

॥श्रीमत्परमहंसमधुसूदनसरस्वतीप्रणीता

अद्वैतसिद्धिः

प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपत्तिः ॥

Advaitasiddhi of shri Madhusudana Sarasvati

Chapter on pratikarmavyavasthA

(Translation by S.N.Sastri)

[Introductory note- In the term pratikarmavyavasthA the word 'karma' does not have the well known meaning of 'action', but it is used in the sense it has in grammar, namely, object, as distinguished from 'karta' or 'subject'. So 'pratikarmavyavasthA' means 'the establishment of the process by which each object is known by a jIva'. The theory of pratikarmavyavasthA deals with the process by which each object is known by an appropriate vRitti (modification) of the mind. The process of visual perception, according to advaita VedAnta, is described in chapter 1 of vedAnta paribhASha thus: Just as the water in a tank, issuing through a hole, enters, through a channel, a number of fields and assumes the shapes of those fields, so also the luminous mind, stretching out through the eye, goes to the space occupied by objects and becomes modified into the forms of those objects. Such a modification is called a vRitti of the mind. The same fact is also stated in pancadashI, 4.27, 28 and 29, based on shri shankara's upadeshasAhasrI, Metrical portion, chapter 14, verses 3 & 4. The whole process of visual perception consists of the following steps:--

- (1) The mind stretches out through the eye, reaches the object and takes the form of the object. This is called a *vRtti* or mode of the mind.
- (2) The mental mode removes the veil of ignorance that covers the consciousness limited by the object.
- (3) The consciousness limited by the object, being thus manifested through the removal of the veil of ignorance by the mental mode, illumines the object.
- (4) The mental mode associates the object-consciousness with the subject-consciousness.
- (5) The subject perceives the object.

Thus the consciousness manifested through the mental mode, which is the consciousness that is the substratum of the object, is itself the knowledge of the object. This is known as *phala* (fruit), being the resultant knowledge.

The mind has three main divisions in this process, namely,

- (1) the part within the body,
- (2) the part that extends from the body to the object perceived,
- (3) the part that coincides with the object.

The first part above is known as *pramAtA* (knower) and the consciousness limited by it is called *pramAta-caitanya*. This is the perceiver. The consciousness limited by the second part is called *pramANa-chaitanya*, or the means of knowledge. The consciousness limited by the third part is called *pramiti-caitanya* or percept.

The object perceived is called *prameya*. Since the third part of the mind mentioned above coincides with the object, *prameya-caitanya*, the consciousness limited by the object and *pramiti-caitanya* become one. All objects in this world are superimposed on Consciousness, i.e. Brahman. All objects are covered by a veil of ignorance, which has to be removed for seeing the object. All external *vyAvahArika* objects exist before they are known through a *vRitti* of the mind. It is therefore said in *vedAnta* that they have 'ajnAtasatta- existence as unknown'. All such objects are known through a *phala* as explained above. They are therefore said to be *phalavyApya*.

In contrast to the above, prAtibhAsika objects like rope-snake and mental states like joy, sorrow, etc., exist only when they are known. They have therefore no ajnAtasatta. They are known only through a vRitti and are called vRittivyApya. In the case of prAtibhAsika objects like rope-snake, the mind cannot stretch out to the object because the eye cannot contact the object for the simple reason that it is not there. There can therefore be no phala. In the case of mental states like joy, etc., also, the mind does not have to go out and so there is no phala. That is why they are called vRittivyApya.

VyasatIrtha, a dvaitin, raised a large number of objections against the above theory of pratikarmavyavasthA in his wprk nyAyAmRita. All these objections have been answered by Madhusudana Sarasvati in this chapter in advaitasiddhi. The text of this chapter in sanskrit and its English translation are given below.)

१. ननु--- विश्वस्य आध्यासिकत्वे प्रातिभासिकस्थले इव
विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाधीनायाः प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थायाः अनुपपत्तिरिति चेत् ॥

1. Objection: If the world is superimposed, there cannot be pratikarmavyavasthA, since that is dependent on the sense-organs coming into contact with the object, which is not possible, as in the case of prAtibhAsika objects..

Note-

The objection raised in the above paragraph is based on the assumption that all superimposed objects have only prAtibhAsika reality and that the entire world is therefore prAtibhAsika. Objects of prAtibhAsika reality, like shell-silver and rope-snake, exist only when they appear and not before. The objector says that, since the entire world is also prAtibhAsika, it exists only when it appears and not before. For an object to be known through a vRitti of the mind there must be contact between the sense-organ and the object. This is

possible only if the object exists before it is perceived. This is not the case with prAtibhAsika objects. Therefore, he says, since all objects in the world are prAtibhAsika, no object in the world can become an object of consciousness through a vRitti of the mind. This objection ignores the fact that, according to advaita, the world has vyAvahArika reality.

२. न, वृत्तेः पूर्वमेव घटादीनां चैतन्ये अध्यासेन प्रातिभासिकस्थलापेक्षया वैलक्षण्यात् । तथा हि--- अन्तःकरणं चक्षुर्वत् तेजोवयवि । तच्च इन्द्रियद्वारेण तत्संयुक्तं विषयं व्याप्य तदाकारं भवति, सैव वृत्तिरित्युच्यते ।

2. Answer; No, since pot and other things are superimposed on consciousness even before the vRitti, there is a difference from prAtibhAsika objects. It is thus--- the mind is luminous like the eye. It, operating through the sense-organ, pervades the object with which the sense-organ is in contact and assumes the form of the object. This mental modification is called a vRitti.

३. तत्र जीवचैतन्यं अविद्योपाधिकं सत् सर्वगतं अन्तःकरणोपाधिकं सत् परिच्छिन्नं इति मतद्वयम् । तत्र आद्ये विषयप्रकाशकं जीवचैतन्यम् । द्वितीये ब्रह्मचैतन्यम् । आद्ये पक्षेऽपि जीवचैतन्यं अविद्यानावृतं आवृतं च । तत्र आद्ये वृत्तिः जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयोपरागार्था । द्वितीये तु आवरणाभिभवार्था । परिच्छिन्नत्वपक्षे तु जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकतदधिष्ठानचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्त्यर्था ।

3. Here there are two views. One is that the jIva-consciousness with avidyA as limiting adjunct is all-pervading. The other view is that the jIva-consciousness with the mind as limiting adjunct is limited. In the first view it is the jIva-consciousness that illumines objects. In the second view it is Brahman-consciousness. In the first view there are two sub-divisions, (1) that the jIva-consciousness is not covered by avidyA and (2) that it is covered by avidyA. In the first case the vRitti is for

connecting the jIva-consciousness with the object. In the second case the vRitti is for removing the covering. In the view in which the the jIva-consciousness is limited, the vRitti is for illumining the object and to manifest the identity of the jIva-consciousness with the consciousness that is the substratum of the object.

४. अनावृतत्वपक्षे हि अनावृतं सर्वगतमपि जीवचैतन्यं तत्तदाकारवृत्त्या एव उपरज्यते न तु विषयैः, असङ्गत्वात् । यथा गोत्वं सर्वगतमपि सास्नादिमद्व्यक्त्या अभिव्यज्यते, न तु केसरादिमद्व्यक्त्या । यथा वा प्रदीपप्रभा आकाशगन्धरसादिव्यापिन्यपि तान् न प्रकाशयन्ति रूपसंसर्गितया रूपमेव प्रकाशयति तद्वत् ।

4. In the view in which the jIva-consciousness is not covered (by avidyA), though it is all-pervading, it is connected only with the vRitti in the form of the object and not with the object itself, since it is unattached, just as cowness, though all-pervading, is revealed only in an individual (cow) having dewlap, etc., and not in an individual (animal) with mane, etc., or, just as the rays of a lamp, though permeating space, smell, taste, etc., do not illumine them, but illumine only forms by being in contact with forms.

५. केवलाग्न्यदाहस्यापि अयःपिण्डादिसमारूढाग्निदाहत्ववच्च केवलचैतन्या-प्रकाश्यस्यापि घटादेः तत्तदाकारवृत्त्युपारूढचैतन्यप्रकाश्यत्वं युक्तम् । एवं च अनावृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारा चैतन्यस्य तत्तदुपरागे तत्तदर्थप्रकाशः ।

5. Just as a thing (like dry grass), which cannot be burnt by fire by itself (in the form of the sun's rays or latent in wood), can be burnt by a ball of iron in association with fire, so also, it is proper that pots, etc., which are not illumined by the light of pure consciousness are illumined by pure consciousness along with a vRitti in the form of that object. Thus, in the view in which

the jIva-consciousness is not covered (by avidyA), each object is revealed by consciousness by contact (with the object) through a vRitti in the form of that object.

६. आवृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणाभिभवेन तत्तदर्थ-
प्रकाशः। अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूपत्वे जीवस्य अवच्छेदकान्तःकरण-
तत्तद्विषयाकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्याभिव्यक्तौ तत्तत्प्रकाशः। यद्यपि प्रकाशं
अधिष्ठानचैतन्यं सर्वगतं जीवचैतन्यं च अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नम्; तथापि चैतन्याभेदेन
अभिव्यक्तत्वात् व्यवस्थोपपत्तिः ।

6. In the view in which the jIva-consciousness is covered (by avidyA), , a particular object is revealed by the removal of the covering of the consciousness limited by that particular object by a vRitti in the form of that object.

In the view in which the jIva is consciousness limited by the mind, when the consciousness limited by an object is manifested by a vRitti of the mind in the form of that object which removes the veil of ignorance, that object is revealed. Even though the light that is the substratum-consciousness is all-pervading, and the jIva-consciousness is limited by the mind, still since the two are manifested as identical, there is a proper result (in the form of the knowledge of the object).

७. ननु इयं प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था न उपपद्यते । तथा हि--

स्वसन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यस्वज्ञानात् पूर्वं घटादेः सत्त्वे प्रतीतिमात्र-
शरीरत्वव्याप्तकाल्पनिकत्वायोगः । न च काल्पनिकत्वविशेषः प्रातिभासिकत्वादिरेव
तद्व्याप्तः गौरवत्वात् । न च प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेऽपि ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वादिना एव
कल्पितत्वं भविष्यति, प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाभावस्य अपि
आपाद्यत्वात्, प्रतीतेः विश्वसत्यत्वेन वा मिथ्यात्वेऽपि स्वप्नादिवत्
इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षनिरपेक्षतया वा उपपत्तेः व्यावहारिकत्वस्यापि भ्रान्तिदैर्घ्यमात्रेण
उपपत्तेः च इति चेत्।

7. Objection: This theory of pratikarmavyavasthA is not tenable. Thus--- If the pot, etc., exists even before the rise of the knowledge of itself from contact of the sense-organ with itself, then it cannot be kAlpanika (what is only imagined, or mithyA), which exists only when it is seen (like rope-snake). It cannot be said that prAtibhAsika is only a particular type of kAlpanika, as that is cumbersome, because whatever is kAlpanika is necessarily a thing that exists only when it is seen. (If a qualification is added to the hetu without sufficient reason it is cumbersome. Here, according to the opponent, the vyApti is that whatever is kAlpanika exists only when it is seen. The hetu is kAlpanikatva. The objector says that the advaitin wants to qualify this hetu so as to make it apply to objects which exist even before they are known, This makes it cumbersome.). Nor can it be said that even when it is not a mere pratIti (an object which exists only when it is known), there can be kalpitatva (being merely imagined) because when it is not a mere pratIti (an object existing only when it is known), there cannot be sublatability by knowledge. (What the opponent says is that, if an object exists even before it is known, it cannot be sublated by mere knowledge of itself). The apprehension of (objects) would be logical if the world is real. Even if it is mithyA, there can be apprehension without the contact of the sense-organ with the object as in dream. The same applies to vyAvahArika objects because the difference is only that vyAvahArika is of longer duration.

८. मैवम्; प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वस्य कल्पितत्वं न व्याप्यम् । दृग्दृश्यसम्बन्धा-
नुपपत्त्यादिसहकृतोक्तानुमानात् प्रपञ्चे कल्पितत्वे सिद्धे प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् च
स्थायित्वे तत्रैव व्यभिचारात् ।

8. Answer: It is not so. Being mithyA does not mean being only a pratIti (existing only when it is known, or prAtibhAsika). By

the inference described in previous chapters, taken along with the inappropriateness of any relationship between the seer and the seen, the mithyA nature of the world having been established, its durability (sthAyitvam) is proved by the recognition (of objects).

Note- The mithyAtva of the world has been established in earlier chapters. mithyA is of two kinds—those which are sublated only by the knowledge of Brahman (vyAvahArika) and those which are sublated by a knowledge other than the knowledge of Brahman (prAtibhAsika). pratikarmavyavasthA applies to vyAvahArika objects.

९. न च--- शक्तिरूप्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञासाम्यं प्रकृतप्रत्यभिज्ञायाः इति वाच्यम्; प्रतीत्यविशेषेऽपि वणिग्वीथीस्थशक्तिरूप्ययोः परीक्षितत्वापरीक्षितत्वाभ्यां स्थायित्वास्थायित्वरूपविशेषसम्भवात् ।

9. It cannot be said that the recognition in the present case is similar to the recognition of nacre-silver. Even in the absence of any difference in apprehension, there is a difference between silver in a silver merchant's shop and nacre-silver, the one being examined and the other not, and the one being of long durability and the other not.

१०. तथापि वा परोक्षवृत्तेः इव अपरोक्षवृत्तेः अपि प्रकाशकत्वमस्तु, किं तदुपरक्तचैतन्येन इति चेत् न; परोक्षस्थलेऽपि परोक्षवृत्त्युपरक्तचैतन्यस्य एव प्रकाशकत्वात् । अथ तत्रापि अपरोक्षैकरसचैतन्योपरागे विषयापरोक्ष्यप्रसङ्गः । न, विषयचैतन्याभिव्यक्तौ एव विषयस्य आपरोक्ष्यम् । न च परोक्षस्थले तदस्ति, विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावेन विषयपर्यन्तं वृत्तेः अगमनात्, अन्तरेव तत्र धीसमुल्लासात् । अपरोक्षस्थले तु प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्ताधिष्ठानचैतन्योपरागः विषये अस्ति; तत्र विषयस्य कर्मकारकत्वात् ।

10. If it is asked, why should not the illumination (of the object)

be by the aparokShavRitti itself as in the case of parokShavRitti; why should it be by the consciousness reflected in the vRitti, the answer is, no, it cannot be. Even in parokSha it is the consciousness reflected in the vRitti alone that illumines. (The vRitti, being insentient, cannot illumine). It is now objected that, in that case, since it is the direct (aparokSha) homogeneous pure consciousness that is reflected (in the parokSha vRitti), the object would become aparokSha. The answer is, no, because the object can become aparokSha only when the consciousness limited by the object is manifested. That does not happen in the case of parokSha cognition since the vRitti does not go up to the object because of absence of contact of the sense-organ with the object and the mind remains only inside (does not stretch out to the object). In the case of aparokSha cognition the knower-consciousness, becoming identified with the consciousness limited by the object, becomes connected with the object (through the vRitti at the place of the object) and the object has the position of a karma (as it is already there before the vRitti). Note- The various kAraka's, subject, object, instrument, etc., represented by the different grammatical cases are necessary for an action and they should be present before the action.

११. न च वृत्तिगतविशेषात् आपरोक्ष्यम्, तत्र हि विशेषः विषयकृतः चेत् ओमिति ब्रूमः । जातिकृतस्तु विशेषः न सम्भवति; सोऽयमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायां परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयोः सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्, अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्, प्रमात्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गात् च । किञ्च वृत्तेः जडत्वादेव न प्रकाशकत्वम् ।

11. It is not because of any distinction in the vRitti that there is directness of perception; if you say that the directness of the perception is due to the object, we agree. There cannot be any difference brought about by being a generic (jAti) , since there is an admixture of directness and indirectness of perception in

the recognition “This is that” and also because of non-pervasiveness and knowledge-ness. Moreover, the vRitti cannot illumine, because it is insentient.

१२. न च--- वृत्तौ अन्तःकरणावृत्त्यापि स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानत्ववत् इति--- वाच्यम् । स्वप्रकाशात्मसम्बन्धेन एव तस्याः प्रकाशत्वोपपत्तौ तत्स्वप्रकाशत्वे मानाभावात् । किञ्च घटं जानामि इति अनुभूयमानसकर्मकवृत्त्यन्या संवित् घटप्रकाशरूपा घटः प्रकाशते इत्याकारकानुभवसिद्धा एव ।

12. It cannot be said that, even though self-luminosity is not there for the mind, there can be self-luminosity for the vRitti just as it (vRitti) has the nature of knowledge (which the mind does not have). It is only because of association with the self-luminous AtmA that the vRitti gets the power of illumination and there is no basis for the vRitti itself to be considered as self-luminous. The vRitti experienced in the form ‘I see a pot’, which has an object is different from the knowledge ‘the pot is manifest’ which is without an object (akarmaka). This is proved by experience. The first is vRittijnAnam while the second is caitanyarUpajnAnam.

१३. न च--- करोति, यतते, चलति, गच्छति इत्यादौ एकार्थत्वे अपि सकर्मकाकर्मकस्वभावत्वदर्शनात् अत्रापि एकार्थत्वे अपि तथा स्यात् इति वाच्यम्। तत्रापि एकार्थत्वाभावात् । अनुकूलयत्नः हि कृञ्धात्वर्थः, यत्यर्थस्तु यत्नमात्रम्, एवं गम्यर्थः उत्तरसंयोगफलकः स्पन्दः, चलत्यर्थस्तु स्पन्दमात्रम्, तथा च ऐकार्थकत्वे कुत्रापि न सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वव्यवस्था । न च--- त्वन्मते परिणतेः अकर्मकत्वात् परिणतिविशेषभूतायाः वृत्तेः कथं सकर्मकत्वमिति--- वाच्यम् ।

13. Nor can it be said that, just as, though among the verbs karoti, yatate, calati, gacChati, the first two and the last two have the same meaning, there is seen to be a difference in that two of them are transitive verbs and two intransitive, the same

could be the case here (i.e., though vRittijnAnam is with an object and chaitanyajnAnam is without an object, they may have the same meaning). In these verbs also the meaning is not the same. The verb 'karoti' means "effort congenial to accomplishing some thing", while 'yatate' means just 'effort'. The verb 'gacChati' means 'movement having the result of reaching another place', while 'calati' means just movement. There cannot be both sakarmaka and akarmaka when the meaning is the same. Nor can it be asked how, since according to vedAnta 'modification' is intransitive (akarmaka), vRitti, which is also a modification (of the mind) have an object (be sakarmaka).

१४. एकस्य हि सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वे एकरूपेण विरुद्धे न तु रूपान्तरेणापि मानाभावात् । यथा स्थितेः अकर्मिकायाः अपि अगमनत्वेन रूपेण सकर्मकत्वम्; तथा परिणतित्वेन रूपेण अकर्मिकायाः अपि वृत्तेः ज्ञानत्वेन सकर्मकत्वं भविष्यति इति अदोषः ॥

14. Though a verb cannot be both sakarmaka and akarmaka in one and the same form, there is no basis for saying that the same is the case in different forms. Though the verb 'standing' is intransitive, it is transitive in the form 'not going', (because here the question arises, 'not going where?' and an object has to be supplied). Similarly, though vRitti as a modification does not need an object, it needs an object when it takes the form of knowledge and so there is no defect.

१५. ननु तर्हि अतीतः प्रकाशते इति धीः न स्यात्, न; इष्टापत्तेः, तत्रापि वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यसत्त्वेन प्रकाशते इत्यादिप्रयोगसम्भवात् च ।

15. Objection: In that case there cannot be the idea that a past thing is manifest.

Answer: No, as that is acceptable. There also it can be said

that the manifestation is due to the consciousness reflected in the vRitti.

१६. ननु यथा अज्ञानविरोधिवृत्तौ अनुभवत्वं नास्ति किन्तु अन्यत्र, तथा द्वेषविरोधिवृत्तेः अन्यत्र इच्छात्वं इत्यपि स्यादिति चेत् । न; बाधकसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां विशेषात्, अत्रैव तत्र सकर्मकाकर्मकविलक्षणक्रियाननुभवात् च । यथा च वृत्त्यतिरिक्तभानसिद्धिः तथा स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वप्रस्तावे विस्तरेण वक्ष्यामः ॥

16. Obj: Just as, (according to you) vRitti which is the enemy of ignorance is not knowledge, but knowledge is elsewhere (in pure consciousness which does not destroy ignorance but manifests it), you can also say that the opposite of aversion is not desire but something else.

Answer: No, because of the difference of being sublated and not sublated. (The luminosity of the vRitti which is insentient is sublated (or has a beginning and an end) and that of consciousness which illumines everything is not sublated (is eternal). (vRitti by itself does not destroy ignorance, but it is consciousness reflected in the vRitti that does it). In the case of aversion and desire there is no difference as sakarmaka and akarmaka as both are sakarmaka. How manifestation is due to something over and above vRitti, we shall explain in detail while dealing with svayaMjyotiShTva.

१७. ननु अस्तु चैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकत्वं, तथापि अन्तःकरणस्य देहात् निर्गतिः न कल्प्या, परोक्षवैलक्षण्याय विषयस्य अभिव्यक्तापरोक्षचिदुपरागः एव वक्तव्यः, चिदुपरागादौ च अपरोक्षवृत्तेः तदाकारत्वं एव तन्नम्, तस्य च तत्संश्लेषं विनापि परोक्षवृत्तेः इव तत्सन्निकृष्टकरणजन्यत्वेन एव उपपत्तिः । न तु प्रभाया इव वृत्तेः तदावरणनिवर्तकत्वादौ तत्संश्लेषः तन्नम्, नेत्रात् निर्गच्छद्ध्रुवाद्याकारवृत्त्या एव स्वसंश्लिष्टनेत्रस्थकज्जलादेः ध्रुवनेत्रमध्यवर्तिनः परमाण्वादेः च अपरोक्षत्वापातात् इति चेत् ॥

17. Obj: Let it be that the object is illumined by consciousness. Even then it is not necessary to postulate the stretching out of the mind from the body. For distinguishing from indirect perception (parokSha), what is necessary is only the connection of the object with the manifested direct consciousness. (The objector assumes that an aparokSha vRitti is a special kind of vRitti which has itself the power to remove the veil of ignorance). For the consciousness to be connected with the object what is necessary is only that the vRitti of direct perception (aparokShavRitti) should take the form of the object. That can happen even without the vRitti coming into contact with the object, by the contact of the sense-organ alone (with the object) as in the vRitti of indirect perception. (He says that direct perception is possible even with the mind not stretching out to the object, as in the case of indirect perception. Only contact of the eye, etc', with the object is necessary). The removal of the veil (of ignorance) by the vRitti does not depend on its contact with the object as in the case of rays of light (from a lamp). Otherwise there is the possibility of the collyrium in the eye and the atoms in between also becoming objects of direct perception if the vRitti in the form of the star Dhruva has to reach up to the star Dhruva.

१८. न; विषयेषु अभिव्यक्तचिदुपरागे न तदाकारत्वमात्रं तन्त्रम्, परोक्षस्थले अपि प्रसङ्गात्, किन्तु तत्संश्लेषः प्रभाया विषयसन्निकृष्टतेजस्त्वेन आवरणाभिभावकत्वदर्शनात् । तैजसस्य मनसः अपि अज्ञानरूपावरणाभिभवाय तत्संश्लेषः आवश्यकः । ध्रुवादिदेहमध्यवर्तिपरमाण्वादौ अतिप्रसङ्गः तु तदाकारत्वप्रयोजकसामग्रीविरहादेव परिहरणीयः । अन्यथा इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादेः विद्यमानत्वात् परमाण्वाद्याकारतया दुर्निवारत्वापत्तेः । तस्मात् प्रभाविशेषान्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां यत् क्लृप्तं सन्निकृष्टतेजस्त्वेन आवरणाभिभावकत्वं, तस्य

तदाकारत्वरूपविशेषापेक्षायां अपि न त्यागः । न हि पृथिवीत्वगन्धत्वादिना
कार्यकारणभावे आवश्यके अनित्यगुणत्वद्रव्यत्वादिना तत्यागः ।

18. No. For the objects to be revealed by the removal of the veil of ignorance on the limited by consciousness, it is not enough if the vRitti takes the form of the objects, since that is there even in indirect perception. (In parokShajnAna also there is a vRitti in the form of the object, but it does not reach the object). It is seen that the veil of darkness (covering an object) is removed only when a ray of light comes into contact with it. The luminous mind has also to contact the object in order to remove the veil of ignorance. In the case of atoms, etc., between the body and Dhruva, the mind cannot take their form because the atoms are not objects of vision and the collyrium in the eye is too close to be seen and so they will not be seen. If that was not so, their being seen would not be avoidable. Thus what is found necessary by the application of anvaya and vyatireka by the analogy of a ray of light, namely the contact with the object, cannot be discarded by accepting only the need for vRitti in the form of the object. (The contact of the mind with the object is the special cause for removal of veil, while vRitti in the form of the object is a general cause. The special cause cannot be discarded in favour of a general cause). An example is—The general rule that substance is the cause of non-eternal guNa cannot be used to discard the special rule that earth is the cause of smell.

१९. अत एव— तदितरहेतुसाकल्ये सति घटचक्षुःसन्निकर्षस्य एव
घटानुभवजनकत्वम्, न तु घटमनःसन्निकर्षस्य, तद्विलम्बेन तद्विलम्बाभावादिति—
निरस्तम्, आवरणभङ्गे सन्निकृष्टतेजःकारणत्वावधारणेन तस्य अपि आवश्यकत्वात् ।

19. Thus, the contention of the opponent is that, when all the other requirements (such as contact of the eye with the object, sufficient light, etc.,) are fulfilled, the vision of the pot arises

from the contact of the eye with the pot alone and not by the contact of the mind, because the absence of contact of the mind with the object does not prevent the object being seen. This contention is rejected, by emphasizing that the cause of the removal of the veil is the contact of the luminosity (mind) with the object and so such contact is essential.

२०. न च-- स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षे चक्षुरादिवत् नियतगोलकद्वाराभावेन अन्तःकरणनिर्गत्य योगादौ आवरणाभिभवानुपपत्तिरिति-- वाच्यम् । सर्वत्र तत्तदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानस्य एव द्वारत्वसम्भवात् ।

20. Nor can it be said that, when an object is known directly by the sense of touch, the veil of ignorance cannot be removed because the mind cannot stretch out and reach the object, on the ground that, unlike the eye, the sense of touch has no specific place through which the contact of the mind can take place, since each sense organ has its own place of contact. (The sense of touch can contact objects throughout the body.)

२१. न च अन्तःकरणवृत्तित्वाविशेषात् इच्छाद्वेषादिरूपवृत्तयः अपि देहात् निर्गत्य विषयसंसृष्टा भवन्ति इति कथं न स्वीक्रियते इति वाच्यम्, आवरणाभिभावकतेजस्त्वस्य तत्प्रमापकस्य ज्ञानवत् तत्र अभावात् ।

21. It cannot be asked why in the case of desire, aversion, etc., also, which are also modifications of the mind (vRitti), it is not held that the mind stretches out from the body and contacts the object. The reason is that in those cases there is no need for removal of veil as in the case of knowledge.

२२. ननु -- घटप्रकाशकं चैतन्यं उपदेशसाहस्रयनुसारेण घटाकारधीस्थाचित् वा परागर्थप्रमेयेषु इत्यादिवार्तिकोक्तरीत्या धीप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्तविषया-धिष्ठानचैतन्यं वा, नाद्यः, आध्यासिकसम्बन्धस्य अतन्त्रत्वापातात् । न द्वितीयः,

आवश्यकेन विषयसंश्लिष्टवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येन एव तदज्ञाननिवृत्तिवत्
तत्प्रकाशस्य अपि उपपत्तौ किं विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनेन इति चेत् ॥

22. Objection: Following upadeshasAhasri (of Shankara), the consciousness that illumines the pot is the consciousness reflected in the mental modification in the form of the pot. (This is stated by the opponent on the basis of shloka 4 of chapter VIII (kUTasthadIpa) of pancadashI, which is as follows:

घटाकारधीस्था चिद्घटमेवावभासयेत् ।

घटस्य ज्ञातता ब्रह्मचैतन्येनावभासते ॥

Meaning: The consciousness reflected in the vRitti of the mind in the form of a pot illumines the pot, but the 'knownness' of the pot is illumined by Brahman-consciousness.)

An alternative view is that of the vArtikakAra, that an external object such as a pot is cognized by the consciousness reflected in the mind becoming identified with the manifested consciousness that is the substratum of the object. (This view is expressed in shloka 11 of chapter VIII of pancadaSI, which is as below:

परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन सम्मता ।

संवित्सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः ॥

Meaning: According to the teachings of vedAnta, an external object of cognition is that saMvit or consciousness which is the result of the act of cognition. This is said to be based on the view of the vArtikakAra).

The opponent claims that both these views are untenable. He says—the first view is not tenable because the pot is superimposed on the consciousness limited by it and not on the consciousness reflected in the mental vRitti. In the second

view, just as the consciousness reflected in the vRitti which has come into contact with the object removes the ignorance veiling the object, the same consciousness can also illumine the object and so, what is the need for the consciousness limited by the object becoming manifest?

२३. न; प्रकाशकं तावत् अधिष्ठानचैतन्यम् । तच्च अध्यासेन विषयैः सह साक्षात् सम्बद्धं प्रकाशस्य च स्वयं भासमानस्य स्वसम्बद्धसर्वभासकत्वं अपि कूप्तमेव । एतदनभ्युपगमे कल्पनान्तरगौरवापत्तेः । तच्च अनभिव्यक्तं निर्विकल्पकरूपं आच्छादितरूपवत् न प्रकाशकं इति तदभिव्यक्तिः अपेक्षिता । तत् च परोक्षस्थले वृत्त्यवच्छेदेन एव अभिव्यज्यते । अपरोक्षस्थले तु वृत्तिसम्पर्कात् आवरणाज्ञानाभिभवे विषये अभिव्यज्यते; वृत्तेः विषयपर्यन्तत्वात् । न च परोक्षस्थले अपि एवं प्रसङ्गः द्वाराभावेन अन्तःकरणनिर्गत्यभावात् ।

23. Answer: No; the illuminator (of the object) is the consciousness limited by the object (which is the same as the consciousness reflected in the vRitti). That is directly connected with the objects by superimposition. It is known that light, while illumining itself, illumines everything that is in contact with it. If this is not accepted there will be cumbersomeness (in holding that the vRitti by itself is sufficient). That light, when not manifested and is indeterminate, does not illumine, like one that is covered and so manifestation is necessary. In indirect perception that is manifested by the vRitti itself. In direct perception, however, when the veil is removed by the contact of the vRitti (with the object), the consciousness is manifested in the object, because of the vRitti reaching up to the object. This is not the case in indirect perception since the mind does not stretch out due to lack of any means of going out (like the external senses in aparokSha).

२४. ननु-- वृत्तेः तदाकारत्वं न तावत् तद्विषयत्वं त्वया एव निरासात् । नापि तस्मिन् चैतन्योपरागयोग्यतापादकत्वम्, तदज्ञानाभिभावकत्वं वा ? उभयोरपि

तदाकारत्वप्रयोज्यत्वेन तत्त्वायोगात् । नापि घटादिवत् पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारत्वम्, साकारवादापातात् । संस्थानहीनजातिगुणादिवृत्तेः निराकारत्वप्रसङ्गात् च । घटपटाविति समूहालम्बने विरुद्धनानाकारत्वापत्तेः च इति-- चेत् ।

24. Objection: The vRitti being of the form of the object cannot mean making the object known, as such a proposition is rejected by you yourself. Nor can it be getting the capacity to connect consciousness, or the removal of the ignorance of the object. In both cases there is self-dependence—Because it has the form of the object it reveals the object, and because it reveals the object it has its form. Nor can the vRitti have a shape like a pot, as that would make knowledge a thing with form. Things such as jAti , guNa, etc., have no form. In the case of two objects such as pot and cloth seen together, there would be different contradictory forms.

२५. न, अस्तीत्यादितद्विषयकव्यवहारप्रतिबन्धकाज्ञाननिवर्तनयोग्यत्वस्य, तत्सन्नि-
कृष्टकरणजन्यत्वस्य वा तदाकारत्वरूपत्वात् । तदुभयं च स्वकारणा-
धीनस्वभावविशेषात् । न च आत्माश्रयः निवृत्तिजननस्वरूपयोग्यतया फलोपधानस्य
साध्यत्वेन स्वानपेक्षणात् ।

25. Answer: No. Being of the form of the object means, having the capability to remove the ignorance that is an obstruction to the object being seen as existing, etc, or, the capability arising from the contact of the sense-organ with the object, because it is of the form of that object. Both are due to its own nature which is dependent on its cause. There is no self-dependence, because it does not depend on itself, being able to produce the result by its capability to remove ignorance.

२६. ननु--- दृशि विषयाध्यासस्वीकर्तुः जीवचैतन्यं वा विषयदृक् ब्रह्मचैतन्यं वा? नाद्यः; जीवे अवच्छिन्नचित्स्वरूपे कल्पिते अध्यासायोगात् । न च---
विषयदृक्जीवचैतन्यमेव अध्यासः तु ब्रह्मचैतन्ये इति-- वाच्यम्, दृश्ययोः एव

आध्यासिकसम्बन्धापत्तेः अध्यस्ताधिष्ठानयोः उभयोरपि दृग्भिन्नत्वात् । अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि ब्रह्मणोऽपि कल्पितत्वेन तत्र अध्यासायोगात् च । न च--- शुद्धचैतन्यं एकं एव तदेव अधिष्ठानं तत्र अवच्छेदकं अविद्यादिकं न अधिष्ठानकोटौ प्रविशति तदेव च जीवशब्देन ब्रह्मशब्देन च व्यपदिश्यते उपाधिविशेषात् । तथा च जीवचैतन्यस्य दृक्त्वेऽपि दृश्याध्यासः न अनुपपन्नः इति-- वाच्यम् । शुद्धचैतन्यस्य आसंसारं आवृतत्वेन जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात् इति-- चेत् ।

26. Objection: According to you who accept that the objects are superimposed on the seer, is the seer of the object the jIva-consciousness or the Brahman-consciousness? The first is not possible, because jIva is limited by upAdhi and is therefore kalpita. And so no superimposition is possible on it. It cannot be said that the seer of the object is the jIva-consciousness, but the superimposition is on Brahman-consciousness, because then it would mean that the relationship of superimposition is between two 'seens' (dRishyaM), which is not possible. If jIva-consciousness is treated as the seer, then Brahman-consciousness, which is different from jIva-consciousness, would become 'seen'. That would mean that the object which is a 'seen' is superimposed on Brahman-consciousness which is also a 'seen'. Thus the second alternative, that Brahman-consciousness is the substratum, is also not tenable, because Brahman-consciousness also being kalpita, (as explained above), no superimposition is possible on it. Nor can you say that pure consciousness is only one, that itself is the substratum and the limiting adjuncts such as avidyA do not become part of the substratum and that pure consciousness itself is known as Brahman and jIva according to the upAdhi. And that though the jIva-consciousness is a seer, there is nothing illogical in its being superimposed on a seer. Since pure consciousness is covered by ignorance as long as the state of saMsAra lasts, this would amount to the world

becoming totally dark-- nothing being seen in the world--- since the knowledge of an object is pure consciousness.

२७. न, मूलाविद्यानिवृत्त्यभावेन सर्वतः आवरणाभिभवाभावेऽपि घटाद्यवच्छेदेन आवरणाभिभवात् आन्ध्यविरहोपपत्तेः ।

27. Ans: No. Even though the veil (on consciousness) is not totally removed because of mUla-avidyA not being removed, the veil over the consciousness limited by the pot is removed and so it follows that the world does not remain totally dark.

२८. ननु तर्हि इदानीमपि ब्रह्मस्फुरणे चरमवृत्तिवैयर्थ्यं; अधिकभावेऽपि तस्य स्फुरणात् न हि अखण्डार्थवेदान्तजन्यायां वृत्तौ भावो वा अभावो विशेषणं उपलक्षणं वा प्रकारः प्रकाशते इति--चेत् ।

28. Objection: In that case, even now (when an object such as pot is cognized), Brahman itself is known and so the final vRitti (in the form of Brahman) is not necessary (for liberation). (When any object is seen, it is actually Brahman with that object as upAdhi that is seen). Even though something else is also present (such as an object), it does not take away from the fact that there is Brahma-jnAna, whether something else such as a qualifier, or upalakShaNa is present or not.

२९. न, उपाध्यविषयकब्रह्मस्फुरणस्य चरमवृत्तिप्रयुक्तत्वेन तस्याः साफल्यात्, प्रकारास्फुरणं तु तस्याः भूषणं एव । इदानीन्तनस्फुरणस्य सप्रकारकत्वेन उपाधिविषयत्वात्, एकधैवानुद्गृष्टव्यमित्यादिश्रुतिबलात् स्वसमानविषयज्ञानादेव च अज्ञाननिवृत्तेः अखण्डचिन्मात्रज्ञानस्य एव मोक्षहेतुत्वावधारणात् ।

29. Answer: No. Since the final vRitti produces knowledge of Brahman without upAdhi, that alone is fruitful. There being no appearance of qualifier (or upAdhi) is actually an adornment to

it. The present appearance of Brahman is with a qualifier and is therefore with an upAdhi. On the strength of the shruti statements such as “It should be realized as only one”, and since knowledge has to be in the same locus as ignorance in order to remove ignorance, only the knowledge of the whole pure consciousness has been stressed as the cause of liberation.

३०. न च-- अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य जीवत्वे सुषुप्तिदशायां तदभावेन कृतहान्याद्यापत्तिरिति-- वाच्यम्, तदापि अस्य कारणात्मना अवस्थानात्, स्थूलसूक्ष्मसाधारणस्य अन्तःकरणस्य उपाधित्वात् । तदापीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात् इत्यस्मिन् सूत्रे च अयं अर्थः स्पष्टतरः ।

30. Nor can it be said that, if the jIva is consciousness limited by the mind, then the jIva will not exist during deep sleep (because the mind does not exist then) and so the results of actions performed by that jIva will be lost and results of actions not performed will have to be experienced. This is because the mind exists in its causal state even during deep sleep. The mind remains as the upAdhi either in its gross or in its subtle state. This has been explained clearly in br. sUtra IV. li. 8— tadAplteH saMsAravyapadeshAt.

३१. न च--- वृत्युपरक्तत्वं चैतन्यस्य न तत्प्रतिबिम्बितत्वम्, दर्पणे मुखस्य इव अनुद्भूतरूपे अन्तःकरणे शब्दान्यप्रतिबिम्बनोपाधिताया अचाक्षुषचैतन्यस्य प्रतिबिम्बित्वतायाः च अयोगादिति-- वाच्यम् । उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं न प्रतिबिम्बितोपाधिताप्रयोजकम्; अस्वच्छेऽपि लोष्टादौ प्रतिबिम्बापत्तेः, किंतु स्वच्छत्वं तच्च प्रकाशस्वभावत्वेन मनसः तत्परिणामभूतायाः वृत्तेः च अस्ति एव । त्रिगुणात्मकस्य अपि अज्ञानस्य स्वच्छसत्त्वात्मकताया अपि सत्त्वेन तत्रापि प्रतिबिम्बितोपाधितायाः सत्त्वात् । नापि च चाक्षुषत्वं प्रतिबिम्बितत्वप्रयोजकम् । अचाक्षुषस्य अपि आकाशादेः प्रतिबिम्बितत्वदर्शनात् ।

31. It cannot be said that the connection of consciousness with

the vRitti is not in the form of its being reflected in the vRitti in the same manner as a face is reflected in a mirror on the ground that the mind which has no definite form cannot be a reflecting medium for anything other than sound and that consciousness which cannot be seen by the eye cannot have a reflection. Being of a visible form is not the criterion for being a medium of reflection, as that would make even an impure lump of clay capable of reflection. But what is necessary is purity, and that the mind which is luminous and the vRitti, which is a modification of the mind, definitely have. Even nescience which is made up of the three guNas is capable of being a reflecting medium because of pure sattvaguna in it. Being visible is also not a criterion for being capable of reflection, as space, which is not visible, is seen to be reflected.

३२. ननु---चाक्षुषवृत्युपारूढचितः कथं रूपमात्रप्रकाशकत्वम्? न च प्रभावन्नियमः वैषम्यात् तथा हि-- प्रभायां तमोविरोधित्वं रूपं प्रति इव गन्धदीन् प्रत्यपि समम् । न हि सा गन्धादिदेशस्थं तमो न निवर्तयति । न च अज्ञानविरोधित्वलक्षणं प्रकाशकत्वं रूपं प्रत्येव न तु रसादीन् प्रतीति वाच्यम्, अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वस्य वृत्तिभिन्ने अनङ्गीकारात् । प्रभायाः रूपग्राहक-चक्षुःसहकारित्ववत् गन्धादिग्राहिघ्राणादिसहकारित्वाभावेऽपि चितः ग्राहकान्तरा-सहकारित्वेन तद्वत् सहकारिविलम्बेन विलम्बस्य वक्तुं अशक्यत्वात्। तथा च चितः सर्वगतत्वेन सर्वसम्बन्धात् रूपादिवत् गुरुत्वादेः अपि आश्रयद्वारा साक्षाद्वा सम्बन्धित्वात् प्रकाशापत्तिः वृत्युपरक्तचित्सम्बन्धस्य एव प्रकाशकत्वात्। ‘असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः’ इति श्रुतिः तु तत्कृतलेपाभावपरा न तु सम्बन्धनिषेधिका; ‘स यत्तत्र यत्किञ्चित् पश्यति अनन्वागतस्तेन भवति’ इति पूर्ववाक्यात् । ‘यथाकाशस्थितो नित्यं वायुः सर्वत्रगो महान्’ इत्यादिस्मृतेश्च इति चेत् ।

32. Objection: How is it that consciousness connected with a visual vRitti reveals only colour? This cannot be compared with a ray of light (which illumines only colour and forms), because

there is a difference. The ray of light is opposed to darkness. It removes the darkness not only in places where there is form or colour, but also where there is smell, etc. It cannot be said that luminosity (of consciousness) which is opposed to nescience can act against colour alone and not against smell, etc, since it is not admitted that the removal of nescience is due to different vRittis. (The opponent argues on the basis that it is consciousness that removes nescience and not vRitti, which is not correct according to advaita.) Because the ray of light is helped by the eye which grasps forms, it cannot be said that consciousness cannot reveal smell, etc., without the help of the organ of smell, etc. Since consciousness, being all-pervading, is connected with everything, it is connected with even weight, etc., as with colour, either through their base or directly, and so it becomes capable of illumining them, since connection with consciousness reflected in a vRitti is itself capable of illuminating. The shruti text, "This person is unattached" denies only tainting by it and not connection. This follows from the previous sentence "He is unaffected by whatever he sees (in dream)" and also the smRiti, " Just as the great wind moving everywhere is ever present in space".

३३. न; प्रभायाः रूपरसादिदेशगततमोनाशकत्वं तत्सम्बन्धात् युज्यते, चैतन्यस्य तु स्वभावतः असम्बद्धत्वात् तदाकारवृत्त्या तदेकसम्बन्धस्य उपादानात् कथं अन्यावभासकत्वप्रसङ्गः? स्वभावतः हि असङ्गत्वे असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः इति श्रुतिः प्रमाणम् । न चैषा लेपाभावपरा, अकर्तृत्वप्रतिपादनाय सम्बन्धाभावपरत्वात्। यथा च एतत् तथा व्यक्तं आकरे । एवं स्मृतिरपि एतच्छ्रुत्यनुरोधेन नेया । अतः सर्वैः सह सम्बन्धाभावात् न सर्वावभासः किन्तु यदाकारवृत्तिः तस्यैव । अत एव 'इदं रजतमि'ति भ्रमे इदमाकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्येन रजतभानानुपपत्तेः रजताकारापि अविद्यावृत्तिः अभ्युपेयते । स्वतश्चिद्धिम्बाग्राहके चैतन्यस्य तदाकारत्वायोगात् स्वतश्चिद्धिम्बाग्राहके तु अन्तःकरणवृत्त्यादौ च न वृत्त्यपेक्षा इति नानवस्था ॥

33. Answer: No; The removal of darkness in places where there is colour, taste, etc., by a ray of light is due to its connection (with that place). How can consciousness which is unattached by nature and becomes connected with an object only through a vRitti in the form of that object illumine other things? That consciousness is by nature unattached is proved by the shruti "This puruSha is unattached". The purport of shruti texts like this is not to declare (only) that consciousness is not tainted; they are intended to declare the unconnected nature of consciousness in order to show that it is not an agent. That this is so is made clear in the bhAShya. smRiti also has to be interpreted in accordance with this shruti. Therefore it cannot illumine everything because it is not connected with everything, but it can illumine only that object in the form of which there is a vRitti. This is why, in the illusion 'This is silver', since the silver cannot be revealed by consciousness limited by a vRitti in the form of 'this' an avidyAvRitti in the form of silver is also accepted. Since an object is not itself capable of receiving the reflection of consciousness, consciousness cannot take the form of the object (without a vRitti in the form of that object). But in the case of mental states (such as joy, sorrow, etc.,) which can themselves take the reflection of consciousness, a vRitti is not necessary.

३४. न च-- आश्रयसम्बन्धाविशेषेऽपि रूपाकारवृत्तिः न गन्धाद्याकारेति कुत इति-- वाच्यम् । यथा तव चाक्षुषज्ञाने आश्रयसम्बन्धाविशेषेऽपि न गन्धो विषयः तथा अस्माकमपि चक्षुद्वारकवृत्तौ न गन्धाद्याकारत्वम्, इन्द्रियविषयसम्बन्धानां स्वभावस्य नियामकस्य समानत्वात् ।

34. It cannot be asked how, when the base (of colour and smell) is the same, the vRitti in the form of colour does not take the form of smell (and reveal smell) also. Just as, according to you, in visual cognition smell is not an object even though it is

also in the same base, in the same way, according to us, a vRitti formed through the visual organ cannot have the form of smell. The nature of each sense-organ is that its function is limited to its object.

३५. ननु आध्यासिकसम्बन्धः वृत्तेः पूर्वमपि अस्ति एव अन्यस्तु उपरागः न दृश्यत्वे तन्त्रमिति किं तदर्थया वृत्त्या इति-- चेत् ।

न, जीवचैतन्यस्य अधिष्ठानचैतन्यस्य च अभेदाभिव्यक्त्यर्थत्वात् वृत्तेः । अन्यथा मयेदं विदितमिति सम्बन्धावभासः न स्यात् ।

35. Objection: The relationship in the form of superimposition does exist even before the vRitti. Connection with the object is different and it is not the factor that makes the object cognizable. Then what is the need for the vRitti?

Answer: No. The vRitti is necessary for manifesting the identity of the jIva-consciousness with the consciousness limited by the object. Without this, the manifestation of relation in the form 'This is known by me' will not take place.

३६. ननु-- जीवचैतन्यस्य असङ्गत्वे ब्रह्मचैतन्यं सुतरां असङ्गम्, तथा च

मायोपाधिकविषयोपरागत्वात् स्वतः सार्वज्ञ्यं न स्यात्, न च-- ब्रह्म

सर्वोपादानत्वात् उपाधिं विना एव स्वस्वरूपवत् स्वाभिन्नं जगत् अवभासयति

इति-- वाच्यम्: उपादानत्वं न तावत् विशिष्टनिष्ठं परिणामित्वम्;

आध्यासिकसम्बन्धस्य अतन्त्रतापत्तेः, अनाद्यविद्यादिकं प्रति तदभावात् च, नापि

शुद्धनिष्ठं अधिष्ठानत्वम्; शुद्धस्य सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वादेः अभावादिति-- चेत् ।

36. Objection: Since the jIva-consciousness is unattached, and Brahman –consciousness is even more unattached, it cannot have omniscience by itself, since the upAdhi of mAyA is necessary for connection with objects. Nor can it be said that, since Brahman is the material cause of the universe, it can

illumine the universe that is non-different from it just as it can illumine itself. Material causality (of Brahman) does not mean transformation of conditioned Brahman, as that would go against the relationship of superimposition. Moreover, what is of the nature of beginningless avidyA cannot have a cause. Nor can the unconditioned Brahman be the substratum, as it is not omniscient and omnipotent.

३७. न, ब्रह्मणः असङ्गत्वे अपि सर्वेषां तत्र अध्यासेन मायोपाधिं विना एव तस्य सर्वप्रकाशकतया सार्वज्ञ्योपपत्तेः । न च-- शुद्धनिष्ठं अधिष्ठानत्वं न उपादानत्वं सार्वज्ञ्याभावात् इत्युक्तमिति-- वाच्यम् ; अविद्याकल्पितानां सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां शुद्धे असत्त्वात् । अन्यथा तेषां तटस्थलक्षणत्वमपि न स्यात् ।

37. Answer: No. Even though Brahman is unattached, it can be omniscient because it illuminates all even without any pramANa vRittis, since everything is superimposed on it. (The superimposition of the world on Brahman is due to mAyA, but saguNa Brahman (Ishvara) does not need any vRitti to know any object as the jlva does). It cannot be said that unconditioned Brahman, which is the substratum, is not the material cause because it is not omniscient. Omniscience, etc., which are attributed due to avidyA, are not there in pure Brahman. Otherwise they (omniscience and material causality) cannot even be taTasthalakShaNAM (accidental characteristics) for Brahman.. (Omniscience, etc., are not there in unconditioned Brahman and so they are not the svarUpalakShaNAM of unconditioned Brahman, but they are its taTasthalakShaNAM).

३८. ननु आवरणाभिभवार्थत्वपक्षः न युक्तः विवर्ताधिष्ठानस्य चिन्मात्रस्य अज्ञानादिसाक्षित्वेन सदा प्रकाशनात् । अन्यस्य अज्ञानकल्पितस्य आवरणस्य अभावादिति-- चेत् ।

38. Objection: The view that the vritti is for removing the veil of

ignorance is not tenable, since consciousness which is the substratum of transfiguration is always shining as the witness of ajnAna. Things other than consciousness are not veiled because they are due only to ajnAna and so they cannot shine even if there is no veil.

न, अज्ञानादिसाक्षित्वेन स्वप्रकाशे अपि अज्ञानायाद्यतीतत्वादिना प्रकाशाभावात् आवरणस्य आवश्यकत्वात् ।

Answer: No. Even though consciousness is self-luminous as the witness of ajnAna, etc., it does not appear as free from hunger, etc., and this has to be attributed to the existence of a veil covering it.

३९. ननु अज्ञानस्य नयनपटलवत् पुंगतत्वे चैत्रस्य अज्ञाननाशे अपि मैत्रस्य तदनाशात् अप्रकाशः युक्तः, विषयगतत्वे तु चैत्रार्जितया वृत्त्या अज्ञाने दीपेन तमसीव नाशिते मैत्रस्यापि प्रकाशः स्यादिति-- चेत् ।

39. Objection: If ajnAna belongs to the individual like an eye disease which obstructs sight, then it is proper that, even when Caitra's eye disease is cured, Maitra will not be able to see as long as the same defect in his eyes is not cured. But if the ajnAna is on the object (covering it), then, when the ajnAna is removed by a vRitti of Caitra, like a lamp removing darkness, then the same object should be visible to Maitra also.

न, चैत्रावरणशक्तेः एव अज्ञानगतायाः चैत्रार्जितवृत्त्या नाशितत्वेन स पश्यति, न मैत्रः । तत्प्रतियोगिकावरणशक्तेः अनाशात्, आवरणशक्तीनां द्रष्टृविषयभेदाभ्यां भिन्नत्वात् । तमस्तु, न तथा इति एकानीतप्रदीपेन अपि अन्यान् प्रति प्रकाशः युज्यते ।

Answer: No. Caitra sees when his vRitti removes the ajnAna covering him and not Maitra, because the veil covering him has not been removed. The veiling power is different for each seer and each object. Darkness is not so. With the light brought by

one person others can also see.

४०. एतेन --- एकाज्ञानपक्षे शुक्तिज्ञानेन तदज्ञाननिवृत्तौ सद्य एव मोक्षापातः ।
अनिवृत्तौ रूप्यादेः सविलासाविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपबाधायोगः इति निरस्तम् ।
आवरणशक्तिनाशे अपि मूलाज्ञाननाशाभावेन सद्यो मोक्षाभावस्य रूप्यादौ
सविलासशक्तिमदविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपबाधस्य च उपपत्तेः ॥

40. By this, the contention that, in the view that there is only one ignorance, when that ignorance is removed by the knowledge of nacre, there should be immediate liberation, and that if the ignorance is not removed, there cannot be destruction of avidyA along with its effects such as illusory silver, etc., is refuted. Since the mUla-ajnAna is not removed by the removal of the veiling power, there is no question of immediate liberation. By the removal of ignorance, its effects such as silver, etc., are destroyed.

४१. ननु-- एकाज्ञानपक्षे रूप्यादेः शुक्तिज्ञानेन स्वकारणे प्रविलयमात्रं क्रियते,
मुद्गरप्रहारेण इव घटस्य न तु अज्ञानं निवर्त्यते इति ते मतं न युक्तम्-- यतो
ज्ञानं अज्ञानस्य एव निवर्तकमिति व्याप्तिबलात् ज्ञानस्य अज्ञाननिवृत्तिद्वारा एव
अन्यविरोधित्वेन अज्ञानं अनिवर्त्य रूप्यादिनिवर्तकत्वायोगात् । शुक्तिज्ञानेन
अज्ञानानिवृत्तौ अभिव्यक्तचैतन्यसम्बन्धाभावेन भ्रान्तौ इव बाधेऽपि शुक्तेः
अप्रकाशापत्तेश्च इति-- चेत् ।

41.Obj: In the view that there is only one ajnAna, your claim that the illusory silver only merges in its cause as a result of the knowledge of nacre, like a pot merging in clay by the blow of a hammer, but ajnAna is not destroyed, is not tenable. This is because of the established rule that knowledge removes only ignorance, and so knowledge can destroy anything else only through the removal of ignorance (and not directly). It follows

that knowledge cannot destroy the (illusory) silver etc., without removing ajnAna. If the ajnAna is not removed by the knowledge of nacre, then, because of not being connected with the manifested consciousness, the nacre will continue to be not known even after bAdha (destruction of the illusion) as during the period of illusion.

४२. न; यतः ज्ञानं अज्ञाननिवर्तकं इति व्याप्तेः उच्छेदविषयत्वात् स्वकारणे सूक्ष्मरूपेण अवस्थाने तदनङ्गीकारात् । शुक्तिज्ञानस्य च अनवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणरूपमूलाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वे अपि अवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणरूपतूलाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वेन अभिव्यक्तचैतन्यसम्बन्धात् बाधदशायां रूप्यनिवृत्तिशुक्तिप्रकाशयोः अपि उपपत्तेः ।

42. No. The rule that knowledge destroys ignorance relates to total uprooting of ignorance. It is not accepted in cases where the effect remains in a subtle form in its cause. Even if the mUla-ajnAna which veils the unconditioned Brahman is not destroyed, connection with the manifested consciousness takes place because of the removal of the tUla-ajnAna veiling the consciousness limited (by the object), and so the destruction of illusory silver and the knowledge of the nacre can happen when there is bAdha.

४३. न च-- उपादेयभूतया वृत्त्या उपादानभूताविद्याभिभवः न घटते उपादेयेन उपादानाभिभवाददर्शनात् इति-- वाच्यम् । वृश्चिकादिना गोमयादेः उपादानस्य अपि अभिभवदर्शनात् । आरम्भवादानभ्युपगमात् च । न गोमयावयवानां उपादानत्वशङ्का ।

43. Nor can it be said that the overcoming of the material cause, avidyA, by vRitti, which is its effect, is not possible, since it is not seen that a cause is overcome (or obscured) by its effect, for it is seen that the cause, cow-dung, is obscured by the insects which grow out of it. (The insects do not have a trace of cowdung). This is also because ArambhavAda is not

accepted by us. There is no doubt about the material causality of the parts of cow-dung.

४४. ननु-- चक्षुरादिजन्यशुक्त्यादिवृत्तेः सप्रकारिकायाः निष्प्रकारकशुद्धचैतन्या-
विषयतया तदावरणरूपमूलाज्ञानाभिभवाभावे अपि अवच्छिन्नविषयतया तया
अवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणरूपतूलाज्ञानाभिभवः युज्यते इति ते मतं अयुक्तम्, अवच्छिन्ने
अविद्याकल्पिते अप्रसक्तप्रकाशे मूलाविद्याया इव तदावरणशक्तेः अयोगात्, त्वया
अनभ्युपगतत्वाच्च । जडविशिष्टात्मानं प्रति तदभ्युपगमे च विशेषणानावारक-
विशिष्टावारकशक्त्यभिभवस्य विशेष्यावरकशक्त्यभिभवं विना अयोगेन
शुक्त्याकारवृत्त्या एव शुद्धात्मप्रकाशापातादिति-- चेत् ।

44. Objection: Your view that, even though the vRitti arising from the visual organ, etc., which is qualified, cannot have the unconditioned pure consciousness as object, and cannot remove the mUla-ajnAna veiling pure consciousness, such a vRitti can remove the tUla-ajnAna veiling the consciousness limited by the object, since its object is a limited thing, is not tenable. There cannot be any veiling of a limited object which is projected by avidyA and is not luminous, like the (veiling of pure consciousness) by mUla-avidya, as it is also not accepted by you. (Inert objects are not self-luminous and so they do not need avidyA to cover them). If you accept it (covering by avidyA) in the case of Atma qualified (limited) by an inert object, then, since the covering of the AtmA limited by the object where the inert object is not covered cannot happen without the removal of the covering on the AtmA itself, the pure Atma will become known by a vRitti in the form of nacre. (That would mean that liberation would be attained by a vRitti in the form of nacre).

४५. न, अनवबोधात् । न हि अविद्याकल्पिते अवच्छिन्ने अस्माभिः अविद्या वा तच्छक्तिः वा अभ्युपेयते किन्तु चैतन्यमात्रे एव । तस्मिंस्तु सर्वं जडं अध्यस्तं इति एकाश्रयाश्रितत्वसम्बन्धात् जडावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं आवृतमिति व्यपदेशः घटाद्याकार-
वृत्त्या तु तदधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तौ तदवच्छेदेन एव तन्निष्ठावरणाभिभवः जायते इति न शुद्धात्मप्रकाशापत्तिः । तदुक्तं संक्षेपशारीरके --

‘आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचितिरेव केवला ।

पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचरः ॥’

‘बहु निगद्य किमत्र वदाम्यहं शृणुत संग्रहमद्वयशासने ।

सकलवाङ्मनसातिगता चितिः सकलवाङ्मनसव्यवहारभाक् ॥’

इति च । तस्मात् अविद्यायां सत्यामपि शक्त्यभिभवात् वा, तूलाज्ञाननाशात् वा, अवस्थाविशेषप्रच्यवात् वा, एकदेशनाशात् वा, भीरुभटवदपसरणात् वा, कटवत्संवेष्टनात् वा, आवरणभङ्गानिर्मोक्षबाधानां उपपत्तिः ।

45. Answer: No, because it is due to not understanding. We do not accept avidyA or its power on what is imagined by avidya and is limited, but only on consciousness alone. All inert things are superimposed on it (consciousness) and thus there is only a single substratum for all and so consciousness limited by the inert is said to be covered. When the consciousness that is the substratum of a pot is manifested by a vRitti in the form of the pot, the cover of ajnAna is removed only on that consciousness limited by the pot and there is no possibility of pure AtmA (consciousness) itself being revealed. This has been said in saMkShepashArIraKa--

‘Undifferentiated consciousness is the locus as well as the object of avidyA. (The embodied soul and God) that come into being subsequent to avidyA can neither be the locus nor the object of avidyA which exists prior to them.’ (I. 319)

And also--

‘What is the use of elaborating this point? I shall state the essence of the tenets of advaita; listen to it. The pure

consciousness transcends mind and speech. And it comes within the range of mind and speech (when it is reflected in the intellect which is superimposed on it by avidyA). (I. 331). Thus, even though avidyA continues, removal of the veil, non-attainment of liberation, and destruction of the effect with its cause (bAdha) are possible, by the suppression of its power, or by the removal of tUla-ajnAna, or by change of state (like waking from dream), or by a partial destruction, or like a cowardly soldier fleeing, or like a mat being rolled up.

४६. ननु अवस्थाविशेषाणां अज्ञानाभिन्नत्वे एकाज्ञानपक्षक्षतिः अज्ञानाभिन्नत्वे च साक्षात् ज्ञानेन निवृत्तिः भ्रमाद्युपादानत्वं च न स्यात् तेषामिव रूप्यस्य एव उपादाननाशं विना नाशप्रसङ्गश्च, शुक्त्यज्ञानं नष्टमिति अनुभवविरोधश्च इति—
चेत् ।

46. Obj: If the various states of ajnAna are not different from mUla-ajnAna, then the claim that there is only one ajnAna cannot stand (because there are so many avasthA-ajnAnas). If they are different from ajnAna, they cannot be directly destroyed by jnAna (since jnAna destroys only ajnAna and not anything different from ajnAna) and they cannot be the material cause of illusion (being not ajnAna). There will also be the possibility of the illusory objects being sublated without their material cause (ajnAna) being destroyed. In the case of illusory silver, there is the contingency of the silver being sublated without the destruction of its material cause (ajnAna), The experience that the ignorance of nacre has been removed will also be contradicted.

४७. न । यतः अवस्था तावत् अवस्थावतः अभिन्ना एव । अज्ञानैक्यं तु सर्वावस्थानुस्यूतैकाकारं आदाय । एवं च अज्ञानावस्थायाः अज्ञानत्वेन न

ज्ञानसाक्षान्निवर्त्यत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः । यत्तु अवस्थाविशेषणामिव रूप्यस्यैव
उपादाननिवृत्तिं विना निवृत्त्यापादनम्, तदयुक्तम् । अज्ञाने एव ज्ञानस्य साक्षात्
विरोधावधारणेन अज्ञानावस्थायाः तदभिन्नायाः ज्ञानसाक्षान्निवर्त्यत्वार्हत्वात् । न तु
रूप्यादीनां अनीदृक्त्वात् । अनेकाज्ञानपक्षे तु शङ्कापि न उदेति ।

47. Answer: No, because the state is not different from the
owner of the state. (So avastha-ajnAna is not different from
ajnAna). The oneness of ajnAna is because the same ajnAna
pervades all the avasthas. Since avastha-ajnAna is ajnAna
itself, it can be removed directly by knowledge. The statement
that, as in the case of avasthavisheSha-ajnAna, the silver will
be destroyed without destruction of its material cause, is not
tenable. Since it is ajnAna alone that is the enemy of jnAna,
knowledge can directly remove avasthA-ajnAna which is not
different from ajnAna. Not so silver etc., which are not the same
(as ajnAna). In the view that there are many ajnAnas, no doubt
at all arises.

४८. ननु-- अस्मिन् पक्षे एकया वृत्त्या सर्वतदज्ञानस्य निवृत्तिः उत
एकतदज्ञानस्य, आद्ये पुनः शुक्तेः कदापि अप्रकाशः न स्यात्, अन्त्ये वृत्तिकालेऽपि
प्रकाशः न स्यात्, एकस्य आवरणस्य निवृत्तौ अपि आवरणान्तरानिवृत्तेः इति चेत् ।

48. Obj: In the view that there are many ajnAnas, by one vRitti
is all ajnAna about the particular object destroyed or only one
ajnAna? In the first case the nacre will never thereafter be
unknown (and so there would never be any illusion about it), In
the second view it will not be illumined even when the vRitti is
there because, even if one veil of ajnAna is removed, there
would be other ajnAnas to cover it.

४९. न; एकया वृत्त्या एकाज्ञाननाशेऽपि तया एव आवरणान्तराणां प्रतिरुद्धत्वात्
यावत् सा तिष्ठति तावत् प्रकाशः तस्यां अपगतायां पुनः अप्रकाशः च उपपद्यते ।
अज्ञानस्य ज्ञानप्रागभावस्थानीयत्वात् । यथा तव एकं ज्ञानं एकमेव प्रागभावं

नाशयति, तन्नाशरूपेणोदयात् प्रागभावान्तरनिबन्धनं अज्ञातत्वादिव्यवहारं च प्रतिबध्नाति तथा ममापि एकं ज्ञानं एकमेव अज्ञानं निवर्तयति अज्ञानान्तरनिबन्धनं च प्रयोजनं प्रतिबध्नाति इति किं अनुपपन्नम्? अत्र च प्रतिबन्धपदेन कार्यानुत्पत्तिप्रयोजकत्वं कारणाभावप्रतिबन्धकसाधारणं अभिहितम् । एवं अवस्थाविशेषपक्षे अपि प्रकाशाप्रकाशौ उपपादनीयौ । एवं अमूर्तस्य अज्ञानस्य यद्यपि दण्डादिना गवादीनामिव अपसरणं करादिना कटादीनामिव संवेष्टनं च न सम्भवति तथापि कार्याक्षमत्वसाम्येन अपसारणसंवेष्टनपक्षौ योजनीयौ । यथा हि उत्तेजकाभावसहकृतस्य मणेः प्रतिबन्धकतायां उत्तेजकसत्त्वे प्रतिबन्धककार्याक्षमत्वं तथा वृत्त्यभावसहकृतस्य अज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकतायां वृत्तौ सत्यां तत्कार्यानुदयः इति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

49. Answer: No. Even when one ajnAna is removed by one vRitti, the other veils of ajnAna will be obstructed and so as long as that knowledge continues the object will remain illumined and when that goes the veiling of the object again is possible, because ajnAna is in the position of antecedent non-existence of jnAna. What illogicality is there in saying that, just as, according to you, one knowledge removes only one antecedent non-existence, and also prevents the consequences of other ignorances arising from other antecedent non-existences, so also, according to me, one knowledge removes one ignorance and prevents the results arising from other ignorances? Here, by the term prevention, causing the non-emergence of the effect and the prevention of the non-existence of the cause are meant. (That is, even when all the causes are present, preventing the effect from emerging, like a mantra which prevents the heat of fire). Thus, even in the view that there are different states of ignorance, illumination and non-illumination are to be explained in this manner. Thus, even though ajnAna, which is formless, cannot be driven away as a cow can be with a stick or a mat can be rolled up with the

hand, still, by making it incapable of being effective, similarity to driving away and rolling up have to be understood. It is to be noted that, just as a gem can act as an obstruction (to the heat of fire) when it is co-operated with by the absence of any factor that encourages the fire, and is unable to obstruct when there is an encouraging factor, similarly, when ajnAna is there along with the absence of a vRitti, it acts as an obstruction, but when there is a vRitti, the effect of ajnAna (veiling of the object) does not arise.

५०. ननु चैतन्यस्य निरवयवत्वात् तस्य एकदेशेन प्रकाशः न युज्यते । अथ आकाश इव तत्तदार्थावच्छिन्नत्वं एकदेशशब्दार्थः, तर्हि न आगन्तुकपदार्थावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं अनाद्यज्ञानस्य विषयः निर्विषयस्य आवरणस्य अयोगात्, प्रागनवच्छिन्नावरणमेव इदानीं अवच्छिन्नावरणंजातं इत्यपि न, अवच्छिन्नचैतन्यज्ञानेन एव अनवच्छिन्नावरणनाशापत्तेः । एतेन व्यक्तिः पूर्वं जातेरिव विषयात् पूर्वं अज्ञानं अस्ति इति निरस्तं इति-- चेत् ।

50. Obj: Since consciousness is part-less, it cannot be illumined in a part alone. If it is said that 'part' means being limited by some object just as space is limited by objects (like pot), then consciousness limited by an object which has come later cannot be the content of ajnAna which is beginningless. Moreover there can be no covering of what is not there. It cannot also be said that what was previously the covering of unlimited consciousness has itself now become the covering of the limited consciousness, because, in that case, by the knowledge of the limited consciousness itself the covering of the unlimited consciousness will be removed. By this the view that ajnAna exists before the object is refuted, like the contention that the individual exists before the generic.

५१. न, अनाद्यज्ञानविषये अनादिचैतन्ये तत्तदागन्तुकपदार्थावच्छेदाभ्युपगमात् ।
‘आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचित्तिरेव केवले’त्युक्तत्वात् । यदवच्छिन्नगोचरा
च वृत्तिः तदवच्छेदेन एव आवरणापसरणात् न अनवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणभङ्गप्रसङ्गः ।
अत एव वृत्तिविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यात् प्राक् अज्ञानं अस्ति इति अभिप्रायेण विषयात्
प्राक् अज्ञानं अस्ति इति साधु उक्तम् । तस्मात् अधिष्ठानचैतन्यं स्वाध्यस्तं
भासयति इति सिद्धम् ।

51. Answer: No, since the delimitation of beginningless consciousness which is the object of beginningless ajnAna, by subsequent objects is accepted and since it has been said, “Undifferentiated consciousness is the locus as well as the object of avidyA”. Since that covering of limited consciousness which is the object of a particular vRitti is alone removed, there is no possibility of the covering of the unlimited consciousness being removed. That is why, in the view that ajnAna exists before the limitation of consciousness by the object of the vRitti, it has been correctly said that ajnAna exists before the object. Therefore it is established that the conscious which is the substratum illumines what is superimposed on it.

५२. तदयं अत्र निष्कर्षः यद्यपि विषयप्रकाशकं विषयाधिष्ठानभूतं प्रमेयचैतन्यं,
अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं तु तस्य प्रमातृ, अन्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं तु
प्रमाणम्, तथापि यदीयान्तःकरणवृत्त्या विषयपर्यन्तं चक्षुरादिद्वारा निस्सृतया
यत्प्रकाशकं चैतन्यं यत्प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदेन अभिव्यज्यते तमेव स एव जानाति न
अन्यं न अन्यो वा । अत एव एकवृत्त्युपारूढलक्षणैकलोलीभावापन्नं प्रमातृप्रमाण-
प्रमेयचैतन्यं भवति । ततः तदवच्छेदेन अज्ञाननिवृत्त्या भासमानं प्रमेयचैतन्यं
अपरोक्षं फलं इत्युच्यते । तत् स्वयं भासमानं सत् स्वाध्यस्तं घटाद्यपि भासयति
इति तत् फलव्याप्यं इति उपेयते । यन्निष्ठा च यदाकारा वृत्तिः भवति तन्निष्ठं तदाकारं
अज्ञानं सा नाशयति इति नियमात् प्रमातृप्रमेयोभयव्यापिनी अपरोक्षवृत्तिः
स्वावच्छेदेन आवरणं अपसारयति प्रकाशस्य स्वावच्छेदेन आवरणापसारकत्व-

दर्शनात् । अतः प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नस्य असत्त्वावरणस्य प्रमेयावच्छिन्नस्य अभानावरणस्य च अपसरणात् घटोऽयं मे स्फुरति इत्याद्यपरोक्षव्यवहारः ।

52. This is the gist. Even though it is the consciousness that is the substratum of the object (which is also known as prameya caitanyam) that reveals the object, the consciousness limited by the mind is the knower of the object, and the consciousness limited by the vRitti of the mind is the pramANa, only that person whose mind has gone out through the eye etc up to the object and formed a vRitti there in the form of that object and manifests the consciousness limited by that object as identified with the knower-consciousness, can know that object, and that object alone, and no one else can know that object. Thus by a single vRitti the knower-consciousness, the consciousness limited by the pramANa and the consciousness limited by the object become one. Then the ajnAna covering the consciousness limited by the object is removed and the object-consciousness which shines is called the direct phalaM. That itself shining, illumines the pot, etc., superimposed on it and so it is known as 'revealed by phala'. By the rule that whichever locus and form a vRitti has, it destroys the ajnAna in that same locus and covering the object of the same form, the aparokSha vRitti which pervades both the knower and the object removes only the covering on the consciousness limited by the object, since it is seen that light removes only the darkness covering the object on which it falls. Thus, by the removal of the covering of ajnAna in the form 'The pot does not exist' which is in the knower (in the mind) and the covering in the form 'The pot is not manifest' which is on the object, direct perception, etc., in the form 'The pot is manifest' etc., takes place.

५३. परोक्षस्थले तु इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षलक्षणद्वाराभावात् अन्तःकरणनिस्सरणाभावेन विषयपर्यन्तं वृत्तेः अगमनात् विषयावच्छिन्नप्रमेयचैतन्येन सह प्रमातृचैतन्यस्य एकवृत्त्युपासूढत्वाभावेन अपरोक्षतया अभिव्यक्त्यभावेऽपि प्रमातृप्रमाणचैतन्ययोः एकलोलुभावापत्त्या प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नं असत्त्वावरणमात्रं निवर्तते; तावन्मात्रस्य वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नत्वात् । इदमेव सुषुप्तिव्यावृत्तिशब्देन विवरणाचार्यैः व्याख्यातम् । विषयावच्छिन्नाभानावरणतत्कार्यसद्भावेऽपि प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नासत्त्वावरणनिवृत्त्या अनुमानादौ व्यवहारोपपत्तिः । अत एव जानाम्यहं पर्वते वह्निः अस्ति इति, स तु कीदृश इति मे न भाति इत्यादिव्यवहारः । त्रयाणां एकलोलुभावे अपरोक्षत्वम्, द्वयोः एकलोलुभावे तु परोक्षत्वमिति न सङ्करः । वृत्तेश्च विषयेण समं साक्षादेव अपरोक्षस्थले सम्बन्धः, परोक्षस्थले तु अनुमितेः अनुमेयेन तद्व्याप्यज्ञानजन्यत्वम्, शाब्दाः संसर्गेण सह तदाश्रयवाचकपदजन्यत्वम्, स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्येन सह तद्विषयानुभवजन्यत्वम् । एवं अन्यत्रापि परम्परासम्बन्धः एव इति परोक्षापरोक्ष-विभागः } विस्तरेण व्युत्पादिता अस्माभिः इयं प्रक्रिया सिद्धान्तबिन्दौ । तस्मात् विषयस्य मिथ्यात्वे अपि प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था उपपन्ना इति दिक् ॥

53. In the case of mediate cognition, however, because of the mind not going out due to lack of any means by which the appropriate sense-organ can contact the object,, the vRitti does not reach the object and so the consciousness limited by the object does not become identified with the knower-consciousness. Consequently there is no direct manifestation of the object. But since the knower-consciousness and the pramANa-consciousness become one, the covering on the knower-consciousness in the form 'The object does not exist' is alone removed. This is what is explained by the author of vivaraNa by the term 'suShuptivyAvRitti'. Even when the covering on the consciousness limited by the object in the form 'The object is not manifest' continues to operate, inference (and other pramANas other than perception) remove the covering in the form "The object does not exist". Thus, in the case of

inference of fire from the sight of smoke on a hill, the person says, “I know that there is fire on the hill, but it is not manifest to me what kind of fire it is”. (Here the smoke is pratyakSha, but the fire is parokSha). There is direct perception when the three—knower-consciousness, pramANa-consciousness and object-consciousness become one. But there is only indirect or mediate knowledge when only the first two become one. Thus there is no confusion. In direct perception the vRitti is directly connected with the object. In indirect cognition the connection is through the invariable concomitance of the inferred in inference, in sabda it is through the sense generated by the words and in remembrance, through the memory generated by the previous experience. Thus in other means of indirect knowledge also there is connection only through something else. This is the difference between direct perception and indirect knowledge. This has been explained by the author in detail in his work siddhAntabindu. Therefore, even though objects are mithyA, the theory of pratikarmavyavasthA is valid.

इति अद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपत्तिः ॥

End of the chapter on pratikarmavyavasthA
