,† to what could the moving out of the Mind from the Body be due? Under our theory the ‡said moving out (of the Mind from the Body, at death) is due to the fact that one set of Karmic Residuum (to which the dead Body owed its existence) having been exhausted, another set of Karmic residuum (to which the next Body would be due) sets up its fruition § "The moving out of the Mind would be due to the unseen quality (*Adrṣṭa*); that same unseen quality which has been the cause of *entrance* (of the Mind into the Body) will also be the cause of its *exit*." This cannot be right; for one and the same thing cannot be the cause of both *life* (which is what the *entrance* of Mind means) and *death* (which is what is meant by the Mind's *exit*); according to your view the same Unseen Quality would be the cause of both life and death; and this is absurd.

Sūtra 70

Inasmuch as Death would not be possible, the Body should have to be regarded as ever-lasting.

BHĀṢYA

When, on the experiencing of the fruits (of all deeds) there is exhaustion of Karmic residuum and the Body falls off, it is called 'death'; and under the influence of another Karmic residuum there is 'rebirth'. Now, if the formation of the Body

* This Sūtra is not found in the Puri Sūtra Ms., it is found everywhere else.

† तत्र is better than तच्च.

§ तादिहं दृष्टान्तस्य.....दृष्टान्ते—These words, found in some editions, have no connection with the present context. They are not found in the Puri Mss., nor in any other manuscript save one.

were due to the material substances themselves, independently of Destiny, what would that be the exhaustion whereof could lead to the fall of the Body, which is called 'death'? And there being no death, we understand that *the Body should have to be regarded as ever-lasting*. For if Death were due to mere chance, (and not to a specific cause relating specifically to the individual), then there could be no difference in the manner of death (in several persons).*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent,—with a view to criticise what has been urged against him, to the effect that 'there would be likelihood of another Body being produced' (Sū. 68),—argues as follows ;—

Sūtra 71

“It would be like the eternity of the dark colour of the Atom.”†

BHĀṢYA

“Just as the dark colour of the Atom (of Clay) is eternal, and yet when it is obstructed (set aside) by fire-contact (in baking), it does not appear again,—in the same manner the Body, though formed by the Unseen Quality (of the Atoms), would not appear again, after Final Release.”

Sūtra 72

That cannot be ; as this would involve (A) the admission of what is not supported (by reasoning or fact)§ [(B) or, the accruing of what is not earned.]

BHĀṢYA

(A) The instance cited (in Sū. 71) cannot be right ;—“Why ?”—*Because this would involve the admission of what is not supported*. The term 'supported' stands for *not compatible with*

* Some persons die in the womb, some as soon as they are born, and so forth. If death were not the effect of a specific cause, it should be either eternal, like *Ākāśa*, or an absolute non-entity, like the sky-lotus.—*Tātparya*.

† This *Sūtra*, though not found in *Sūtra* Ms. C, is found everywhere else.

§ The *Tātparya* construes the *Sūtra* thus :—*Pramānena aviśayīkṛtam 'akṛtam'—pratyuta pratyakṣāgamaviruddham—tasya 'abhyāgamah' abhyūpāgamah tatprasangāt*. This is the interpretation that has been adopted in the translation ; as also a second interpretation (B), put forward in the *Bhāṣya*.

any right Cognition ; the 'abhyāgama' of that means its acceptance, avowal ; the meaning thus is that he who believes what has been said (in Sū. 71) would be avowing what is incompatible with all right notion. Hence the instance cited cannot be right ; since what is asserted is neither perceptible, nor cognisable by inference. Thus what the Sūtra (72) urges is the fact that what has been cited by the Opponent is something *still to be proved*.

(B) Or, the Sūtra may be explained to mean that—*That cannot be, as this would involve the accruing of what is not earned*. A person who, on the basis of the example of the Dark Colour of the Atom, seeks to support the view that the formation of the Body is not due to Destiny, draws upon himself the incongruity of *the accruing of the unearned*. That is, the theory would involve the contingency that pleasure and pain accrues to the man without his having done the acts leading up to that pleasure and pain. If, in answer to this, you say "yes, be it so" ;—then our answer is that this would be contrary (a) to Perception, (b) to Inference and (c) to Scripture.

(a) To perception it would be contrary in the following manner :—That the Pleasure and Pain experienced by each individual Soul is distinct is a fact perceptible to all persons. "What is the distinction ? " The distinctions are such as *strong and weak, belated and quick, diverse and uniform*, and so forth. (Under the Opponent's theory) there can be no speciality in the causes bringing pleasure and pain to each individual Soul separately ; and unless there is some speciality in the cause there can be none in the effect. If, on the other hand, the advent of pleasure and pain is due to Destiny,—inasmuch as it is possible (a) for the acts of diverse personalities to be strong or weak etc., (b) for their Karmic residuum to be correspondingly more or less potent, and (c) for their acts to be of diverse or uniform character,—it is only right that there should be a corresponding distinction in the Pleasure and Pain resulting from those acts. And since no such distinction *in the cause* would be possible on the theory of the Opponent, there should be no distinction in the resultant Pleasure and Pain :—and this would be incompatible with (contrary to) a fact known by Perception.

(b) The Opponent's theory would be contrary to Inference in the following manner:—The distribution of Pleasure and Pain among persons is found to follow from the distribution of their qualities; e.g. when an intelligent person, having recognised a certain pleasure as brought about by a certain means, *desires* that pleasure, he makes an *effort* to obtain that means, and thereby obtains that pleasure; and he does not obtain it otherwise [i.e. if he does not put forth the said effort];—similarly, when a person, having recognised a certain pain as brought about by a certain means, *desires* to avoid that Pain, he makes an *effort* to avoid that means, and thereby avoids that pain; and not otherwise. Now in the case in question, we find that there are certain pleasures and pains that accrue to a person without any effort on his part [such for instance as the sufferings due to a mis-shaped body]; and on the strength of the well-known facts just mentioned, we *infer* that the distribution of these pleasures and pains also must be due to some other quality of the intelligent being (if not his direct *effort*) [and this other quality is *Merit-Demerit* constituting the person's Destiny]. This inference would be contradicted if the accruing of pleasure and pain were held to be not due to Destiny. The said 'other quality' (Merit-Demerit), being imperceptible, is called '*adr̥ṣṭa*' (Unseen Force, Destiny), and since the time of its fruition is not definitely fixed, it is regarded as *indefinite*;* while Apprehension and the other qualities of the Soul are perceptible and evanescent.

(c) The Opponent's theory would be contrary to Scripture in the following manner:—There are several Scriptures written by sages, containing the instructions imparted by those sages, in regard to the performance and avoidance of actions; and the effect of such instruction we find in the shape of activities of men consisting of performance in due accordance with their respective castes and conditions of life, as also in the shape of cessation from activity, consisting of avoidance of action. Both

* We have translated the reading *avyavasthitam*; though to keep up the contrast with the 'evanescence' of Buddhi, spoken of in the next sentence, '*vyavasthitam*', 'permanent', 'lasting', would appear to be the better reading.

these kinds of action, good and evil, would be impossible, under the philosophy of the *Pūrvapakṣin*; so that this philosophy is contrary to the view (in consonance with Scriptures) that the accruing of pleasure and pain to persons is due to Destiny.

Thus the conclusion is that the doctrine—that “the formation of the Body is not due to Destiny, and the accruing of Pleasure and Pain is not due to Destiny”—is clearly wrong and is maintained only by the worst sinners.

Thus ends the *Bhāṣya* on *Adhyāya III*.

DISCOURSE IV

DAILY LESSON I

SECTION (1)

Sūtras 1—2

General Examination of Activity and Defect.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After *Mind* it is the turn of *Activity* to be examined.* All that has been said in course of the Examination of the *Body* as the receptacle of Merit and Demerit may be regarded as constituting the Examination of *Activity*;—this is what is asserted in the following *Sūtra*.

* The Third Discourse has dealt with the first six of the twelve 'objects of cognition' mentioned in Sū. 1-1-9; these six—Soul, Body, Sense-organs, Things perceived, Apprehension and Mind—being the *causes* of the remaining six—Activity, Defect, Re-birth, Fruition, Pain and Release; these are the *effects* of the former six. [This is what constitutes the connection between Discourses III and IV.] In the First Daily Lesson we have the examination of the six 'objects'; and in the Second we have the Examination of the Highest Cognition, the Right Knowledge, (that leads directly to Release).—*Parisuddhi*.

Vardhamāna adds—Another connection between the end of Adhyāya III and the beginning of Adhyāya IV, consists in the fact that among the Objects mentioned in Sū. 1-1-9, it is 'Activity' whose *mention* follows that of 'Mind'; hence it is only natural that the 'examination' also of *Activity* should follow that of *Mind*.

Vardhamāna raises a further question—According to the rule laid down by the *Bhāṣya*, the 'examination' of a subject must be preceded by its 'mention' and 'definition'; and as 'Right Knowledge' has nowhere been *mentioned*, there can be no justification for its *examination* in the second Daily Lesson of Adh. IV. The answer is that 'Right-Cognition' has been actually mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1, where it is *mentioned* as leading to the Highest Good of Man, and further, to justify an 'examination', it is not necessary to directly *mention* a subject; for we find the *Sūtras* examining several subjects that are connected only remotely with the subjects *mentioned*. Another question that arises is—since Right Knowledge is the precursor of Release, it should have been dealt with beforehand. The answer to this is that a full account of Right Knowledge demands a previous account of the *objects* of that knowledge; it is for this reason that Right Knowledge has been dealt with *after* all other subjects have been dealt with.

Sūtra 1

As Activity has been defined—so has it been examined.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It might be urged that after 'Activity', there should follow the Examination of 'Defects'; hence the *Sūtra* adds—

Sūtra 2

So also have the Defects—

BHĀṢYA

been examined. (A) Inasmuch as they subsist in the same substratum as *Apprehension*, Defects are regarded as the qualities of the Soul ;—(B) inasmuch as they are the source of Activity and as they have the power of bringing about re-birth, they are regarded as the cause of 'Samsāra', 'Birth-Rebirths';—and since this (series of births and re-births) is beginningless, Defects are regarded as operating† in a continuous series.‡ *Wrong Knowledge* ceases when Right Knowledge is attained ; and on the cessation of *Wrong Knowledge*, the whole series of *Affections and Aversions* drop off ; whereupon follows *Final Release*;—and from this it is clear that Defects (i.e., *Wrong Knowledge, Affec-*

* Activity has been defined under Sū. 1-1-17 as the 'Operation of Speech, of Mind and of Body', and this may be regarded as its 'examination' also.

These words—'so has it been examined'—are, according to the *Bhāṣya*, to be supplied to complete the *Sūtra*. Viśvanātha has taken exception to this.—'It is not right to supply these words to the *Sūtra* ; for if this is done then the word '*tathā*', 'so', required as the necessary correlation to '*yathā*', 'as', of the *Sūtra* (1), having already been thus supplied, there would be no syntactical connection between *Sūtras* (1) and (2). Hence the right way to construe is to take both *Sūtras* together, the meaning being—'just as Activity is as has been defined, so is Defect also as it has been defined'".

This construction is perhaps better ; but there is no point in the criticism of the *Bhāṣya*-interpretation, for there is nothing wrong in construing the single '*yathā*' of Sū (1) with two '*tathās*'—one supplied by the *Bhāṣya* and the other occurring in Sū. (2).

† The right reading '*pravartante*' is supplied by Purī Ms. B.

‡ Defects are due to the contemplation of desirable and undesirable things ; hence like *Apprehension* they must be qualities of the Soul ; being qualities of the Soul they must proceed on lines similar to Activity, which is the product of the Soul's quality, Effort. Hence the examination of 'Defects' becomes included in that of 'Activity.'—*Tātparyā*.

tion etc.) are liable to Appearance and Disappearance ;—all this in connection with Defects has already been explained (under *Sūtras* 1-1-2 and 3-1-25).

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)*

Sūtras 3-9

Defects divided into three Groups.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question :—It has been said in Sū. 1-1-18 that ‘Defects have inciting (causing activity) as their distinguishing feature’ ; now the feelings of Pride, Jealousy, Envy, Suspicion, Selfishness and the like are all characterised by the said distinguishing feature ; under the circumstances, why are not these enumerated by name ?

The answer to this is supplied by the following *Sūtra*:

Sūtra 3

There are three Groups of Defects ;—[all being included under] Desire, Hatred and Illusion, which are distinct from one another.

BHĀṢYA

Of Defects there are three groups, three types ; (I) *The Desire-type*—under which are included Love (for the other sex), Selfishness, Longing for acquiring, in a lawful manner, what belongs to another, Hanking (for Rebirth) and Greed (desire for obtaining, in an unlawful manner, what belongs to another) ;—(II) *The Hatred-type*—under which are included Anger, Jealousy, Envy, Malice, and Resentment ;—(III) *The Illusion-type*—under which are included Error, Suspicion, Pride, and Negligence. Thus,

* Vardhamāna remarks—*Sūtra* 2 having dealt with Defects, it would appear reasonable to regard, *Sūtra* 3 *et seq* as continuing the same section. So that the proper arrangement would be to put Sū. (1) alone under Section I, dealing with ‘Activity’, and *Sūtras* 2 to 9 under Section II dealing with Defects. But to this arrangement there would be the objection that only one *Sūtra*, the first, would form a ‘Section’ which is not right ; as a ‘Section’ must consist of several *Sūtras*. Hence the best explanation is that under Section I we have the treatment of ‘Defects’ only in a general way, and that too, as a side-issue, as something connected with Activity ; while under Section II we have the detailed treatment of ‘Defects’.

since all defects are included under one or the other of these three groups, they are not described individually.

Objection—“Since all have the same distinguishing feature (of *causing activity*), it is not right to divide them under three groups.”

Answer :—The division into three groups is certainly right, since ‘Desire’, ‘Hatred’ and ‘Illusion’ *are distinct from one another* [though all are *causes of activity*, yet each has a distinctive character of its own]; e.g., ‘Desire’ is characterised by *attachment*, ‘Hatred’ is characterised by *aversion* (intolerance), and ‘Illusion’ is characterised by *wrong notion*; this fact is realised by every man in his own experience: every conscious person knows when Love appears, when he has the feeling that ‘the quality of Love has appeared in my Soul’; he also recognises the absence of Love, when he has the feeling ‘the quality of Love is not present in my Soul’: and similarly with the other two. As for the feelings of Pride and the rest, these are all found to be included under one or other of these three groups: and hence they have not been mentioned separately.

Sūtra 4

[*Objection*]—“**What is asserted is not right; because all three have one and the same thing for their antithesis.**”

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

“Desire and the rest cannot be regarded as distinct from one another;—Why?—*Because they have one and the same thing for their antithesis*; all three have one and the same thing for their antithesis—viz.: that which is known under the names ‘*tattvajñānam*’, ‘knowledge of truth’, ‘*samyammatih*’, ‘right knowledge’, ‘*āryaprajñā*’, ‘truthful cognition’, ‘*sambodhaḥ*’, ‘right apprehension.’”

Sūtra 5

[*Answer*]—**The reason put forward is not valid, as there is no invariable concomitance.**

BHĀṢYA

The Dark Colour and several such properties of Clay have the same antithesis in the form of ‘fire-contact’, and there are other qualities of it, which, being brought about by baking, have one and the same source;—

Sūtra 6

of these, Illusion is the worser evil ; each of these three being distinct :—as for one who is not under Illusion the others do not appear.

BHĀṢYA

Illusion is an evil ; it is spoken of as the 'worser evil', by taking the three two at a time.* "Why is Illusion the 'worser evil' ?" *Because for one who is not under illusion the others do not appear*,—i.e. unless one is affected by Illusion, Desire and Hatred do not appear ; and when a man has become influenced by Illusion, one or the other (of the other two) appear in accordance with the man's notions ;† when the man's impressions in regard to a thing are attractive (such as create attachment), they produce in him *Desire* (for that thing) ; while when his notions are repulsive (such as create aversion), they produce *Hatred*. Both these notions are nothing other than 'Illusion', which consists of *wrong notion*. Thus it is that Desire and Hatred have their source in Illusion. When Illusion is destroyed by Right Knowledge, both Desire and Hatred cease to appear ; this is what accounts for their having one and the same thing for their antithesis. It is with a view to these facts that it has been explained under Sū. 1. 1. 2. that, *after True Knowledge 'there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect, and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to the Highest Good'*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Objection :—" If what is said in Sū. 6 is true, then there arises the following difficulty :—

* Because the term '*pāpīyān*' is in the comparative degree, it follows that what is meant is that, as between Illusion and Desire, and Illusion and Hatred, Illusion is the 'worser evil'.

† What is spoken of '*Sankalpa*', 'Notions' is the remembrance, under Illusion, of a certain thing as bringing pleasure, and that of another thing, as bringing pain—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 7

“Inasmuch as (between Illusion and the other two) there is the relation of cause and effect, it follows that ‘Illusion’ is something different from the ‘Defects’”.

BHĀṢYA

“The effect is always different from the cause: hence if Illusion is the cause of the Defects (Desire and Hatred), it cannot itself be a ‘Defect’.”

Sūtra 8

[Answer]—That is not so; as Illusion is included under the definition of ‘Defects’.

BHĀṢYA

Defects having been defined as *those that have ‘causing activity’ for their distinguishing feature*—Illusion becomes included, by this definition, under ‘Defect’.

Sūtra 9

Further, since it is quite possible for things belonging to the same class to bear among themselves the relation of cause and effect, the objection (in Sū. 7) has no force.

BHĀṢYA

Among substances, as well as qualities, belonging to the same class, it is found that they bear to one another various kinds of causal relation.

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

*Sūtra 10–31**Examination of ‘Rebirth’*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After ‘Defects’ comes ‘Rebirth’.* In regard to this the following objection is raised:—“There can be no such thing as

* The doubt in regard to ‘Rebirth’ is as to its belonging to the Soul, or to Apprehension, or to the Body—says the *Tātparya*. To this form of Doubt, the objection is raised in Vardhamāna’s ‘*Prakāśa*’ that, it having been already determined under Sū. 1-1-19 that Rebirth is of the Soul, there can be no room for such a doubt. The answer given is that from the definition provided under Sū. 1-1-19, ‘Rebirth’ appears to consist in death and birth; hence the further question naturally arises—‘How can death and birth

Rebirth, as the Soul is eternal : and no eternal thing is ever found to be born or to die : so that the Soul being eternal, there is no possibility of *Birth and Death* : and yet it is only these two that constitute 'Rebirth' ?''*

On this point we have the following statement of the established conclusion :—

Sūtra 10

Rebirth is possible only because the Soul is eternal.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, it is the *eternal* Soul that 'departs' (*praiti*),—i.e. abandons the former body, dies,—and having 'departed' (*pretya*), i.e., having abandoned the former body, 'comes' (*bhavati*)—i.e. is born, takes up another body ; and it is these two (*departing—coming*) that have been spoken of as 'Rebirth', '*Pretya-bhāva*', under the Sūtra—'Rebirth consists in being born again' (Sū. 1-1-19) ; so that what is meant (by Rebirth 'belonging to the Soul') is that *it abandons the previous body and takes up another* ; and this is possible only when the Soul is eternal. On the other hand, he, for whom 'Rebirth' consists of the 'birth of one entity and destruction of another entity', would be faced with the absurdity that one entity would be deprived of the fruits of his deeds, while another would be saddled with the fruits of acts not done by him.† And further, under

belong to the *Soul*, which, being eternal, cannot die or be born ?' And the most fitting occasion for dealing with this question is that when the 'examination' of 'Rebirth' is taken up. Vardhamāna also suggests another answer as offered by 'others'—The *Pūrvapakṣin* imposes upon the *Naiyāyika* the view that 'Rebirth' consists of 'destruction and production', and then raises the doubt and the objection against the view that 'Rebirth' belongs to the Soul ; and instead of urging the objection in this form, the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in the *Bhāṣya*) starts off with the *Naiyāyika* view that Rebirth is something belonging to the Soul, and then goes on to say that such Rebirth is not possible ; as it is not possible for any such thing to belong to the Soul.

* Thus 'Rebirth,' is impossible under the theory of the *Naiyāyika* ; though it is quite compatible with the theory of the Buddha, according to whom all these are evanescent, undergoing destruction every moment.

† The entity that does the act is destroyed immediately afterwards ; the entity that is subsequently born, at the time when the fruit of the said act appears, is a totally different being ; so that while the latter is saddled

the theory that there are causes bringing about destruction (of the Being in the body), the teachings of the sages would be entirely useless [as the Being to whom the teachings are imparted cannot live long enough to profit by them].*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Question—“In what manner does the *production* of things come about?”†

Sūtra 11

[*Answer*—The (production) of perceptible† things is from perceptible‡ things ; as is clearly proved by Perception.

The question being—“in what manner, and from what sort of material cause is the perceptible thing, such as the Body, produced?”—the answer is that, ‘*from perceptible things*’, known as ‘material substances’—i.e. from Earth and the other material substances, in their extremely subtle eternal forms—is produced the ‘*perceptible thing*’, i.e., the ordinarily known Substances (Earth etc. in their gross form), which appear in the form of the Body, the Sense-organs, the Objects and their appurtenances.

with the fruit of the acts not done by him, the former becomes deprived of the fruit of those acts done by himself. Under the view that the eternal Soul is re-born, it is the same Soul that does the act and experiences its effects.

* According to the Naiyāyika, on the other hand, the real Being, Soul, being everlasting, persists from life to life ; and its birth and death consist respectively, in its becoming connected, and disconnected, with a Body, a set of Sense-organs, Intellect and Sensation.

† It is not easy to perceive the connection of this question with ‘Rebirth’, the subject-matter of the Section. The ‘production’ questioned about now, is the coming into existence of material objects ; and the only connection possible would be that, the *Bhāṣya* having declared that ‘Rebirth’ does not consist of ‘destruction and production’, it becomes necessary to determine the exact nature of ‘production’, and then to show that it is not possible for the non-material substance Soul ; and hence in the term ‘*pretyabhāva*’, ‘Rebirth’, ‘*bhāva*’, ‘birth’ cannot mean ‘production’.

Viśvanātha takes it as introduced for the purpose of bringing forward the various theories in regard to the ‘production’ of the Body.

‡ The term ‘*vyakta*’ stands, according to the *Vārtika*, for that which is endowed with the conditions of perceptibility, i.e. anything endowed with such perceptible qualities as Colour and the rest. Hence the word ‘*vyaktāt*’ takes in the Atoms also, which are endowed with the qualities of Colour etc.

The term 'vyakta', 'perceptible', stands for what is cognisable by means of the Sense-organs ; and by reason of similarity to this 'perceptible' thing, its cause also is called 'vyakta', 'perceptible'.

“ What is the similarity ? ”

The similarity (between the perceptible thing and its cause) consists in the presence of Colour and other qualities. Hence the meaning of the Sūtra is that—‘out of the eternal substances, Earth etc., which are endowed with the qualities of Colour etc., are produced the Body and such other things, which are endowed with the qualities of Colour etc.’

[That this is so] is *clearly proved by Perception*. We actually see that out of such substances as Clay and the like which are endowed with the qualities of Colour and the rest, are produced objects of the same kind (*i.e.*, possessed of the qualities of Colour etc.);—and from this fact (perceived in connection with visible Objects) we infer the same in connection with invisible things also ; that is, in the case of the Clay etc., we find that the presence of Colour and other qualities is common to the material cause as well as its product ; and from this we deduce the same in regard to the causal nature of the eternal super-sensuous things (Atoms) also.

Sūtra 12

[*Objection*]—“What is asserted is not true ; as the Jar is not produced out of the Jar.”

BHĀṢYA

“This also is a perceptible fact that the ‘perceptible’ Jar is never found to be produced out of the ‘perceptible’ Jar ; hence, as we do not see the ‘perceptible’ thing being produced out of the ‘perceptible’ thing, it follows that the cause (of the production) of the ‘perceptible’ (Body etc.) is not a ‘perceptible’ thing.”

Sūtra 13

[*Answer*]—Inasmuch as the Jar is actually produced out of a ‘perceptible’ substance, the objection has no force.

BHĀṢYA

We do not say that everything is the cause of everything ; what we do say is that whatever ‘perceptible’ thing is produced, it is produced out of a similar (*i.e.*, *perceptible*) thing ; and the

substance Clay, which is called 'potsherd', out of which the Jar is produced, is 'perceptible'. One who would deny such a patent fact could never be argued with by any person.

The truth of the matter is as we have described.

End of Section (3)

SECTION (4)

Sūtra 14—18

Examination of the Theory that the Things of the World are produced out of the Void.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

We now proceed to show up the views of philosophers (of several schools)—*

Sūtra 14

"Entities are produced out of Negation ; as no object comes into existence without having destroyed (its cause)."

BHĀṢYA

" One theory is that the *entity* is produced out of *negation* ;— Why ?—Because things are produced only after having destroyed (something) ; e.g. the sprout is produced only after the seed has been destroyed ; and not till the seed is destroyed. If the ' *destruction* of the seed ' were not the cause of the sprout, then it would be possible for the sprout to come into existence even without destroying the seed."†

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to the above is given in the following Sūtra :—

* The *Parisuddhi* calls Sections 4-11 '*Aupodghātuka*', 'Introductory', or (more correctly) 'Supplementary', to the Section putting forward the theory that 'perceptible things are produced out of perceptible things'.

It is interesting to note that the purely theistic doctrine of God having created the world has been put by Gautama among these 'views' held apparently by other people. It is in view of this that the *Vārtika* has remarked that the Author of the Sūtra has put forward these various views of doctrines here ;—'some of these are set forth for being criticised, and others are put up as accepted'. The *Tātparya*, the *Parisuddhi* and the *Prakāśa* however do not admit this view. (See below, Note on Sec. 5.)

† Whenever an object is produced, its production is always preceded by the destruction of its material cause. Hence every object has for its cause this *Destruction*, and Destruction is a form of *negation*.

Sūtra 15

The reasoning put forward is unsound ; as it involves self-contradiction.

BHĀṢYA

The premiss—‘because there is no production without destruction’—is unsound ; as it involves self-contradiction. That which *destroys* (the cause) cannot be said to come into existence *after that destruction* ; since it must have been already in existence [in order to be able to destroy the cause ; that which is itself non-existent cannot destroy anything] ;—and that which comes into existence (*after destruction* of the cause) was not in existence before, and being non-existent, it could not destroy the cause [consequently the assertion that ‘the thing comes into existence after destroying the cause’ is self-contradictory].

Sūtra 16

[Not comprehending the purport of the Siddhāntin’s argument, in Sū. 15 the Nihilist says]—

“What has been urged is not right ; for, as a matter of fact, words denoting the case-relations are applied to past as well as future things.”

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—“As a matter of fact words denoting the case-relations are used in regard to past as well as future things, e.g. ‘the son shall be born’, [where the *future* son is in the *Nominative case*],—‘he rejoices at the son to be born’, [where the *future* son is in the *Accusative Case*],—‘he appoints the name of the son to be born’ [where the *future* son is in the *Genitive case*].—‘the Jar existed’ [where the *past* Jar is in the *Nominative case*],—‘he is sorry for the broken Jar’ [where the *past* Jar is in the *Accusative case*],—‘these postherds are of the broken Jar’ [where the *past* Jar is in the *Genitive case*].—Sons, not being born, are a source of anxiety, to the old Father,* [where the *future* son is in the *Nominative case*] ;—we find several instances of such secondary (figurative) usage. ‘What is the primary basis of this secondary usage?’ Immediate sequence is the primary basis : and on this basis of ‘immediate sequence’, what the ex-

* The *Vārtika* reads स्थविर which gives better sense.

pression 'comes into existence after having destroyed' means is that 'when *going to come into existence*, the sprout destroys the seed'; and the Nominative character (of the Sprout, not yet born) is purely secondary (or figurative)."

Sūtra 17

[*Answer*]—[**Even so**] the view put forth cannot be accepted ; because as a matter of fact there is no production out of things destroyed.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Sprout is *not* produced out of the *destroyed* seed. Hence it is not true that "Entities are produced out of negation" (as alleged in Sū. 14).*

Sūtra 18

In so far as 'Sequence' is mentioned,—this we do not deny.

BHĀṢYA

The fact that the 'coming into existence' (of the sprout) is preceded by the 'destruction' (of the seed) constitutes their 'sequence' ; and in so far as this 'sequence' has been put forward (by the Opponent) as the reason (probans) for the proposition that "Entities are produced out of negation" ;—this 'sequence' we do not deny ; all that we mean is that, when the composition of the particles becomes disturbed, the previous combination ceases and another combination takes its place ; and it is out of this latter combination,—and not out of *negation*—that the next substance is produced. What happens is that the component particles of the Seed have aroused within them a certain vibration by reason of some (unknown) cause,—whereupon they abandon their previous combination and take upon another ; and it is from this latter combination that the sprout is produced ; in fact

* If the 'destruction of the seed' were the cause of the birth of the sprout,—then, how is it that we find no sprout appearing when the seed is broken up into pieces by the hammer, and the disrupted component pieces do not form another composite ? And how is it that the sprout appears only when the disruption of the seed is followed by a fresh composite formed out of its disjointed component pieces ? These facts clearly show that the birth of the sprout does not arise out of the 'destruction' of the seed — *Tātparya*.

we actually see that the 'particles of the seed' and their 'composition' constitute the causes of the production of the Sprout; and unless the previous combination has been *destroyed*, it is not possible for another combination to come into existence;—this is all that constitutes the 'sequence' between 'Destruction' and 'coming into existence';—but this cannot prove that "Entities are produced out of Negation" (as alleged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*). And inasmuch as, for the production of the sprout there is no other cause except the component particles of the seed, it is only right that the seed should be admitted as the cause of the Sprout.*

End of Section 4

SECTION (5)

Sūtras 19–21

Examination of the Theory that God is the Cause of the Universe.†

* Because, says the *Tātparyā*, unless the seed is there, the component particles of the seed cannot be there.

† In regard to this *Section* there is a difference among Commentators. According to the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and Viśvanātha, it is meant to propound the Naiyāyika *Siddhānta* that the Universe has been created by God; and in accordance with this view, Sū. 19 puts forward the final *Siddhānta*. Sū. 20 puts forward an objection against the *Siddhānta* and Sū. 21 answers that objection from the stand-point of the *Siddhānta*. It is this interpretation that we have adopted in the translation.

In view, perhaps, of the fact that such an interpretation of the Section is inconsistent with the introductory assertion of the previous *Bhāṣya*—'we now proceed to show up the views of philosophers',—the *Tātparyā*, followed by the *Parīśuddhi* and *Prakāśa*, has taken it as representing the criticism of the Vedānta doctrine that "God is the *constituent* cause of the Universe." By this interpretation Sū. 19 represents the Vedānta view, Sū. 20 shows the untenability of that view, and Sū. 21 puts forward the final *Nyāya-Siddhānta* that God is the *creator*, the *operative* cause, *not* the *constituent cause*, of the Universe.

There is also a wider issue involved in this Section. The Commentators are agreed that the *Siddhānta* view here put forward is that God is the Creator of the Universe. Now the question arises—How is it that this cardinal doctrine of the system has been inserted by Gautama as a side-issue? He has put it forward only among "certain philosophical doctrines", and not as *the true doctrine*. Nor is it easy to reconcile the doctrine of God being the *Creator* with the view that there is no such thing as 'beginning of

Another philosopher says—

Sūtra 19

God is the cause ; because we find fruitlessness in the actions of Men.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we find that Man, desiring a certain thing, does not always obtain the fruit of his desire ; hence it is inferred that Man's acquisition of the fruits of his actions is dependent upon some other person ; and that Person upon whom it is dependent is *God* ; hence it follows that God is the Cause (of the World).*

Sūtra 20

[*Objection**]—“**It is not so ; because as a matter of fact, no fruit appears without man's action.**”

Creation'—as is often found re-iterated by the *Vārtika* (e.g. on P. 445 and P. 466, Bib. Ind. Ed.) ; if there is no beginning, God may be the *Controller*, the *Ruler* ; He cannot be the *Creator*. From the *Bhāṣya* also (under Sū. 21) it seems that *God is held to be only the Seer, Knower, Omniscient, All-powerful.*

* According to the *Tātparyā* this *Sūtra* presents the Vedānta view that God is the *constituent cause* of the world, the *Parīśuddhi* remarks that though the *Sūtra* has used the general term 'cause', yet it is clear from the context that the constituent 'cause' is meant. *Vardhamāna*—'From this *Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra* it is clear that the purpose of the Section is to refute the Vedānta-theory.' In support of this view is also the fact that the preceding section also has dealt with the question of the *constituent cause* of the world.

The Vedānta doctrine is thus stated by the *Tātparyā*—“The phenomenal world may not have come out of the Void ; it can certainly be produced out of Brahman, which becomes modified into the several names and forms [i.e. *objects* and their *qualities*, says *Vardhamāna*], exactly in the same manner as the clay is modified into the Jar etc. ; or (according to other Vedantins) Brahman, through the limitations cast by the beginningless Nescience, appears in the form of the several phenomenal substances, just as the face appears in several forms, through the limitations of the substances in which it becomes reflected. It is this *Brahman* that is meant by the term 'Īśvara', in the *Sūtra* ; this term connoting the powers of reflection and action, both of which are present in Brahman alone ; and not in *Negation*, or in *Primordial Matter*, or in *Atoms*. Man himself does not possess these powers. But if Man were the ordainer of the World, and had the necessary properties of omniscience and omnipotence, then he could never undertake an action that would turn out to be futile, fruitless. And inasmuch as we do find the actions of Men turning out fruitless, we conclude that God,—i.e. Brahman—is the Cause of the World. Sū. (19)”

BHĀṢYA

[*Objection*]:—“ If the appearance of fruits (of actions) were dependent upon God (entirely), then such fruits could be accomplished even without the desire (and action) of man.”

Sūtra 21

[*Answer*]:—Inasmuch as it is influenced by Him, there is no force in the reason (put forward).†

* According to the *Bhāṣya* this *Sūtra* is an objection urged by the Pūrvaṃpaksin, against the Nyāya doctrine stated in Sū. 19. According to the *Tātṭparya*, it is an objection urged by the *Siddhāntin Naiyāyika*, against the Vedānta doctrine stated in Sū. 19. In pursuance of this interpretation, the *Tātṭparya* introduces this Sū. 20 as follows —It puts forth arguments against the Vedānta theory of things evolving or modifying out of Brahman, and concludes with the assertion that it is not right to hold that Brahman evolves or modifies into the endless phenomenal substances, and as such is the *constituent cause* of things ; though it may be that Brahman or God is the *operative cause* of things ;—and then it goes on to say that in connection with the view that God is the *operative cause* of things, it might be held that in creating the world, God is not influenced by any other force ;—and it is with a view to guard against this view that we have Sū. 20, which shows that *God is influenced by the actions of men*.

It may be noted that the roundabout manner in which the *Tātṭparya* has got to fit in the *Sūtra* to its own interpretation shows that it is, perhaps, not what the *Sūtras* really mean ; that is, the *Sūtras* have no bearing upon the Vedānta theory at all.

† The *Tātṭparya*, in pursuance of its own interpretation, remarks :—‘Having rejected the two theories—(1) that the World is evolved out of Brahman, and (2) that God, independent of all other forces, is the Creator of the world,—the author of the *Sūtra* now puts forward his own final *Siddhānta*.’

According to the *Bhāṣya*, this *Sūtra* is only the *Naiyāyika*’s answer to the objection urged in Sū. 20 ; the sense being that—‘inasmuch as Man’s efforts are influenced by God, what has been urged in Sū. 20, against the view that God is the *operative cause* of the world, is not a valid reason.’

The *Nyāya-Siddhānta* is thus expounded by the *Tātṭparya* —The World has the Atoms for its *constituent cause* ; and its *operative cause* is God as influenced by Men’s acts ; and these acts also have God for their *operative cause*, nor is there any incongruity in this ; since even though the carpenter is helped and influenced by the axe, yet the axe also is made by him. The reason put forward in Sū. 20 has no force against the view that the world is the work of God as helped by Men’s acts, though it is an effective argument against the view that in creating the world, God does not require the help of anything outside Himself.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, God helps the effort of Man; *i. e.*, when Man is trying to obtain a particular fruit, it is God that accomplishes that fruit for him; when God does not accomplish it, Man's action becomes fruitless;—hence since things are thus influenced by God, what has been urged to the effect that—'because as a matter of fact no fruit appears without man's action'—is no reason at all.

[The question now arises—What is *God*? The *Bhāṣya* proceeds to answer this question]—God is a distinct Soul endowed with certain qualities; as a Being of the same kind as 'Soul'. He cannot be put under any other category; hence God is defined as a particular Soul endowed with such qualities as—(1) absence of demerit, wrong knowledge and negligence, and (2) presence of merit, knowledge and intuitiveness; and to Him also belongs, the eight-fold 'Power'—consisting of 'minuteness' and the rest—as the result of His Merit and Knowledge;—His 'Merit' follows the bent of his Volition;—He controls the operation of the accumulated Merit-Demerit subsisting in each individual Soul, as also that of the Earth and other material substances; and He is Omnipotent in regard to His creation, not however, failing to be influenced by the results of acts done by the beings He creates.

He has obtained* all the results of His deeds; [and continues to act for the sake of His created beings, because] just as the father acts for His children, so does God also act father-like for His creatures. There is no other category except the category of 'Soul' to which God could belong; or (as in the case of Soul so) in the case of God, no other property, save *Buddhi*, Consciousness, can be pointed out as being indicative of His existence.† From scriptures also we

* Purī Ms. B. reads आप्तकर्मफल instead of आप्तकल्प, which latter is the reading adopted by the *Tātparyā* and in our text, this latter also explains आप्तकल्प as अवाप्तसकलकाम; so that the sense remains the same under both readings.

† Though God differs from other Souls in the point of His Cognition etc. being eternal, while those of others are evanescent, yet He must be classed under the same category; since, like other Souls, He also is indicated by *Buddhi* etc.

learn that God is the 'Seer, the Cogniser and omniscient'. If God were not discernible by the presence of Consciousness and such other indicatives of the 'Soul', then, as He is beyond the reach of ordinary Perception, Inference and Words, how could His existence be described and proved by anyone ?

Lastly, if God acted irrespectively of the effects of acts done by the beings created by Him, then, this view would become open to all those objections that have been urged against the view that "the creation is not due to the acts of Souls". [*Vide*, end of I Daily Lesson, Adhyāya III].

End of Section (5)

SECTION (6)

(Sūtras 22-24)

Examination of the View that the World is the result of Chance.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Another philosopher asserts as follows :—

Sūtra 22

"The production of entities must be without an operative cause ; as we see such things as the sharpness of the thorn and the like. "

BHĀṢYA

" The Body and such other entities must be regarded as produced without an *operative cause* ; *since we see such things as the sharpness of the thorn and the like* ; such things as the sharpness of the thorn, the variegated colour of the minerals found in mountainous regions, the smoothness of stones and so forth are found to be produced without any *operative cause*, and yet each of them has a constituent cause ;* the same must be the case with the production of the Body etc., also."

* चोपादान of the *Viz.* text gives no sense ; the right reading is चोपादानवच्च, which is countenanced by the *Vārtika*, and is found in the Puri Ms. B.

It is clear that what the *Pūrvapakṣin* denies in the present Sūtra is the Nyāya-theory of God being the *operative cause* of the world ; the Sūtra distinctly mentions the '*nimitta*', and the *Bhāṣya* makes it still clearer by

Sūtra 23

[The Ekadeśin's answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*.]

Since the non-cause is (spoken of as) the 'cause', the said production of entities is not 'without cause'.

BHĀṢYA

[Some Naiyāyikas have offered this as an answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view expressed in Sū. 22]. It is alleged (in Sū. 22) that '*bhāvotpatti*', the 'production of entities', is '*animittataḥ*'; [and since this latter term ends in an affix which has the sense of the Ablative, it can only mean that the 'production' proceeds from '*animitta*', 'non-cause']; and that from which a thing proceeds is its 'cause'; so that since (from what is said in Sū. 22 it is clear that) the '*animitta*', 'non-cause', is the 'cause' of the 'production of entities', it follows that the said 'production' is not 'without cause' (as is alleged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*).

Sūtra 24

'*Nimitta*' (Cause) and '*Animitta*' ('Non-cause') being two distinct things, the answer (offered in Sū. 23) is no answer at all.

BHĀṢYA

'*Nimitta*', Cause, is one thing, and its negation (*animitta*) ('Non-cause') is another; and the negation cannot be the same as the negated; e. g. when it is said that 'the vessel is *without water*', this *denial of water* is not the same as *water*. [So that

saying that the things mentioned—the sharpness of the thorn etc.—*have a constituent cause*, and yet they have no operative cause. Thus explained, the present section becomes connected naturally with the foregoing section dealing with God as the *operative* cause of the world. In their anxiety to connect this section with what they consider the principal subject of the *Adhyāya*—the constituent cause of the world—the commentators have needlessly confused the issues involved. E.g, the *Pariśuddhi* says—"The *Pūrvapakṣin* proceeds to criticise the *Siddhānta* position (put forward under Sū 4-1-11) that perceptible things are produced out of perceptible causes; and for demolishing this view he begins with the demolition of the *operative* cause—", and Vardhamāna adds that in reality the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s standpoint is to deny all kinds of cause of the world. Viśvanātha also says—"If things are due to mere *chance*, then Atoms cannot be the constituent cause, nor God the *operative* cause, of the World [hence the *Pūrvapakṣin* insists upon the *Chance*-theory, and the *Siddhāntin* controverts it]."

there is no point in saying, as the *Ekades'in* has said in Sū. 23, that the 'animitta', 'non-cause', is the 'nimitta', 'cause', of production.]

[The real answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* put forward in Sū. 22 is that] the view therein put forward in no way differs from the view that 'the origination of the Body etc. is not due to the actions of men'; and being identical with this view, it must be taken as refuted by the refutation of that view, (under Sūtras 3 2. 60-72).

End of Section (6)

:SECTION (7)

(Sūtras 25-28)

Examination of the view that All Things are evanescent.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Other philosophers have held the following view :—

Sūtra 25

"All things must be evanescent ; because they are liable to be produced and destroyed."*

"What is the meaning of being 'evanescent'? . That which exists only for some time is called 'evanescent'. That which is

* The causes, out of which the things of the world are produced,—do they consist of all evanescent things ; or of all eternal things ; or of some eternal and some evanescent things ? This is what is going to be considered now. If the first two alternatives are true, then there can be no 'Rebirth', such as the *Naiyāyika* postulates. Hence it becomes necessary to refute them ; and the present Section proceeds to refute the first of the three alternatives. The position controverted here is not the same as that in which all things are held to be momentary ; because the *Pūrvapakṣin* here admits some sort of continuity of existence of things and as such differs from the thorough-going *Kṣanabhangavādin* Nihilist—*Parīśuddhi*

Vardhamāna, in view of what he has said in connection with the preceding Section, says—Though what has been proved in the foregoing Section is that the things of the world have an *operative* cause, yet what the present Section takes up is the question of eternity or evanescence of all three kinds of cause, because in a general way what has been said in proof of the *operative* cause is applicable to the *constituent* and *non-constituent* causes also. The precise Doubt or question to be dealt with in the present Section is—whether or not *cognisability* is invariably concomitant with *evanescence*.

Viśvanātha says—If all things are evanescent, the Soul also should be evanescent ; hence it becomes necessary to controvert that view.

liable to be produced is *non-existent* while it is not produced, and that which is *liable to be destroyed* is *non-existent* when it has been destroyed;* and what this means is that all material things—such as the Body etc.—and all non-material things—Cognition and the rest—both kinds of things are found to be *liable to production and destruction*; from which it follows that they are all evanescent.”

Sūtra 26

[The Ekadeśin's answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—**What is asserted cannot be true ; as the 'evanescence' itself is eternal.**

BHĀṢYA

If the *evanescence* of all things is everlasting (eternal), then, by reason of the *eternality* of that 'evanescence', it cannot be true that 'all things are evanescent';—if, on the other hand, the said 'evanescence' is not ever-lasting, then while the 'evanescence' would be non-existent, all things would be *eternal* !

Sūtra 27

[The *Siddhāntin's* objection to the Ekadeśin's argument in Sū. 26.]

As a matter of fact, the 'evanescence' is not eternal ; it is like the destruction of fire after having destroyed the thing burnt by it.

BHĀṢYA

The said 'evanescence' is not eternal. "How so?" Just as Fire, after having destroyed the thing burnt by it becomes itself destroyed (extinguished), similarly the 'evanescence of all things', after having destroyed all things, becomes itself destroyed. [So that there need be no incongruity in regarding the 'evanescence' as 'non-eternal'.]

* The *Viz.* edition reads चचिनर्ध ; the *Vārtika* (Bib. Ind. edition) and the *Tātparya* read च चिनर्ध ; we have adopted the latter, as being more in keeping with the sense of the sentence as a whole. With the former reading the sentence would mean—'that which is liable to be destroyed is never not destroyed.' Though this will give some sort of sense, yet it would not be in keeping with the rest of the passage. The *Tātparya* construes the *Bhāṣya* to mean—'things are non-existent after destruction, hence liability to production and destruction proves that *things exist only for some time*, that is, *they are evanescent.*'

Sūtra 28

[The Final *Siddhānta*.]

The Eternal cannot be rightly denied ; because the determination (as to a certain thing being eternal or evanescent) must be in accordance with what is actually perceived.

BHĀṢYA

The theory propounded (in Sū. 25) totally denies all 'eternality'; but the total denial of 'eternality' is not right.—Why?—*Because the determination must be in accordance with what is actually perceived.* That is, when a certain thing is rightly found to be 'liable to be produced and destroyed', it should be regarded as *evanescent*,—and when a thing is found to be *not* so liable, it must be the reverse; and as a matter of fact, the said *liability to be produced and destroyed* is not perceived by any means of right knowledge, in such things as the elemental substances in their subtle forms, Ākāśa, Time, Space, Soul and Mind,—and some qualities of these,—Community, Individuality and Inherence;—hence the conclusion is that all these are eternal.

End of Section (7)

SECTION (8)

(Sūtras 29–33)

Examination of the Theory that All Things are Eternal.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Here is another sweeping assertion :—

Sūtra 29

[*Pūrvapakṣa*].—“All things must be eternal ; because the five elemental substances are eternal.”

BHĀṢYA

“All this, everything in the world, is an elemental substance ; and elemental substances are eternal ; the total destruction of any elemental substance being impossible (according to the Naiyāyika himself) [everything must be eternal].”

* If all things are eternal, there can be no Re-birth, as Re-birth presupposes the destruction of the Body. Hence it is necessary to controvert this view.

Sūtra 30

What has been asserted cannot be right ; as we actually perceive the cause of production and of destruction.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we actually perceive the cause of the production (of things), as well as the cause of (their) destruction; and this would be incompatible with the view that all things are eternal.*

Sūtra 31

[*Objection*—“Inasmuch as all things possess the characteristics of elemental substances, the denial (in Su. 30) is not right.”

BHĀṢYA

“ The thing, of which you think you perceive the causes of production and destruction, is not found to be anything totally different from, and devoid of the characteristics of, Elemental Substances ; and inasmuch as everything possesses the characteristics of Elemental Substances, it must be an Elemental Substance ; so that the denial (in Sū. 30) is not right.”†

Sūtra 32

[*Answer*—**What has been urged can not be right ; because as a matter of fact, the cause and production are actually perceived.**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact (in the case of every ordinary thing, such as the Bull, the Jar and the like), the *cause* is actually perceived ; as also the *production* of the thing possessing qualities analogous to the qualities of the cause ; and neither of these can be possible in regard to an ‘ eternal ’ thing ; nor is it possible to

* Things composed of elemental substances are not the same as the elemental substances themselves ; the Bull and the Jar for instance are not the same as the subtle Atoms ; for if they were so, they would be as imperceptible as the Atoms are. And since we actually perceive the cause of production and destruction of such things as the Bull and the Jar, these cannot be eternal, even though the elemental substances may be so.—

† Elemental substances are eternal ;—the Bull and the Jar are not anything different from Elemental substances ;—hence eternality cannot be denied of the Bull and the Jar. .

deny that there is such perception of the 'cause' and the 'production' (of the thing); nor again is it possible for a perception to be entirely devoid of a real objective basis; so that on the strength of this perception it is inferred that the product is *produced* (brought into existence) as possessing qualities analogous to those of its cause; and it is that product which forms the real objective basis for the said perception. This (the fact of products having qualities similar to those of their cause) accounts for the fact that "all things possess the characteristics of Elemental Substances" (that has been urged by the Opponent in Sū. 31).*

Further, as a matter of fact, we find that the effort of the cognitive agent is put forth only when he is urged by a desire for the cause of the production (of what he wishes to obtain) and the destruction (of what he wishes to get rid of). [So that Man's effort also presupposes the *production* and *destruction* of things].

Thirdly, every composite substance is known to have that character; i.e., it is a well-known fact that every composite substance has the character of being liable to production and destruction.

Fourthly, what has been urged by the Opponent is not applicable to Sound, Motion, Cognition and such things.; as a matter of fact, the two reasons put forward—(a) "because the five Elemental Substances are eternal" (Sū. 29) and (b) "because everything is possessed of the characteristics of Elemental Substances" (Sū. 31)—are not applicable to such things as Sound, Motion, Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort, [as not one of these is either an Elemental Substance, or possessed of the characteristics of elemental substances]; hence the reason is '*anekānta*' i.e., inconclusive, because non-pervasive, too narrow).

[Says the Opponent]—"Like the cognition of things in a dream, the said perception (of the cause and of production) is wrong."

* The fact of the Bull and the Jar having the characteristics of Elemental Substances is due to their being the *products* of those substances, and *not* to their being the same as those substances. Hence the said fact cannot prove the eternality of the Bull and the Jar.

The same may be said of the perception of Elemental Substances also. What you mean is that—"The perception of the production and the cause of things is of the same character as the cognition of things in a dream"; but if that be so, then the same might be said also in regard to the perception of Elemental Substances; and the perception of Earth etc. also would have to be regarded as similar to the cognition of things in a dream [so that there would be no justification for regarding even the Elemental Substances as *eternal*].

[The Opponent says]—"If there are no such things as the Earth etc., then the practical usages of men would come to an end."

The same would apply to the other case also; if there were no real objective basis for the perception of the production and the cause of things, then also all practical usages of men would come to an end.

Further, to argue that "the said perception (of production etc.) is as unreal as the cognition of things during dreams", is not a right argument at all [i.e., it cannot prove any such conclusion as the Opponent desires to prove, *viz.*, ordinary things like the Bull and the Jar are exactly like the Atoms of Elemental Substances];—(a) because Eternal Substances (Atoms) are beyond the reach of the senses (which the ordinary things of the world are *not*), and (b) because they are *not* objects of *production* and *destruction* (which the ordinary things of the world *are*).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

"What really happens," says another philosopher, "is that the Original Substance remaining constant, one property of it ceases and another property is produced;—and this is what forms the object (meaning) of the 'destruction' and 'production' of the thing; in fact when a thing is said to be 'produced', it is something that has been already in existence (in the form of the original substance (even before that 'production')); and similarly when a thing is said to be 'destroyed' it continues to exist (in the form of the Substance) even after that destruction [for all that has happened is that one *property* has disappeared

and another has appeared] ; and in this manner all things are eternal.'* *

[This doctrine is refuted in the following *Sūtra*.]

Sūtra 33

This cannot be accepted ; for (under this theory) there would be no possibility of differentiation.—

BHĀṢYA

There would be no possibility of any such differentiation as 'this is *birth*, and *that is cessation*' ; as under the theory put forward what is born and what has ceased to exist are both *extant*. (A) [In regard to properties also] there could be no differentiation (as to Time), such as 'this property is born and that property has ceased', as both are equally *extant* ;—(B) nor would there be any differentiation as to time,—such as 'at this time there are birth and cessation, and not at that time', for *at all times* things would be equally *extant* ; (C) nor could there be any differentiation as to *relationship*, such as 'there are birth and cessation of this property, and not of that', for both properties would be equally *extant* ; (D) nor again, could there be any such differentiation in regard to *Time*, as 'this, not yet come, is in the future, and that is past' ; for under the theory all things are always *extant*, which means that they are always 'present' [and as such can never be spoken of as 'future' or 'past'].

None of these objections lie against the view (held by the *Naiyāyika*) that 'birth' (production) consists in the coming into existence (gaining its own nature) of what has not been in existence, and cessation (destruction) consists in the ceasing to exist

* The *Tātparyā* calls this doctrine '*Śvāyambhuvānāmmatam*' ; does it mean the '*Saiva*' system ? The doctrine is thus summed up in the *Tātparyā* — "The modification undergone by Substances is of three kinds . (1) modification of properties, (2) modification of condition, and (3) modification of age. *E.g.* (1) the original substance *Gold* in lump becomes modified into the ear-ring, and here we have the modification of the property (shape) of the gold ; (2) when the ear-ring is broken up and made into the bracelet, we have the modification of *condition*, *i.e.*, the ear-ring has renounced its *present* and reverted to the *past* condition, and the bracelet has removed its *future* and reverted to the *present* condition ; and (3) in the beginning the bracelet is new, young, and in time it becomes *old* ; so that here we have the modification of *age*. [The original gold remains constant all the time]."

(losing its own nature) of what has been in existence. For these reasons we conclude that it is not right to assert, as has been asserted by the Opponent (End of Bhāṣya on Sū. 33), that—“a thing exists before it is born, and it exists also after it has been destroyed.”

End of Section (8)

SECTION (9)

[Sūtras 34-36]

The Refutation of the View that all is Diversity, there is no Unity.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

The following is another sweeping assertion (of the Bauddhas):—

Sūtra 34

“All must be regarded as diverse ; because the symbols (names) of things refer to diverse entities.”*

BHĀSYA

“All must be regarded as diverse ; there is no *single entity*.—Why?—*Bhāvalakṣaṇapṛthaktvāt*—says the Sūtra ; the '*lakṣaṇa*'

* It has been established up to this point that all things are aggregates of—‘the Quality and the Qualified’, ‘the negative and the positive’, ‘the intelligent and the non-intelligent’, ‘the eternal and the non-eternal’ ;—and it becomes necessary to refute the theory that there is no such thing as the ‘aggregate whole’. This theory has been held in several forms—(1) the theory that there is no *unity* (refuted in Sū. 34-36), (2) ‘all is mere Void’ (Sū. 37-40), (3) ‘there is *only one* thing’, or ‘there are *only two* things’, and so forth, (Sū. 41-43) All these have to be refuted, because—(1) if there is no *unity*, no one thing, then of what could there be an *aggregate* ? (2) If nothing exists, and all is Void, then there can be no *aggregate* ; and (3) similarly there can be no ‘aggregate’ under the theory of absolute Monism.—*Parisuddhi*.

The doctrine put forward under this Sūtra (34) is thus explained in the *Tātparya* :—“All things must be diverse, distinct ; because there is no such thing as ‘substance’, apart from colour etc., and colour etc. are distinct from one another ; nor is there any such thing as ‘composite’ apart from the components, and these latter are distinct from one another.” Such is the view of the *Sautrāntikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas*.

Viśvanātha states the doctrine thus—“Such things as the Jar and the like must be regarded as distinct, even from themselves ; because the odour, taste, etc., of these things, as also their component parts, are distinct from one another ; and the ‘Jar’ is nothing apart from these latter.”

or 'symbol' of the 'bhāva', 'entity', is that which distinguishes it, i.e. its name; and the names refer to diverse entities, as a matter of fact, all 'names of things' denote combinations; e.g. the name 'Jar' is applied to the combination of 'odour, taste colour and touch', (the qualities of the Jar), and also to the combination of the 'bottom, sides and neck' (the parts of the Jar) [and these are diverse, distinct from one another; and the Jar is nothing apart from these qualities and component parts]. The 'Jar' has been mentioned only by way of illustration [the same holds good in regard to the *names* of all things.]"

Sūtra 35

What is alleged cannot be accepted; because (as a matter of fact) several (kinds of) things go to make a single entity.

BHĀṢYA

The compound '*anekalakṣaṇaiḥ*' should be treated as one that has the middle word eliminated, and as standing for '*anekavidhalakṣaṇaiḥ*', 'several kinds of things'. As a matter of fact, it is the single entity (the composite substance, Jar) that comes into existence as related to Odour and other qualities, and to the Bottom and other components; in fact, the *Substance* is something different from *its Qualities*, and the *Composite* is something different from the Components; both these facts have been already explained by us (under Sū. 2-2-33 *et. seq.*).

Further,—

Sūtra 36

The denial cannot be right, as the symbols (of things) are restricted in their application.

BHĀṢYA

The denial—that "there is no single entity"—cannot be right;—why?—for the very simple reason that 'the symbols of things are restricted in their application'; as a matter of fact, the 'symbol' of entities,—i.e. the word that forms their name, is restricted in its application to single entities; as is clear from such expressions as 'I am touching that *Jar* which I saw before', 'I am seeing that which I touched before'. Then again, as a matter of fact, we never perceive any mere 'group of atoms' as such, and these 'groups of atoms' (as composing the

Jar) being imperceptible (by reason of their extreme minuteness), that which is actually perceived must be a single entity (composed of those atoms).

(A) It has been subsequently urged by the Opponent that—“there can be no single entity, because all things are mere groups (of several things)”,—but if there is no *single* thing, there can be no *group* of things. What the Opponent means is that—“there is no *single* entity as the names of things apply only to groups”,—but the fact is that if there is no *single* thing, there can be no ‘group’, as the ‘group’ is nothing more than the conglomeration of several *single* things; so that the allegation—“There is no single entity etc.”—involving a self-contradiction, is most incongruous. That is, that (single entity) of which the denial has been alleged, (by the Opponent, on the basis of the premiss), “because the names of things are applied to groups”,—becomes admitted by the Opponent when he asserts that “the names of things are applied to groups”; for the ‘group’ is only a collection of several *single* entities. (B) Further, in making the allegation—“because the names of things are applied to groups of things”—you admit the ‘group’, and then in the proposition, “there is no single entity” you deny each component of that ‘group’ [for each such component can only be a *single entity*] [and when each component is denied, the *group* also becomes denied *ipso facto*]. Thus then, the Opponent’s allegation being beset with a twofold ‘self-contradiction’ (A & B), it must be rejected as a frivolous assertion.

End of Section (9)

SECTION (10)

[*Sūtras 37-40*]

The Refutation of the Theory that All is Mere Void.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

The following is another sweeping assertion :—

Sūtra 37

“All things must be non-entities, because all things are known to be mere negations of one another.”

BHĀṢYA

All things must be regarded as non-entities ;—why?—*because all things are known to be mere negations of one another.* As a matter of fact, the Bull is ‘ non-existent in the form of ‘ Horse ’, and the Bull is only ‘ not-horse ’; similarly the Horse is ‘ non-existent ’ in the form the ‘ Bull ’, and the Horse in only ‘ not-bull ’; thus we find that the names of things (‘ Bull ’, ‘ Horse ’ etc.) are concomitant (co-substrate) with the notion of ‘ non-existence ’ as also with *negation*; from which it follows that all things are *non-existent* or non-entities.”*

[The *Bhāṣya* offers its own answer to the Nihilistic doctrine put forward in the *Sūtra*]—The assertion put forward cannot be right ; because there is contradiction between (A) the two terms of the Proposition and (B) between the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans :

(A) The term ‘ all ’ signifies *several things without exception*, while the term ‘ non-entity ’ signifies the *negation of existence*; of these two the former is something possessed of a definite character, while the latter is totally devoid of any character ; now

* This Nihilism is thus expounded in the *Tātparyā* :—“All things—Pramāna and the rest—are actually found to be cognised as ‘ non-existent ’ and also spoken of in negative terms; hence it follows that the names of those things are concomitant with these (the notion of non-existence and negation); hence Pramāna and the rest must be regarded as non-existent, as nonentities, just like the Cloth that has either not come into existence or has been destroyed. Further are these things—Pramāna etc.—eternal, or evanescent? If they are eternal, they must be non-entities, being without any capacity or power, as we have already explained how no sequence being possible among things that are eternal, no eternal things can ever bring about a product. If, on the other hand, the things are evanescent, then, since they would be liable to destruction, they would be *non-existent* at the first as at the second moment. Further, if things are *existent*, they should not be liable to destruction, and as such they could not be destroyed at any point of time; for the blue Colour, being brought about by its cause, can never be turned into yellow by even thousands of painters. In fact evanescent things cannot but be regarded as liable to destruction. From all this we conclude that all things are mere *Void, Blank*; and it is only through assumed *existence* that they appear as *existing*. The reasoning may be formulated thus —“All names of things apply to non-existent things,—because they are concomitant with notions of *non-existence* and *negation*,—like the unproduced and the destroyed Cloth.”

how can that which is spoken of as possessed of definite character, i.e. 'all', be a mere 'non-entity', which is devoid of any character? Certainly the 'non-entity', which is totally devoid of any character, cannot be predicated either as 'several' or as 'without exception' [which are the two factors in the denotation of the term 'all'].

"But it is just all this that is non-entity; what *you* (Logician) call the 'all' is what is really only non-entity."

Even so the 'contradiction' does not cease, for the conception of 'several things' and 'without exception' cannot possibly arise in regard to what is mere non-entity;* and yet it is just this conception that is expressed by the term 'all'; hence it follows that this 'all' cannot be a *non-entity*.

(B) There is contradiction also between the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans; the Proposition is in the form 'all things are non-entities', and it denies the existence (of all things); and the statement of the Probans is 'because all things are known to be mere negations of one another',—which admits that there is 'mutual negation' among 'things'; and then on the basis thereof—the fact of there being mutual negation having been established,—it is asserted that 'all things are non-entities',—now if 'all things are non-entities', then it is not possible for 'things' to be the 'negation of one another'; and if 'things' are 'negations of one another,' then 'all things' cannot be 'non-entities'.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The following is the answer (to Nihilism) offered by the *Sūtra*—

Sūtra 38

What has been alleged is not right, because things are, by virtue of their very nature, real entities.

BHĀṢYA

(A) All things cannot be non-entities.—Why?—Because by virtue of their very nature things are real entities (really existing). The proposition laid down is that *by their very nature*

* The right reading is अभावे प्रत्ययेन (as in the Puri Ms.). Construe thus. अनेकमशेषश्चेति प्रत्ययेन अभावे न भवितुं शक्यम् ।

things exist. “What is the *nature* of things?” ‘Existence’, ‘being an entity’, and so forth constitute the nature or character common to Substances, Qualities and Actions;—‘having action’ and so forth are the ‘character’ peculiar to Substances;—the qualities ending with Touch belong to Earth;—so on and so forth there are endless characters peculiar to the several things of the world;—in *Universal*, in *Individuality* and in *Inherence* also we find specific characters. All this distinction among things which is recognised in actual experience, would not be possible [if all things were mere non-entities], as a non-entity is without any character;—and yet such distinction among things does exist;—from which it follows that all things are not mere non-entities.

(B) [Another interpretation of the Sūtra]—Or, the words of the Sūtra may be taken to mean that—*what has been asserted cannot be right; because each thing is recognised as having a distinct individuality of its own*; that is to say, when the word ‘Bull’ is used, what is apprehended is a particular substance qualified by (belonging to) a particular community, and not a mere non-entity. If all things were non-entities, the Bull would have been recognised as a ‘non-entity’, and the word ‘Bull’ would have denoted a *non-entity*. “But how do you know that the word ‘Bull’ does not signify a non-entity?”* We know it from the fact that whenever the word ‘Bull’ is used, it brings about the notion of a particular substance, and not that of a non-entity. For these reasons what has been asserted by the Opponent cannot be right.

(C) Or, the words of the Sūtra ‘*na svabhāvasiddheḥ etc.*’ may be explained to mean as follows:—When you assert (Bhā. on Sū. 37) that “the Bull is non-existent *in the form of the Horse*”, why do not you say that “the Bull is non-existent *in the form of the bull*”?† That you do not say so indicates that *in the form of the Bull* the Bull is *existent*; that is what is meant by the expression ‘*Svabhāvasiddhi*’, ‘existence in its own form’. [If you really mean that things are non-existent], why cannot you say that the

* The right reading is कस्मान्न गोशब्देन चाभाव उच्यते, as found in Puri Ms. B.

† असन् गौर्गवात्मनेति कस्मान्नोच्यते is the better reading, as found in Puri Ms. B.

Horse is not-Horse, or that the Bull is not-Bull? Since you do not say so, it follows that *in its own form*, the substance *exists*.

*As a matter of fact, whenever there is denial of non-difference—'difference' consisting, in this case, of the absence of conjunction and such other relations, and 'non-difference' consisting of identity,—even really existing things come to be spoken of as co-substrate (concomitant) with the notion of 'non-existence', as we find in the case of the expression 'the jujube fruit is *not* in the cup';†—so that in the case in question, in the expressions 'the Bull is non-existent in the form of the Horse', 'the Bull is not-Horse', what is denied is the non-difference between the Bull and the Horse,—the meaning being that, 'there is no identity between the Bull and the Horse'; and this identity being denied, there comes about the co-substrateness or concomitance of the notion of 'non-existence' with the thing, 'Bull'; hence the expression 'the *Bull is non-existent*, in the form of the Horse'; just as in the sentence 'the jujube fruit is *not* in the cup', the conjunction of the fruit with the cup being denied, we have the co-substrateness of the notion of 'non-existence' with the fruit which is a real entity. [All this shows that 'concomitance with the notion of *non-existence*,' upon which the Opponent bases his arguments, in Bhāṣya, on Sū. 37, is not incompatible with *real entities*.]

Sūtra 39

[*Objection*].—"There is no such thing as the character (or individuality) of things; as what is so regarded has only a relative existence."§

BHĀṢYA

"'Relative' is that which is due to the *relativity* of things: e.g., a thing is spoken of as 'long' in relation to what is 'short',

* This, according to the *Vārtika*, explains how we have the negation expressed in the statement, 'the Bull is not-horse'.

† This is an obscure passage; the obscurity being due to wrong readings. From what follows in the next sentence it is clear that the passage should read as follows—अव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधे—असंयोगादिसम्बन्धो व्यतिरेकोऽत्राव्यतिरेकोऽभेदाख्यसम्बन्धः—भावेन असत्प्रत्ययस्यसामानाधिकरण्यम् । यथा न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणीति ।

§ Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣana reads in this Sūtra a reference to the *Mādhyamikā-Sūtra*.

and 'short' in relation to what is 'long'; and neither of the two has an absolute existence of its own—Why so?—Because such is the force of relativity. Hence we conclude that there is no such thing as the *character or individuality* of things.”

Sūtra 40

[Answer]—What is put forward cannot be right, as it involves a self-contradiction.

BHĀṢYA

If a thing is 'long' only relatively to the 'short', then the 'short' should be *non-relative*; for to what would the 'short' be relative? (Similarly) if a thing is 'short' only relatively to the 'long', then the 'long' should be *non-relative*; for to what would the 'long' be relative? And if the two depended upon each other, then the negation of one would imply the negation of the other, so that there would be negation of both. Hence it is not right to assert that the character of the 'short' is to be determined only relatively to the 'long'.†

Further, if there is no such thing as the 'character' (or individuality) of things, [and all is merely relative], why do we not have the relative notions of 'length' and 'shortness' in regard to two equal Atoms, or to any two objects of equal size? For, taken relatively or non-relatively, the two things remain the same; the two things taken relatively remain precisely the same two things, even when not taken relatively; the presence or absence of relativity does not alter the things themselves [so that under the *Pūrvapakṣa* theory, there can be no reason why the notions of 'length' and 'shortness' should not arise in regard to the two Atoms]; but if the character of things were purely relative, then the presence of *relativity* (of one thing or the other) would surely make a difference in the nature of things “What then is the effect of *relativity* on things?” What *relativity* does

* All things are relative : the *blue* is blue in relation to, in comparison with, the *yellow*, the *father* is so in relation to the *son*, and so forth, with all things.—*Tātparya*.

† The whole of this passage is read better in Puri Ms B. यदि ह-
स्वापेक्षाकृतं दीर्घं ह्रस्वमनापेक्षिकम् किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य.....दीर्घमनापेक्षिकम् ।
किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य दीर्घमिति गृह्यते । एवमितरेतराश्रययोरेकाभावेऽन्यतराभावाद्दुभया-
भावइति दीर्घापेक्षान्यवस्थाऽनुपपन्ना ।

is that when we perceive two things, it becomes possible for us to perceive the preponderance of one over the other ;* that is, when one sees two things and notices a preponderance in one of them, he regards it as 'long', and that which he finds deficient, he regards as 'short' ; this is what is done by relativity.

End of Section (10)

SECTION (11)

[Sūtras 41-43]

*Examination of certain sweeping assertions in regard to
the exact number of things*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The following are the sweeping assertions in regard to the exact number of things —(I) "All things are *one*, all being equally existent" ; (II) "All things are *two*, being divided into *eternal* and *non-eternal*" ; (III) "All things are *three*, *cogniser*, *cognition* and *cognised*" , (IV) "All things are *four*, *cogniser*, *means of cognition*, *cognised* and *cognition*" , and so on there are other assertions on the same lines. It is the examination of these views that proceeds now †

* E. g. When we perceive the bamboo relatively to the sugar-cane, this relativity leads us to the judgment that the former is 'longer' than the latter, or that the latter is 'shorter' than the former.

† These views are criticised, because they limit all things within one particular number —According to (I) there is only one thing, according to (II) there are two things, and so forth

The *Parisuddhi* remarks—The question arises—Why should those views be criticised which are not incompatible with the Nyāya view of things being the conglomeration or composite of several component particles ? But the fact of the matter is that those theories limit things within one definite number only · e.g., 'There are only two things', and *two* only,—then, inasmuch as those two would be everlasting, there would be no explanation of the fact that they bring about their effects only *occasionally* ; under this theory the appearance of effects should be unceasing. Similarly with the other views.

The *Tātparya* offers the following explanations of the two views mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* —

(1) The entire phenomenon of the world is nothing apart from the *Light* of Consciousness ; everything is an emanation from this *Light*. There is no difference among cognitions, nor between the cognised object and its cognition ; as everything is a manifestation of Consciousness, which is

Sūtra 41

Any absolute limitation of the number (of things) cannot be established, either in the event of the means (of proving it) being available, or in that of its being not available.

BHĀṢYA

If the *means* of proving the desired conclusion is (available, and) something different from the conclusion *to be proved*, then no limitation of number can be proved; as the said Means will always, *ex-hypothesi*, be something outside that limited number (which, being included in the 'conclusion to be proved') could not include the *means* of proving (that same conclusion). If, on the other hand, there is no difference between the Means and the Conclusion to be proved by it, then also the limitation of number cannot be proved, as there is, *ex-hypothesi*, no real *means* of proving, and in the absence of such means nothing can be proved.

Sūtra 42

[*Objection*]- "What has been urged is not true; as the means (of proving) is only a part (of what is to be proved)".

BHĀṢYA

"It is not true that the limitation of number cannot be proved;—why?—because the means is a part (of what is proved by it); it is only a part of the subject-matter of the Proposition which is the Means of proving that Proposition; so that the Means need not be anything different. Similarly with the views that *there are only two things*, and so forth".

Sūtra 43

[*Answer*]-The reason put forward is no reason at all; as (according to the Pūrvapakṣa) things can have no 'parts'.

Cognition. (II) 'Eternal' and 'non-eternal', being contradictory terms, must include all things; there can be nothing that is not either 'eternal' or 'non-eternal'.

The "other assertions" referred to in the *Bhāṣya* are—(1) that of the *Sāṅkhya*, that Soul and Primordial Matter are the only two entities; (2) that of the Bauddha, that the only entities are the five *skandhas* of Form, Name, Impression, Sensation and Cognition; and (3) that of the *Pāśupata*, that the only entities are the *Paśu* (living beings), their bondage, the removal of this bondage, and the Lord.

BHĀṢYA

The reason put forward (in Sū. 42) is "as the means of proving is only a part of what is to be proved"; but this is not a valid reason ;—why?—because the Opponent has laid down the sweeping assertion that "all things are *one* only", without any exception at all ; and then (in the reason put forward) he speaks of a certain thing (the Means of Proving) as being 'one' (part of the subject of the proposition) ; but there is nothing (apart from that 'one') which, in the Proposition, takes in, *all things*, that could be the 'part' and the necessary 'means of proving'.* Similarly with the other views limiting the number of things to 'two' etc.

If all these sweeping assertions in regard to the limitation of the number of things proceed on the basis of the denial of the indefinite number of diversities among things due to their distinctive properties, they militate against well-known facts ascertained from Perception, Inference and Verbal Cognition ; and as such they have to be rejected as wrong doctrines. If, on the other hand, they proceed on the basis of the admission of the said diversities, then they renounce their absolutism ; as the inclusion of things (under any one head) is due to the presence of common properties, and the exclusion (or diversity) of things is due only to the presence of distinct properties [so that the admission of the diversity of things involves the admission of an indefinite number of diversities, and the renouncing of all limitation of the number]

All the above sweeping assertions (from Sū. 14 to Sū. 43) have been examined with a view to get at the discernment of True Knowledge.

End of Section (11)

* If there were such a thing as the *part* of what is to be proved, then this would mean that there is no absolute limitation of the number of things to *one* only. When it is stated that "all things are one", nothing is left out; so that there is nothing that is not included in the Proposition which could be the proof of that proposition

SECTION (12)

[Sūtras 44-54]

On Fruition—the Tenth object of Cognition

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After Rebirth, comes Fruition ; and with regard to this—

Sūtra 44

there arises a doubt since the fulfilment of the result (of acts) is found to appear immediately as well as after some time.

BHĀṢYA

When a man cooks rice or milks the cow, the results, in the shape of the Rice and the Milk respectively, appear immediately ; whereas when he ploughs the field and sows the seeds, the result in the shape of the Harvest, accrues to him after some time ;— now the *Agnihotra* is an act, the performance whereof is laid down in the text 'One desiring heaven should perform the *Agnihotra*', and in regard to the fruition of this act, there arises a doubt (as to whether or not any results follow it, and if they do, when they follow, and so forth).*

Sūtra 45

[*Siddhānta*.]—The fruition is not immediate ; because it is such as can be experienced only at a later time.†

* Says the *Pariśuddhi*—It is not possible that there should be any such doubt regarding *Fruition* in general, as to whether it appears immediately after the act, or after the lapse of some time ; for so far as the acts of cooking, etc., are concerned, it is already ascertained that their fruition is immediate ; and in regard to the acts of *Agnihotra*, etc., also, it is already known that their fruition comes only after the lapse of some time. But what gives rise to the doubt is the very fact of the *Agnihotra*, etc., being *actions*, involving the effort of an intelligent agent ; and inasmuch as it is found that the activities of intelligent beings are of both kinds—some having their fruition immediately and others after the lapse of time, there is nothing to show for certain to which of the two classes the action of *Agnihotra* belongs.

† This *Sūtra* is not found in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, and the *Tātparya* calls it 'Bhāṣya'. *Viśvanātha* treats it as 'Sūtra', and it is found in the *Purī* 'Sūtra' Ms as also in *Sūtra* Mss. C. and D.

The *Siddhānta* embodied in the *Sūtra* is in answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* that it is not necessary to assume any invisible superphysical results for *Agnihotra*, etc., since we find them bringing about the immediate result in the shape of Fame, etc.—*Viśvanātha*.

BHĀŚYA

'Heaven' is the result mentioned in the scriptures; and the attainment of Heaven accrues only to another body, which comes after the present body has been destroyed; and in the case of actions done with a view to the acquiring of landed property also, we find that the result does not appear immediately after the actions have been done.*

Sūtra 46

[*Objection.*]—"The fruition cannot appear at another time; as the cause thereof will have ceased to exist."

BHĀŚYA

"The actual action (the sacrificial performance) having ceased to exist, the result of that action could not come about, in the absence of its cause (in the shape of the action); for, as a matter of fact, no effect is ever found to be produced out of a cause that has ceased to exist."

Sūtra 47

[*Answer.*]—Prior to the actual fulfilment of the fruition there would be something (in the shape of an inter-mediary), just as there is in the case of the fruit of trees.

BHĀŚYA

The man who desires fruits renders such services to the tree as pouring water at its roots, and so forth; and it is only after the actual act of watering has ceased to exist that the earth particles (under the tree's roots) become lumped together by the particles of water, and becoming heated with the heat underground, they produce a juicy substance; this juicy substance, as modified by the heat, comes into contact with the tree and, in a peculiarly modified form enters into it and produces the leaf etc., and the fruit;—in this manner the action of *watering* is fruitful, and yet the result does not quite follow from a cause that has entirely ceased to exist. In the same manner actions produce (in the Soul) a faculty in the shape of *Dharma-Adharma*, Merit-Demerit; and this faculty, after being produced, comes to be helped

* Puri Ms. B. reads प्रामादिकानाम् which would mean that—"in the case of the actions done by men still in the meshes of ignorance". But in view of what follows later on in the *Bhāṣya*, the reading of the *Viz.* text is better.

by other causes and thus brings about the results at a later time. This is what we have already explained under Sū. 3-2-60, where it has been shown that 'the body comes into existence on account of the continuity of the results of previous deeds'.

Pūrvapakṣa

Says the Opponent—

Sūtra 48

“ Prior to its fulfilment, the accomplished fruition (result) cannot be either (A) non-existent, (B) or existent, (C) or existent-non-existent; because 'existent' and 'non-existent' are contradictory ”*

BHĀṢYA

(a) “ A thing that is liable to be accomplished (produced) could not be *non-existent*, before its production; because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things, that is, as a matter of fact, for the bringing about of a certain product (the Jar, e g.) it is only the particular material (Clay) that is brought in; and it is not that any and every material is brought in for the making of all things; there could not be this limitation or restriction (in the form that one product is produced out of only one material substance, and not from all substances), if the product were absolutely *non-existent* (before its production)”.†

(b) “Nor could the thing be *existent* (prior to its production); because if the thing already exists, before it is brought about, there could not (need not) be a further 'production' of that same thing.”

* The question going to be discussed now is whether the Fruition or Result of Acts is something that, prior to its being brought about, was—(1) already existent, or (2) non-existent, or (3) both existent and non-existent, or (4) neither existent nor non-existent. The Pūrvapakṣa propounded in the Sūtra is that no one of these alternatives is possible, hence there can be no such thing as the 'fruition' of actions.—*Tātparya*.

The fourth of these alternatives is found in the *Vārtika*, not in the *Sūtra* or in the *Bhāṣya*. In this *Sūtra* also Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣana finds a reference to the *Mādhyaṃkā-Sūtras*.

† The very fact that it is only out of Clay that the Jar is produced, clearly shows that the Jar already exists in the Clay. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9—'Upādānagrahanāt.'

(c) "Nor could the thing be both *existent and non-existent*; because 'existent' and 'non-existent' are contradictory: the term 'existent' affirms a thing, while the term 'non-existent' denies it; and it is this mutually contradictory character that is spoken of as 'dissimilarity' (in the Sūtra); and because of this fact their being contradictories, no co-existence of them is possible."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The truth of the matter is that prior to being produced, the thing to be produced was *non-existent*—"How so?"—

Sūtra 49

Because we perceive the production as well as destruction (of things) *

BHĀṢYA

It has been alleged (in the Bhāṣya on Sū 48) by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"Prior to its production, the Product is not non-existent, because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things";—[the answer to that is as follows]—

Sūtra 50

That the product is non-existent is clearly proved by that very conception.

BHĀṢYA

The conception (of restriction in regard to the material cause, which the Opponent has cited) is in the form 'this thing, and not all things, is capable of producing this effect'; and this conception clearly proves that prior to being produced, every effect is known as capable of being produced by a particular cause; and that this conception is correct is shown by the fact that the production of the effect is actually in accordance with that conception; and in fact it is only on the basis of this conception that we can explain the restriction in regard to the cause of things. If, on the other hand, the product is already existent, prior to being produced, then there can be no such thing as its 'production' [so that there could be no conception

* If a thing is existent, even prior to being produced, it means that it is eternal; and if it is eternal, there can be production or destruction of it.

at all in regard to its being produced out of only a particular material cause].*

Sūtra 51

[*Objection*].—“The receptacles being different [in the case of the fruition of acts], it is not right to argue that it is like the fruition of trees.”—

BHĀSYA

“ [In the case of the fruition of trees] it is found that the services rendered, in the shape of the watering of the roots and so forth, as well as the *fruition*, both are in the tree itself,—both have the same tree for their receptacle ; [in the case of the fruition of actions] on the other hand, the action occurs in the present body, while the fruition appears in the next body; so that there being a difference in the receptacles, what has been urged (in Sū. 47) does not prove anything at all (in regard to the sacrificial acts being the cause of fruition in the shape of Heaven, etc.)”.

Sūtra 52

[*Answer*].—Inasmuch as Happiness subsists in the Soul, the objection has no force at all.

BHĀSYA

Happiness, being perceptible to the Soul, subsists in the Soul ; *action* also,—in the form known as ‘ *Dharma* ’, ‘ Merit ’—subsists in the Soul,—as *Dharma* is a quality of the Soul ; thus then, there is no possibility of *receptacles being different*.†

Sūtra 53

[*Objection*].—“What has been just said is not true : as [the obtaining of] Son, Wife, Cattle, Clothing, Gold, Food and such things is mentioned as the fruit (of acts).”

* The very conception that a thing is produced only out of a certain cause proves that before being produced that thing must be non-existent. The weaver takes up the yarns with the idea—‘the Cloth shall be produced out of this’ and not that ‘the Cloth is here already’ ; for in the latter case, why should he put forth any effort to bring into existence the Cloth which already exists ?

† ‘Heaven’, which is the result of sacrificial acts, is only a form of *Happiness* ; and Happiness subsists in the Soul, not in the Body ; and Soul remains the same through the several lives.

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, what is mentioned as the 'fruit' is the obtaining of such things as the son etc., and *not* 'Happiness'; we have such assertions as—'one who desires landed property should perform *this* sacrifice', 'one who desires a son should perform *that* sacrifice', and so forth. So that the assertion (under Sū. 52) that 'Happiness is the fruit of actions' is not true.

Sūtra 54

[*Answer.*]—Inasmuch as the real fruition follows from connection with the things mentioned, it is only indirectly (figuratively) that these latter are spoken of as the 'fruit'.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact the real fruition, in the shape of Happiness, results from connection with the son, wife etc., and it is for this reason that these latter are regarded, or spoken of, only indirectly, as 'fruit'; just as food is (indirectly) spoken of as 'Life', in such statements as 'Food is life itself'.

End of Section (12)

SECTION (13)

[*Sūtras 55-58*]

Examination of the nature of Pain

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After 'Fruition' (in Sū. 1-1-9) is *mentioned* 'Pain'; and this has been *defined* (in Sū. 1-1-21) as 'that which is connected with annoyance is *Pain*'. But now the question is raised—"Does the Siddhāntin mean to totally deny such a thing as 'Pleasure', which is felt by every personality? or does he mean something else?"*

* *Question*—"What is it that has to be *examined* in the present section? No one denies that there is such a thing as Pain; nor is there any doubt as to its being a thing to be got rid of; it might be useful to examine whether it is eternal or not; but it has already been established, in course of our refutation of the doctrine that all things are eternal; what causes pain is also well known to be such things as the serpent, the thorn and so forth; Activity has been fully examined, as also its Effects, in the form of Birth etc.; and how the cessation of the cause leads to the cessation of its effects has been shown under Sū. 1-1-2. What then has remained uninvestigated, for the sake of which the present section has been taken up?"

Our answer is that the meaning of the *Siddhāntin* is something different. "Why so?" It is not possible to totally deny Pleasure, to whose existence testimony is borne by all men. The teaching (of the *Siddhānta*) that Pleasure should be looked upon as 'Pain' is meant for the removal of all pain for the person who has become disgusted with the sufferings caused by the experiences undergone during a series of births and deaths and is anxious to get rid of all similar experiences * "But by what method (is this advice effective)?" The bodies of all living beings, all the regions where people are born, all rebirth (all conditions of life), every one of these is beset with 'annoyance', being inseparable from Pain; and it is in view of this fact that the sages have tendered the advice contained in the Sūtra 'Pain is that which is connected with annoyance' (Sū. 1-1-21); and the meaning of this is that all the aforesaid things should be looked upon as 'Pain'.† Reasons for this view are put forward in the following Sūtra.

Answer—Pain has been defined as that which is connected with annoyance; by 'annoyance' here is meant the *feeling of annoyance*; and this according to the *Siddhānta*, includes, not only Pain and its causes, but *Pleasure* also. If this is duly realised, then there is no room for the question put by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, but he has put the question in view of the primary meaning of the term 'annoyance', which is restricted to *Pain only*. —*Parīśuddhi*.

The sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa* has been thus expounded in the *Tātparya*:—"We admit that *Pain is that which is connected with annoyance*; but that which is experienced by every personality as *Pleasure*, that certainly could not be regarded as *Pain*; as this would be contrary to experience. As regards the Body and the Sense-organs etc.—if they are to be regarded as Pain because they are the Source of Pain, they may be regarded as 'Pleasure' also, as being the source of Pleasure. In fact the timidity involved in the idea of regarding everything as pain is likely to strike at the root of all worldly usage. As a matter of fact, when a man eats meat, he removes all the bones and hence does not suffer the pain that might be due to the bones; similarly a wise man will enjoy Pleasure only, taking care to avoid all that may be likely to bring pain." ..It is in view of all this that the *Pūrvapakṣin* has put the question.

* The *Tātparya* explains the expression '*utpattisthānāni*' as *the regions for the acquiring of things which bring pleasure and pain*.

† If it were possible to obtain pleasure *unmixed with pain*, no intelligent person would ever seek to get rid of it. as a matter of fact, however, no such unalloyed pleasure is ever met with; hence what the *Siddhānta* means 'is not the total denial of all Pleasure, but that all Pleasure should be looked upon as Pain.'—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 55

The Birth of the Body etc., is only Pain ; because it is beset with Annoyances.

BHĀṢYA

The term 'janma' (in the *Sūtra*) stands for *that which is produced i.e.*, the Body, the Sense-organs and so forth ; and the 'utpatti' of 'janma' is the coming into existence of the Body etc., in their various forms. The 'several annoyances' are—the *least*, the *medium*, and the *greatest* ; the *greatest* 'annoyance' is of those in hell ; the *medium* is that of the lower animals ; and the *least* is that of human beings ; of the divine beings, as of those who have got rid of all attachment, it is *still less*. When a person perceives that every condition of life is beset with annoyance, he becomes confirmed in his idea that Pleasure and its causes, in the shape of the Body, the sense-organs and cognitions are all to be regarded as 'Pain' ; and when he has come to look upon all these as 'pain', he loses all attachment to all things of the world ; and after he has harboured this dis-attachment, all his longings for worldly things come to an end ; and his longings having come to an end, he becomes freed from all suffering, just as when one understands that by the contact of poison, milk becomes poison, he no longer seeks to obtain milk, and not obtaining it, does not suffer the pangs of death.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The teaching that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain' is not meant to be a denial of Pleasure ;—Why ?

Sūtra 56

It is not so ; Because Pleasure also is accomplished during intervals.*

BHĀṢYA

By the teaching that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain', it is not meant that there is no such thing as 'Pleasure' at all ;—Why ? *Because Pleasure also is accomplished during intervals* ; that is, as a matter of fact, in the intervals of 'annoy-

* सुखस्याप्यन्तराल is the reading of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, of the *Sūtra*-Mss. C. and D. as also in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*.

ances', Pleasure is actually accomplished and experienced by all living beings ; and hence it cannot be denied entirely.

Further,—

Sūtra 57

There is no denial [of Pleasure] ; because [all that is meant is that] inasmuch as the Man experiencing pleasure is oppressed with the frailty of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him.

BHĀSYA

The ' non-denial ' (in the *Sūtra*) is meant to be that of *Pleasure*—by the teaching that it should be looked upon as 'Pain'; that such is the meaning of the *Sūtra* is clear from the context. '*Longing*'—is wish, the eager desire for acquiring a thing ; and the ' frailty of this longing ' is as follows :—when the man experiences pleasure from a certain thing, he desires that thing, —and sometimes the desire is not fulfilled, or if fulfilled, it is fulfilled only in part, or is fulfilled in such form as is beset with obstacles, —and from this ' frailty of longing ' there arise various kinds of mental suffering ; so that *the man experiencing pleasure, being oppressed with the frailty of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him* ;—and it is because there is no cessation of annoyance that it has been taught that Pleasure should be looked upon as ' Pain '. It is for this reason that Birth is ' pain ', and not because there is no pleasure at all. This is the idea that has been expressed in the following verses :—

(1) ' For the man who desires a desirable thing, as soon as that desire is fulfilled, another desire quickly besets him.'

(2) ' Even though a man obtains the entire sea-girt Earth, along with all cows and horses, that seeker after wealth does not become satisfied with that wealth ; what pleasure, then, can there be for one who desires wealth ?'

Sūtra 58

Also because there are several kinds of Pain which people wrongly regard as pleasure ;—

BHĀSYA

' *we have the instruction that Pleasure should be regarded as Pain* ' [these words complete the sentence of the *Sūtra*].

The ordinary man, addicted to pleasure, regards Pleasure as the highest end of man, and feels that there is nothing better than Pleasure ; and hence when Pleasure has been attained, he feels happy and contented, feeling that all he had to attain had been attained ; and under the influence of illusion, he becomes attached to the Pleasure, as also to the things that bring about its accomplishment ; becoming so attached, he makes an attempt to obtain the pleasure ; and while he is trying for it, there come down upon him several kinds of Pain, in the form of birth, old age, disease, death, the contact of disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, the non-fulfilment of desires and so forth ; and yet all these several kinds of Pain he regards as 'Pleasure'. In fact Pain is a necessary factor in Pleasure ; without suffering some pain no pleasure can be obtained ; hence as leading to Pleasure, this Pain is regarded by the man as Pleasure ; and such a man, having his mind obsessed by this notion of 'Pleasure', never escapes from metempsychosis, which consists of a running series of births and deaths. And it is as an antidote of this notion of Pleasure that we have the teaching that all this should be looked upon as 'Pain'.

Birth has been called 'pain', because of its being beset with 'pain', and not because there is no such thing as Pleasure

Objection .—" If that is so, then why is it not said simply (in Sū. 55) that 'Birth is Pain' ? When this simple expression might have been used, the fact of the Sūtra having used the expression 'Birth is *only* pain' shows that the idea meant to be conveyed is that *there is no pleasure at all.*"

Answer :—What the emphatic term 'eva', 'only', implies is that what is laid down is conducive to the cessation of Birth. "How [does the particle serve the purpose of indicating the cessation of Birth] ?" What it means is that Birth is pain, not by its own nature, but by reason of its being beset with Pain ; and so with Pleasure also [which is 'Pain' because it is intermingled with Pain, and not because there is no such thing as *Pleasure*]. This is what is meant by the words of the Sūtra (55),—and not that in Birth there is *only Pain* (and *no Pleasure* at all).

End of Section (13)

SECTION (14)

[Sūtras 59-68]

Examination of the Nature of Final Release

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After 'Pain', 'Release' [has been *mentioned* and *defined*].
This Release is thus denied (by the Opponent)—

*Sūtra 59**Pūrvapakṣa*

"Since there is concatenation (a) of Debts, (b) of Aberrations and (c) of Activity,—there can be no Release"—

BHĀṢYA

"(a) *On account of the concatenation of debts there can be no Release.* The 'debts' are thus described (in the *S'atapatha Brāhmana*, 1-7-2-1)—'When the Brāhmana is born, he is born with three debts : from the debt owing to the Risis he becomes freed by leading the life of the Religious Student ; from the debt owing to Divine Beings he is freed by the performance of sacrifices ; and from the debt owing to the Fathers he is freed by begetting children' ;—the 'concatenation of these debts consists in the connection (presence) of acts connected with the debts' ; that it is necessary throughout one's life to perform these acts (towards the clearing of the debts) is thus mentioned (in the *Veda*)—'The sacrifices known as the *Agnihotra* and the *Darśa-pūrnāmāsa* should go on till old age or death,—it is only by either old age or death that one becomes freed from the necessity of performing the said sacrifices'.—So that the concatenation of these debts persisting (till the man's old age or death), there is no time left for the performance of acts conducive to Release ; hence it follows that there can be no Release."

"(b) *On account of the concatenation of Aberrations, there can be no Release.* The man dies beset with aberrations [viz , Ignorance, Egoism, Affection, Hatred and Yearning for Life], and he is born beset with aberrations ; and he is never found to be absolutely free from the concatenation of these aberrations [from which it follows that he can never be free from Births and Deaths ; *i.e.*, there can be no Release]."

“(c) *On account of the concatenation of Activity, there can be no Release.* From birth till death, man is never found to be absolutely free from the ‘Operating of Speech, Mind and Body’. From this it follows that the assertion made (in Sū. 1-1-2) to the effect that—‘there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to Release’,—is not true.”

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Siddhānta

Our answer to the above is as follows :—(A) Our answer to the argument, that “ since there is concatenation of Debts etc., etc. ”,—is that the term ‘Debt’ (in the texts quoted) stands for *what is like debt*.

Sūtra 60

Inasmuch as the word cannot be taken in its primary signification, the statement must be taken as a description by means of a word used in its secondary (figurative) signification ; specially as it is only thus that the sense of condemnation and commendation is obtained.

BHĀṢYA

The word ‘*ṛṇaiḥ*’, (in the passage quoted from the *S’atāpatha Brāhmaṇa*) is not used in its primary sense of *debt*; the word ‘debt’ can be used in its primary sense only in a case where one gives to another something that has to be repaid and another receives such a thing ; and this condition is not present in the case spoken of in the passage quoted ; hence it follows that—*inasmuch as the word ‘debts’ cannot be taken in its primary signification, the statement must be taken as a description by means of a word used in its secondary (figurative) signification* ; the sense being that what are described are ‘*like debts*’. Such figurative descriptions are very common ; e.g., when the ‘young student’ is described as ‘Fire’ ; just as the word ‘Fire’ elsewhere used in one (the primary) sense is applied to the young student in another (figurative) sense,—so in the case in question, the word ‘debt’, elsewhere found used in the primary sense, is used in the passage quoted in a different

sense. “ But why should there be a description by means of a word in the figurative sense ? ” *Because it is only thus that the sense of condemnation and commendation is obtained* ;—the meaning of the passage being that “ if a person fails to perform the acts referred to, he is *condemned* in the same manner as the debtor, not repaying his debts ; and if he does perform the acts, he is *commended* in the same manner as the debtor, repaying his debts ; this is what is meant by the figurative description of the acts as ‘*debts*’.

The word ‘*jāyamānah*’, ‘when he is born’, is also used figuratively ; as otherwise (if the word were taken in its literal sense), the man would not be entitled to the performance of the acts mentioned ; what the phrase, ‘when the Brāhmana is born’ means is ‘when the Brāhmana enters the state of the Householder’,—this is what is meant by the man ‘being born’, (that such must be the sense is clear from the fact that) it is only when the Brāhmana enters the state of the Householder that he becomes entitled to the performance of the act mentioned ; on merely being *born from his mother’s womb* (which is the primary meaning of ‘being born’) the Brāhmana is not entitled to the performance of those acts ; as a matter of fact, when the child is just born from his mother’s womb he is not in a position to perform any acts ; for only such persons are entitled to the performance of an act as (a) are *desirous* of acquiring the results following from that act and (b) are *capable* of performing it. (a) That to be entitled to the performance of an act it is necessary to have the desire for results calculated to follow from that act, is shown by the fact that the injunctions of the acts always speak of the presence of such desire ; e.g., in the injunction ‘*one desiring heaven should offer the Agnihotra libations*’ ; and (b) that to be so entitled one must be *capable* of performing the act is shown by the fact that it is only a person who is capable of doing an act that can do it ; since it is only a capable man that can do an act it follows that it is only a capable man that is entitled to the performance of that act ; as a matter of fact, it is only the *capable* man, and none other, who actually undertakes the performance of an act. If the word ‘born’ were taken in its primary sense (of *coming out* of the mother’s womb), then both these conditions

would be absent in the child just born; at the time that the child is just born out of the mother's womb, there is not present in it either the desire for the results following from any act, or the capability to perform it. An assertion made in the Veda in no way differs from an assertion made in common parlance,—both being the work (utterance) of intelligent persons; and in common parlance no one, even the most foolish, would ever address, to the newborn child, such injunctions as 'Study the Veda', 'Perform sacrifices', 'Lead the life of the Religious Student', and so forth; how then could a wise Sage, who says only what is true and faultless, and who is prompted to teach pupils, ever address such injunctions (to the new-born child)? No dancer ever dances before blind men; no singer sings to deaf persons. Then again, it is only the person who comprehends what is taught that can be the recipient of the teaching; *i.e.*, he alone who comprehends what is taught, can have the teaching addressed to him; and certainly this condition is not present in the new-born infant. Further, the Brāhmaṇa-passage itself (quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) speaks of acts that clearly indicate the state of the House-holder; as a matter of fact, the action that the passage speaks of is such as requires the presence of the *wife*, and as such is clearly indicative of the state of the Householder. From all this it follows that, what is meant by the term 'born' is *one who has entered the state of the Householder*.

Further, the assertion (in the text quoted) in regard to old age and death (being the limit of the performance of the *Agniho-tra* etc.) can be explained on the basis of the assumption that the acts continue to be performed till the ceasing of the man's desire. That is, till the man's desire for the results (accruing from the act) does not cease—does not come to end—he should continue to perform the act,—it is in this sense that the assertion in regard to 'old age and death' would be applicable to the man. Further, what the passage—'by old age is the man freed etc.'—means is that 'when the man reaches the last quarter of his life, he enters the state of the Renunciate and thus becomes freed from the obligation of performing the sacrificial act'; the term 'old age' standing for the last quarter of man's life, when he enters the state of the Renunciate, it is in connection with

the last quarter of man's life that Renunciation has been enjoined. If the term 'old age' meant absolutely *decrepit senility*, then the assertion—'by old age is man freed etc.', would have no sense at all,* it could not be taken to mean that 'when the man is disabled (by decrepitude), he becomes freed from the obligation etc. ;' as for the man who is himself unable to perform a sacrificial act, the Veda permits external aid; e.g., (a) 'or the pupil might offer the libations, his services having been secured by the teaching of the Veda', (b) 'or the milk-offerer might offer the libations, his services having been secured by presents of wealth' Such being the case, the passage can either be taken as 'descriptive' of what has been enjoined in another text, or some other meaning (that of direct injunction of the acts for the new-born infant) may be arbitrarily assigned to it. And there can be no doubt that the most reasonable course is to take it as containing a 'description' of what has been enjoined elsewhere,† the most natural meaning of the passage being that 'when the Householder undertakes the performance of the sacrificial acts, he is as much under compulsion as a debtor' Then again, what form the direct objective of man's effort are the means of accomplishing the desired result, and not the result itself; and when the said means have been duly accomplished they lead to the accomplishment of the Result; so that what has been enjoined previously (in some other passage) is the *coming into existence* of the means leading to the Result; and the same is also spoken of subsequently (in passages occurring later than the passage in question); so that it must be the person connected with the said means that is referred to by the term '*jāyamāna*', 'being born'.‡

* Because when the man has reached the state of senility, or has died, he actually becomes freed from all obligations.

† The passage itself does not contain a single injunctive word. Even so there might have been some justification for regarding it as an injunction if we had found no other Vedic text containing the necessary injunction of the Agnihotra etc. As a matter of fact, however, there are hundreds of such texts. There can, therefore, be no justification for assuming the passage in question to be injunctive.—*Tātparya*.

‡ This anticipates the following argument of the Opponent—"The new-born infant may not have the capacity of *discerning the result*, and of knowing and attempting to obtain, the means leading to that result. But it certainly has the capacity of bringing upon itself the results of acts if the

“ But,” says the Opponent, “ there being no direct injunction (of Renunciation)—[the passage in question cannot be regarded as referring to the state of the Renunciate].”

This, however, is not right ; as there is no direct injunction of the negation of it either [so that the fact cannot be urged one way or the other].

“ The Brāhmaṇa-text directly enjoins the state of the Householder ; if there were other states also [such as that of the Renunciate], the Brāhmaṇa would have directly enjoined these also ; so that, inasmuch as there is no direct injunction of these other states, we conclude that there is no other state.”

There is no force in this, we reply ; as of the negation of such other states also there is no direct injunction ; we find no such direct injunction of the negation of other states as—‘ there are no other states, that of the Householder being the only one state ’ ; hence, inasmuch as we do not meet with any direct injunction of the negation (of the state of the Renunciate), the argument put forward can have no force at all. Then again, the direct injunction (of the state of the Householder) in the passage in question is based upon the fact that it is that particular state that forms the subject-matter of the context ; just as we find in the case of the various sciences. In the case of the sciences it is found that the fact that each science directly lays down certain things only is due to those things alone being connected with its own subject-matter,—and not to there being no other things at all ; similarly the fact that the passage lays down things connected with the state of the Householder only is due to this state forming its subject-matter, and *not* to there being no other states.

child does an act, however unconsciously of its being the means of a particular result, the *merit* or *demerit* accruing from that act will certainly accrue to the soul of the infant. So that there can be nothing incongruous in the acts being enjoined for the new-born child.”

The sense of the reply is thus explained in the *Tātparya* —The direct objective of man’s effort cannot be the *Result* ; what the man tries to obtain, in the first instance, is the means that leads to that *Result* ; and certainly the new-born child can have no idea of what is the means leading to a *Result*. Hence no injunction could have any effect upon it. For this reason the only right course is to take the word ‘born’ in the figurative sense, as explained above.

Then again, we find *verses* and *prose-texts* speaking of Final Release ; as a matter of fact, we find several Ṛk verses and Brāhmana-texts speaking of Final Release (along with the means of attaining it, and the four states, specially that of the Renunciate, fall under these). As instances of verses, we have the following:—(a) ‘ The sages, blessed with children and desiring wealth, fell into death (and rebirth) by performing actions ; other sages, who were endowed with wisdom, transcending beyond actions, attained immortality ’ ;—(b) ‘ Neither by action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth,—but by renunciation, only—did they attain immortality ; that immortality which shines beyond Heaven, hidden in the cave (beyond ordinary cognitions, which the renunciates alone enter) ’ (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10-10-3) ;—(c) ‘ I know that Great Person, effulgent like the Sun, lying beyond Illusion ; by knowing Him alone does man transcend death, there is no other path for going beyond ’ (*Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* 31-18) ; and as prose-texts we have the following:—(a) ‘ There are three stages of Dharma—Sacrifices, Study, and Charity ; the first of these constitutes Austerity ; the second as the Religious Student residing in the house of the Teacher ; and the third is the same person putting himself under severe penance while residing in the Teacher’s house ; all these lead man to pure regions : it is only one who is firm in Brahman (i.e. the Renunciate) who reaches immortality ’ (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 2-22-1) ;—(b) ‘ It is with a view to attain this region that Renunciates take to renunciation ’ (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4-4-22) ; (c) ‘ They say that man is made up of desires ; as he desires so does he put forth efforts, and as he puts forth efforts, so does he act ; and as he acts so does he become, ’—having in this way described the process of metempsychosis determined by the performance of acts, the texts go on to lay down the real teaching thus—‘ When the man with desires becomes free from desires, he becomes without desires, beyond desires, having all his desires fulfilled, his desires centred in the Self,—then his life-breaths do not go out, they become absorbed here and now, being Brahman, he attains Brahman itself. ’ (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4-4-5 and 6)

Thus then we find that the assertion that—“ Since there is concatenation of debts, there can be no Release ”—is not right.

There is yet another text—‘The four paths leading to the Divine Beings’ (*Taittirīyasamhitā* 5-7-23)—which speaks of the four states ; and hence also it is not right to say that there is only one state (that of the Householder) laid down in the Veda [and that the state of the Renunciate is nowhere enjoined].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the passage speaking of ‘the *Agnihotra* and the *Dars’apūrṇamāsa* sacrifice continuing till old age and death’ must refer to the man that desires the results (following from those acts) “Why ?”

Sūtra 61

Inasmuch as there is transportation (of the Fires) into the Soul, the Denial (of Release) cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

It is laid down in the Veda that—‘Having offered the *Prājāpatya* sacrifice, having offered the libation of all his belongings, and having transported the Fires into his Soul, the Brāhmaṇa should go out as a Renunciate’;—and from this we learn that the ‘transportation of the Fires’ (which means the end of the *Agnihotra*) is only for the man who has risen above all desires for children, wealth and fame, and when his desire for the results (of the *Agnihotra*) also have entirely ceased. To this same end we have the following Brāhmaṇa-passage (*Bṛhadārāṇyaka* 4-5):—‘Yājñavalkya, when going to undertake another austerity, said to Maitreyī as follows: Oh, dear one, I am going to wander away from this place, I shall therefore make up an understanding between you and Kātyāyani; you have already had your instructions, O *Maitreyī*! Immortality extends only so far;—having said this Yājñavalkya went away as a renunciate.’

Sūtra 62

Inasmuch as the ‘collecting of sacrificial vessels’ could not be possible in their case, the Results mentioned cannot pertain to others (than Householders).

BHĀṢYA

If the performance of the acts till ‘old age and death’ were taken as referring to *all men* (Householders as well as Renunciates), then the after-death rites ending with the ‘collecting of the

sacrificial vessels' would also have to be performed for *all men*; and in that case there would be no point in the describing of the 'rising above desires', which we meet with in such passages as the following—'The ancient Brāhmaṇas, great teachers and learned, do not desire offspring, their idea being—what shall we do with offspring, we for whom the Self is the whole world?—it is these Brāhmanas that, having risen above desire for sons, desire for wealth and desire for fame, live upon alms.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka—Upaniṣad*, 3-5-1). Because for one who has 'risen above desires (including also the desire for results accruing from the *Āgniho-trā etc.*) there can be no possibility of those rites that end with the 'collecting of sacrificial vessels'. Specially because Results do not supply sufficient motive to all men to the same extent.

Further, since we find *four stages* of life laid down in the *Itihāsas*, the *Purāṇas* and the *Dharmashāstra* scriptures, it is not right to hold (as the Pūrvapakṣin does) that there is only one stage (that of the Householder). It will not be right to regard the said scriptures as having no authority; for the authoritative character of these is vouched for by authoritative texts; as a matter of fact, the authoritative character of *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* is vouched for by *Brāhmaṇa-texts*, which are entirely authoritative; e.g., 'The *Atharvāṅgīrasas* declared the *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*; and these *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* constitute the fifth of the Vedas.' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3-4-2). For these reasons it is not right to say that the said *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* are not authoritative. As regards the *Dharmasāstra* scriptures, if these had no authority, there would be an end to all business among living beings, which would put the whole world into confusion. Secondly, inasmuch as the 'seers' and 'speakers' are the same, there is no reason why these scriptures should not be authoritative; as a matter of fact, the 'seers' and 'speakers' of the *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and *Dharmasāstra* scriptures are the same as those of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts (of the Veda). Thirdly, inasmuch as there is a restriction in regard to their subject-matter (the said scriptures must be authoritative); as a matter of fact, the authority of each scripture bears upon its own special subject-matter; and the subject-matter of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts is different from that of the *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and the

Dharmaśāstra scriptures ; e.g., 'sacrificial performance' forms the subject-matter of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts, the 'doings of men' that of *Itihāsas* and *Purānas*, and the 'regulation of men's business' that of the *Dharmaśāstra* scriptures. So that since no single one of these regulates all the said subjects, every one of them must be regarded as authoritative in regard to its own special subject ; just as every one of the sense-organs is an authoritative means of the cognition of its own special object of perception.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the second argument propounded by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in Sū. 59) viz : "since there is no cessation of concatenation of the aberrations (there can be no Release),"—our answer is as follows :—

Sūtra 63

Release is possible ; inasmuch as (we find that) there are no aberrations in the case of the man in deep sleep, who dreams no dreams.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we find that when a man is in deep sleep and dreams no dreams, there is an end (for the time being) of all connection with attachment, as also of all connection with pleasure and pain. Exactly in the same way there could be an end of all these at Release also. In fact people who have realised the real nature of Brahman actually describe the condition of the 'released' Soul as similar to that of *deep sleep*.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the third argument—viz., "because there is concatenation of Activity,"—our answer is as follows :—

Sūtra 64

For the man whose aberrations have been destroyed, Activity does not lead to recrudescence.

* The only difference being that while during deep sleep, the tendency of aberrations is present—[by virtue of which the man becomes beset with them on waking]—at Release there is no such tendency left; [so that there is no chance of the *Released* man being re-beset with aberrations.]—*Tātparyā*.

BHĀṢYA

When Love, Hatred and Ignorance (which are the aberrations) have been destroyed, *Activity does not lead to recrudescence*; —‘Recrudescence’ stands for re-birth at the end of the previous birth; and since this rebirth is always brought about by Desire,* —when all Desire has been destroyed, there is no further birth after the previous one has come to an end; and this is what is meant by ‘non-recrudescence’, and this is *Release*.

“But this would mean that actions are fruitless.”

Certainly not, for our doctrine does not deny the experiencing of the fruition of one’s acts. All that we say is that the previous birth having come to an end, there is no further birth, and we do not say that there is no experiencing of the fruits of one’s acts; this comes about in the last birth (preceding Release) [so that there is no fruition left to be experienced]

Sūtra 65

[*Objection.*]—“**What has been just alleged is not possible as the concatenation of aberrations is innate (in man)**”

BHĀṢYA

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—“Cessation of the concatenation of aberrations is not possible, —why?—*because the concatenation of aberrations is innate in man*; as a matter of fact, the concatenation of aberrations is without beginning; and what is beginningless can never be destroyed.”

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

To the above objection some people (Ekadeśī—Logicians) make the following reply :

Sūtra 66

(A) ‘Just as there is evanescence of the negation of things prior to their coming into existence,—so there can be evanescence of innate things also.’

BHĀṢYA

“The negation or absence of things, prior to their coming into existence, has had no beginning; and yet it is set aside by

* The reading तच्चादृष्टकारितं does not fit in with तस्याम्. In the *Vārtika* we find the expression तच्च तृष्णाकारितम्; so that we prefer to read the *Bhāṣya* also as तच्च तृष्णाकारितम्; and to take तस्य as referring to तृष्णा.

the *existence* of the things when they are produced :—and in the same manner the *concatenation of the aberrations* also, though without beginning, may be liable to be set aside.’

Sūtra 67

(B) ‘Or it may be like the evanescence of the dark colour of the Atom.’

BHĀSYA

Others again offer the following answer to the objection (urged in Sū. 65) :—

‘The dark colour of the Atom (of Earth) is beginningless, and yet it is destroyed by contact with fire ; similarly the concatenation of aberrations [though beginningless, could be destroyed]’.

BHĀSYA

(A) As a matter of fact, ‘eternality’ and ‘evanescence’ are properties of existent things ; so they can be predicated directly of positive entities only ; to negative entities they can be attributed only indirectly (or figuratively). [So that it is not right to cite the case of the *negation of things*, as the *Ekadeśin* has done in Sū. 65] (B) Then, as regards the ‘dark colour of the Atom’ (cited by the second *Ekadeśin* in Sū. 66), there is nothing to prove that it is *without beginning*,* and hence it is not right to put that forward as an instance. Nor is there anything to prove that a thing *not liable to production* is *evanescent*.

The real answer to the argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin* (put forward in Sū. 65) is as follows :—

Sūtra 68

What has been alleged by the Opponent cannot be right ; also because (a) desire and the rest have their source in misapprehension.†

* On the other hand, we have the following argument to prove that the dark colour of the Atom is *not without beginning* :—‘The dark colour of the Atom is a *product*, because it is a Colour of the Earth, just like its red colour.’—*Tātparya*.

† On the exact meaning of the term ‘*sankalpa*’ in the present context, the *Tātparya* says :—Though it is the *wish for a cognised thing* that is generally called ‘*sankalpa*’, yet here we have to take it as referring to the *cognition* that is the precursor of the *wish* ; hence it should be taken here as standing for *wrong cognition, misapprehension*.

BHĀṢYA

The participle 'ca', 'also', has a cumulative force, including the following two reasons also—(b) *because Desire and the rest are due to action*, and (c) *because Desire and the rest are due to one another*.

(a) As a matter of fact, Desire, Hatred and Illusion proceed from such wrong cognitions (respectively) as the actual *delighters, annoyers and deluders* of men (b) Action also is what brings about the bodies of living beings, and gives rise to Desire, Hatred and Illusion, within well-defined limits; that it is so we gather from the fact that there is a limitation in regard to these; e. g. a certain animal-body is found to abound in Desire, while another abounds in Illusion. (c) Lastly, the appearance of Desire etc. is due to one another; that is, it is the man under illusion who desires things; it is the man under illusion who is moved by hatred; the man under the influence of desire falls into illusion, and the man under the influence of hatred falls into illusion.

All misapprehensions cease to appear as soon as True Knowledge appears; and inasmuch as on the cessation of the cause, the effect cannot appear, there is absolute non-appearance of Desire etc (on the disappearance of Misapprehensions, which are the source of Desire etc).

Further, the assertion that "the concatenation of aberrations is beginningless" has no point at all. As *all things* related to the Soul,—e. g., the Body, the Sense-organs etc. etc.—are such as proceed in a beginningless series, and there is not a single individual of this series that is produced without another individual having gone before it, with the sole exception of *True Knowledge* (which is produced *once* and *once* only for a Soul); but our doctrine (that Desire etc. are destroyed) does not imply the assumption that 'things not liable to be produced are liable to destruction' [as the *individual* Desire etc. whose destruction we postulate are not *without beginning*; the beginninglessness of the *series* does not simply the *beginninglessness* of each individual constituting the series; e. g., *one series of Bodies* for each Soul is beginningless, yet each individual Body has a beginning]. As soon as *misapprehensions* have been dispelled by *True Knowledge*, 'Action' also, which is what brings about the Body of each living body, ceases to be a productive of Desire etc, though it continues to bring about (for some time) the experiencing of pleasure and pain

End of Section (14)

DISCOURSE IV
DAILY LESSON II

SECTION (i)

[Sūtras 1-3]

Dealing with the Appearance of True Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

**Question*—“Now, Sir, does *True Knowledge* appear in connection with each one of the several things that there are? Or only in connection with some of them?—What difference does that make?—Well, as a matter of fact, it would not be possible for it to appear in connection with each of the things, for the simple reason that the number of things to be known is endless. Nor again could the True Knowledge be held to appear only in connection with some of the things; for in connection with

* The *Tātparya* introduces this Daily Lesson thus: *Doubt, Instruments of and Objects of Cognition* have been only examined;—*Motive* and the rest also have been examined by implication under *Sūtra* 2-1-7. So that all the sixteen categories have been examined. It has been declared in *Sū* 1-1-1 that the ‘true knowledge’ of these categories is the means of attaining the highest good, it has also been explained that it is the ‘true knowledge’ or *cognition of objects* that leads directly to the attainment of the highest good; that of the others helps only indirectly. What we proceed to examine now is whether from among the Soul and the other objects of cognition, it is the true knowledge of only a few, or that of all, that brings about the highest good.

On this the *Parīśuddhi*—In the *first* Daily Lesson of this *Adhyāya*, six *objects of cognition* have been examined; and we now proceed to examine ‘True Knowledge’, which pertains to them. The questions for determination are—(a) What is True Knowledge? (b) To what things does it pertain? (c) How is it maintained? (d) How does it improve? First of all we proceed to consider—to what does True Knowledge pertain and how does it appear?

The *Nyāyanibandhāprakaśa* raises the objection, (i) that it is not right to proceed with the *examination* of ‘True Knowledge’ before having defined it; and (ii) that there is no sameness of subject-matter between the two Daily Lessons, and hence there is no reason why they should form part of the same *Adhyāya*. The answers provided by it are as follows:—(i) The definition of ‘True Knowledge’ has been provided, by implication, in *Sūtra* 1-1-2, and (ii) the real subject of the *Adhyāya* is the Examination of ‘objects of cognition’ in the form of ‘Effects’; and ‘True Knowledge’ also is an *effect*.

those few things with reference to which True Knowledge would not appear, the man's Illusion would not cease; so that there would still be a residue of Illusion left behind; nor could the Illusion in regard to one thing be removed by True Knowledge in regard to another thing."

Answer:—"Illusion" consists in *wrong notion, misapprehension*,—not in mere *absence of True Knowledge*; and what is to be sought after is the *True Knowledge* of that thing the wrong notion of which becomes the active seed of metempsychosis.*

Question:—"What is that *wrong notion* [which leads to metempsychosis]?"

Answer:—The notion of what is *not-Soul* as 'Soul',—appearing in such forms as 'I am'; this is the *notion of 'I'* (Egoism, *Ahankāra*) 'Illusion'; † When one looks upon the not-Soul as 'I am', this is the conception that is called the notion of 'I' (Egoism, *Ahankāra*).

Question:—"What are those things in regard to which people have the notion of 'I'?"

Answer:—They are—the Body, the Sense-organs, the Mind, Feelings and Cognitions.

Question:—"In what way does the *notion of 'I'* in regard to these become the seed of metempsychosis?"

* It is the Soul and such things connected with the Soul, which, when wrongly known, lead to birth and death; hence it is the wrong notion of these things that has to be got rid of, as it is the True Knowledge of these that leads to the cessation of metempsychosis. The different views are—(1) True Knowledge consists of realisation of Brahman, says the Vedāntin; (2) according to the Sāṅkhya it consists in discrimination between Matter and Spirit; (3) the Nyāya view is that it consists in the recognising of the Soul as eternal, as distinguished from the non-eternal things, Body, Sense-organs etc. etc.

† The *Tātparya*, after having criticised the other views, sums up the Nyāya view thus:—It is because the notion of 'I' consists in regarding as *Soul*, the Body etc. which are *not-Soul*, that people have such hopes as 'may I not cease to be, may I continue to live'. Such ideas come to only such men as regard the Body etc. as their 'Soul', and never to one who knows the real character of the Soul, as different from Body etc. This latter man looks upon his Body as the snake does upon its cast-off slough; and so does not feel attached to it, and does not fear separation from it.

Answer :—When a man looks upon the Body etc. as 'this is I', he regards their destruction as *his own* destruction ; so that he becomes imbued with a longing for the non-destruction of those, and thus becomes equipped with them over and over again and he thus becoming equipped with them, all his efforts tend to bring for him births and deaths ; so that not being freed from these, he is never *released*. On the other hand, the man who looks upon Pain, Receptacle of Pain (Body), and Pleasure intermingled with Pain,—on all these things as 'Pain',—he is the man who knows the real nature of 'Pain', and when this 'Pain' has been duly recognised (in its true nature), it is not embraced by the man (as something desirable), and so comes to be dropped ; just like poisoned food. This man comes to look upon 'Defects' and 'Action' also as sources of pain ; and until the Defects have been removed, there is no possibility of cessation of the continuity of Pains ; hence the man renounces the 'defects' ; and when the 'defects' have been renounced, Activity does not lead to 'Rebirth',—as has already being explained (under Sū. 4-1-64).

Thus the man comes to the conclusion that 'Rebirth', 'Fruition', and 'Pain' are *things to be known*, and that 'Action' and 'Defects' are *things to be abandoned*, 'Final Release' is a *thing to be attained*, and True Knowledge is the *means of attaining it*. Thus when the man attends to, repeatedly looks upon and ponders over, the 'objects of cognition' as grouped under the aforesaid four categories, [(1) things mistaken as 'Soul,' *viz* Body *etc* ; (2) things to be known, *viz*. 'Rebirth' *etc*. ; (3) things to be renounced, *viz*. Defects and Action ; and (4) things to be attained, *viz*. 'Release']—there comes to him right perception,—*i e.* the cognition of things in their real character, *i e.* *True Knowledge*.

It is with a view to the above that we have the following *Sūtra*.

Sūtra 1

From the True Knowledge of the 'Cause of Defects' follows the cessation of the notion of 'I'.—

BHĀSYA

The 'objects of cognition' beginning from 'Body' and ending with 'Pain' [*i e.* Body Sense-organs, Objects of Perception, Appre-

hension, Mind, Activity, Defects, Rebirth, Fruition and Pain] are called the 'Cause of Defects', because these are what form the subjects of *wrong notions*;—hence when the 'True Knowledge' of these comes about, it sets aside the notion of 'I' in regard to them; for the True Knowledge of the said things (which are not the Soul, which alone can be rightly spoken of as 'I') is incompatible with the notion of 'I' in regard to those same things. Thus when True Knowledge has been attained, *'there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing about the annihilation of that which precedes it; and this ultimately leads to Final Release'* (Sū. 1-1-2.)

Thus we find that this brief statement of the main doctrine of philosophy is only a re-assertion (of what has been stated already under Sū. 1-1-2), and it is not meant to put forward any new doctrine.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The order in which this True Knowledge is to be attained is as follows.*

Sūtra 2

Colour and other objects, when they form the subjects of wrong notion, become the cause of Defects.†

BHĀṢYA

Such objects of Sense-perception as form the objects of desire are spoken of here as 'Colour and other objects'; when these are wrongly conceived, they set going Attachment, Hatred and Illusion. Hence it is these objects that the man should seek to know (and understand in their true character) first of all. When the man knows the true character of these, his wrong notions in

* Purī Ms. B. reads प्रसंख्यानानुपूर्वी, which gives better sense.

† It has been declared that one should set aside the notion of 'I' in regard to the Body etc. which are not-Soul. Now the Sūtra proceeds to describe with which of these latter the process should begin; and since the process is much easier in regard to external objects, the Sūtra begins with these '*Prasaṅkhyāna*' means true knowledge resulting from contemplation.'—*Tātparya*.

† '*Sankalpa* is explained by the *Tātparya* as meaning 'wrong notion'. Viśvanātha specifies it further as the notion that 'these are good and desirable things'.

regard to Colour etc., disappear. When these have disappeared, then he should seek to know the things related to the Soul, such as the Body and the rest. When the knowledge of these has been attained, the notion of 'I' in regard to things related to the Soul ceases forthwith. Thus, the man, acting with his mind wholly unattached, either to external objects or to objects related to the Soul, comes to be called 'released'.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The author next proceeds to instruct us as to the propriety of our ignoring certain aspects of things and pondering over certain others; and the next Sūtra has got nothing to do with either the proving or the disproving of things (as some people have supposed)

“What is this instruction?”

Sūtra 3

Regard for the object as a whole becomes the cause of Defects.

BHĀṢYA

The regard or admiration for the object as a whole brings about Defects. For instance (in connection with sexual love), for the Male, the conceiving of the Female as such, becomes a source of bondage, and for the Female the conceiving of the Male as such becomes a source of bondage.* And there are two aspects in which the object (Male or Female) can be conceived of.—(1) the aspect of organs, and (2) the figurative or poetical aspect

The 'aspect of organs' pertains to the teeth and the lips, the eyes and the nose, one by one; and the 'figurative aspect' pertains to the teeth or the lips, being 'so and so beautiful'. All this three-fold aspect intensifies Desire and its attendant Defects all which have to be avoided. The avoidance of the said object of love is to be done by conceiving of it in the terms of its limbs, —e.g., by conceiving of the Female as only made up of hairs, bristles, flesh, blood, bone, tendons, arteries, phlegm, bile, ordure and so forth. This is what is called the 'disagreeable aspect' (of the thing). When one ponders over this aspect of the thing, his desire and attachment for it cease.

* In translating 'pariskāra' as 'bondage' we have followed the Vṛtika which says—*pariskāro bandhanam*.

Thus then we find that there being two aspects (agreeable and disagreeable) of each object, there is one aspect (the agreeable) which should be ignored, while the other (the disagreeable) should be pondered over. This is what is taught here. Just as in the case of the poisoned food, while the food-aspect is meant to be acquired, the poison-aspect is to be avoided.*

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)

Sūtras 4-17

Dealing with Components and Composites

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Now the Idealist, with a view to deny the Object, proceeds to deal with (and demolish) the 'Composite'.†

Sūtra 4

"Apprehension and Non-apprehension being two-fold, there arises doubt."

BHĀṢYA

"Since there is apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, Apprehension is of two kinds; and since there is non-apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, non-apprehension also is of two kinds.‡ So that if we apprehend

* The *Parīśuddhi* remarks:—As a matter of fact, for one who seeks after Release, all things of the World, in all their aspects, are equally to be avoided, and are equally evil,—yet the author speaks of the two 'aspects' in regard to the ordinary Man of the World, who becomes desirous of Release only after having gone through a life of enjoyment.

† Says the *Tātparya*—The Idealist proceeds to deal with the Composite for the purpose of demolishing it. The conceptions spoken of under the preceding Sūtra are possible only when there is an object composed of several component parts. But since there is no such object, how can there be any such conceptions? It is with this view that the Idealist Pūrvaśaka proceeds to demolish the *Composite*; and thus we shall follow with the denial of the Atom. So that the Composite and the Component Atom being both demolished, Idea would be the only thing left.

On this the *Parīśuddhi*—Some people have tried to get rid of the entire fabric of Instruction expounded under the preceding Sūtra, by denying the *Composite*, in the absence whereof none of the 'conceptions' described above are possible.

‡ There is apprehension of the existent thing when we see water in the tank, there is also apprehension of the non-existent thing when we perceive

the Composite, there is doubt, since Apprehension is of both kinds;—on the other hand, if we do not apprehend the Composite, then also there is doubt, since non-apprehension also is of both kinds. Thus then, whether the Composite is apprehended, or not apprehended,—in either case it does not become free from doubt.”

Sūtra 5

There can be no doubt (in regard to the Composite), as its existence has been established by reasons already explained before.

BHĀSYA

No doubt is possible (in regard to the Composite);—why? because the reasons already explained before (under Sū. 2-1-33 *et seq.*) have not been refuted; so that it remains established that there is such a thing as the *Composite* arising out of, and distinct from, the *Components*.

Sūtra 6

[*Objection*]—“**In that case, (we might as well say that), since the existence (of any such thing as the Composite) is impossible, there can be no doubt (as to whether it exists or not).**”*

BHĀSYA

“No doubt is possible. That is, there certainly *is* no such thing as the Composite. This is further explained (in the next Sūtra).”

Sūtra 7

[*Objection continued*]—“**Inasmuch as the components cannot reside either in the whole or in a part (of the Composite), it follows that there is no Composite**”†

water in the mirage. There is non-apprehension of the existent thing when we do not perceive long-buried treasure; and there is non-apprehension of the non-existent thing when we do not perceive the absent Jar. So that whether we apprehend the Composite whole or not, there is doubt as to its existence or non-existence—*Tātparya*.

* This Sūtra is not found in the Purī Sū. Ms. The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* has omitted तैः.

† Sūtras 7 and 8 are not in Viśvanātha, nor in any Sū Ms. They are found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and Viśvanātha also says that they have been regarded as Sūtra. From the Bhāṣya—‘*tad vibhajate*’ also it would appear that they are ‘*Sūtra*’.

BHĀṢYA

“As a matter of fact, each single *component* cannot reside in the entire *Composite*; (1) because both are not of the same dimension, and (2) because, in that case, there would be no connection between the *Composite* and the other *components*. Nor can the *component* reside in only a part of the *Composite*; for the simple reason that the *Composite* has no ‘parts’ apart from the *Components*”

“If (in order to escape from this difficulty) it be held that it is the *Composite* that subsists in the *Components* (and not the *Components* in the *Composite*),—[then our answer is as given in the following *Sūtra*].”

Sūtra 8

[*Objection continued*].—“**Inasmuch as it is not possible (for the Composite) to reside in them,—there can be no Composite.**”

BHĀṢYA

“(a) The entire *Composite* cannot reside in each one of the *Components*,—because they are of different sizes; and further, because in this manner the (*Composite*) object would consist of a single component substance [and as such it would have to be regarded as eternal, which is absurd]. (b) Nor can the *Composite* subsist *in parts* in all the components; as it has no other parts (except those same components) ’

“From all this it follows that it is not right to entertain any doubts (as to whether the *Composite* exists or not),—the conclusion doubtless is that there does not exist any such thing as the *Composite*.”

Sūtra 9

[*Objection continued*].—“**And since the Composite cannot reside apart from the Components (there can be no such thing as the Composite).**”*

* Viśvanātha notices three interpretations of this *Sūtra*.—(1) As in the *Bhāṣya*. (2) The *Composite* could not subsist apart from the *Components*; as in that case it would be non-existent:—(3) For reasons given in the preceding *Sūtra*, the *Composite* could have no existence even apart from the *Components*, hence it does not exist at all

BHĀSYA

* “*There can be no such thing as the ‘Composite’*—These words have to be brought in from the preceding *Sūtra* The Composite cannot reside apart from the Components,—(1) because it is not so perceived, and (2) because in that case it would be eternal. For these reasons it follows that there is no such thing as the Composite”

Sūtra 10

[*Objection continued*—“**Lastly, the Composite cannot be the same as the Components.**”†

BHĀSYA

“The Composite cannot be regarded as a mere quality of the Components,—why?—because, as shown above, there can be no connection of the said quality with the *qualified* Components; and apart from the *qualified* Components, the quality is never perceived; this last argument being the same as that urged before (in the preceding *Sūtra*).”

Sūtra 11

[*Answer*—From the standpoint of the *Siddhānta*—**Inasmuch as there is no diversity in what is one only, terms connoting diversity cannot be applied to it; so that there is no room for the question put by the Pūrvapakṣin** §

BHĀSYA

There is no room for the question—“Does the Composite reside in the Components in its entirety, or only in parts?”—[as

*The correct reading of the *Bhāṣya* on this *Sūtra* is found in Puri Ms B अवयव्यभाव इति वर्तते । न चायम्पृथगवयवेभ्यो वर्तते, अग्रहणात् नित्यत्व-प्रसङ्गच्च । तस्मान्नास्त्यवयवीति ।

† This *Sūtra* is directed against those persons who have held the following view —“The Composite is only a quality of the Components, and it is neither absolutely different from them, not absolutely non-different; it is *both* different and non-different from them.”

§ The *Vārtika* remarks that there are two parts of the *Pūrvapakṣa* — (1) Do the Components subsist in the Composite? and (2) If the Composite subsists in the Components, does it do so in its entirety or in parts? The (1) is ignored by the *Sūtrakāra* for the simple reason that no Logician acknowledges the subsistence of the Component (cause) in the Composite (Effect)

Hence it is only the (2) that is answered by the *Siddhāntin* in this *Sūtra*.

put by the Pūrvapakṣin under Sū. 7 *et. seq*]—Why?—Because *inasmuch as there is no diversity in what is one only, terms connoting diversity cannot be applied to it.* As a matter of fact, the term ‘*kṛtsna*’, ‘entire’, connotes *all members of a group consisting of several individuals*, and the term ‘*ekadeśa*’, ‘a part’, connotes a few individuals out of several; so that both these terms, ‘entire’ and ‘in part’ are connotative of *diversity*, and as such they cannot be applied to the *Composite* which, being a single entity, is devoid of diversity

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin has argued that—“The Composite cannot reside in parts in the Components, because it has no other ‘parts’ (apart from the Components)” ;—but this is not right reasoning.

Sūtra 12

Even if there were other parts (of the Composite),* it could not subsist (in the Components); hence the reasoning is not right.

[In support of the proposition that the Composite cannot subsist in the Components, or in its parts] the Opponent has propounded the reason “because the Composite has no other parts”; but † even if ‘parts’ of the Composite were actually other than its Component, the meaning (of the Composite subsisting *in part* in the Components) would be that one part or Component subsists in another part or Component,—and not that the Composite subsists in them. If the Composite be accepted as being something different (from the Components), then,—even though it had ‘parts’ other than its Components, it would not mean the subsisting of the Composite, and hence it would not mean that it is *in parts* that the Composite subsists in the Components ;—so that there can be no force in the reasoning—“be-

* The V1z. text reads अवयवान्तरभावे; as also V1śvanātha, Purī Bhā. Ms., Purī Sū. Ms. and Sū. Ms. C. But Sū. Ms. D, the *Nyāyasūcīnbandha* and the *Tātparya* read अवयवान्तरभावे. Mss. of the *Vārtika* contain both. In view, however, of the explanation given in the *Bhāṣya*, अवयवान्तरभावे should be accepted as the right reading.

† अवयवान्तरभूतस्य does not give good sense. Purī Ms. B. reads अवयवान्तरभूत : which gives better sense.

cause it has no parts apart from the Components (the Composite subsists in parts in the Components).”

Question —“ What is the meaning then of the *subsisting* (of the Composite in the Components) ? ”

Answer :—What it means is that there is *co-existence* (juxtaposition), consisting in the relation of container and contained, between the one (Composite) and the many (Components).

“ What is the meaning of the *relation of container and contained* ? ”

It means that when between two things it is found that one can have no existence apart from the other, the latter is called the ‘ container ’ ; and as a matter of fact, the Product can have no existence apart from its constituent cause ; but this is not the case with the constituents (which may exist apart from the product). [So that what is meant by the Composite subsisting in the Components is that it cannot exist apart from these latter.]

“ But how can this be so in the case of eternal things (which have no cause) ? ”

In their case we infer it from what we perceive in the case of non-eternal things. What you mean to ask is—“ how can there be the relation of container and contained in the case of eternal things ? ”—and our answer is that when we perceive in the case of non-eternal things—substances and qualities—the relation of container and contained, we infer from this that similar relation exists in the case of eternal things also.

From all that has gone before (under Sūtras 4-12) it follows that what has been prohibited (under Sū. 3)—for the benefit of the person seeking after the highest good—is the *having of regard for objects as a whole* ; and it does not mean that there is no such thing as the *Composite* ; just as in regard to Colour etc., what has been prohibited is the *wrong notion* of them ; and the existence of Colour etc., themselves has not been denied.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Under Sū. 2-1-34 the *Siddhāntin* has put forward, in proof of the existence of the Composite, the argument that—‘ if there were no Composite, there would be non-apprehension of all things ’ ; and even though he has been answered by this, the *Pūrvapakṣin* re-asserts his contention [having been reminded of the previous arguments by the reference to them in Sū. 4-2-5] :—

Sūtra 13

“ The perception of things would be possible , just like the perception of the mass of hairs by the person of dim vision.”

BHĀSYA

“ As a matter of fact, we find that the man whose vision is dimmed does not perceive each single hair ; and yet he does perceive the mass of hair , similarly though each single Atom may not be perceived, yet it would be quite possible to perceive a mass of atoms. Thus the perception that we have of things (and which the Siddhāntin has put forward as inexplicable except by the assuming of the *Composite* as apart from the component atoms) really pertains to the *masses of Atoms* (and not to any such thing as the *Composite*).”

Sūtra 14

The efficiency (distinctness) and dulness (indistinctness) of the perception is due to the efficiency and dulness of the sense-organs ; but these never go beyond the range of their respective objectives ; and they cannot operate upon what is not their objectives

BHĀSYA

This efficiency and dulness of the Sense-organs are in reference only to their respective objectives ; and it is from this that there follows the distinctness and indistinctness of the perceptions. That is, however efficient the Visual Organ may become, it can never apprehend *odour*, which is not the special object of visual perception ; and however dull it may become, it cannot fail to apprehend its own object. Now (turning to the case cited by the Opponent) there may be some person who, having his vision dimmed, does not perceive the hair singly ; while he does perceive the *mass* of hair ; and yet both (the single hair and the mass of hair) are perceived by the person whose vision is not dimmed. [But in all cases the man's eyes apprehend the *Hair*, either singly or in mass, which is an object perceptible through that organ]. Atoms, on the other hand, are beyond the reach of the sense-organs ; they never become objects of perception through the organs ; they are never apprehended by any sense-organ ;—under the circumstances, if the *Mass of Atoms* were perceived, (through sense-organs) it would mean that

the organs have operated upon something which is not their object at all ; for (according to the Opponent) there is no other object except Atoms (and Atoms are absolutely imperceptible). So that what the Opponent asserts (in Sū. 13) comes to mean that when the Atoms, being massed, become perceived, they renounce their imperceptibility,—and when, being disjoined, they fail to be perceived, they cease to be objects of perception through by the sense-organs. All this would be entirely absurd, except on the supposition that a new object is produced (when the Atoms become massed) From all this it follows that what forms the object of perception is an object distinct (from the component Atoms),

It might be urged that “what forms the object of perception is merely the mass (of the Atoms themselves)” But this would not be right ; for ‘ Mass ’ is only of the nature of *conjunction. combination* ; and the *conjunction* of things that are themselves imperceptible can never be perceived ; hence the explanation propounded would be highly improper. As a matter of fact, the ‘ Mass ’ is only *the conjunction or combination of several things* ; and when we perceive a conjunction—as that ‘ this thing is in conjunction with that thing ’,—it is only the conjunction of things that are themselves perceptible, and never that of things beyond the reach of sense-organs ;—hence the explanation put forward cannot be right. Further, in the case of things perceptible through the sense-organs, if they fail to be perceived, there is always found some thing, in the shape of an obstruction, that serves to prevent the perception [and we do not find any such thing as should prevent our perceiving of the Atoms, if they were perceptible]. It follows from all this that the non-perception of single Atoms cannot be due to the inefficiency of the sense-organs ; just as the non-apprehension of Odour etc., through the Eye cannot be due to the inefficiency of that organ.

Sūtra 15

The difficulties in connection with Composites and Components would continue till the total negation of all things.

BHĀṢYA

The Opponent has pointed out difficulties in the way in which the Composite may subsist in its Components, and has, on that ground, denied the existence of the Composite. But the

components (the pieces that go to make up the Jar, e.g.) also have their own component parts ; and the said difficulties would be applicable to the way in which the Component may subsist in its own component parts ; so that, these difficulties should either lead us to deny the existence of all things, or they would lead us on and on to the mere Atom, which has no component parts ;—and either of these contingencies would mean that there does not exist anything that could be the object of perception, (the Atoms being imperceptible) ;—and in the absence of all objects of perception, there could be no Perception ;—and yet the denial of the subsistence of the Composite in its Components is supposed to be based upon facts of ordinary perception. Thus, when this denial (of the subsistence of the Composite etc.) ultimately leads to the denial of its very basis (in the form of Perception), it must be regarded as striking at its own very root. [Hence the fact urged by the *Siddhāntin* under Sū. 2-1-34, remains, that if there is no Composite there can be no Perception at all]

Sūtra 16

But as a matter of fact,—

The total denial of all things cannot be right ; for the Atom remains.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, however, the (Opponent's) denial of things based upon the difficulties in connection with the subsistence of components and their parts, would cease at the Atom ; it cannot lead to the total denial of all things. Because the Atom has no component parts ; and difficulties based upon the dividing of things into their component parts must end at the thing than which there is nothing smaller. For instance, when we proceed to divide a clod of earth, into parts, we get at smaller and smaller particles ; and this division must come to an end at that piece than which there could be no smaller piece, and which is (on that account) the smallest piece possible ; and it is that very thing than which there is nothing smaller which we call 'Atom'.*

* It is only for the sake of argument that the two contingencies have been put forward in the preceding *Sūtra*. It is now shown that the denial of the Composite can lead only to the postulating of the Atom ; and as this is imperceptible, the *Pūrvapaksa* view would do away with all Perception, as urged by the *Siddhāntin*, under Sū. 2-1-34.

Sūtra 17

Or [the Atom may be defined as] that which is beyond the Diad.

BHĀŚYA

As according to the Pūrvapakṣa (a) there would be no end to the division of things into their component particles, and (b) all things would come to consist of equally innumerable component substances,—there could be no such thing as the *Diad*.*

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

(*Sūtras 18-25*)

Regarding the Atom being without parts.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀŚYA

The Nihilist, holding the view that “all things are non-existent”, urges the following argument†:—

Sūtra 18

[*Objection.*]—“There can be no such thing (as the indivisible Atom), as it is surely permeated by Ākāśa ”

BHĀŚYA

“*There can be no such thing as the impartite eternal Atom;—Why?—Because it is surely permeated by Ākāśa; both inside and outside the Atom must be surrounded by Ākāśa, permeated*

* The term ‘*truti*’, literally, ‘dismemberment’, has come to mean the Diad. The point is that unless some end is postulated in the process of division, all things would consist of equally innumerable particles; which would mean that the mountain is of the same size as the grain of sand.

† The theory of the whole world emanating from the Void has been disposed of under Sūtras 4-1-14 to 17. The hypothesis taken up now is that all is mere *Void*. And in course of the refutation of this hypothesis, the Author proceeds to show that there do exist certain things that are devoid of parts, this subject being a natural sequence to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing section that there is such a thing as the *Composite*, composed of Component parts.

Viśvanātha introduces the section with the following remarks.—The present section is introduced with a view to establish the existence of the *impartite* Atom, in answer to the view that the world being a *Void* there can be no such thing as the Atom, on which the whole argument of the Siddhānta in the foregoing section is based.

by it ; and being so permeated, it must be made up of parts ; and being made up of parts, it must be non-eternal.”*

Sūtra 19

“Or else, Ākāś’a would be not all-pervading.”

BHĀṢYA

“ If it is not admitted (that the Atom is permeated by Ākāśa), then it would mean that there is no Ākāśa inside the Atom ; so that Ākāśa would cease to be *all-pervading* ”

Sūtra 20

[*Answer*]**—Inasmuch as the terms ‘ inside ’ and ‘ outside ’ are denotative of other constituent causes of the Product,—they cannot apply to the case of the Atom, which is not a ‘ product ’.**

BHĀṢYA

When one uses the term ‘ inside ’ (in regard to an object), it stands for that constituent (part) of it which is hidden (from view) by other constituents ; and the term ‘ outside ’ is applied to that constituent (part) which hides the others ; and which itself is not hidden (from view). And [since both these terms are applied to parts or *constituent causes*], these can apply only to such objects as are *products* ; they can never apply to the Atom, because it is not a *product* ; the Atom not being a *product*, the terms ‘ inside ’ and ‘ outside ’ cannot apply to it ; and the object to which these terms are really applicable is only a *product (composed) of the Atom*, and not the Atom itself ; because the Atom is the name of that than which there is nothing smaller.

Sūtra 21

It is by reason of the pervasion of Sound and of Conjunctions, that Ākāś’a is regarded to be all-pervading.†

* The real point of this objection, as the *Tātparya* points out, is that if the Atom is made up of parts, its existence will be open to the same difficulties as those that have been shown to beset any ordinary Composite ; so that the inevitable conclusion could only be that the Atom is as non-existent as an ordinary thing,—and that *nothing is existent, all is Void*.

† The *Tātparya* expounds the compound in both ways—(1) Pervasion of Sound and of Conjunctions, and (2) Pervasion of the Conjunctions of Sounds’. The *Bhāṣya* has adopted the former.

The *Vārtika* reads the *Sūtra* as सर्वसंयोगे etc.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Sounds, that are produced anywhere, are found to pervade in *Ākāśa*, and subsist in it ;—similarly the conjunctions that take place,—with Minds, with *Atoms*, and with their products,—are also found to pervade in *Ākāśa* ; not a single corporeal object is ever found to be disjoined from *Ākāśa*. From these two facts it follows that *Ākāśa* cannot but be *all-pervading*

Sūtra 22

‘ **Absence of Transfigurations** ’, ‘ **Unobstructiveness** ’ and ‘ **All-pervasiveness** ’ are the properties of *Ākāśa*.*

BHĀṢYA

There is no *transfiguration* (or displacement) caused in *Ākāśa* by things moving in it or striking against it ; as there is in Water by the piece of wood passing through it ;—and what is the reason for this ? ;—the reason for this lies in the fact that *Ākāśa* is not made up of parts. Secondly, *Ākāśa* offers no obstruction to things moving in it or striking against it ; that is, it does not counteract that quality of the thing which causes its motion ;—and why is this so ?—It is because *Ākāśa* is not tangible. It is only under contrary conditions,—*i.e.*, in the case, of such objects as are made up of parts and are tangible,—that we find obstruction ; and certainly you cannot attribute it to a substance where these conditions are not present.

Further, the character of ‘ product ’ must be denied to the Atom, because it would mean that the component parts of the Atom are smaller than the Atom ; if the Atom were made up of parts, these parts should be smaller than the Atom ;—why ?—because it is always found that there is a difference of size between the Cause and its Product ; it is for this reason that the parts of the Atom would have to be smaller than the Atom ; as the Atom that is made up of component parts must be a

* This *Sūtra* anticipates the following objection :—If *Ākāśa* is really all-pervading, as asserted under the foregoing *Sūtra*, then it should offer obstruction to things moving in it, and it should undergo changes in its shape by such objects ; as we find in the case of water ; as no such phenomena are found to take place, *Ākāśa* cannot be all-pervading.

The sense of the reply is that this reasoning would be all right, if *Ākāśa* also, like Water, were made up of parts, and tangible.

Product.* It is for this reason that we deny the fact of the Atom being a Product.

Lastly, the *non-eternality* of products is due to the dismemberment of its constituent cause, and not to 'permeation by *Ākāśa*' (as held by the Opponent, in Sū. 4-2-18) : e.g., when the clod of earth is destroyed, it is so by reason of the dismemberment of its component parts, and not by the entering into it of *Ākāśa*.

Sūtra 23

[The *Nihīlist*][†]—“**But the Atom must be made up of component parts ; because it is only corporeal objects that have shape.**”

BHĀṢYA

“As a matter of fact, shape belongs to only such things as are limited and tangible,—such shapes as triangular, rectangular, square, and globular ; and this ‘shape’ is only a particular arrangement of component parts ;—Atoms also are endowed with the globular *shape* ; hence these must be made up of component parts.”†

Sūtra 24

“**Also because they are capable of conjunction [Atoms must be made up of component parts].**”

BHĀṢYA

“When an Atom comes between two other Atoms and becomes conjoined to them, it brings about separation between them ; and from this separation it is inferred that the intervening Atom is conjoined, in its forepart, with the Atom lying behind it, and, in its aft-parts, with the Atom appearing in front of it ; and these fore and aft-parts are the ‘component parts’ of the Atom. Similarly when the Atom becomes conjoined in all its parts, it must be regarded as having component parts all over.”

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the arguments of the *Nihīlist*, as follows]—

* The right reading for सणुकार्यत्त् is सणुःकार्यत्त्.

† The *Vārtika* and *Viśvanātha* construe the Sūtra as propounding two reasons.—“The Atom must be made up of components,—(a) because it is corporeal, and (b) because it has shape.”

(A) As regards the argument—“*The Atom must be made up of component parts, because it is only corporeal objects that have shape*” (Sū. 23),—this has been answered by us already. “What is the answer that has been given?” The answer given was—(a) that there can be nothing smaller than that at which the process of division comes to an end (under Sū. 4-2-16);—and (b) that the Atom cannot be regarded as a product, as, if it were so, then the parts of the Atom would be smaller still (under Sū. 4-2-22). (B) As regards the argument—“*also because they are capable of conjunction*” (Sū. 24),—which means that “the Atom can bring about separation only if it is tangible, and conjunction not pervading over the whole of its substratum, it must be divisible into parts”,—this also we have answered by pointing out that it is true that the Atom is tangible, but the separation caused by the intervening Atom is due to its being an obstacle in the way of the coming together of the two Atoms,—and not to its being made up of component parts. “But the Atom being tangible and causing separation, inasmuch as the conjunction of the Atom does not pervade over the whole of its substratum, the Atom must be divisible into parts, and it would appear as if it were made up of component parts” This also we have answered by pointing out (above)—(a) that the process of division must end at a thing than which there is nothing smaller, and (b) that the Atom cannot be regarded as a product, as that would mean that its parts are still smaller.

As regards the arguments—“(a) *Because it is only corporeal objects that have shape* (Sū. 24), and (b) *because Atoms are capable of conjunction* (Sū. 24), Atoms must be regarded as being made up of component parts”,—these arguments

Sūtra 25

Cannot set aside (the fact of Atoms being impartite), because they lead to an infinite regress, and infinite regress cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

The arguments put forward mean that everything that is corporeal, and everything that is conjunct,—all these are made up of parts; and as such these arguments lead to an *infinite regress*; and infinite regress cannot be right; if *infinite regress* were right, then alone could the said arguments have any force.

Consequently these cannot set aside the fact of Atoms being impartite.

Further, as a matter of fact, it is possible for the division of an object to completely destroy that object, hence it is not possible to carry on the process of division till the disappearance of the object.

If there were an *infinite regress* (such as is involved in the Opponent's arguments), it would mean that in every object there are endless component substances, so that (a) there should be no conception either of diverse dimensions, or of gravity,—and (b) after the dismemberment of the component parts of the Atom, the Composite and the Component would have to be regarded as of equal dimension.

End of section (3)

SECTION (4)
(Sūtras 26–37)

Refutation of the Denial of the External World

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Bauddha Idealist says]—“ You take your stand upon Cognitions, and then go on to assert that the objects of these Cognitions exist; but all these Cognitions are wrong notions. If these were right notions, then alone could the proper examination of Cognitions enable us to form an idea of and comprehend the real character of their objects.*

Sūtra 26

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—“ As a matter of fact, however, when we come to analyse things by our reason, we fail to apprehend their real character; and this non-apprehension must be like the non-apprehension of the ‘ cloth ’ after the yarns have been abstracted.”†

* The foregoing two sections have proved that all ordinary things are made up of component parts, and that the Atom is not so made up;—we are now led on to discuss the question as to whether or not external objects exist. It is only when external things exist that there can be any occasion for considering whether or not they are composites.

† Cf. *Bauddhakārikā*—बुद्धया विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निस्स्वभावाश्च कर्तिताः ॥

Satish Ch. Vidyābhūṣaṇa finds in this Sūtra an echo of the *Mādhyamika-sūtras*.

BHĀSYA

“ When we come to analyse each yarn in the Cloth,—as ‘this is a yarn’, ‘this is another yarn’, and so forth,—we fail to perceive in it anything else besides the yarns, which could be the real object of the notion of ‘Cloth’; and since we do not perceive things as they are ordinarily conceived of, it follows that no such things (as the Cloth) exist, so that the *Cloth* being non-existent, if there is a notion of ‘Cloth’ it must be a wrong notion; similarly with all things.’* ”

Sūtra 27

[*Siddhānta*]**—The reason propounded is invalid, as it involves self-contradiction.**

· BHĀSYA

If an ‘analysis’ of things by reason is possible, then it is not true that the real nature of things is not apprehended; if, on the other hand, the real nature of things is not apprehended, then there can be no analysis or scrutiny of things by reason. So that to allege, that “there is analysis of things by reason—and the real nature of things is not apprehended”, involves a contradiction in terms. We have explained all this under Sū. 4-2-15, where it has been pointed out that—‘the difficulties in connection with Composites and Components would continue till the total negation of things’ †

Sūtra 28

The non-apprehension (of the whole) apart (from its parts) is due to the fact that it subsists in these.

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, the Product subsists, is contained, in its Causes; it is for this reason that it is not apprehended apart from these latter; there is separate apprehension only when the contrary happens to be the case; that is, two things are separately apprehended only when one is not contained in the other

* There is no Cloth apart from the yarns; there is no yarn apart from its parts, and so on, up to Atoms, of Atoms also we cannot perceive the real character. Hence from Atom upwards, no Object exists.

† When the real nature of a thing is not comprehended, how can there be analysis of it by reason? [As regards the analysis of things put forward by the Opponent under the preceding Sūtra] the process of analysing must end at a certain point; if it did not, then the Diad would become immeasurable, etc etc etc as pointed out before.—*Tātparya*.

Then again, the analysis of things by reason does lead to the distinct apprehension of things,—as is found in the case of Atoms which are imperceptible ; that is, that which is perceived by the senses, when it comes to be analysed, is surely recognised as different (from the *imperceptible* Atoms).*

Sūtra 29

In reality, things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition.†

BHĀṢYA

When things are analysed by reason, what sort of apprehension of the real nature of things we have, and how we have it,—and also what sort of apprehension we do not have, and how we do not have it,—all this is known through what we can cognise by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition. In fact, the very ‘analysis of things by reason’ consists of what is cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition ; as it is only such cognitions that pervade through all scriptures and all actions, as also all activities of living beings. It is only when one comes to examine things by his reason that he comes to determine that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist. And such an examination or analysis does not warrant the conclusion that nothing exists‡.

Sūtra 30

By reason of the possibility and impossibility of proofs [the *Pūrvapaksa* allegation becomes untenable]

BHĀṢYA

Under the circumstances, the allegation “nothing exists” in untenable—Why?—*By reason of the possibility and impossibility*

* In the case of ordinarily perceptible composites and components—where both are perceptible, e.g. the cloth and the yarns,—it may be difficult to apprehend the composite as distinct from its parts. But when it comes to the composite thing whose components are atoms, the distinct apprehension becomes quite easy ; the composite being perceptible while the component is not perceptible.—*Tātparya*.

† This *Sūtra* is meant to show that even in the case of ordinary things, where the composite and its components are both perceptible, we do have the distinct apprehension of things in their real character.—*Tātparya*.

‡ The *Tātparya* construes this last sentence with the following *Sūtra*. It appears better to construe it with the foregoing *Bhāṣya*. The connection of the next *Sūtra* follows from its very construction.

of proofs. That is, if proof is available in support of the allegation that "nothing exists", then the allegation becomes self-condemned.—If, on the other hand, no proof is available in support of the allegation, how can it be established? If it can be established without proofs, then why cannot the assertion "all things exist" be regarded as established?

Sūtras 31-32

[*The Idealist objects to what has been said in Sū. 30.*]—

"The notion of reality in regard to the 'Instruments of Right Cognition' and 'objects cognised' (by means thereof) is similar to the notion of the reality of dreams and the objects dreamt of; (Sū. 31)—or, it may be likened to the notions of reality in regard to Magical phenomena, imaginary cities in the Air, and the Mirage."

BHĀSYA

"In Dreams, no objects are existent, and yet we have the notion of reality in regard to them; similarly neither 'Instruments of Cognition' nor 'Objects of Cognition' are really existent, yet we have the notion of reality in regard to 'Instruments of Cognition' and 'objects cognised' by means thereof. [And it is not so in Dreams only, in the waking condition also, we have several such notions of reality in regard to things not really existent; e.g., magical phenomena etc., etc.]"

Sūtra 33

[*Answer*]—**Since there is no reason (in support of it), the Proposition (of the Opponent) cannot be regarded as established.**

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, there is no reason in support of the view that "the notion of 'Instruments' and 'Objects' of Cognition are like the notion of reality in regard to things dreamt of, and it is not like the cognition of things during the waking state";—and since there is no such reason, the Proposition cannot be regarded as established. In fact, there is no reason to show that what are cognised during dreams are non-existent things.—"Inasmuch as things dreamt of are not perceived when the man wakes up, (they must be regarded as *non-existent*)."—[According to this reasoning of yours] inasmuch as we do appre-

hend the things cognised during the waking state, the existence of these cannot be denied ; if, from the fact of our not apprehending, on waking, the things cognised in dreams, you infer that these things are not existent,—then it follows that the things that we do apprehend when awake, are *existent*, because they *are* apprehended ; so that the reason you put forward in proof of the unreality of things dreamt of) is found to have the power of proving a conclusion contrary to your tenets. It is only when the existence of things can be inferred from their apprehension, that you can infer their non-existence from their non-apprehension.* And if under both circumstances (of dream as well as of waking) things were equally non-existent, then non-apprehension could have no power at all (of proving anything) ; when, for example, there is non-perception of Colour when the lamp is absent, what justifies our attributing the non-perception of Colour to the absence of the Lamp is the fact that the Colour is existent,† (and would have been perceived if the lamp were there).

Further, you have to show cause for the diversity that is found in dream-cognitions ; e g., one dream is beset with dread, another with joy, and yet another is devoid of both ; while at times one does not dream of anything at all. According to the theory under which the dream-cognitions are due to real causes, the said diversity can be explained as being due to the diversity in those causes. §

Sūtra 34

Like Remembrance and Desire, the cognition of objects in dreams also—

* The right reading is उपलम्भात् सद्भावेऽसति अनुपलम्भाद्भावः सिध्यति as found in Puri B., and countenanced by the *Vārtika*.

† We can attribute the non-perception of colour to the absence of the lamp, only if we know that colour is existent, and would have been perceived if the lamp were there. If all things were always—during dreams as well as during the waking state—non-existent, then their non-perception could not prove anything at all ; as in that case we could have no such notion as that ‘if it existed, it would have been perceived’.

§ This explanation cannot be available for the Idealist, for whom there is no real object at all.

BHĀṢYA

has for its object something that has been previously apprehended [this has to be added to complete the Sūtra]. Just as Remembrance and Desire have for their objects previously apprehended things, and are incapable of lending support to the denial of the reality of such things,—so in dreams also the cognition of things has for its object things that have been previously apprehended; hence these also do not justify the notion that no such things exist. Thus in reality the Dream-cognition is always one that has its object previously perceived in the waking state; and when the sleeping man who has seen a dream wakes up, he recognises the dream-cognitions as his own, the idea in his mind being ‘this is what I saw in my dream’. And it is only in relation to (and in comparison with) the said waking cognition that we come to the conclusion that the Dream-cognition is unreal. That is to say, when on waking one recognises the Dream-cognition—as ‘this is what I saw in my dream’—it is the recognition that leads him to the conclusion—‘my cognition of things in the dream is unreal’. If there be no difference between the two, the proof becomes meaningless; that is, he for whom there is no difference (on the point of reality) between the waking and the dream-cognition, for him the proof or reason,—that ‘the notion of Instruments and Objects of Cognition is *like the notions of things in a dream*’ (Sū 31)—can have no meaning; for he has denied the very basis of such an allegation; the idea of a thing as what it is not (*i. e.* a wrong notion) is always based upon a real original (counterpart); *e.g.*, the conception of the pillar, which is not man, as ‘man’ is always based upon a real original; *i. e.* until the original, the real *man*, has been perceived, one can have no conception of ‘man’ in regard to what is *not man*. Similarly the conception of things in a dream,—such as ‘I have seen an elephant’, ‘I have seen a mountain’,—can only rest on the basis of some real counterpart (the cognition of real elephants and mountains) *

Such being the case,—

* Unless one has had a previous cognition of the real object, he can have no wrong conceptions in regard to it

Sūtra 35

The destruction of Wrong Apprehension follows from True Knowledge ; just as there is destruction of the conception of things during a dream, on waking.

BHĀṢYA

When one has the conception of 'man' in regard to the Pillar, this is 'wrong apprehension',—being the apprehension of the thing as what it is not : whereas when, in regard to the Pillar one has the conception of 'pillar', this is 'True Knowledge' ;—and what is set aside by 'True Knowledge' is the wrong *Apprehension*, not the *Object*,—the generic character of 'object' being common to the Man and the Pillar* Just as when the man wakes up, the cognition that he has set aside the *conception* of things that he had during the dream,—and not the 'object' in general. Similarly in the case of magical phenomena, imaginary cities and mirage, we have the cognition of things as what they are not ; and these wrong apprehensions also are set aside, in the manner described above, by 'True Knowledge', which does not set aside the fact of the cognitions having some sort of an *objective counterpart*. As a matter of fact, in the case of magic etc, also, the Wrong Apprehension has always got some basis in reality ; for what happens in what is called 'magic' is that the man equipped with the necessary appliances, takes up a real substance similar to that whose illusion he intends to produce, and in regard to this real substance, he brings about the wrong apprehension in another person ;—in the case of the 'Imaginary City', what happens is that either Snow or some such real substance actually comes to assume the shape of a city, and hence, from a distance, people come to conceive of it as 'City' ; that this is what really happens is proved by the fact that the illusion does not appear when there is no such substance as the said Snow ;—similarly again, when the Sun's rays, coming into contact with the heat radiating from the Earth's surface, begin to flicker, there arises the notion of 'water' in regard to it, by reason of the perception of the common quality of (flickering) ;

* When we subsequently come to recognise the pillar as 'pillar', all that this proves is that our former *cognition* of it was wrong, *not* that the 'man' (as which the pillar had been formerly apprehended) is non-existent, nor that the former cognition had no *objective* counterpart at all.

that this is so is proved by the fact that when the man draws near, or when the Sun's rays are not there, there is no such illusion. Thus we find that in the case of every Wrong Apprehension there is some sort of real entity at the bottom somewhere, and no Wrong Apprehension is entirely baseless. We also find that there is a clear difference in the character of the two cognitions,—viz : (a) that of the magician and his audience (the former regarding the magic phenomenon as *unreal*, and the latter believing it to be *real*) ; (b) that of the man at a distance and of one who is near at hand, the former regarding the 'imaginary city' and the 'miragic water' as *real*, while the latter has no idea of such things at all, and (c) that of the sleeping man and of the waking man. All this diversity would be inexplicable if everything were non-existent, and as such entirely without any name or character.

Sūtra 36

[*Having disposed of the Idealist, who, while denying the reality of the External World, admits the Idea,—the Author next takes up the Nihilist, who demes the Idea also*]—**In the same manner, the existence of the 'Apprehension' also (cannot be denied) ; because we actually perceive its cause, as also its real existence.**

BHĀṢYA

Just as the existence of the 'object' of Wrong Apprehension cannot be denied, so that of the Apprehension itself cannot be denied ;—why ?—(a) because we actually perceive its cause, and (b) because we actually perceive its real existence ; (a) as a matter of fact, we are actually cognisant of the cause of Wrong Apprehension ; and (b) Wrong Apprehension also is found to appear in every person, and is actually cognised as such, being, as it is, distinctly cognisable. From all this it follows that Wrong Apprehension actually exists.

[And when even *Wrong Apprehension is real, Right Apprehension is all the more so*].

Sūtra 37

Wrong Apprehension has a double character, based upon the difference between the real object and the counterpart.*

* The Bauddha argues that, since the object of Wrong Apprehension is non-existent, that of Right Apprehension also must be non-existent. This

BHĀṢYA

The 'real object' is the *Pillar*, and the 'counterpart' ; the *Man* ; and whenever there is a wrong apprehension of the Pillar as 'Man', both of these—the real object and the counterpart—are manifested in it quite distinctly, and the misapprehension is due to the perception of their common properties ;—similarly there is misapprehension of the *Flag* as a *line of crane*; of a piece of *stone* as a *pigeon*. In fact, Wrong Apprehensions are possible only in regard to *similar* objects, because they are brought about by the perception of *common* properties (belonging to two or more similar objects). (For these reasons, he for whom everything is without name and form—according to such a person there can be no possibility (of Wrong Apprehension).

As regards Odour and such other objects of Cognition, the notion of 'Odour' etc., (*i.e.*, of the things in their own character),—which would be regarded (by the Opponent) as Wrong Apprehension,—must, in fact, be regarded as *True* Apprehension ; for the simple reason that in the case of these Cognitions there are no two things involved—in the shape of the real object and its counterpart,—nor is there the perception of any property common to two or more things.

From all this it follows that the allegation that—"the conceptions of the Instruments and the Objects of Cognition are wrong"—is not right.

End of Section

SECTION (5)

(*Sūtras* 38-49)

The Development of True Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been said above that when there is True Knowledge of the causes of Defects, there follows the cessation of the notion of

is what the present *Sūtra* traverses. The idea is that the object of Wrong Apprehension also is not entirely non-existent : What forms the object of Wrong Apprehension has a dual character—that of the real object 'Pillar' and also that of the counterpart 'Man' ; and though in the character of 'man' the object is *non-existent*, it is really *existent* in the character of 'Pillar'.

' I. ' Now the question arises—How is True Knowledge brought about :*

Sūtra 38

[True Knowledge proceeds] from the practice of a particular form of meditation †

BHĀSYA

When the Mind having been abstracted (withdrawn) from the Sense-organs, is kept steady by an effort tending to concentration,—the contact that takes place between this Mind and the Soul, and which is accompanied by a conscious eagerness to get at the truth, is what is called 'Meditation'.§ During this meditation, no cognitions appear in regard to the objects of the senses. From the practice of the said Meditation proceeds True Knowledge.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[Objection]—“ It has been said that *during* “*Meditation no cognitions appear in regard to the objects of the senses* ; but—

* The reality of the External World and of Cognitions having been established, the Author reverts to what was said under Sūtras 4-2-1 *et seq.* in connection with the causes of Defects, where the process was described. This cannot be regarded as sufficient for the purposes of the enquirer, as the True Knowledge therein described cannot do away with such illusions and wrong apprehensions as are of the nature of Direct Apprehension ;—hence it becomes necessary to describe such True Knowledge as may be of the character of Direct Apprehension—*Parīśuddhi*.

This is the particular form of 'True Knowledge' that is referred to by the question with which the *Bhāṣya* introduces the Sūtra.—*Vardhamāna*.

Viśvanātha adds—The Knowledge produced by the Scriptures is momentary, like all cognitions, so that when it ceases to exist, wrong notions would again continue to appear and entangle the Soul. Hence it becomes necessary to explain the process by which the said True Knowledge may be developed and amplified and rendered capable of putting an end, once for all, to all possibility of wrong notions appearing again.

† The exact reading of this Sūtra is uncertain. Sū. Ms. D. and *Viśvanātha* read as in the viz. edition ; Puri Sū. Ms. reads समाधिविशेषाभावात् (which is apparently wrong) ; the *Tātparyā* reads समाधितत्त्वान्यासात् ; though the *Nyāyasūcīmbandha* reads as in the Viz. edition. Sū. Ms. C. however reads—तवज्ञानविबुद्धिस्तत्त्वज्ञानवासनात् (?) ततश्चात्यन्तिको मिथ्याज्ञाननाशः ।

§ By 'concentration' is meant the keeping of the Soul within its own abode in the lotus of the heart. As such concentration is present also during deep sleep, we have the additional qualification 'which is accompanied by etc.'—which excludes Deep Sleep.—*Tātparyā*.

Sūtra 39

“This is not possible ; (A) Because certain objects are extremely powerful.”—

BHĀṢYA

“ In some cases, Cognitions *will* appear, even in the absence of any wish on the part of the person ; so that what has been asserted cannot be right,—why ?—*because certain objects are extremely powerful*. As a matter of fact, we find that sometimes, even though the man has no wish for the cognising, the cognition does appear, as we find in the case of the thundering of the clouds and such things (which we cannot help hearing, even against our wish) So that the said *particular kind of meditation* cannot be possible. ”

Sūtra 40

“ (B) Also because Cognitions are brought about by Hunger etc. ”

BHĀṢYA

“ Such things as Hunger and Thirst, Heat and Cold, and Disease bring about cognitions even against our wish. Hence no ‘concentration’ (or one-pointedness, of the Mind) is possible.”

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It is possible that the man may renounce Meditation and become agitated, and there may also be causes tending to bring about such agitation as constitutes an obstacle to Meditation ; but even so,—

Sūtra 41

Meditation would be brought about by the force of the fruit of what has been previously accomplished.

BHĀṢYA

‘ *What has been previously accomplished* ’—stands for the Merit and Wisdom, acquired in previous lives,—which serve to bring about True Knowledge ;—‘ *Force of the fruit* ’—stands for the faculty born of Yogic practices ; if there were no fruits of such practices, people would never pay any heed to them ; even in the case of ordinary worldly acts, we find that constant practice produces a certain faculty.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It is for the removal of the obstacle (to Meditation) that—

Sūtra 42

there is the advice that Yoga should be practised in forests, caves and on river-banks.

BHĀṢYA

The Merit produced by the practice of Yoga follows the Soul in other births also ; and when the Merit that brings about True Knowledge has reached a high stage of development, and the Exercise of Meditation has assumed high proportions,—True Knowledge appears. We have actually found that Meditation serves to suppress the force of even powerful things ; as for example, even the ordinary man says—‘ My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear this,’ or ‘ I did not know this. ’

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—“ But if you admit the fact (urged in Sū. 39) that on account of the force of certain extremely powerful things, Cognitions appear even against the man’s wish—then,—

Sūtra 43

“ this contingency would arise also upon Final Release”.

“ Even when the man has become *released*, it would be possible for Cognitions to appear, by reason of the force of external things.”

Sūtra 44

Not so ; for Cognition is sure to appear only in the accomplished Body

BHĀṢYA

It is only when the Body,—as the receptacle of Activity, Sense-organs and Objects,—has been accomplished, under the influence of Karma (past deeds) that the presence of their cause makes the appearance of Cognitions sure to come about ; so that however powerful the external object may be, it is not able to bring about Cognitions in the Soul ; for the external object has been found to have that power (of bringing about Cognitions) only when it is in contact with a Sense-organ. [And no such contact is possible in the case of the person who has attained Final Release].

Sūtra 45

And there is absence of that when Final Release has been attained.

BHĀṢYA

'That'—stands for the Body and the Sense-organs, which contain the causes of cognition ; and of this there is *absence* when Final Release has been attained ; for the simple reason that there are no Merit and Demerit left (to bear fruition). Hence the allegation (in Sū. 43)—that " the contingency would arise also upon Final Release "—is not right.

It is for this reason that Final Release consists of freedom from all kinds of pain ; inasmuch as the root of all pain, and the receptacle of all pain,—*i. e.*, the Body and the Sense-organs,—absolutely cease upon the attainment of Final Release, it follows that Final Release consists in absolute freedom from all pain ; for without its root, and without its receptacle, no pain can appear.

Sūtra 46

For that purpose (there should be) embellishment of the Soul, by means of restraints and observances and such other methods of internal discipline as may be learnt from the Science of Yoga.

BHĀṢYA

For the purpose of attaining Final Release, there should be '*embellishment of the Soul*'.—'*Restraints*' are the means of acquiring merit, common to men in all Life-stages ; while '*Observances*' are peculiar to each Life-stage. '*Embellishment of the Soul*'—consists in the destruction of Demerit and accretion of Merit.—'*Internal discipline*' should be learnt from the Science of Yoga ; it consists of Penance, Controlling of the Breath, Abstraction of the Mind, Contemplation and Concentration of the Mind ; and the practice of the renouncing of objects of sense serves to remove attachment and hatred. The other '*methods*' consist of the details of conduct laid down for Yoga [such as concentrating of the Mind, eating only particular kinds of food, not staying at one place for any length of time, and so forth].

Sūtra 47

[There should also be] repetition of the study of the Science, as also friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science.

BHĀSYA

'For that purpose' has to be construed with this *Sūtra* also. The term 'jñāna' stands for *that by which things are known, jñāyate anena i.e., the Science of the Soul*;—the 'grahaṇa', 'study', of this consists in reading it and retaining it in the mind;—the 'repetition' of such study means the carrying on of it continuously, in the shape of reading it, listening to it (being expounded) and pondering over it.—'Friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science'—is meant to bring about consolidation of the knowledge acquired; this 'consolidation' consists in—(1) the removing of doubts, (2) the knowing of things not already known, (3) the confirmation (by the opinions of the learned) of the conclusions already arrived at (by one's self);—the term 'samvāda' means* 'samāya vādah', 'discussion for the sake of coming to an agreement' [*i.e., friendly discussion*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

The expression 'friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science' (occurring in the preceding *Sūtra*) is vague; it is explained in the following *Sūtra* :—

Sūtra 48

That (friendly discussion) should be carried on with the pupil, the teacher, companions in study, and other well-known learned persons,—who wish well (to the enquirer) and who are not jealous of him.†

BHĀSYA

The meaning of the *Sūtra* is explained by its own words.

* The reading of the Viz. edition समापवाद gives no sense, the right reading समाय वाद is supplied by the Puri Ms.

† The Commentators have explained 'tam' as referring to the 'person learned in the Science', 'abhyupeyāt' as jānīyāt; by this the *Sūtra* would mean that one should know the persons mentioned as 'learned in the Science'.—Similarly 'śreyorthubhiḥ' they explain as meaning 'those that have faith in Final Release.' We have thought it best to deviate from this explanation. In the case of the former, it is not easy to construe the instrumental in शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्ट श्रेयोर्थिभिः and as regards the latter, it is very much simpler, and more in keeping with the epithet 'ānasūyibhiḥ', to take it in its natural sense 'those who wish well'; as it is only such well-wishers whose intercourse can be entirely friendly and conducive to good.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It might be thought that—the putting forward of theories and counter-theories would be unpleasant to the other party (the teacher and the rest) ; [with a view to this we have the following *Sūtra*.]:—

Sūtra 49

Being a seeker (after truth) [the man should carry it on] for the accomplishment of his purpose, even without putting forward any counter-theories.

‘ *He should carry on the discussion* ’ (of the foregoing *Sūtra*) has to be construed here also Inasmuch as the man is desirous of acquiring knowledge from the other person, he should simply express a desire to learn the truth ; and thus without seeking to establish any theory of his own, he should clarify (correct) his own view of things,—specially by realising the fact that the doctrines of several philosophers are mutually contradictory [and from among these accepting what is right and rejecting what is wrong].

End of Section (5)

SECTION (6)

(Sūtras 50—51)

The Guarding of True Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Through excessive partiality to their own theories, some people transgress all bounds of reasoning ; in that case—

Sūtra 50

Disputation and Wrangling (should be carried on) for the purpose of defending one’s own determination to get at the truth ; just as the hedge of thorny branches is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds.

BHĀṢYA

This, however, is meant only for those persons who have not acquired True Knowledge, whose defects have not been entirely removed, and who are still making an attempt for those purposes.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

When one has been rudely addressed by an Opponent, either through arrogance (of superior knowledge), or through sheer prejudice (against truth), or through some other similar reason (*i.e.*, desire for wealth, fame etc.),—then he (failing to perceive the right answer to the ill-mannered allegations of the Opponent)—

Sūtra 51

should pick up a quarrel with him and proceed to deal with him by Disputation and by Wrangling.

BHĀṢYA

'Pick up a quarrel'—*i.e.* with a view to defeating the Opponent,—and not with a view to getting at the truth. But this should be done only for the purpose of defending true Science,* and not for the purpose of obtaining wealth, honour or fame.

Thus ends the *Bhāṣya* on the II Daily Lesson of *Discourse IV*.



* The motive prompting the man should be—If this ill-mannered person is allowed to go undefeated, then ordinary men will accept his conclusions as the right ones, and this would bring about a total confusion relating to Dharma and true Philosophy,—says the *Tātparyā*.

ADHYĀYA V
DAILY LESSON I
SECTION (1)
(Sūtras 1—3)

*The Futile Rejoinders consisting in the Unfair Urging of the Fallacy of 'Neutralisation.'**

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Futile Rejoinder having been defined (in Sū. 1-2-18) as 'that objection which is taken on the basis of mere similarity and dissimilarity', it was described briefly under Sū. 1-2-20, where it was pointed out that 'there is multiplicity of Futile Rejoinders owing to there being several and diverse varieties of it'; this Futile Rejoinder is now described in detail. The Futile Rejoinders herein described consist of arguments urged in confutation of the argument that has been put forward in demonstration of a certain conclusion; and their number is twenty-four; they are as follows:—

* Among commentators there has been a great deal of discussion in regard to the exact character of this Fifth Discourse and its connection with what has gone before. To the end of Adh. IV, we had the *Examination*, 'Parīksā', of what had been mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1 and defined in the rest of Adh. 1; so that the natural subject-matter of Adh. V should consist in the continuation of the same *Examination* of things; what we find, however, in this *Adhyāya* are *definitions* of the several varieties of Futile Rejoinders and Clinchers. Hence the difficulty.

The *Tātparya* says—The proper place for the *defining* of the particular kinds of *Futile Rejoinders* and *Clinchers* was just after the general definition of these in Adh. I; yet the author of the Sūtra intentionally omitted to do it there, in order not to delay the examination of the 'objects of cognition', for which the pupils were growing eager; and having finished all that, he now naturally reverts to the *defining* of the several varieties of the two categories that he had left undefined. Further, the last part of the preceding *Adhyāya* having dealt with 'Disputation and Wrangling', it is in connection with those that the Sage deals with Futile Rejoinder and Clincher, which can occur only in Disputation and Wrangling; so that the sequence of Adh. V is all right; its subject-matter arising directly out of what has gone towards the end of the preceding *Adhyāya*.

The *Parīśuddhi* enters into a long discussion as to whether Adh. V is meant to be 'Definition' or 'Examination', and comes to the conclusion that its subject-matter consists of *Definition*.

Sūtra 1

(1) Parity,* per Similarity, (2) per Dissimilarity, (3) per Augmentation, (4) per Subtraction, (5) per Uncertainty, (6) per Certainty, (7) per Shuffling, (8) per Probandum, (9) per Convergence, (10) per Non-convergence, (11) per Continued Question, (12) per Counter-Instance, (13) per Non-generation, (14) per Doubt, (15) per Vacillation, (16) per Non-probativeness, (17) per Presumption, (18) per Non-difference, (19) per Evidence, (20) per Apprehension, (21) per Non-apprehension, (22) per Non-eternality, (23) per Eternality and (24) per Character of Effect.—

BHĀSYA

When the argument urged in confutation is through *similarity*, and does not differ in validity from the argument put forward in demonstration, it constitutes 'Parity per Similarity'; the said 'non-difference' we shall exemplify in the particular instances that we shall cite. 'Parity per Dissimilarity' and the other Futile Rejoinders may be similarly described.

BHĀSYA

The definition (of these Futile Rejoinders) is as follows :—

Sūtra 2

(1) and (2)—The original Proposition having been propounded on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity, if the Opponent seeks to prove the contrary of its predicate, also on

* Udayanācārya in his *Bodhasiddhi (Nyāyaparīṣita)* thus explains the signification of the term 'sama' occurring at the end of these names.—(1) According to the *Vārtika*, it means 'equalising'; *i.e.*, the Futile Rejoinder is put forward for the purpose of counter-poising or neutralising the effect of the original Reasoning;—(2) according to the *Bhāṣya*, it means that the Futile Rejoinder is put up with a view to show that there is nothing in the original reasoning which differentiates it from what is now put forward; [there is not much difference between these two].—(3) others explain it as meaning that the Futile Rejoinder puts the original *reasoner* on exactly the same footing as his Opponent putting forward the Rejoinder;—(4) the 'Equality' of the Futile Rejoinder lies in the fact that while demolishing the reasoning of the first party, it demolishes itself also. [Udayanācārya himself accepts this last explanation.]

the basis of similarity and dissimilarity, we have instances of 'Parity per Similarity', and 'Parity per Dissimilarity'.*

BHĀṢYA

(1) When the original proposition is propounded on the basis of similarity, if the Opposition to it, seeking to establish the contrary of its predicate, is set up also on the basis of similarity, —and this Opposition does not differ from the argument put forward in support of the original proposition,—it is a case of that Opposition which is called 'Parity per Similarity'. E.g. The Proposition: having been in the form 'The Soul must be *active* (mobile), —because every Substance is endowed with qualities conducive to *activity*,—the clod of earth, which is a substance, is endowed with qualities conducive to *activity*, and is found to be *active*,—the Soul also is so,—therefore the Soul must be active ;'—the Opponent sets up the following opposition to it, also on the basis of Similarity :—'The Soul must be inactive,—because every all-pervading substance is inactive,—Ākāśa, which is an all-pervading substance, is inactive,—the Soul also is so,—therefore the Soul must be inactive.' And there is no special reason why on the ground of its *similarity* to active substances the Soul should be regarded as *active*, and it should not be regarded as *inactive*, on the ground of its *similarity* to *inactive substances* ;—so that inasmuch as there is no special reason (which makes one or the other more valid), this is an instance of Futile Rejoinder called 'Parity per Similarity'. [This is a case where the original Proposition is based upon Similarity, and the Opposition to it is also based upon Similarity.]

(2) An instance of 'Parity per Dissimilarity' (in opposition to the same Proposition) is the following—'The clod of earth which is endowed with qualities conducive to activity, is found to be limited in its extent,—*the Soul is not so limited*—therefore the Soul cannot be active, like the clod of Earth ;'—there being no special reason why, on the basis of its *similarity* to an *active substance*, the Soul should be regarded as *active*,—and why, on the basis of its *dissimilarity* to the *active substance*, it should not be

* *Sādharmyavāidharmyābhyām* is to be construed with '*upasamhārē*,' as also with '*taddharmavi paryayo papātteh*,'—according to the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. Viśvanātha appears to construe it only with the latter term.

regarded as *inactive* ; and inasmuch as there is no such special reason, it is a case of 'Parity per Dissimilarity'. [This is a case of the Proposition being based on Similarity, and the Opposition on Dissimilarity].

(3) The original Proposition being set up on the basis of *dissimilarity*,—'The Soul must be inactive,—because it is all-pervading,—every *active* substance is found to be not all-pervading, as in the case of the clod of Earth,—the Soul is not so non-all-pervading,—hence it must be inactive';—the following opposition is set up on the basis of *dissimilarity* :—'the Ākāṣa, which is an inactive substance, is found to be devoid of qualities conducive to activity,—the Soul is not so devoid of such qualities,—hence the Soul cannot be inactive';—and there is no special reason why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance the Soul should be regarded as *inactive*, and why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *inactive* substance, it should not be regarded as *active* ; thus there being no such special reason, this is an instance of 'Parity per Dissimilarity'. [This is an instance of the Proposition as well as its Opposition both being based upon Dissimilarity].

(4) An instance of 'Parity per Similarity' (in opposition to the same Proposition)*—'the clod of Earth which is active, is found to be endowed with qualities conducive to activity,—the Soul also is so endowed,—hence it should be active';—there is no special reason why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance, the Soul should be regarded as *inactive*, and why on the ground of its *similarity* to the *active* substance, it should not be regarded as *active* ; and there being no such special reason, this is an instance of 'Parity per Similarity'. [This is an instance of the Proposition being based upon *Dissimilarity* and the Opposition on *Similarity*.]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to the above two Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—†

* The words अयं साधर्म्यसम wanting in the Viz. text is supplied by the Purī Ms. B. and also Mss. C and D.

† *Udayanachārya* in his *Bodha-siddhi* says—Each of these two Futile Rejoinders is three-fold (1) Bearing upon a true subject, (2) bearing upon an untrue subject, and (3) consisting of wrong expression. The examples

Sūtra 3

The proposition would be established in the same manner as the fact of a certain animal being the 'Cow' is established by the presence in it of the class-character of the 'cow'.—

BHĀṢYA

If one were to seek to establish his proposition by means of mere 'similarity', or by means of mere 'dissimilarity',—then there would certainly be the uncertainty (inconclusiveness, urged in the Futile Rejoinder). There is however no such uncertainty when the conclusion is based upon a particular property [such as is invariably concomitant with what is sought to be proved]; e.g. that a certain animal is the *cow* is proved by reason only of that 'similarity of it to the cow' which consists in *the presence of the particular class-character 'cow'* (which is invariably concomitant with, inseparable from, all cows),—and not by reason of the presence of such other properties as are different from the *presence of the dewlap* * [which *other properties* are not invariably concomitant with all cows]. Similarly the proposition that a certain animal is the cow is proved by reason only of that 'dissimilarity of it to the Horse' which consists in *the presence of the lass-character 'cow'*—and not that dissimilarity which might consist in a mere diversity of qualities etc. All this has been explained in the section on 'Factors of Reasoning' (in *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1-1-39), where it has been pointed out that in the sentence

cited in the Vārtika belong to the first kind (Sound being really non-eternal). Following is the example of the second kind —The Proposition being propounded in the form 'Sound must be *eternal*, because it is intangible, like Ākaśa', the Opposition is set up against it that 'Sound being cognisable, and as such similar to *non-eternal* things, it should be regarded as *non-eternal*'. 'The examples cited in the *Bhāṣya* belong to the third kind; as the subject thereof is true, it is only the verbal expression that is defective.' A Rejoinder, even though quite right in matter, if it is put up in wrong form, becomes Futile

* The word '*sāsnādisambandhāt*' as it stands, would mean that the said conclusion cannot be proved by *the presence of the dewlap etc.* This however would be wrong; as *the presence of the dewlap etc.*, is as peculiar to, and invariably concomitant with, all cows, as the class-character 'cow' itself. In view of this, the *Tātparyā* has explained the compound '*sāsnādi*' as meaning properties *other than the presence of the dewlap.*

(formulating the inferential argument), several Instruments of Cognition combine together and conjointly accomplish the common purpose (of proving the conclusion),—and that the *uncertainty* (that the Futile Rejoinders point out) can apply only to Fallacious Reasonings (and not to valid reasonings).

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)

(Sūtras 4-6)

Dealing with the six Futile Rejoinders—(3) 'Parity per Augmentation'; (4) 'Parity per Subtraction', (5) 'Parity per Uncertainty'; (6) 'Parity per Certainty'; (7) 'Parity per Shuffling, ; and (8) 'Parity per Probandum',—which are based upon the diversity of the character of the Subject and that of the Example.

Sūtra 4

Based upon the difference in the properties of the 'Subject' * and of the 'Example' are the Futile Rejoinders named (3) 'Parity per Augmentation'; (4) 'Parity per Subtraction'; (5) 'Parity per Uncertainty', (6) 'Parity per Certainty'; (7) 'Parity per Shuffling'; and based upon the fact of both (Subject and Example) being 'objects to be proved' (by Inference) is the Futile Rejoinder named (8) 'Parity per Probandum'.—

BHĀSYA

(3) When the Opposer puts forward the contingency of an additional property of the 'Example' subsisting in the 'Subject', it is 'Parity per Augmentation'. † E.g. [against the Proposition that 'the Soul must be active, because it is endowed with properties conducive to action, like the Clod of Earth'] the Opposition is set up—"if by reason of the presence of qualities conducive to action, the Soul should, like the Clod of Earth, be regarded as active, then, like the Clod of Earth, it has to be

* 'Sādhyā' says Viśvanātha, stands here for 'pakṣa', 'Subject'. The diverse character referred to are *existence* and *non-existence*.

† The property in question does not really belong to the 'Subject', and the Rejoinder attributes that property to it; thus there is an accession to, a union of the properties of, the 'Subject'. Hence the name 'Parity per Augmentation'

regarded as tangible also ; if it is not tangible, like the Clod of Earth, then it should not be active either ; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as *active*, and not as *tangible*). [Here the *additional* quality of *tangibility*, which is not existent in the Soul, is attributed to it].**

(4) When the Opposer urges the contingency of the *absence of a certain property* in the Subject, on the analogy of the 'Example',—It is '*Parity per subtraction*'; e. g., (against the same Proposition) the Opposition is set up—"inasmuch as the Clod of Earth is found to be *active* and *not all-pervading*, the Soul also, if active, should be regarded as *not all-pervading* ; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as *active* and not as *not all-pervading*) [Here the property of *all-pervadingness* is subtracted from the Soul].†

(5) and (6) '*Varnya*' means '*khyāpanīya*', '*that which is yet to be known*', hence '*uncertain*'; and '*avarnya*', '*certain*', is the reverse of that ; these two properties, '*uncertainty*' and '*certainty*' belong respectively to the 'Subject' and the 'Example' [the presence of the Probandum in the Example being known for *certain*, while its presence in the Subject is still *uncertain*] ; and when, in opposition, the opposer reverses these qualities (by attributing *uncertainty* to the 'Example', and *certainty* to the 'Subject'), we have the Futile Rejoinders, '*Parity per Uncertainty*' and '*Parity per Certainty*'.§

* This Futile Rejoinder is intended to urge the Fallacy of 'Contradiction'—says Udayana.

† This is intended to urge the Fallacy of the 'Unknown'.

§ '*Parity per Uncertainty*', by reducing the Example to *Uncertainty*, makes it *equal* to the 'Subject', and '*Parity per Certainty*', by removing *uncertainty* from the 'Subject', makes it equal to the 'Example'. The 'Subject' is that in which the presence of the Probandum is *doubtful* and is sought to be confirmed by the argument in question ; while the 'Example' is that wherein the presence of the Probandum is known for certain.

As an example of '*Parity per Uncertainty*' in the generalised form, Viśvanātha puts forward the following—Against any argument that the First Party might put up in support of his Proposition, the Opponent will set up the following Opposition—"What can prove the Proposition is only that Property which as Probans, subsists in the Subject of that Proposition ;—this Probans must in order to be effective, subsist in the Example also ;—now the principal property that subsists in the 'Subject' is *the character of*

(7) The 'Example' being endowed with the property that constitutes the Probans (proving the desired Proposition),—if the Opponent attributes to it some other property, and then urges the fact of this other property being such as is not invariably concomitant with the properties of the Probandum,—it is a case of 'Parity *per Shuffling*'. E. g. (against the same Proposition) we have the Opposition—"One thing endowed with qualities conducive to action is found to be *possessed of Gravity*, as we find in the Clod of Earth (Example),—while another thing similarly endowed is found to be *devoid of Gravity*, as we find in the case of Air;—similarly it is possible that while one thing, the Clod of Earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is *active*, another thing, the Soul, which is similarly endowed, may be *without action*;—or you should show some special reason (against this)."*

(8) That character is called 'Probandum' which is found to be one upon which the whole force of the Probans and the other Factors of the Reasoning is operative; and when such

having the presence of the probandum doubtful,—and this same character should reside in the Example; hence the Example also should be one in which *the presence of the probandum is doubtful*."—And the following is the example of 'Parity *per Certainty*'—"The Example must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is known for certain,—the property in the Example must also reside in the Subject,—hence the Subject also must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is known for certain,—and if the Subject is so, then it loses the very character of the 'Subject', which must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is only *doubtful*".

The 'Parity *per Uncertainty*' is intended to urge the Fallacy of 'contradiction' and 'Parity *per Certainty*' is intended to urge the Fallacy of the 'unknown',—says Udayana.

* Here the Opponent attributes to the Example, Clod of Earth, the quality of 'gravity', and then shows that *gravity*, one quality of the Example, is not invariably concomitant with the *qualities conducive to action* (as in Air, we find these latter, but not the former),—and analogously it may be possible that *qualities conducive to action*, which also belong to the Example, may not be invariably concomitant with *activity*. Here we have a case of a property (gravity) being found in the Example which is not invariably concomitant with the Probans, 'qualities conducive to action'. This also includes the case where the property found in the Example is one with which the Probans is not invariably concomitant. This Futile Rejoinder is intended to urge the Fallacy of Inconclusiveness,—says Udayana.

character is attributed to the ' Example ', it is ' Parity *per Probandum* '. E. g., " If the Soul is to be regarded as *active*, in the same manner as the Clod of Earth is active, then it comes to this that the Clod of Earth is like the Soul,—and the Soul is the Subject in regard to which the presence of Activity is still to be proved,—hence the Clod of Earth also should be one in regard to which the presence of Activity is still to be proved :—if this is not so, then it is not* true that the Soul is like the Clod of Earth [which means that the Example cited is not right]."[†]

The answer to the above six Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—

Sūtra 5

Inasmuch as the ' Reaffirmation ' (leading to the conclusion) is only secured on the basis of a particular similarity (between the ' Subject ' and the ' Example), there can be no denial of it on the basis of any mere dissimilarity. §

It is not possible to hide away (*i.e.* deny) what has been duly established ;—and the ' analogy ' (between the Subject and the Example) is duly established, if there is some point of similarity between them ; as we find in the case of the well-known analogy ' as the Cow so the Gavaya ' ; this being so, in regard to the cow and the *Gavaya*, it is not possible to urge that " there is some difference (of character) between the two (and hence the analogy is not right) " ;—similarly (in the case in question) when on the point of that character which is meant to establish the conclusion, it is found that it is present in the

* This ँ is wanting in the *Viz.* text ; it is found in the Puri Mss. also in C. and D.

† The Subject, the Probans and the Example must be such as are definitely known from other sources of knowledge, and are not dependent upon the reasoning of which they themselves form parts. That which is to be proved, *i.e.* the Probandum, is one that is not so known. If the Example is shown to be one which also is still to be proved, this vitiates the entire reasoning.

This is meant to urge the Fallacy of the ' Unknown '.

§ Invariable concomitance is the essential element, and when we have even one point of similarity which is invariably concomitant with the Probandum, that is enough to prove our conclusion. It is not possible for the ' Subject ' and the ' Example ' to have no dissimilarity at all ; that would mean *identity*. All that is necessary is that they should resemble on certain such points as are invariably concomitant with the Probandum.‡

Example (and in the Subject),—it cannot be possible to deny the conclusiveness of the said character merely by pointing out that there is some difference between the two, consisting in a diversity in their properties.

Sūtra 6

Further, inasmuch as the 'Example' becomes an 'Example' only by reason of the indication of the actual presence, in it, of the Probandum [it can never be said to stand on the same footing as the Probandum, which is still to be proved].

BHĀṢYA

What is indicated (in the Example) is only such a fact as is not incompatible with what is agreed upon by all men, ordinary as well as learned; and since it is only when the presence of the Probandum is so indicated that the Example becomes a true 'Example',—there can be no ground for saying that the Example stands on the same footing as the Probandum.*

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

[*Sūtras 7-8*]

*Dealing with (9) 'Parity per Convergence' and
(10) 'Parity per Non-convergence.'*

Sūtra 7

“ The Probans (could establish the Probandum) either by becoming united, or not becoming united, with the Probandum;—if it becomes united with it, then it becomes non-different from it; while if it does not become united with it, it cannot prove it ”—these arguments constitute (9) 'Parity per Convergence' and (10) 'Parity per non-convergence.'

BHĀṢYA

“ Is it by becoming united with the Probandum that the Probans would establish it? Or by not becoming united with it? It cannot establish it by becoming united with it, because by

* The answer given in Sū. 5, applies to all the six Futile Rejoinders described in Sū. 4. What is said in Sū. 6, is the answer that is applicable to only three of them—'Parity per Uncertainty', 'Parity per Certainty', and 'Parity per Probandum'—*Tātparya*.

becoming united with it, it would become non-different from it, and as such could not establish it. When of two things both are existent, and become united,—which could be the ‘ probans ’, the ‘ establisher ’, and which the ‘ probandum ’ * the ‘ established ’ ? If, on the other hand, the Probans does not become united with the Probandum,—then (on that very account) it could not establish it ; for example, the Lamp does not illumine an object unless it is united with it ”. When the Opposition is urged on the basis of ‘ uniting ’ (Converging), it is ‘ Parity per Convergence ’ ; and when it is urged on the basis of ‘ not-uniting ’ (non-converging), it is ‘ Parity per Non-convergence ’ .

The answer to the above two Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—

Sūtra 8

The Denials (embodied in the Rejoinders) are not effective ; (a) because we find the Jar and such other objects accomplished (when their causes are in contact with them), and (b) because Killing by magic (is accomplished without the killer coming into contact with the killed person).†

BHĀṢYA

The denial is not right, in either of the two forms : (a) Such effects as the Jar and the like are brought about by the Agent, the Instruments, and the Receptacle, only when these are in contact with the Clay (out of which the Jar is made). [So that ‘ Parity per Convergence ’ can have no force] ;—and (b) when trouble (killing) is brought on a person by means of magical spells, we find that the cause brings about its effect without coming into contact with it [So that ‘ Parity per Non-Convergence ’ also can have no force].

End of Section (3)

* It is only what is not already accomplished that can be established ; what is united with anything must be an accomplished entity ; hence no such thing can be what is *to be established*, the ‘ probandum ’ ; and when two things unite, they become identified ; hence if the Probans and the Probandum become united, there can be no relation of cause and effect between them.—*Tātparya*.

†The printed *Nyāyasūcinibandha* (Bd-Ind.) reads व्यभिचार for अभिचार.

SECTION (4)

Sūtra 9

Dealing with—(11) 'Parity per Continued Question' and (12) 'Parity per Counter-instance.'

Sūtra 9

(a) When the basis of the 'Example' is not mentioned, it is (11) 'Parity per Continued Question' and (b) when the Opposition is set up through a counterinstance, it is (12) 'Parity per Counter-instance'.

BHĀSYA

(a) When the Opposition is set up in the form of the 'Continued Questioning'—that "it is necessary (for the propounder of the original Proposition) to point out the proof for the Probans also"—it is Opposition called 'Parity per Continued Question'. E.g., "You do not mention the reason (basis) for asserting that the Clod of Earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, must be active; and until the reason is mentioned, nothing can be accepted as true". *

(b) When the Opposition is based upon a counter-stance, it is 'Parity per Counter-instance'. E.g. the original proposition having been put forward in the form 'The Soul must be active,—because it is endowed with qualities conducive to action,—like the Clod of Earth',—the Opponent sets up a counter-instance—"Ākāśa, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is found to be *without action* [and hence why cannot the Soul be regarded as *inactive*, like Ākāśa?]" But what is that quality in Ākāśa which is conducive to action? "It consists of contact with Air, which aided by Faculty or momentum (leads to action), as is found in the case of the contact of Air with the Tree." †

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—

* The *Tātparya* thus explains the difference between 'Parity per Continued Question' and 'Parity per Probandum'.—In 'Parity per Probandum' the Opponent urges the necessity of the Probans and all other Factors of Reasoning being provided in support of the Example, exactly in the same manner as is done in support of the Probandum; while in 'Parity per Continued Question', he only wants to know by what means of cognition the Example is known.

† Contact of Air with the Tree leads to the action of moving in the Tree; hence the contact of Air in Ākāśa also should be conducive to action.

Sūtra 10

The continued question could come to an end just as it does in the case of the fetching of the Lamp.

BHĀṢYA

The first party, on being questioned by the Opponent in the manner described in the preceding *Sūtra*, can say (in reply)—Who are the persons that fetch the lamp? and why do they fetch it? [The Opponent will say]—“It is fetched by persons desiring to see, and they fetch it for the purpose of seeing the things to be seen.” But [the first party will ask again] Why do not people, desiring to see the Lamp (which is a thing to be seen) fetch another lamp?—“They do not do so, because they can see the lamp even without the second lamp.” From this, it follows that for the seeing of the Lamp itself, the fetching of another lamp is useless. [Now turning to the case in question]—For what purpose is the Example put forward?—It is put forward for the purpose of making known something not already known. Why then is the *mention of the basis of the Example* sought for* (by the Opponent setting up the Futile Rejoinder)? If it is sought for the purpose of making the Example *known*,—then our contention is that the Example is already known [as, if it were not known, it would not be put forward as *Example*]; for the Example is that in regard to which there is a consensus of opinion among all men, learned and unlearned; so that any *mention of basis* for the purpose of making the Example known would be absolutely useless. This is the answer to ‘Parity per Continued Question’.

The answer to ‘Parity per Counter-instance’ is as follows :—

Sūtra 11

If the Counter-instance is an effective reason, the Example also cannot but be an effective reason.

BHĀṢYA

When the Opponent puts forward the Counter-instance, he does not cite any special reason in support thereof—to show that for such and such a reason the Counter-instance is an

* The correct reading is देश्यते as found in Mss. B. C. and D.

effective reason, and the Example is not so. So that, when the Counter-instance is recognised as an effective reason, there can be no ground for saying that the Example is not an effective reason ;—and when can it not fail to be effective reason ? Only when it is itself not capable of being denied and is capable of proving the conclusion. [So that if it is effective reason, it must prove the conclusion.]

End of Section (4)

SECTION (5)

(Sūtras 12-13)

Dealing with (13) ' Parity per Non-generation '.

Sūtra 12

' Before the birth (of the Subject), since [what is urged as] the ground [for the probandum being predicated of it] cannot subsist, [the argument can prove nothing], '—this is ' Parity per Non-generation '.

BHĀṢYA

The proposition being stated in the form—' Sound must be non-eternal *because it comes after effort*, like the Jar ', the Opponent sets up the following Opposition :—“ Before it is produced, the Sound has not appeared, hence (at that time) the *character of coming after effort*, which is the ground urged for its non-eternality, does not subsist in Sound ; and since this character does not subsist in Sound, it follows that Sound is *eternal* ; and that which is eternal is *never produced* '.—This opposition, based upon ' non-generation ' (or non-production), is ' Parity per Non-generation '.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 13

Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is, and since what is urged as the ground (for the Proposition) does then subsist in it,—the presence of the ground cannot be denied.

BHĀṢYA

Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is—*i.e.*, it is only when it has been produced that the Sound becomes ' Sound ' ; before it is produced, it is not even

'Sound'; and as it is 'Sound' only after it has been produced, and when the Sound has been produced, *the character of coming after effort*, which is the ground for non-eternality, is actually present in it; and *since the ground does then subsist in it*, there is no force in the objection that "before the birth of the Subject, the ground does not subsist in it" (urged in the Futile Rejoinder).

End of Section (5)

SECTION (6)

[Sūtras 14-15]

Dealing with 'Parity per Doubt'.

Sūtra 14

The 'Community' and the 'Example', both being equally perceptible by the senses, [the Opposition] based upon similarity to 'eternal' as well as 'non-eternal' things constitutes 'Parity per Doubt'.

BHĀṢYA

The Proposition being put forward in the form—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar',—the Opponent opposes it by casting doubt over it: "Even though Sound comes after effort, it has this *similarity* to the *eternal* 'Community' that both are *perceptible by the senses*;—and the same also constitutes its *similarity* to the *non-eternal* 'Jar'—thus, by reason of its *similarity* to both 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' things, there must be doubt (as to the real character of Sound)."

The answer to the above is as follows :

Sūtra 15

(a) As regards the doubt being raised on the basis of (mere) 'similarity', [our answer is that] there can be no such doubt when the 'dissimilarity' (to that same thing) has been duly recognised; (b) if, even on both (similarity and dissimilarity) being recognised, doubts were to arise, then there would be no end to such doubts,—(c) and since mere 'similarity' is not accepted as an everlasting source of doubt,—the opposition set up cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

(a) When, on perceiving the distinguishing feature of 'Man'—which constitutes its 'dissimilarity' (to the Pillar)—it has been duly ascertained that the object perceived is a 'Man',—there is no room for any doubt arising in regard to it on the basis of some 'similarity' between Man and Pillar. Thus, in the case of Sound, *the character of coming after effort*, which forms its distinguishing feature and dissimilarity to *eternal* things, having been recognised, its 'non-eternality' becomes duly ascertained; and there can be no room for any further doubt arising on the mere ground of its similarity to eternal and non-eternal things. (b) If such a Doubt were to arise, then, inasmuch as the 'similarity' between the Man and the Pillar would never cease, the Doubt would never come to an end. (c) Lastly, *we do not admit that 'similarity' is an everlasting source of Doubt*, even when the distinctive feature of the thing has been duly recognised; e.g., when the distinctive feature of Man has been recognised, a mere similarity between 'Man' and 'Pillar' does not become a source of doubt.

End of Section (6)

SECTION (7)

[Sūtras 16-17]

Dealing with 'Parity per Neutralisation.'

Sūtra 16

"By reason of Similarity to both, there arises vacillation"—(Opposition) based upon this reasoning is 'Parity per Neutralisation.'

BHĀṢYA

By reason of the similarity (of Sound) to both, eternal and non-eternal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views [*i.e.* the original Proposition as well as its contrary];—this is what is meant by the term '*prakriyā*', or 'vacillation' in the Sūtra: One view being—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar',—the other view is propounded on the basis of the similarity (of Sound) to *Eternal* things ['Sound must be eternal, because it is perceptible by the Auditory Organ, like the *class-character Sound*']. Thus then, it is found that when the Probands—'because it comes after effort'—is put for-

ward as constituting the similarity (of Sound) to *non-eternal* things, it is not free from the possibility of the contrary view being set up ; and in the face of this possibility, the conclusion sought to be based upon that Probans cannot be established. The same holds good in regard to a Probans that would be put forward as constituting the 'similarity' (of Sound) to *eternal* things. The Opposition put forward on the basis of this 'vacillation' constitutes 'Parity per Neutralisation'.

What has been said in this Sūtra applies also to the case of *Dissimilarity* ; and 'by reason of Dissimilarity to both, there arises Vacillation,—and Opposition based upon this reasoning constitutes *Parity per Neutralisation*'.

The answer to the above is as follows :—

Sūtra 17

Inasmuch as the said 'Vacillation' can follow only from the counter-view, there can be no denial of it ; specially as that contrary-view must be regarded as established (before the 'Vacillation' can be put forward).*

BHĀṢYA

When the Opponent says that—"by reason of similarity to both there arises vacillation"—his assertion comes to this that there is 'vacillation', because the *counter-view* is there ; it is only when there is (real) similarity to both that one of them can be called the 'counter-view' ; hence it follows from the statement that the 'counter-view' is an established fact ; and the 'counter-view' being regarded as established, its denial cannot be right. If the 'counter-view' is *established*, its denial cannot be right ; and if its denial is right, the 'counter-view' cannot be regarded as *established* ; for 'the establishment of the counter-view' and 'the right denial of the counter-view' are contradictory terms.

When however [as in the case of the Fallacy of Neutralisation, which also is based upon vacillation] the 'vacillation' is due to the absence of definite knowledge (in regard to the subject

* The term '*prātipakṣa*' 'counter-view', stands for the view of the First Party ; it is called 'counter-view' from the Opponent's point of view—*Udayana* and *Viśvanātha*.

in question) [and not to the mere existence of the counter-view], the 'vacillation' comes to an end, as soon as that definite right knowledge is attained; i.e., as soon as definite right knowledge has been attained, the vacillation ceases.*

End of Section (7)

SECTION (8)

[Sūtras 18-20]

Dealing with (16) 'Parity per Non-probativeness'.

Sūtra 18

'Parity per Non-probativeness' is based upon the contention that "the Probans as such cannot exist at any of the three points of time".

BHĀSYA

"'Probans' is *that which proves*; and this could exist only either (a) before, or (b) after or (c) together with, the probandum (that which it is intended to prove). Now, (a) if the Probans is held to exist before the Probandum,—at the time that the Probandum is not there, of what could it be the 'probans', 'means of proving'? (b) If it is held to exist after the Probandum,—in the absence of the Probans, of what could there be the 'Probandum' (to be proved)? (c) If the Probans and the Probandum are held to exist (simultaneously),—since both would be equally existent, which could be the 'probans' (means of proving) of what? From all this it follows that the 'probans' does not differ from what is *non-probative*."

* When the Opponent puts up the Futile Rejoinder based upon the vacillation in regard to the exact character of Sound, on account of its being similar to eternal as well as non-eternal things,—he admits that the proposition that 'Sound is non-eternal' is as admissible as that 'Sound is eternal'; that both possess an equal degree of truth; otherwise, if one were more reasonable, that would be definitely accepted and there would be no vacillation. And when he accepts the admissibility of the view that 'Sound is non-eternal', he cannot, consistently with himself, deny it.

The position of the person urging the Fallacy of 'Neutralisation' is different, he bases his denial of the conclusion of the first party, not upon any vacillation, but upon absence of true knowledge.

This contention, thus based upon similarity to what is non-probative, constitutes 'Parity per Non-probateness'. *

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 19

It is not true that "the Probans cannot exist at any of the three points of time", because it is by the Probans that the Probandum can be proved.

BHĀṢYA

It is not true that "the Probans cannot exist at any of the three points of time";—why?—because it is by the Probans that the Probandum is proved. As a matter of fact, we find that the *accomplishing of what is to be accomplished*, as also the *knowing of what is to be known*, is brought about by a cause; and this patent fact of ordinary perception is an instance in point.† As regards the question—"at the time that the Probandum is non-existent, of what could the Probans be the *means of proving?*"—our answer is that [it is the means of proving of *what is to be proved*; just as in the cases cited] the cause is the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished, and of the knowing of what is to be made known.

Sūtra 20

Further, [according to the Opponent's reasoning] there can be no Denial; from which it follows that what has been denied cannot be denied.

* This Futile Rejoinder differs from 'Parity per Convergence' and 'Parity per Non-convergence' on the following points.—(1) In these latter the question raised was in regard to the form of the Probans, while in the present case, it is raised in regard to its causal efficiency; (2) in the latter two the convergence or otherwise was in regard to the thing denoted by the words of the probans, while here it is the verbal expression that is taken up for enquiry; (3) there were only *two* alternatives, while here we have *three*; (4) those two had the semblance of the contention urging the fact of the qualification of the Probans being untrue, while here the contention urges a reasoning to the contrary—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

† Just as the *accomplishing of what is to be accomplished* is brought about by a cause, in the same manner the *proving of what is to be proved* (*i.e.*, the Probandum) must be brought about by a cause; and this cause is the *Probans*.

BHĀSYA

[Exactly what you have urged against our Probans, we can urge, with equal force, against the Opponent]—The denial cannot exist, either before, or after, or together with, what is denied—and since there can be no ‘Denial’ at all (of the Probans urged by the first party), it follows that the Probans (being undeniable) is firmly established

End of Section (8)

SECTION (9)

[Sūtras 21–22]

Dealing with (17) ‘Parity per Presumption’

Sūtra 21

When the contrary conclusion is proved by means of Presumption, it is ‘Parity per Presumption’.

BHĀSYA

The proposition having been sought to be established by the reasoning ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar’,—if the Opponent seeks to establish the contrary conclusion by means of Presumption,—this is a case of ‘Parity per Presumption’; it is as follows:—‘If Sound is held to be non-eternal, on the ground of its coming after effort, which constitutes its similarity to non-eternal things,—then it follows by implication, that Sound must be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its *similarity to eternal things*, consisting in the fact that it is *intangible*, like eternal things’.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows—

Sūtra 22

(A) If what is not expressly stated can be taken as following by implication, then the renouncing would be taken as following by implication, for the simple reason that such renouncing is not expressly stated;—(B) and further, ‘Presumption’ would be indecisive.

BHĀṢYA

(A) Without showing the capacity (of the words to afford the idea of what is presumed), if what is not expressly stated is held (by the Opponent) to be taken as implied,—then the renoun-

cing by such an arguer of his own view may also be taken as implied, for the simple reason that it is not expressly stated ; and thus inasmuch as the view that ' Sound is non-eternal ' would be regarded as established (by reason of its being taken as implied by reason of its not being expressly stated by you), this would mean that your own view that ' Sound is eternal ' has been renounced.

(B) *Further, Presumption would be indecisive* ; that is, Presumption would apply equally to both views ; for ' if on the ground of its similarity to eternal things consisting of *intangibility*, Sound were to be regarded as *eternal*, like *Ākāśa*,—it would be taken as following by implication that, on account of its similarity to *non-eternal* things, consisting in *its coming after effort*, Sound is *non-eternal* '.*

Then again, conclusive Presumption does not necessarily follow from mere negation ; for instance, because the *solid* gravel falls, it does not necessarily follow by presumption that there can be no falling of Water, which is liquid (not solid).

End of Section (9)

SECTION (10)

[*Sūtra 23—24*]

Dealing with (1) ' Parity per Non-difference '.

Sūtra 23

“ If the presence of a single (common) property were to make the two things non-different,—then all things would have to be regarded as non-different, because the property of ' existence ' is present in all ” ;—this contention constitutes ' Parity per Non-difference '

BHĀṢYA

The single (common) property, in the case in question, is that of *coming after effort*, and because this single property is present in Sound and in the Jar, if these two things be regarded as non-different,—*i.e.*, both be regarded as ' non-eternal ' ;—then all things should have to be regarded as non-different—Why ?—*Because the property of ' existence ' is present in all* ; the one

* This is the reverse of the argument put forward in the Futile Rejoinder.

property of 'existence' is present in all things ; and since 'Existence' is present in all things, all things should be regarded as non-different. Such contention constitutes 'Parity per Non-differenoe'.*

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūtra 24

The above denial does not hold ; because in the case of some (common property) the presence of certain other properties) of the similar thing is possible, while in the case of others such presence is not possible.

BHĀSYA

For instance, in the case where the one common property between the 'Subject' and the 'Example' consists of 'coming after effort', the presence of another property—which constitutes a further 'non-difference' or 'similarity' between them—is found possible ; while in the case of the common property among *all things* consisting of 'existence', the presence of no other common property is found possible ; which could constitute a further 'non-difference' among them.

The following might be urged (by the Nihilist, who holds that 'existence' is invariably concomitant with 'Non-eternality');—"Non-eternality would be the other property common to 'all things', the presence whereof would be indicated by the presence (in them) of the property of *existence* "

(A) Under this assumption, the Proposition would come to be of the following form : 'All entities are non-eternal, because they have the property of *Existence*' ; and in that case, no 'Example' would be available, apart from what is already included in the Proposition (which includes 'all things') ; and there can be no valid reasoning without an Example ; nor would

* Udayana in his *Bodhasiddhi*, notices a different interpretation of this Sūtra by which the meaning is as follows —'The single property that constitutes the Probans is really effective ; so that if the Subject and the Example were taken as possessed of the unqualified probandum, then *they would be non-different in every way, Sarvāviśeṣah*, because their co-existence is well known.'

it be right to put up as 'Example' some thing that is already included under the Proposition; for what is itself yet to be proved cannot serve as an 'Example'. (B) Then again, inasmuch as *existent* things are actually found to be both *eternal* and *non-eternal*, they cannot all be regarded as *non-eternal* (on the ground of *existence*). From all this it follows that the sentence—"all things would have to be regarded as non-different, because the property of 'existence' is present in all" (Sū. 23) is meaningless.

(C) Lastly, when the Opponent alleges, that "because *existence* is present in all things, they should be regarded as non-eternal",—he admits that 'Sound is non-eternal'; so that opposition to this last Proposition is not quite consistent. *

End of Section (10)

SECTION (11)

[Sūtras 25-26]

Dealing with (19) 'Parity per Evidence'.

Sūtra 25'

'Parity per Evidence' is based upon the presence of grounds for both (views).

BHĀṢYA

"If Sound is held to be non-eternal, because there is present ground (or evidence) for its non-eternality—there is present evidence for eternality also, in the shape of *Intangibility*; so that it may be regarded as eternal also". This, being an opposition based upon *the presence of grounds for both*, 'Eternality' and 'Non-eternality,' is 'Parity per Evidence'.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 26

This denial has no force; because the presence of ground in support (of the original Proposition) is admitted.

BHĀṢYA

When the Opponent alleges 'the presence of grounds for both views' (Sū. 25), he cannot deny that 'Sound is non-eternal, *because there are grounds for non-eternality*'. If this

* The Futile Rejoinder was urged against the Proposition 'Sound is non-eternal'; and yet this is admitted by the Opponent in setting forth the Rejoinder.

could be denied, then it would not be true that 'grounda for both views are present'. When he speaks of 'the presence of grounds for both views', he admits that there are grounds for 'non-eternality'; and having been admitted, it cannot be denied. "The denial is due to incongruity." But 'incongruity' applies equally (to both views). "When we pointed out the incongruity consisting of the possibility of both eternality and non-eternality, we put forth the denial." But the 'incongruity' applies equally to your own view as well as to that of the other party; and it cannot establish any one of the two views.*

End of Section 11

SECTION (12)

[Sūtra 27-28]

Dealing with 'Parity per Apprehension'.

Sūtra 27

'Parity per Apprehension' is based upon the fact that what is put forward is found to exist even in the absence of the cause mentioned.

BHĀṢYA

Even in the absence of *the character of coming after effort* which is mentioned as the cause (ground) of 'non-eternality'—this 'non-eternality' is found in that Sound which proceeds from the breaking of the branches of the tree shaken by the wind [this Sound not being the Product of the Effort of any person];—and the Opposition, based upon this fact of the Probandum being found to exist even in the absence of the Probans, constitutes 'Parity per Apprehension'.†

* If you admit the presence of grounds for both views, you admit the truth of the other view also; while if you deny the presence of the said grounds, you deny those for your own view also. So that the Futile Rejoinder that you urge stultifies itself.—*Udayana*.

† The *Bodhasiddhi* mentions five kinds of this Futile Rejoinder: (1) The Subject existing in the absence of the Probandum, which makes it a case of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction';—(2) the Subject existing without the Probans,—this being a case of the Fallacy of the 'Unknown';—(3) the Subject existing without both Probans and Probandum,—when there are both of the said fallacies,—(4) the Probandum existing without the Probans—this being a case of untrue premiss, the Probans not being invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—(5) the Probans existing without the Probandum, in which case also the necessary invariable concomitance between the two would be wanting. It goes on to cite examples of the Futile Rejoinder based upon each of these five.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 28

Inasmuch as the property in question may be due to some other cause,—the denial has no force at all.

BHĀṢYA

When the First Party says—‘ [Sound must be non-eternal] *because it is the outcome of effort* ’, what is meant is that *it is produced from some cause* ; and it is not meant to restrict the particular product (Sound) to one particular cause only ;— so that if the property in question, ‘ Non-eternality ’, is found in Sound produced from some other cause,—in what way does that militate against our view ?

End of Section (12)

SECTION (13)

[*Sūtras 29–31*]

Dealing with ‘ Parity per Non-apprehension ’.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The First Party puts forward the Proposition in the following form]—‘ It is not true that even before it is uttered, Sound exists and (if it is not heard) it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it ’;—this is not true—why?—because we do not perceive any covering or obstruction ; that is, in the case of such things as Water (underground) and the like, we find that when they are existent, if there is *non-apprehension* of them, it is due to the presence of obstruction (in the shape of the surface of the ground under which the water lies) ; in the case of Sound, however, we do not find its non-apprehension to be due to the presence of obstruction or any such causes of non-apprehension ; and such cause of its non-apprehension would certainly have been perceived (if it existed), just as it is perceived in the case of Water etc. ;—as a matter of fact, however, no such cause is perceived (in the case of Sound) ; hence it follows that when Sound is not apprehended (heard), its condition is contrary (not analogous) to that of the Water etc. [*i.e.* while Water etc., are *existent*, Sound is *non-existent*].’ [And against this the Opponent sets up the following Futile Rejoinder]—

Sūtra 29

“ Inasmuch as Non-apprehension of the obstruction is also not apprehended,—it follows that this Non-apprehension is not-existent ; and this proves the contrary conclusion [*i. e.* existence of the obstruction] ’—the opposition based upon this contention is ‘ Parity per Non-apprehension ’.

“ The ‘ Non-apprehension ’ of Obstruction etc., is not apprehended ;—and from this ‘ non-apprehension of the Non-apprehension, ’ it follows that the latter does not exist ; and this ‘ Non-apprehension ’ being non-existent, what has been urged by the First Party as the ‘ Probans ’ of his reasoning is found to be non-existent ; all which leads to the conclusion that Obstruction etc., are *existent*. And since the contrary conclusion is thus proved, the original proposition—‘ it is not true that even before it is uttered, Sound exists, and it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it ’—is *not proved*.

Thus it is found that the probans, ‘because Obstruction is not apprehended’, is equally applicable to the *Obstruction*, and to the *Non-apprehension* of the Obstruction. ”

This opposition, based upon Non-apprehension, constitutes ‘ Parity per Non-apprehension ’.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows —

Sūtra 30

Since ‘Non-apprehension’ is of the nature of negation of apprehension,* the reason urged is no reason at all.

BHĀSYA

The reasoning—“ There can be no non-apprehension of Obstruction, because no such Non-apprehension is apprehended —is no reasoning at all, *because Non-apprehension is of the nature of the negation of apprehension* ’; that is, because Non-apprehension ’ is nothing more than mere *negation of apprehension*. As a matter of fact, what *exists* forms the object of ‘apprehension’, and this, by reason of its being apprehended, is asserted *to be existent* ; while of ‘ Non-apprehension ’ the object is that

* It is of the nature of ‘ Negation of Apprehension ’—*i. e.* mere ‘ Negation of Apprehension ’, without any further qualification—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

which *does not exist* ; and this by reason of its being not apprehended is declared to be *non-existent*. The 'non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of the obstruction' cannot negate the 'non-apprehension' ; operating as it does upon its own objective, which is 'Non-apprehension', it cannot negate that same 'objective' ;*—and when the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' *is not negated*, it becomes capable of serving as an effective Probans (for proving the non-existence of the obstruction). 'Obstruction' can be the object of apprehension when it exists : and if it exists there should be *apprehension* of it ;—so that when it is not apprehended—there being an absence of the 'apprehension' that would indicate the existence of its own objective.—from this 'non-apprehension' (serving as the means of cognition) it is understood that the object in question (which would have been apprehended if it existed) is the object of 'Non-apprehension' ; i. e. it is *non-existent* ; † the resultant conclusion being that 'the Obstruction and such other things, which would have been the cause of (which could have accounted for) the non-apprehension of Sound (before its utterance), are *non-existent*.' And the reason for this lies in the fact that what 'Non-apprehension' (as a means of cognition) indicates is that there is no apprehension, — this fact of there being non-apprehension forming the subject of the said 'Non-apprehension'.

* This passage is rather obscure.

We have adopted the explanation given by the *Tātparya* :—What the Opponent, in putting forward the Futile Rejoinder, does, is to urge that there must be obstruction and the apprehension of this obstruction, because we fail to apprehend the non-apprehension of these. But it is far more reasonable to regard the latter absence of apprehension (of the non-apprehension of obstruction) as bearing upon the obstruction and its apprehension, than upon Non-apprehension. Because as the *Nyayamānari* points out, what is negated by a negation must be something *positive* ; apprehension proves the *existence*, and 'non-apprehension' the *non-existence*, of only positive entities ; hence even the 'non-apprehension', even though of the 'non-apprehension of obstruction', can prove the *non-existence* only of the *obstruction* and *apprehensions*, which are positive entities, and not of the *non-apprehension* itself.

The *Bodhasiddhi* also explains similarly.

† The *visaya* object, the cognition of which is brought about by 'Non-apprehension', is *the non-existence of the object that would have been apprehended*.

Sūtra 31

Further, because the presence and absence of one's several cognitions are clearly perceptible to every person.*

BHĀṢYA

'Therefore the reasoning put forward in the *Futile Rejoinder* is no reasoning at all'—this has to be brought in from the preceding *Sūtra*. The presence and absence of the several cognitions that living beings have in the body, are clearly discernible by them; as is clear from such conceptions as 'My doubtful cognition exists' and 'My doubtful cognition does not exist'; similarly in connection with perceptual, inferential, verbal and reminiscential cognitions. So that in the case in question, when there is 'non-apprehension of the obstruction',—i.e. the *non-existence* of its apprehension—it is clearly discernible by the person himself, and he has the conception, 'My apprehension of the obstruction is not present', or 'Obstruction, or any such thing as would be the cause of the non-perception of Sound, is not apprehended'; from which it follows that what was alleged in (Sū. 29)—"inasmuch as the non-apprehension of the obstruction is also not apprehended it follows that this Non-apprehension also is non-existent"—is not right.

End of Section 13

SECTION 14

Dealing with (22) 'Parity per Non-eternality'.

Sūtra 32

"If by reason of 'similarity' two things be regarded as having analogous properties; then all things should have to be regarded as 'non-eternal',—this contention constitutes 'Parity per Non-eternality'.

BHĀṢYA

"When the First Party says that—'Sound should be regarded as *non-eternal*, by reason of its similarity to the Jar, which is *non-eternal*',—he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of

*According to *Tātparya* and *Bodhasiddhi* the *Sūtra* would mean—'it is clearly perceptible to every person whether a certain cognition apprehends the Existence or Non-existence of a thing.' The translation adopts the interpretation of the *Nyāyamañjarī* which is more in keeping with the *Bhāṣya*.

having to regard *all* things as *non-eternal*, by reason of their similarity (consisting of *existence*) to the Jar, which is non-eternal.”—This opposition based upon ‘non-eternality’ constitutes ‘Parity per Non-eternality.’*

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 33

If rejection can be based upon ‘similarity’, there should be rejection also of the denial (set up by the Opponent), as there is a similarity between the denial and that which it is sought to deny.*

BHĀṢYA

The ‘Denial’ is that allegation which is fully equipped with the Proposition and the other Factors of Reasoning, and which, while representing the counter-view, sets aside the original view;†—and the said ‘Denial’ has this similarity to the *original view* that both are equipped with the factors of Reasoning, Proposition and the rest. Now, if there is to be a rejection of *non-eternality* (of Sound) on the ground of the ‘similarity’ (of all things) with the non-eternal (Jar),—then, inasmuch as this would mean that ‘similarity’ leads to rejection, it would follow that there should be rejection of the *Denial* also, on the ground of its similarity to *what is sought to be denied* (i.e. the original view).§

Sūtra 34

What serves as the Probans is that property which is definitely known to subsist in the Example, as being an infallible indicator of the Probandum ; and since such a Probans can be of both kinds, there can be no non-difference (among all things).

* This Futile Rejoinder is described as based upon ‘similarity’; it includes also a similar rejoinder based upon ‘dissimilarity’—says the *Bodhasiddhi*.

† The right reading of the Sūtra, as shown by the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika*, the *Tātparya* and *Bodhasiddhi*, is साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसाधर्म्यात्.

‡ The correct reading is पक्षनिवर्तकम् ; with the reading पक्षनिवर्तक, the meaning would be—‘which is meant to establish a counter-view’.

§ The *Tātparya* remarks that the answer contained in this Sūtra only puts the Opponent on the same footing as the First Party. The real answer comes in the next Sūtra.

BHĀSYA

That property, which is found in the 'Example' to be an infallible indicator of the Probandum, is what is put forward as the *Probans*. *This Probans can be of both kinds*,—i.e. it may be similar to certain things, and dissimilar to certain other things; when it is similar, it constitutes the 'similarity' (among those things), and when it is dissimilar, it constitutes the 'dissimilarity' (among those things). Now, it is only a particular form of 'similarity' that constitutes the real 'Probans',—and not either mere 'similarity' without any qualification, or mere 'dissimilarity'. What you have urged (under Sū. 32)—that, "If by reason of similarity two things are to be regarded as having analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded as non-eternal, and this constitutes Parity per Non-eternality",—is based upon mere 'similarity' and mere 'dissimilarity'; and as such cannot be right.*

[In addition to what has been said here] all that was said (in Sū. 5-1-24) in answer to Parity per Non-difference should be taken as applying with equal force to the present Futile Rejoinder also.

End of Section 14

SECTION (15)

[Sūtras 35-36]

Dealing with (23) 'Parity per Eternality'

Sūtra 35

"The character of 'non-eternality' being eternal, it follows that the 'non-eternal thing' is itself eternal",—based upon this contention is 'Parity per Eternality'.

BHĀŚYA

"The proposition is put forward in the form—'Sound is non-eternal'; now, is this 'non-eternality' of Sound *eternal*, everlasting, or *non-eternal*, evanescent? If it is present in Sound

*What can rightly prove a conclusion is only such 'similarity' or 'dissimilarity' as is invariably concomitant with the Probandum. While the 'similarity' that has been put forward by the Opponent as his 'probans' in the proving of the 'non-eternality' of all things, is 'Existence'; and there is no invariable concomitance between 'Existence' and 'Non-eternality'; there being several things that are *existent* and yet *eternal*, not non-eternal.

at all times, then, since the property (non-eternality) is everlasting, the thing to which that property belongs ('Sound') must also be everlasting, so that Sound should be *Eternal*. If, on the other hand, the said property ('Non-eternality') is not present in Sound at all times,—then since (at some time or other) 'Non-eternality' would be absent in Sound, Sound would be 'eternal'.

This opposition based upon 'Eternality', constitutes 'Parity per Eternality'.*

BHĀSYA

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūtra 36

Inasmuch as the everlasting character of the 'non-eternality' in the subject of Denial (Sound) [is admitted by the Opponent], the 'non-eternality' of the non-eternal thing (Sound) becomes established; so that there can be no basis for the Denial.†

When the Opponent speaks of the character of *non-eternality* being 'everlasting' in Sound, which is the object whose non-eternality he seeks to deny,—he admits the *non-eternality* of Sound;—and when this 'non-eternality of Sound' has been thus admitted, there is no room for the Denial. If, on the other hand, he does not admit the 'everlasting' character of the 'non-eternality in Sound', then for him, the expression,— 'because non-eternality in Sound is eternal',—cannot serve as the Probans (of his reasoning);—and in the absence of the Probans, the denial cannot be proved.

* In this Sūtra, the mention of 'non-eternality' is meant to include all those specific reasons that may be adduced in support of the non-eternality of Sound. The sense of the definition of 'Parity per Eternality' is as follows—When the Opponent puts forward certain exhaustive alternatives in regard to the property put forward by the First Party, and shows that none of these is admissible, and then proceeds to urge that the Subject cannot, on that account, be accepted as having that property;—this form of Opposition constitutes 'Parity per Eternality'.—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

† The *Nyāyamañjarī* reads the Sūtra without अनित्ये and with अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः. The presence or absence of अनित्ये does not make any difference in the meaning. But from the explanation provided in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Bodhasiddhi* and the *Nyāyamañjarī*, अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः is the right reading for नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः.

In fact, what is meant by Sound being 'non-eternal' is that it is *produced and ceases to exist on being destroyed*; and there can be no question against this; hence there is no room for any such question as—"does the non-eternality subsist in Sound at all times or not?"—Why?—Because the non-eternality of Sound consists in its being produced and ceasing to exist on being destroyed;—it is not right to regard 'Sound' as the *container* (the receptacle) and 'non-eternality' as the *contained*; for such a conception would involve a self-contradiction in terms.* Further, 'eternality' and 'non-eternality' are contradictory terms (hence also the Denial cannot be maintained); that 'non-eternality' and 'eternality'—which are mutual contradictories—should belong to the same Object (Sound) is an impossibility. For these reasons we conclude that what has been alleged by the Opponent—that "Non-eternality being eternal, Sound must be eternal"—has absolutely no sense.

End of Section 15

SECTION (16)

[*Sūtras 37-38*]

Dealing with (24) 'Parity per character of Effect'.

Sūtra 37

'Parity per character of Effect' is based on the diverse character of the products of effort.

BHĀṢYA

The original proposition is put up in the form—'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is the outcome of effort*', now that which is 'the outcome of effort' is such as, *not having previous existence comes into existence*; as is found to be the case with such products as the Jar and the like; that which is 'non-eternal', on the other hand, is such as, *having come into existence, ceases to exist*. Such being the condition of things, the Opposition is

* If 'non-eternality' is contained in 'Sound', then alone can there be any force in the contention that if the former is eternal, the latter also should be so; as in that case alone could the former not subsist without the latter. As a matter of fact, the relation of 'container and contained' does not subsist between *Sound* and Non-eternality. For such relationship belongs only to *positive* entities, and Non-eternality is purely *negative*; and this only *qualifies* Sound, it does not *subsist in it*;—says the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

set up on the basis of *the diverse character of the products of effort*. 'Coming into existence after effort' we find in the case of the jar, etc., and we also find the 'manifestation' of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction [and this also is the *outcome of effort*]; and there is no special reason to show whether Sound *comes into existence after Effort*, or there is only *manifestation* of it (after effort); and the Opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these (production and manifestation) being equally the 'products of effort',* is 'Parity per Character of Effect'.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūtra 38

Even though there are several Kinds of Products,—inasmuch as [in the other Kind of Product] causes of non-apprehension are present, Effort could not be the cause (of mere 'manifestation' of Sound, in whose case there is no cause of non-apprehension).*

Even though there are several kinds of Products, there are present causes of non-apprehension,—hence Effort could not be the cause, of the manifestation of Sound. In a case where there is *manifestation* as the *outcome of effort*, it is possible that there may have been some cause, in the shape of obstruction, to which its non-apprehension (before manifestation) was due, so that when, as a result of effort, there is a removal of the obstruction, there comes about the *apprehension* of the thing, which constitutes its 'manifestation'. In the case of Sound, however, no such cause of Non-apprehension is possible, by the removal whereof, as following from Effort, there could come about the 'manifestation' of

* The mere fact of Sound being the 'outcome of Effort' does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is non-eternal, it comes into existence, or is destroyed; for even if it were only *manifested*, it could be regarded as the 'outcome of effort'.

* We have translated the Sūtra as it is explained in the Bhāṣya and read in all manuscripts. The interpretation however is far fetched; hence the *Nyāyamañjarī* has read the Sūtra with the last term as अनुपलब्धिकारणानुपपत्तेः and explains it to mean as follows:—'*Even though there are various kinds of Products,—Effort cannot be regarded as the cause (of the manifestation of Sound), as there is not present (in the case of Sound) any cause of its non-apprehension*'. This is much simpler.

the Sound consisting of its *apprehension*, From this it follows that Sound is *produced*, not *manifested* (by Effort).*

End of Section 16

SECTION (17)

[*Sūtras 39-43*]

*Dealing with the 'Ṣaṭpakṣi'—the six steps of a Futile Discussion.**

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *first* step consisting of the Proposition, 'Sound must be non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort, like the Jar', it is urged against this that the Probans is 'inconclusive', and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the 'conclusion'—(this represents the *second* step);—[to this the First Party, offers the following *wrong answer*, which represents the *third* step]—If my Probans cannot prove the conclusion because it is inconclusive, then—

Sūtras 39

the same fault lies with the denial (by the Opponent) also.—

BHĀṢYA

That is, the Denial also is 'inconclusive'; it denies something, and does not deny other things; and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the desired conclusion.

Or, the Opponent having said—"If Sound be held to be *non-eternal*, there is no special reason why what happens to Sound, after Effort, is *production*, and not *manifestation*,"—[he is met by the First Party with the following *wrong answer*]—if Sound be held to be *eternal*, then also there is no special reason why what

* The *Nyāyamañjarī* remarks that by having selected the 'non-eternality of Sound' as the Example, dealt with under all the twenty-four *Futile Rejoinders*, the author of the *Bhāṣya* has accomplished two purposes. he provides examples of the Rejoinders and also sets aside all possible objections against the Nyāya doctrine of the *Non-eternality of Sound*.

* Says the *Tātparya*—It has been shown up to the last Section that when the Opponent sets up a Futile Rejoinder he is met by the First Party with a suitable answer; and in every such case, the disputants come to an understanding as to the true conclusion. But there are cases where the First Party also meets the Opponent with a wrong answer; in that case no right conclusion is arrived at; and an entirely futile discussion is carried on, to six steps. This is what the author of the *Sūtra* proceeds to show, for the benefit of his pupils.

happens to Sound is *manifestation*, not *production*. Thus special reasons being equally wanting in both views, both are equally *inconclusive*.

Sūtra 40

The same may be said by the First Party in answer to all (Futile Rejoinders)—

BHĀṢYA

In connection with all that may be taken as the basis of the Futile Rejoinders—e g. 'Similarity' and the rest—whenever no special corroborative reason may be found,—the contention may be put forward (by the First Party) that both views stand on the same footing.

Sūtra 41

[*Fourth Step*] "With the Contravention of the Denial also would lie the same fault as that which lies against the Denial itself.

BHĀṢYA

It has been urged by the First Party that the fault of *Inconclusiveness* that had been urged (in the *Second Step*) as lying in the original Proposition, lies also in the Denial (set up by the Opponent). But the same fault lies with this contravention of the Denial. Thus then, the *First Step* in this Futile Discussion consists in the propounding of the original proposition by the First Party—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is the outcome of Effort';—the *Second Step* consists of the denial or negative argument set up by the Opponent Critic, in the form—"Since the products of Effort are of several kinds there is Parity per Character of Effect"; this is what is called the 'Denial';—then comes the *Third Step*—in which the First Party urges that the same fault lies with the Denial also. this is what is called (in the *Sūtra*) *Vipratīṣēdha*' (Contravention);—then comes the *Fourth Step* (urged by the Opponent)—"the same fault of Inconclusiveness lies also with the Contravention of the Denial."

Sūtra 42

[*Fifth Step*]*—*The contingency of the same fault lying with the Contravention of the denial is urged (by the Opponent), after admitting the presence of the fault in his

own contention;—and this involves ‘Confession of the Contrary Opinion’.—

BHĀSYA

What the Opponent has done (in the *Fourth Step*) is to confess that the view he had expressed in the *Second Step* is faulty, and, without freeing his view from that defect, he has admitted it and then has urged that the same fault of ‘Inconclusiveness’ lies also with the Contravention of the Denial in the *Third Step*;—and on the part of the Opponent this involves a ‘Confession of the Contrary Opinion’. This is the *Fifth Step* [in the Futile Discussion].

Sūtra 43

[*Sixth Step*]—“It is after having admitted what has been urged against his own view, that the first party has urged the presence of the same fault (in the Opponent’s view), and has put forward reasons for the same;—in so doing he has admitted the presence (in his own view) of the fault urged against the Opponent’s view;—so that the fault of ‘Confessing the contrary opinion’ is equally applicable to him also”.

BHĀSYA

The fault urged against the original Proposition of the First Party was that ‘there are several kinds of products of effort’ (Sū. 37); and this is what, for the First Party who is propounding reasons in support of that proposition, constitutes ‘*Svapakṣalakṣaṇa*’, ‘*fault urged against his own view*’;—how?—because it arises out of his own view;—now what he has done (in course of the present Futile Discussion) is to admit this fault that has been urged against his view, and without refuting it, he has admitted it and urged the presence of the same fault in the words ‘the same fault lies with the Denial also’ (Sū. 39); and he has put forward reasons in support of the same,—in the words ‘the denial is inconclusive’. Thus it being a case where *he has admitted what has been urged against his view and urged the presence of the same fault in the Opponent’s view and has put forward reasons for the same*,—this means that he has admitted the presence in his own view of the fault he had urged against the Opponent’s view.*

* The right reading is परपक्षदोषोऽभ्युपगतो भवति as found in C.

'How so?' The Opponent had argued that 'there are several kinds of products of Effort', by which he meant to indicate 'the fault of inconclusiveness' (as lying against the original proposition);—without refuting this the First Party has said—'the same fault lies with the Denial also';—thus he has admitted that the arguments in support of the original proposition are faulty, and then urged the same against the Denial also; by doing so he admits the view of the Opponent, and becomes open to the same charge (of 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'). Just as the Opponent having admitted the faultiness of the Denial of the First Party, and having urged the presence of the same fault in the Contravention of the Denial also, has been charged (in the *Fifth Step*) with 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion',—exactly in the same manner, the First Party also, having admitted the faultiness of the affirmation of the original Proposition, and having urged the presence of the same fault against the Denial, becomes open to the same charge of 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'.

This represents the *Sixth Step* in the Futile Discussion. Among the six steps, the *first*, *third* and *Fifth* steps represent the assertions of the Propounder of the Original Proposition, and the *second*, *fourth* and *sixth* represent those of the Opponent denying that Proposition. When we come to consider the validity and invalidity of those assertions, we find as follows:—*(a)* Since there is no difference in the meaning of the *fourth* and the *sixth*, they are open to the charge of needless repetition; for what the *fourth* says is that 'with the Contravention of the Denial also would lie the same fault as that which lies with the Denial itself' (Sū. 41), which means that the other party is subject to the same fault;—and again in the *sixth* we have the assertion that by admitting the Opponent's view the First Party becomes open to the same charge; and this also means that the other party is open to the same fault; thus there is no difference in the meanings of these two.—*(b)* The same charge of needless repetition lies also against the *third* and *fifth* steps; in the *third* what is alleged is that the same fault lies with the Denial also, which admits the equality of both views and again in the *fifth* it is admitted that the denial of the the Denial is subject to the same fault;—so that the *fifth* says nothing new.—*(c)* Again

the *fifth* and *sixth* also are mere repetitions, there being no difference in what they allege.—(d) The *third* and the *fourth* involve the 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion'—(e) In the *first* and the *second*, no special reasons have been adduced (in support of either view). Thus it is found that in the Futile Discussion consisting of the said six steps, neither of the two views becomes established.

When does this Futile Discussion with the six steps, take place?—It takes place whenever the First Party begins the discussion with the contention that the same fault lies with the denial also, and in this case neither of the two views becomes demonstrated. When, however, the third step (in answer to the Opponent's denial which is the second step) is put forward by the First Party in the form—'Even though there are several kinds of Products, inasmuch as in the other kinds of Product causes of non-apprehension are present, Effort could not be the cause of the manifestation of Sound' (Sū. 38)—then the original view does become demonstrated, that 'What happens to Sound after Effort is that it comes into existence, and not that it becomes manifested', and in this case there is no room for the six steps of the Futile Discussion.

*Thus ends the First Daily Lesson of the Fifth Adhyāya
of the Bhāṣya.*

ADHYĀYA V
DAILY LESSON II

SECTION (1)

[Sūtras 1-6]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Dealing with the five Clinchers or Grounds of Defeat that bear upon the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans

Under Sū. 1-2-19 and 20 it has been briefly stated that—'It is a case of Clincher when there is misapprehension, as also when there is non-apprehension; and there is a multiplicity of Clinchers owing to there being several varieties of both'; the same has now got to be described in detail. The Clinchers are actual occasions of defeat, the receptacles of faults; and they mostly bear upon the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning, and they may affect the propounder of the true, as also that of the false, doctrine [but only so long as perfect wisdom has not been attained]. They are divided as follows:—

Sūtra 1

(1) Violating the Proposition, (2) Shifting the Proposition, (3) Contradicting the Proposition, (4) Renouncing the Proposition, (5) Shifting the the Probans, (6) Irrelevancy, (7) Meaningless Jargon, (8) Unintelligibility, (9) Incoherence, (10) Inconsequentiality, (11) Incompleteness, (12) Redundance, (13) Repetition, (14) Non-reproduction, (15) Incomprehension, (16) Embarrassment, (17) Evasion, (18) Confession of a Contrary Opinion, (19) Overlooking the Censurable, (20) Censuring of the non-censurable, (21) Inconsistency, and (22) Fallacious Probans are the Clinchers —

BHĀSYA

All these, divided into twenty-two kinds, are defined one by one, in the following Sūtras.*

* These twenty-two Clinchers have been grouped under seven heads, each of which is dealt with in the seven *sections* of this *Daily Lesson*.

Sūtra 2

When the property of the 'counter-instance' (urged by the Opponent) is admitted by one to be present in the example cited by himself,—it is a case of (1) 'Violating the Proposition'.

BHĀSYA

The Opposition having been set up on the basis of a certain property which is contrary to the Probandum,—if the First Party admits that that contrary property, which belongs to the Counter-instance cited by the Opponent, is present in the Example cited by himself, he violates his original Proposition; hence this becomes a case of 'Violating the Proposition'. *Example*—The Proposition having been put forward in the form—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the senses, like the Jar',—the Opponent says—"But we find that Community, which is *eternal*, is also perceptible by the senses; and why cannot Sound also be the same?"—Being met with this Opposition, the First Party may say—"if Community, which is perceptible by the senses, is eternal, the Jar also may be eternal", and in this the First Party attributes 'eternality' to the Example that he had cited in support of his proposition; and in so doing he violates his entire thesis up to the 'Final Conclusion'; and violating his entire thesis, he is said to violate his Proposition,—since the Thesis rests in the Proposition *

Sūtra 3

The subject of the (original) Proposition having been denied, if the First Party finds a diversity in the properties (of the Example and the counter-instance), and puts it forward with a view to establish the former Proposition,—this is (2) 'Shifting the Proposition'.

* The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the Sūtra describes two kinds of 'Violating the Proposition'—the first is described by the very name 'Violating the Proposition', and another by the rest of the Sūtra. The example of the former kind would be that case when, on finding that he cannot bring forward arguments to sustain his position, the First Party entirely surrenders his point.—'All right, I give up my point; *Sound is not non-eternal.*' What is cited in the *Bhāṣya* is the example of the second kind.

BHĀṢYA

The 'subject of the original Proposition' is—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the Senses, like the Jar'; this Proposition having been propounded (by the First Party), which consists in showing, by means of a counter-instance, that the Probans (of the original Proposition) is not truly concomitant (with the Probandum),—'Community, which is perceptible by the senses, being eternal';—and the subject of the original Proposition being thus denied, the First Party finds a 'diversity in the properties of Example and the Counter-instance',—i. e., he finds that while both (Jar and Community) have a certain property, being perceptible by the senses, in common, there are others in which they differ; e. g., Community is perceptible by the senses and *all-pervading*, while the Jar is perceptible by the senses and *not-all-pervading*; and perceiving this diversity of properties he puts it forward with a view to establish his former Proposition,—how?—[in this way]—'Just as the Jar is *not-all-pervading*, so is Sound also *not-all-pervading*, and hence like the Jar it should be *non-eternal* also';—now here the former Proposition was 'Sound is non-eternal', and 'Sound is not-all-pervading' is a totally different Proposition,—this is thus an instance of 'Shifting the Proposition'.

"In what way does this become a *Ground of Defeat*, a Clincher?"

Well, as a matter of fact, one Proposition does not prove another Proposition; what prove a Proposition are the Probans and the Example; hence the putting forward (as proof) of what cannot prove the Proposition is entirely futile; and being futile, it becomes a 'Ground of Defeat'.*

Sūtra 4

When there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans, it is (3) 'Contradiction of the Proposition'.

* Though when the First Party puts forward the fact of Sound being *not-all-pervading*, the idea in his mind is that, after having brought this home to the other party, he would add that as a qualifying clause to his original premiss—stating it in the form 'because Sound, while being *not-all-pervading*, is perceptible by the senses (it must be non-eternal)';—yet until he actually does so, his position is clearly subject to the said Clincher.—*Tātparya*.

BHĀSYA

The Proposition is stated in the form—‘Substance must be something different from Quality’, and the Statement of the Probans is in the form—‘because no objects are ever perceived, except Colour etc.’:—and there is a contradiction (conflict) between these, Proposition and Statement of the Probans.—How?—If Substance is something different from Quality, then it is not possible that nothing except Colour etc. should be perceived;—while if nothing except Colour etc., is perceived, then it is not possible that Substance should be something different from Quality; thus there is a conflict between the two statements—(a) ‘Substance must be different from Quality’ and (b) ‘Nothing except Colour etc. is perceived’; *i.e.*, the two are mutually Nugatory, and are impossible.*

Sūtra 5

The original thesis having been opposed, if what was formerly affirmed happens to be retracted,—it is (4) ‘Renouncing the Proposition’.

BHĀSYA

The original thesis having been put forward in the form, “Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by the senses,” the other party says—“Community is perceptible by the senses, and is yet eternal, and similarly Sound also, which is perceptible by the senses, may be eternal”;—and the original thesis being thus opposed, if the First Party happens, to say—‘Who says that Sound is *non-eternal*?’ This retraction of what had been affirmed in the Proposition is what is called ‘Renouncing the Proposition’.*

* The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the contradiction between the ‘Proposition’ and the ‘Statement of the Probans’ has been mentioned only by way of illustration; as a matter of fact, there is contradiction of the Proposition whenever there is any inconsistency between any two factors of the reasoning, and also when the Proposition is inconsistent with a well-ascertained fact.

* The Bauddha Logician Dharmakīrti has objected to this Clincher of ‘Renouncing the Proposition’, on the ground that the First Party having been already ‘defeated’ by the pointing out of the inconclusiveness of his Probans, there can be no need for any further ‘ground of defeat’. The *Tātparya* has answered this by saying that, as soon as the person finds that unless he renounces his proposition he shall be faced with the Fallacy of

Sūtra 6

The Probans in the unqualified form having been opposed, if the First Party desires to qualify it, it is a case of (5) 'shifting the probans'.—

BHĀSYA

Example :—The Proposition is set up in the form, 'Everything that is manifested has a single origin';—why?—'*because products emanating from a single origin have a definite magnitude,*—in the Cup and other products of Clay we find a definite magnitude, the product being of the same magnitude as the composition of the original substance—and such magnitude is found in every product;—and every manifested thing is found to have a definite magnitude;—hence from the fact that every product emanating from a single origin has a definite magnitude, we conclude that everything that is manifested emanates from a single origin.' Against this argument of the First Party, the following Opposition is set up with a view to show that the Probans is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum :—

"As a matter of fact, magnitude is found present in products emanating from the same origin, as also in those emanating from several origins." This opposition having been put forward, the First Party says—'[My reasoning would then be] because a definite magnitude is found in the Cup and other products, *in all which there subsists the same original substance*;—every manifested thing, *having subsisting in it Pleasure, Pain and Delusion (the constituent attributes of Primordial Matter)*, is found to have definite magnitude;—and from this it follows that no other original substances being found subsisting in all manifested things, they must all have a single origin (in the form of Primordial Matter).'

Now here it is found that in the first instance the First Party stated the Probans in an unqualified form ['because they have a definite magnitude']—and when this was objected to—he added a qualification to it [in the form 'while having the same

Inconclusiveness,—with a view to save himself from that he retracts the Proposition; so that this Retraction comes in before the charge of Inconclusiveness is brought home to him, and until this is brought home to him, he cannot be 'defeated'.

original substance subsisting in them'¹; and this thus becomes a case of 'Shifting the Probans'.

[The reason why this is a 'ground for defeat', is as follows]—The second (qualified) probans having been put forward, if the party mentions an Example in corroboration of what is stated in the Probans, then that *manifested thing*, which is cited as 'Example' (which, as example, cannot be included in the Proposition) ceases to be the emanation from a single origin, because, by its very nature (of Example), it must be the emanation from some other origin;*—if, on the other hand, no Example is cited, then the Probans, not having its truth corroborated by a suitable Example, cannot prove that desired conclusion; so that the Probans turning out to be futile, the 'ground of defeat' remains in force.

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)

[Sūtras 7—10]

Dealing with the four Clinchers—(6), (7), (8) and (9) which consist in the non-apprehension of what is needed for the desired purpose.

Sūtra 7

The putting forward of statements bearing no connection with the purpose in hand constitutes (6) 'Irrelevancy'.

BHĀṢYA

The thesis and counter-thesis having been set up in the manner described above, the 'purpose in hand' being the proving of the Probandum by a proper Probans—the First Party might make the following statement:—'That Sound is eternal is proved by the *Heṭu*, because it is *intangible*' [having said so far he finds that his Proban is not valid, hence he goes on]—'the term *heṭu* is a verbal noun derived from the root *hi* and affix *ṭun*,—a term is either a *Noun* or a *Verb* or a *Preposition*, or *Indeclinable*

* The proposition is in the form—'all manifested things are etc'; if the example is not included in this 'all', then what is predicated of the 'all' will not be true of the Example; if the Example is also included in it, then no Example can be possible

Particle ;—the *Noun* is that word which has its form qualified by the fact of the thing denoted by it having a distinct action,—the *Verb* is either (a) an aggregate of the action and the active agencies, or (b) that which denotes the presence in the active agent, of a certain action qualified by a definite time and number,* or (c) that which is simply expressed by the root and is qualified by a particular time,—the *Indeclinables* are those that, in actual usage, have no denotation apart from what is expressed by the *Noun* or the *Verb*,—the *Prepositions* are used as prefixes and serve to qualify the action denoted by the *Verb*—and so forth, [all which has nothing to do with the proving of his Proposition] ; and this constitutes ‘Irrelevancy’.

Sūtra 8

That which is like the mere repeating of the letters of alphabet is (7) ‘Meaningless Jargon’.

BHĀSYA

E. g., ‘Sound is eternal, because *ka-ca-ṭa-ta-pa* are *ja-ba-ga-ḍa-das*’, † like *jha-bha-ṇa-gha-ḍha-dha-ṣ*’ ;—such statements are absolutely meaningless. Since the mere letters of the alphabet can have no denotation, they cannot express anything ; hence it is the mere letters that are repeated in a certain order.‡

Sūtra 9

If the assertion made is such that, though stated three times, it fails to be understood by the audience and the Second Party, it is a case of (8) ‘Un-intelligibility’—

BHĀSYA

If the assertion is made and is not understood by the audience and the Second Party, even though stated three times—and this happens when the assertion consists of words with double meanings, or of such words as are not met with in ordinary

* The right reading in all Mss. is कारकसंख्याविशिष्ट.

† The right reading is supplied by B and D—कचयत्पानां जबगडदशत्वात्.

‡ No such argument is found in actual usage. The *Tātparya* points out that we have an example of this when the Drāvīda puts forward his argument, for the convincing of an Arya, in his own Vernacular, which conveys no idea to the latter, who is ignorant of the Dravidian tongue ; and for whom the words of that language are only so many letter-sounds.

usage, or when the words are uttered too hurriedly and so forth ;—this constitutes ‘Unintelligibility’ ; since the man makes use of unintelligible expressions intentionally, with a view to cover the weakness of his reasonings,—this constitutes a ‘Ground of Defeat’.

Sūtra 10

In a case where, there being no connection between the expressions following one another, they are found to afford no connected meaning, it is a case of (9) ‘Incoherence’. *अप्रतिशिल*

BHĀṢYA

In a case where, either among several words or several sentences, there is no possibility of proper sequence and connection,—and hence the whole is found to be disconnected,—since there is no meaning obtained from the words or sentences taken collectively, it is a case of ‘Incoherence’. *E.g.* (a) ‘Ten pomegranates, six cakes’ (where there is no connection between the two sentences), (b) ‘Cup—goatskin—flesh—lump—deer-skin*—of the Virgin—to be drunk—her father—devoid of character’ †. Where the words have no connection among themselves.

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

[*Sūtras 11–13*]

Dealing with the (10), (11) and (12) Clinchers—which consist in the wrong presentment of one’s case.

Sūtra 11

When the factors of reasoning are stated in the reversed order, it is a case of (10) ‘Inconsequentiality’.

BHĀṢYA

Among the several Factors of Reasoning, Proposition and the rest, there is a definite natural order, in which they are stated,—which is based upon the nature of what is expressed by each of them ; and when a statement is made in which this natural order is reversed,—it becomes a case of that ‘Ground of Defeat’, which

* C and B and D read रौद्रकम् .

† C and D read अप्रतिशिल.

is called 'Inconsequentiality'; which means that what is expressed by the several Factors is not found to form a connected whole.

Sūtra 12

That which is wanting in any one of the Factors of Reasoning is (1) the 'Incomplete'.—

BHĀSYA

When the statement is wanting in any one of the Factors of Reasoning—Proposition and the rest—it is a case of the 'Ground of Defeat' called 'Incompleteness'; for in the absence of a complete statement of the reasoning, the desired conclusion cannot be established.

Sūtra 13

That which contains superfluous 'Probans' and 'Example' is the (12) 'Redundant'—

BHĀSYA

One alone being sufficient for the purpose in view, (when more than one Probans or Examples are put forward), one or the other must be superfluous. This, however, is to be regarded as a 'Ground of Defeat' only when there is a restriction (placed upon the speaker, in regard to stating *only* what is actually necessary for his proposition).

End of Section (3)

SECTION (4)

[*Sūtras 14-15*]

Sūtra 14

Dealing with the Clincher (13) Repetition.

The re-statement of Words and Ideas constitutes 'Repetition'—except in the case of Reproduction.

BHĀṢYA

Except in the case of Reproduction, (a) 'Repetition' of Words and (b) Repetition of Ideas (constitute 'grounds of defeat'); e.g. (a) 'Sound is eternal, Sound is eternal; here we have 'repetition of words'; and (b) 'Sound is non-eternal, Intonation is liable to destruction'; here we have the 'repetition of the Idea' (of Sound

being not everlasting). In the case of 'Reproduction' it is not 'Repetition' (a Ground of Defeat), because in that case the re-statement serves an additional purpose; when for instance, 'the re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probans constitutes the Final Conclusion'. (Sū. 1-1-39).

Sūtra 15

The actual statement by means of directly expressive words of what is already implied—

BHĀṢYA

is *Repetition*,*—this term coming in from the preceding Sūtra.

Example [of this second kind of Repetition]—Having asserted that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced', if the man goes on to add 'only that which does not have the character of being produced can be eternal', which words are expressive of the idea that is already got by 'implication'—this should be regarded as 'Repetition'; because words are used only for the purpose of conveying a meaning, and when this has already been done by implication [the actual using of words to the same effect is superfluous].

End of Section (4)

SECTION (5)

[Sūtras 16-19]

Dealing with the four Clinchers—(14), (15), (16) and (17)—which denote incompatibility with the right method of Answer.

Sūtra 16

If the First Party fails to re-state what has been stated (by the Second Party) three times, and duly understood by the audience, it is a case of (14) 'Non-reproduction'.

BHĀṢYA

When the meaning of the sentence has been duly understood by the audience, and it has been stated by the Opponent three times,—if the First Party fails to re-state it, it is a 'Ground of

* The Nṛ̥āyasūcīnibandha, the Tātparya and Sū. Ms D. makes 'पुनरुक्तम्' part of the Sūtra 15, itself, but this is not in keeping with the Bhāṣya.

Defeat' named 'Non-reproduction'. Because, unless he re-states the position of the Opponent, on the basis of what would be put forward his arguments against that position?*

Sūtra 17

When the statement is not comprehended it is a case of (15) 'Incomprehension'.

BHĀṢYA

When the statement (of the Opponent) has been understood by the Audience, and has been repeated, by the Opponent, three times, if the First Party still fails to comprehend it, this is the 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Incomprehension'. Without understanding what the Opponent has said, whose refutation would be set forth ?

Sūtra 18

It is (16) 'Embarassment' when the Party does not know the answer.

BHĀṢYA

The 'answer' consists in the confutation of the Opponent's view† ; when the Party does not know this, he is 'Defeated'.

Sūtra 19

When the Party breaks off the discussion under the pretext of business, it is a case of (17) 'Evasion'.

BHĀṢYA

When the Party puts forward the pretext of having to do something else, and breaks off the discussion, saying—'I have got to do such and such a work, I shall resume the discussion after having finished that work,'—this is the 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Evasion.' In such a case, since every discussion ends with a single 'Clincher', the man, by breaking off in the said manner, concludes the discussion into which he had entered, and thus the discussion taken up after the lapse of some time, would be a new discussion.

End of Section (5)

* Though the man does not understand it, he does not say so;—if he did, it would be a case of 'Incomprehension'. Nor does he desist from the discussion;—if he did, it would be a case of 'Evasion'.—*Bodhasiddhi*.

† पक्षप्रतिषेधः is the right reading as in C and D.

SECTION (6)
[Sūtras 20-22]

Dealing with the three Clinchers—(18), (19) and (20)—which bear upon flaws in the Statements.

Sūtra 20

If the Party admits the flaw in his own thesis, and then urges the same in that of the Opponent,—this is a case of (18) 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'.

BHĀṢYA

When the Party admits that defect in his thesis which has been urged against it by the Opponent—and without trying to show that his statement is free from that defect, he simply says—'the same defect is found in your statement also',—he admits the defect in his own thesis, and then tries to apply the same to that of the Opponent; and in doing this he admits the opinion of the other party regarding his own thesis, and as such becomes subject to the 'ground of defeat' called 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'.

Sūtra 21

When one Party has rendered himself subject to a 'Clincher', if the other party fails to bring it home to him (by directly charging him with it),—the latter himself becomes subject to the Clincher of (19) 'Overlooking the Censurable'.—

BHĀṢYA

What is meant by the man being 'Censurable' is that he becomes open to the contingency of the application of the 'Clincher' being brought home to him; the 'overlooking' of this means that he does *not* directly charge his opponent with the words—'You have become subject to a Clincher or Ground of Defeat'.

This 'Ground of Defeat' however can be pointed out only by the audience, when directly appealed to with the question—'Who is defeated?' The man himself, who had rendered himself open to a Clincher, could not very well show his own cloven feet (by saying 'I had rendered myself subject to a Clincher, and you failed to urge it against me').

Sūtra 22

When one party urges a 'Clincher' when there is no 'Clincher' (incurred by the other party),—it is a case of (20) 'Censuring the Un-censurable'.

BHĀṢYA

It is only when the man has a wrong conception of the true character of the 'Clincher' that he can urge—"You are defeated"—against the other Party, who in fact, has *not* rendered himself subject to a 'Clincher;' and in doing so, since he would be censuring one who does not deserve to be censured, he should be regarded as 'defeated'.*

Sūtra 23

Having taken up one standpoint, if the party carries on the discussion without restriction,—it is a case of (21) 'Inconsistency'.—

BHĀṢYA

Having affirmed a certain character in regard to a thing, if the party carries on further discussion *without restriction*—*i.e.*, even contrary to the view taken up before—it should be regarded as a case of 'Inconsistency'. E.g. 'An entity never renounces itself,—there can be no distinction in what exists—that which is non-existent can never come into existence,—no non-existent thing is ever produced'; having taken up this standpoint, the *Sāṅkhya* goes on to establish this thesis in the following manner:—'All that is manifested must be regarded as emanating from a single origin, because there is a common substratum running through all emanations,—and in the case of the Earthen Cup and such things it is found that they have the substratum of *Clay* running through them all, and are the emanations from a single origin—and all manifested things are found

* This is not the same as 'Embarassment', as in this latter the man does not know what to say in answer, while in 'Censuring the Un-censurable' he says something, as the *answer*, which is not an answer at all. It is for this reason that this 'Clincher' includes all *Futile Rejoinders*. The difference between this and 'Fallacious Probans' lies in this that the 'Fallacious Probans' when pointed out, tends to the 'defeat' of the propounder of the argument, while 'Censuring the Un-censurable' is urged against the person who is answering an argument.—*Tātparya*.

to have Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion running through them all,—and from seeing the subsistence of this common substratum in these—Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion,—we conclude that the whole of this Universe must be the emanation from a single origin’.*—When he has said this he is met (by the Logician) with the following question—‘How is it to be determined that a certain thing is the *origin*, and another the *emanation*?’—Thus questioned, *Sāṅkhya* answers—‘That which itself remains constant while one character of it ceases to exist and another comes into existence is the *origin*; and the character that ceases to exist and comes into existence is the *emanation*.’†

Now here we find that the *Sankhya* has carried on discussion without any restriction, without regard to the view taken up by him before, in fact even contrary to the opinion accepted before. For the opinion accepted by him at the outset was—‘the non-existent can never come into existence—the existent cannot cease to exist’; and it is a well-known fact that unless there is cessation of existence of what has been *existent*, or ‘coming into existence’ of what has been *non-existent*, there can be no *disappearance* or *appearance*; e.g. when, the Clay remaining constant, its own character, in the shape of the *Cup*, comes into existence, it is said to *appear*, and when it has ceased to exist, it is said to *disappear*;—all this should not be possible (according to the *Sāṅkhya* standpoint) even in connection with the character of the Clay. Having all this urged against himself, if the *Sāṅkhya* comes to admit that what is *existent* does *cease to exist*, and what is *non-existent* does *come into existence*,—then he becomes subject to the Clincher of ‘Inconsistency’; while if he does not admit the said facts, his thesis fails to be established.‡

* The right reading is एकमकृतीद विश्वमिति, as found in D.

† The best reading of this passage is found in the *Tātparya* and D—यस्यावस्थितस्य धर्मान्तरनिवृत्तौ यद्धर्मान्तरं प्रवर्तते सा प्रकृतिः यद्धर्मान्तरम्प्रवर्तते निवर्तते वा स विकार इति. In the case of the Jar, the Clay is the constant factor; while the varying shapes of the Jar, Cup etc., are the *emanations*.

‡ Without the said fact, no distinction is possible between ‘Origin’ and ‘Emanation’; and without this distinction, the original Proposition of the *Sāṅkhya* can have no meaning.

Sūtra 24

(22) The 'Fallacious Probans' also, (are Clinchers) as they have been already described.

BHĀṢYA

The 'Fallacious Probans' also are 'Grounds of Defeat'. *Question*—"Is it on account of the presence of some other character that the Fallacious Probans comes to be regarded as *Clinchers*,—just in the same way as the 'Instruments of Cognition' come to be regarded as 'Objects of Cognition'?"

In answer to this the *Sūtra* says—*as they have been described*; *i e.*, it is in the character of the 'Fallacious Probans' itself that they become 'Grounds of Defeat' (Clinchers) also.

Thus have the Instruments of Right Cognition and other categories been duly *mentioned, defined* and *examined*.

'The Science of Reasoning that revealed itself to the Sage Akṣapāda, the chief of exponents,—of that Vātsyāyana has propounded the Commentary.'

Thus ends the Second Daily Lesson of the Fifth Discourse in the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana.

FINIS

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