Vedanta-Paribhasha
of
Dharmaraja
Adhvarindra
A
summary
The Vedanta-Paribhasha is an epistemological work on Advaita Vedanta as
interpreted by the Vivarana school of Prakasatma Yati, the commentator on
Padmapada's Panchapadika. The author is believed to have lived in the
seventeenth century in South India. In this work he has adopted the method and
phraseology of Navya-Nyaya, introduced by Gangesa Upadhyaya in the fourteenth
century.
(Epistemology
is the study of the origin, nature and validity of knowledge).
The work begins with the following prayer:--
I bow to that Supreme Self, the embodiment of Existence, Knowledge and
Bliss, by the manifestation of the nescience associated with which the
projection of the elements and all things made up of the elements takes place.
The first six chapters are devoted to establishing the means of valid
knowledge (pramanas) from the standpoint of Vedanta, refuting the other systems
of philosophy, particularly Nyaya-Vaiseshika.
The pramanas according to the various systems
Charvakas-- Only perception (Pratyaksha).
Buddhists and Vaiseshikas-- Perception
and Inference
(Pratyaksha and Anumana)
Sankhya and Yoga- Perception, Inference and Verbal testimony (Pratyaksha,
Anumana and Sabda).
Nyaya - Perception, Inference, Verbal testimony and Comparison (Pratyaksha,
Anumana, Sabda and Upamana).
Prabhakara Mimamsa-- Perception, Inference, Verbal testimony, Comparison
and Presumption (Pratyaksha, Anumana, Sabda, Upamana and Arthapatti).
Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa-- Perception, Inference, Verbal testimony,
Comparison, Presumption and Non-apprehension (Pratyaksha, Anumana, Sabda,
Upamana, Arthapatti and Anupalabdhi).
The Naiyayikas include presumption under inference, but this is rejected
by Vedanta on the ground that presumption is based on negative invariable
concomitance (vyatireka-vyapti) which Vedanta does not admit, since Vedanta
admits only affirmative inference.
Valid
knowledge and its means
Valid knowledge (prama) is defined as that knowledge which has for its
object something that is not already known and is uncontradicted (anadhigata-abaadhita-arthavishayaka-jnaanam).
The qualification 'something that is not already known' is meant to exclude
recollection. The word 'uncontradicted' excludes illusion or error, as when a
rope is mistaken for a snake.
The Mimamsakas hold that time is also cognised through the organs of
sense. Thus, when an object is seen, the cognition is connected with the moment
when it is seen. As a result, when an object is seen continuously for several
moments, the cognition at each moment is considered to be different from the
cognition of the same object at the previous or next moment. In this view, the
cognition at each moment is a new cognition and so the qualification 'something
that is not already known' applies and the definition is applicable. According
to Vedanta, however, a continuous cognition for several moments is one single
cognition. The knowledge of a pot, for example, is Consciousness reflected in
the mental modification (vritti) in the form of the pot and this is just one
throughout the time the same pot continues to be seen. In this view also the
definition applies.
Objection:-- According to Advaita Vedanta, all objects such as pot are
unreal, being 'mithya', and so the knowledge of the pot is contradicted and it cannot
be valid knowledge.
Answer:-- It is only after the realisation of Brahman that the pot is
contradicted. In the above definition, 'uncontradicted' means 'not contradicted
during the transmigratory state'.
Perception
as a means of knowledge
Valid perceptual knowledge is nothing but Pure Consciousness.
Objection:-- Consciousness is without a beginning; i.e. it is eternal. So
why should it need the eye, etc as an instrument to produce it?
Answer:-- Although Consciousness is eternal, the vritti that reveals it
arises only through the contact of the organ with the object. It is
Consciousness reflected in the vritti that is spoken of as having a beginning.
The vritti is figuratively designated as knowledge (though it is by itself
insentient).
The mind is a substance with a beginning and so it has parts. The
knowledge which is a mental modification (vritti) is an attribute of the mind,
just as desire, etc are. See Br.up. 1.5.3-- "Desire, resolve, --- all these
are but the mind".
Though desire, etc are attributes of the mind, they are wrongly thought
to be attributes of the self, in the same way as it is said that a hot iron rod
'burns' when it is really the fire that burns. The false identification of the
self with the mind is the reason for considering desire, happiness, etc as
attributes of the self.
According to the author of Vedanta Paribhasha the mind is not an
organ. (However, in the Bhashya on Brahmasutra, 2.4.17, Sri Sankara says:--
In the Smriti the organs are counted as eleven, and hence the mind also is
accepted to be an organ like those of hearing, etc. The Smriti referred to here
is Bhagavad gita, 13.5, second line. In the Bhashya on this it is said,
"The five organs, ear etc., which are called the sense organs and the five
organs which accomplish actions, and the mind, the eleventh". According to
Vivarana, the mind is not an indriya, but according to Bhamati it is an indriya).
Objection:-- If the mind is not considered as an indriya,
the perception of happiness, etc, which is produced by the mind, and not by
any of the other sense-organ such as the eye, cannot be considered to be
immediate (sakshat), because only
perceptions produced by an indriya can be accepted as immediate.
Answer:-- No, because the immediacy of knowledge does not depend on its
being produced by an indriya. If it is contended that only knowledge produced by
an indriya is immediate, it would mean that God's knowledge, which is not
produced by any indriya, is not immediate, and God would never have any
perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, if all knowledge
produced by an indriya is considered
as immediate, and the mind is considered as an indriya, then inference, which is
produced by the mind, would also have to be accepted as immediate, which is not
acceptable to any one.
What
is perceptual knowledge?
Perceptual knowledge (pratyaksha jnanam) arises when the Consciousness
limited by the mental mode (pramana chaitanyam) coincides with the Consciousness
limited by the object. In perception the Consciousness becomes threefold-- (1)
Consciousness limited by the object (prameya-chaitanyam), (2) Consciousness
limited by the mental mode (vritti) (pramana-chaitanyam) and (3) Consciousness
limited by the mind (pramatr-chaitanyam).
The
process of visual perception, according to Advaita Vedanta
,
is described in chapter 1 of Vedanta Paribhasha thus. Just as the water in a
tank, issuing through a hole, enters, through a channel, a number of fields and
assumes the shapes of those fields, so also the luminous mind, stretching out
through the eye, goes to the space occupied by objects and becomes modified into
the forms of those objects. Such a modification is called a vritti
of the mind. The same fact is also stated in Panchadasi, 4.27, 28 and 29,
based on Sri Sankara’s Upadesasahasri, Metrical portion, chapter 14, verses 3
& 4. The whole process of visual perception consists of the following
steps:--
(1)
The mind stretches out through the eye, reaches the object and takes the
form of the object. This is called a vrtti or mode of the mind.
(2)
The mental mode removes the veil of ignorance that hides the object.
(3)
Consciousness underlying the object, being manifest through the mental
mode, illumines the object.
(4)
The mental mode associates the object-consciousness with the
subject-consciousness.
(5)
The subject perceives the object.
Consciousness
manifest through the mental mode coincident with the object serves as the
knowledge of the object. This is known as phala
(fruit), being the resultant knowledge.
The
mind has three main divisions in this process, namely,
(1)
the part
within the body,
(2)
the part
that extends from the body to the object perceived,
(3)
the part
that coincides with the object.
The
first part above is known as pramaataa and
the consciousness manifest in it is called pramaata-chaitanya.
This is the perceiver. The consciousness manifest in the second part is
called pramaana-chaitanya, or the
means of knowledge. The consciousness manifest in the third part is pramiti-chaitanya or percept.
The
object perceived is called prameya.
Since the third part of the mind mentioned above coincides with the object, prameya-chaitanya,
the consciousness underlying the object and pramiti-chaitanya
become identical. The point to be kept in mind here is that all objects in
this world are superimposed on Consciousness, i.e. Brahman. All objects are
covered by a veil of ignorance, which has to be removed for seeing the object.
It is only consciousness that reveals the objects, since the objects themselves
are non-luminous.
The object perceived is but the underlying consciousness manifest or appearing as such. It has no existence apart from the all-pervading Consciousness. That all-pervading Consciousness (Brahma-chaitanya) which underlies the object known, that is to say, to be known, becomes manifest as the object known".
(This
matter is dealt with in great detail in Panchadasi, chapter VIII- Kutastha dipa.)
In the case of feelings such as happiness, since the Consciousness
limited by happiness, etc., coincides with the Consciousness limited by the
vritti in the form of happiness, the knowledge in the form "I am happy' is
also a perception (pratyakshajnanam).
Obj. In that case, recollection of past happiness would also have to be
considered as pratyaksha.
Ans. No; the two limiting adjuncts, the vritti in the form of
recollection and the vritti in the form of past happiness, belong to different
times and so they cannot coincide. The criterion is that the two limiting
adjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time.
Though punya and papa are also attributes of the mind, they are, by
nature, incapable of being perceived. Capability of being perceived is another
criterion.
The knowledge in the form 'the hill has fire' is pratyaksha in respect of
the hill and anumana in respect of fire. Knowledge such as 'this is a fragrant
piece of sandal' is aparoksham (immediate) in respect of the sandal, but
paroksham (mediate) in respect of the fragrance. According to Nyaya, such a
knowledge is called jnanalakshana pratyaksha (See Bhasha-Pariccheda- sl. 65).
(Nyaya recognises ordinary (laukika) and extra-ordinary (alaukika)
perception. Ordinary or laukika perception is of two kinds- (1) internal (maanasa),
where the mind comes into contact with psychical states and processes like
cognition, affection, conation, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion, etc; and (2)
external perception in which the five external organs of sense come into contact
with external objects.
Extra-ordinary or alaukika perception is of three kinds--
samanyalakshana, jnanalakshana and yogaja. The first is the perception of
the universals. Whenever we perceive a particular cow we first perceive the
‘universal cowness’ inhering in it.
Jnanalakshana is the ‘complicated perception through association’.
For example, I see a blooming rose at a distance and say, ”I see a fragrant
rose”. Here the visual perception of the rose revives in memory, by
association, the idea of fragrance, which was perceived in the past through the
nose. It is perception revived in memory through the cognition (jnana) of the
object in the past. Other examples are—‘the piece of sandalwood looks
fragrant’, ‘ice looks cold’, etc. The theory of anyathakhyati is based on
this kind of perception. Anyatha means ‘otherwise’ and ‘elsewhere’. The
shell and the silver are both separately real; only their synthesis is unreal.
The shell is directly present as ‘this’ while the silver exists elsewhere
and is revived in memory through jnanalakshana perception.
Yogaja is the perception of all objects, past, present, etc, through
yogic power.)
A generic attribute (jati) is a distinct category according to Nyaya and
is defined as "that which is eternal and inherent in many things", for
example, jarhood (ghatatva). Vedanta does not accept such generic attributes.
According to Vedanta, jarhood is the sum total of the characteristics of a jar,
which distinguishes it from other things. It is not eternal. These
characteristics are just attributes.
According to Nyaya, inherence (samavaya) is eternal relation. It is the
relation between the whole and parts, jati and vyakti, qualities or actions and
the substances possessing them, and ultimate difference (visesha) and the
eternal substances-- atoms, ether, time, space, etc. Vedanta denies inherence
and substitutes tadatmya,
or difference-cum- identity,
Knowledge that is limited by mental modifications in the form of
particular objects is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is not
different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are
capable of being apprehended by particular organs.
This is a comprehensive statement about the criterion of perceptuality of
knowledge.
The
perceptuality of objects
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar (which are superimposed on the
Consciousness limited by them), consists in their not being different from the
Consciousness associated with the subject (pramaata-chaitanyam).
But in the case of inference, etc, since the mind does not go out to the
space covered by the fire, etc, the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one
with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence
of the fire, etc, is distinct from that of the subject. So the definition of
perception does not wrongly extend to such cases.
In the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness,
though the Consciousness limited by them is not distinct from the Consciousness
associated with the subject, they cannot become pratyaksha because they are not
capable of being perceived.
Being cognised by the witness alone (kevalasakshi-vedyatvam) does not
mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of the mental
modifications corresponding to them, but that they are objects of the witness
without the activity of pramanas such as the sense-organs and inference. Hence
Prakasatmayati has, in Vivarana, admitted a mental modification in the form of
the ego-- ahamakara-vritti. So also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver,
a vritti of nescience in the form of silver (rajata-akara-avidya-vritti) has
been admitted in works such as Samkshepa-sariraka. The illusory silver is 'sakshi-bhasyam',
cognised by the witness-self, since the mental modification is not of the
vyavaharika mind, but is a vritti of avidya.
(See page 22 of commentary by Abhyankar on Siddhantabindu). Thus, an object is
said to be cognised by perception when it is capable of being perceived and is
devoid of any existence apart from that of the Consciousness associated with the
subject, which Consciousness has for its limiting adjunct a mental modification
in the form of that object.
Samyoga-- conjunction-- when a sense-organ is in contact with a substance
such as a pot. This is called samyoga in Nyaya also.
Samyukta-tadatmya-- contact of organ with qualities and other attributes
of substances, such as the colour of a pot. Here the organ is connected with the
pot and the colour, according to Vedanta, is identical with the pot. This
is called samyukta-samavaya in Nyaya.
Sound is a quality of ether and is therefore identical with it.
Sabdatva is identical with sound, which is identical with ether.
In Nyaya the conjunction of organs with objects which causes perception
is of six kinds:--
Samyoga--
contact of a pot by the eye.
Samyukta-samavaya-
in the perception of colour of the pot.
Samyukta-samaveta-samavaya--
the perception of the universal genus such as rupatva, colourness. In Vedanta
this is called samyukta-abhinna-tadatmya.
Samavaya-
the hearing of sound by the organ of hearing, which is the ether in the cavity
of the ear. Sound is a quality of ether and quality and the qualified are
connected by samavaya.
Samaveta-samavaya--
the contact in cognising soundness.
Viseshana-viseshya-bhava-sannikarsha--
the conjunction in the perception of negation, as in the cognition:
ghata-abhavavad-bhutalam.
Vedanta denies the relation of viseshya-viseshana-bhava admitted by Nyaya,
as in the sentence "The ground has no jar". For tadatmya Nyaya
substitutes samavaya or inherence.
In Nyaya also, sound is a quality of ether. Since qualities inhere in
substances, they cannot be perceived apart from the latter, except in the
case of sound, which, though a quality, is perceived by itself.
According to Bhatta Mimamsa, however, sound is a substance.
Savikalpaka-pratyaksham-- determinate perception, is that knowledge which
apprehends relatedness (of the substantive and the qualifying attribute) (vaisishtya),
such as, "I know the jar". (Here there is the relation of subject and
object). In Nyaya determinate perception is cognition which involves an
attribute or an adjunct, such as "This is a Brahmana', "This is
black", "This is a cook". See page 163 of A Primer of Indian
Logic by Prof.S.Kuppuswami Sastri).
Nirvikalpaka-pratyaksha- indeterminate perception, is that knowledge that
does not apprehend this relatedness; for example, knowledge arising from
sentences like, "This is that Devadatta" or "Thou art That".
In these cases the knowledge arises by ignoring the particular features of
'This' and 'Devadatta' or 'Thou' and 'That'. In Nyaya indeterminate perception
is a cognition which does not involve any attribute or adjunct (prakara).
The criterion of perception is not the fact of its being due to an organ.
The criterion is the fact of the Consciousness associated with the means of
knowledge not being different from the Consciousness associated with the object,
when the object is present and is capable of being perceived, i.e., the identity
of pramana-chaitanya and prameya-chaitanya.
Hence
the knowledge arising from the sentence "Thou art That" is pratyaksha,
because the subject itself being the object, the condition about the identity of
the Consciousness limited by That and that limited by Thou is satisfied.
There is a difference between perceptuality of cognition and
perceptuality of objects. In the inference, 'The hill has fire, because it has
smoke', both the hill and the smoke are objects of perception, but not the fire,
which is inferred. Hence, if the perception is considered only with regard to
the objects, then the knowledge of the fire would not be a perception. But if
perceptuality is considered in respect of the cognition, the cognition of fire
is a case of perception, since all knowledge is perceptual in respect of itself
in Vedanta.
Dream
Perception
Consciousness, which is self-effulgent, is the sub-stratum of the
chariot, etc, seen in dream. They are experienced as existent; hence it is
Consciousness manifesting itself as Existence that is the substratum.
Some hold that the chariot, etc, seen in dream are direct transformations
of Maya; others that they are its transformations through the medium of the
mind.
Twofold
destruction of effects
The destruction of an effect is of two kinds. In one the destruction is
together with that of the material cause, and in the other the material cause
remains intact. The first is nullification or badha
and the second is cessation or nivrtti.
The cause of the first is the realisation of the truth of the substratum,
Brahman for, without that, nescience, which is the material cause, is not
removed. The cause of the second is the rise of a contrary mental modification,
or the removal of defects. Hence, although on waking up the world conjured up in
dream may not be nullified, i.e., destroyed with its material cause, nescience,
in the absence of realisation of Brahman, yet, like the cessation of a pot by
the blow of a club, the cessation of the chariot seen in dream occurs as a
result of a contrary cognition, or through the removal of the defect of sleep.
Thus, according to the view that the silver seen in a nacre is an effect
of the subsidiary nescience abiding in the Consciousness limited by the nacre,
there is nullification of the silver together with the nescience regarding the
nacre by the knowledge that the apparent silver is only nacre. But according to
the view that the silver is an effect of the primal nescience, since the latter
is destroyed only by the realisation of Brahman, there is just a cessation of
the silver through the knowledge that it is a nacre-- as in the case of the
destruction of a pot through the blow of a club.
Perception
through or without an organ
The perception of happiness, etc, is not due to an organ, since the mind
is not considered as an organ. The nose, tongue and skin generate cognitions of
smell, taste and touch, just remaining at their seats, while the eye and ear
apprehend their objects by themselves reaching the spot occupied by the objects.
From Methods of Knowledge-- p.112:--
According
to Nyaya, the cognition 'This is a jar is manifested by a subsequent reflective
knowledge (anuvyavasaya) in the form
of 'I have the knowledge of the jar'. But according to Bhatta Mimamsa, the
knowledge of the jar is known by inference. When the jar is known it acquires
the quality of 'knownness' (jnaatataa), which
is observable. By perceiving this mark of 'knownness' in the jar one infers
one's antecedent knowledge of the jar. Thus, while the jar is known directly,
its knowledge is known indirectly, by inference. Both Bhatta and Nyaya hold the
theory known as paratah-prakasa-vada, according
to which the manifestation of a particular knowledge does not rest on itself,
but on another knowledge.
Vedanta rejects both the above views. If knowledge is not self-manifest,
if one knowledge depends on another for its manifestation, then the second would
depend on a third, and so on, ad infinitum.
From Gangesa's Theory of Truth-- by Jitendranath Mohanty p. 3:--
The theory of svatah- pramanya:--
Advaita, and the Bhatta, Prabhakara and Misra Mimamsa.
Paratah-pramanya:--
Bauddhas and Nyaya.
Svatah-prakasa
Advaita, Prabhakara Mimamsa and Bauddhas.
Paratah-prakasa
Misra
and Bhatta Mimamsa and Nyaya.
Prakasa
is concerned with the apprehension of the knowledge itself. It asks
the question, how is the knowledge itself known? How do I know that I know?
Pramanya is about how a
knowledge becomes true and how is its truth ascertained.