Inference or anumaana is defined as that cognition which presupposes some
other cognition. It is knowledge which arises (anu) after another knowledge. It
is mediate and indirect and arises through a mark, linga or hetu (middle term)
which is invariably connected with the saadhya (the major term). Invariable
concomitance (vyaapti) is the nerve of inference. The presence of the linga in
the paksha (minor term) is called pakshadharmataa. The invariable association of
the linga with the saadhya is called vyaapti.
According to Nyaya, anumaana
(inference) is the efficient instrument (karana)
of inferential knowledge (anumiti).
Anumiti is knowledge that arises from paraamarsa. Paraamarsa is a complex cognition which arises from a
combination of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyaaptijnaana) and that of the presence of the linga
in the paksha -- technically known as pakshadharmataajnaana.
From
'A Primer of Indian Logic', page 194:--
Paraamarsa
is an indispensable
antecedent and should, therefore, be treated as the cause of anumiti.
It is contended by the
Naiyayikas that, in the absence of such a paraamarsa,
anumiti does not arise. Paraamarsa is
also known as lingaparaamarsa or tritiyalingaparaamarsa
(the third cognition of the reason). The cognition of the presence of the linga
in the paksha may be said to be the first lingaparaamarsa; the cognition of the invariable concomitance is the
second. The complex cognition which arises from these two cognitions is the
third.
The Mimamsakas
and the Advaitins hold that the complex cognition called paraamarsa is not indispensable for anumiti, though it may actually arise just before anumiti
in many cases. They therefore maintain that it would be necessary to treat anumiti as the effect of vyaaptijnaana
and pakshadharmataajnana and to
exclude paraamarsa from the causal
complement of anumiti.
From
Methods of Knowledge, page 146:--
According to Advaita, the instrument of inferential knowledge is the
knowledge of invariable concomitance, the latent impression of which knowledge
is the cause. As soon as a person who has gained from previous experience the
knowledge of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire sees smoke on a
hill, the latent impression of this knowledge is revived within him and
immediately follows the conclusion, 'The hill has fire'. Hence the interposition
of the third consideration of the mark is redundant.
Major term---- saadhya—fire--probandum
Minor term-- paksha--
hill
Middle term-- linga or hetu—
smoke-- probans
An upaadhi in Nyaaya is
an adventitious factor which is invariably concomitant with the probandum and
not so with the probans. The relation of vyaapti
embodied in the proposition--- "Wherever there is fire, there is
smoke"-- is not a necessary and unconditioned relation and depends upon the
association of fire with the adventitious contact of wet fuel with fire. Such an
adventitious circumstance is called upaadhi.
It is called upaadhi because its invariable concomitance with the probandum
(fire) comes to be erroneously associated with the probans (smoke), just in the
same way as the redness of a flower is erroneously associated with a crystal in
its vicinity.
In a statement of vyaapti, the vyaapya
(pervaded--smoke) should be first referred to and the vyaapaka
(pervader -- fire) should be the
principal predicate.
Nyaya postulates five component parts in the syllogism:--
Pratijnaa- The proposition
Hetu --reason
Udaaharana--example
Upanaya -- application
Nigamana -- conclusion.
According to Advaita Vedanta only the first three steps or the last three
are necessary.
The Naiyayikas classify inference into three different types, as below:--
Anvaya-vyatireki--
in which the invariable
concomitance can be either affirmative or negative, e.g.--'Wherever there is
smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen', and, 'Where there is no fire, there is
no smoke, as in a lake'.
Kevala-vyatireki--
that which is based solely on negative invariable concomitance, e.g.-- 'Whoever
is not omniscient is not the creator' . The inference, 'God is omniscient,
because He is the Creator' is based on this negative invariable concomitance. No
knowledge of affirmative invariable concomitance is possible in this case,
because the co-presence of Omniscience and Creatorship cannot be seen anywhere.
Kevala-anvayi--
This is where the sadhya is present everywhere, e.g.-- 'The jar is nameable, because
it is knowable', because nameability (the thing inferred), is present
everywhere. This inference is based solely on the affirmative invariable
concomitance, namely, 'Whatever is knowable is nameable'. Here negative
invariable concomitance is not possible.
The
Advaitins, like the Mimamsakas, do not acknowledge negative invariable
concomitance-- kevala-vyatireki, because,
according to them, knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not possible
without the knowledge of affirmative invariable concomitance. The conclusion
derived from negative invariable concomitance is
treated as arthaapatti. Both anvaya-vyatireki
and kevala-vyatireki are rejected
by them and only anvayi is accepted.
This includes the type of inference designated as kevala-anvayi
by the Naiyayikas. But Advaitins repudiate the latter term as too narrow.
In
Vedanta, as in Nyaya, inference is twofold-- that for oneself and that for
others.
Inference
for oneself:--
The
inferential knowledge, “The hill has fire”, arises when one has knowledge of
the reason (smoke) being present in the thing (hill) where something (fire) is
to be inferred, in the form, “This has smoke”, and there is awakening of the
latent impression left by previous experience, in the form, “Smoke is a
subordinate concomitant of fire”. The knowledge “The hill has fire” is
inferential only in respect of the fire, and not in respect of the hill, because
the knowledge of the hill is a perception.
This
requires the help of syllogisms. The component parts of a syllogism have already
been given above.
According to Advaita Vedanta there are three levels of reality- absolute
(paaramaarthika), empirical (vyaavahaarika) and illusory (praatibhaasika).
Brahman alone is absolute reality. Everything in the universe has only empirical
reality, i.e. they are real only till the dawn of Self-knowledge. Things such
the illusory snake appearing on rope, silver on shell, objects experienced in
dream, have only illusory reality.
The unreality of the universe is inferred from the statements in the
srutis that there is nothing other than Brahman.
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